Storable votes

Motivated by the need for more flexible decision-making mechanisms in the European Union, the paper proposes a simple but novel voting scheme for binary decisions taken by committees that meet regularly over time. At each meeting, committee members are allowed to store their vote for future use; the decision is then taken according to the majority of votes cast. The possibility of shifting votes intertemporally allows agents to concentrate their votes when preferences are more intense, and although the scheme will not achieve full efficiency, storable votes typically lead to ex ante welfare gains over non-storable votes. Welfare gains can be proven rigorously in the case of 2 voters. With more voters, counterexamples can be found, but the analysis suggests that the welfare improvements should continue to hold if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) the number of voters is above a minimum threshold; (ii) preferences are not too polarized; (iii) the horizon is long enough.     

The likelihood of dubious election outcomes

Summary. A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that election outcomes (for fixed preferences) can change with the way the ballots are tallied. This causes difficulties because with each possible choice, some set of voters can be dubious about whether it is the “correct” one. But, how likely are these settings allowing multiple election outcomes? By combining properties of the geometry of voting developed by Saari with a analytic-geometric technique created by Schlafli, we determine the likelihood that a three candidate election can cause these potentially dubious outcomes. Received: April 11, 1997; revised version: November 12, 1997     

Convergence of bank competition in Central and Eastern European countries: do foreign and domestic banks go hand in hand?

Following the massive entry of foreign banks into the Central and Eastern European (CEE) banking markets, one may wonder whether their competitive behaviour differs from that of their domestic counterparts, possibly leading to the segmentation of these markets at the regional and national levels. We find that the competitive behaviour of foreign and domestic banks differs, with foreign banks having less market power until the recent financial crisis and more market power after this financial turmoil. Despite this difference, banks tend to behave similarly, and their market power converges to a similar level. The tendency towards similar competitive behaviour is observed at the regional and national levels and for both foreign and domestic banks, although foreign institutions that enter these markets through the acquisition of domestic banks have slightly more market power. Our findings suggest the regional integration of CEE banking markets and no segmentation between foreign and domestic institutions.     

An activist revival in central banking? Lessons from the history of economic thought and central bank practice

Abstract

We introduce the “minimalist–activist” spectrum as an analytical prism through which to view key aspects of central banking theory and practice. We focus on the activist end of this spectrum, concentrating on economic growth. We explore the theoretical roots of these ideas in the writings of Dennis Robertson. We illustrate central banking practice by detailing some approaches followed by central banks pursuing economic growth and development in the decades following the Second World War. History of monetary thought, monetary theory, and analysis of central bank practices blend together to illuminate key principles and practices of central banking.     

On the origin and rise of central bank independence in West Germany∗

Abstract

This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on central bank independence, which at the time represented a German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to conventional wisdom, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and Ordoliberalism are identified.

JEL Classification Codes: B22, B31, E50     

Dissertation abstract: Essays on veto bargaining games

This dissertation experimentally analyzes the outcomes of multilateral legislative bargaining games in the presence of a veto player. The first essay examines veto power—the right of an agent to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure his/her preferred outcome. Using Winter’s (1996) theoretical framework, I consider two cases: urgent committees where the total amount of money to be distributed shrinks by 50% if proposals do not pass and non-urgent committees where the total amount of money shrinks by 5% if proposals do not pass. Committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) than without a veto player and veto players proposals generate less consensus then non-veto players proposals, outcomes on which the theory is silent. In addition, veto power in conjunction with proposer power generates excessive power for the veto player. This suggests that limiting veto players’ proposer rights (e.g., limiting their ability to chair committees) would go a long way to curbing their power, a major concern in committees in which one or more players has veto power. Finally, non-veto players show substantially more willingness to compromise than veto players, with players in the control game somewhere in between. I relate the results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees. The second essay discusses in detail the voting patterns in the veto and control games reported in the first essay. The empirical cumulative density functions of shares veto players accepted first degree stochastically dominates that of shares for the controls and the empirical cdfs of shares the controls accepted first degree stochastically dominate that of shares for non-veto players. Random effect probits support this conclusion as well. In addition, regressions imply favorable treatment of voting and proposing between non-veto players which, however, does not result in larger shares in the end. Coalition partners consistently demand more than the stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium share except for veto players in non-urgent committees. JEL Classification C7, D7, C78, D72 Dissertation Committee: John H. Kagel, Advisor Massimo Morelli Alan Wiseman Stephen Cosslett     

Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members

Abstract. This paper starts by describing the composition of monetary policy committees (MPCs) in inflation‐targeting and non‐targeting countries. The experience of MPC members on their inflation performance is then compared, opposing inflation targeters with non‐targeters. Our sample covers the major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, in the period 1999–2008. Our results first show that MPCs are different in inflation‐targeting (versus non‐targeting) countries. They also reveal that policy‐makers' backgrounds influence inflation, and that the influence of MPCs' experience is much greater in inflation‐targeting countries, while size effects are more important for committees that do not target inflation.     

Do non-citizens affect U.S. Congressional elections?

U.S. citizens against immigration argue that immigrants commit voter fraud and skew election outcomes towards progressive candidates. These arguments have increased in number and severity since the Supreme Court ruled in 2013 that states cannot require photo identification from voters. We examine whether the size of the non-citizen population is related to election outcomes. Previous research indicates that non-citizens sway elections in favour of progressive candidates but only in elections where the victory margin is small. We find no evidence of a relationship between non-citizens and vote outcomes. We find evidence that the percent of the population that is non-white is positively related to percent of votes cast for democratic candidates.     

领导会视谁为圈内人?内隐追随与领导-成员交换关系研究

基于内隐追随-外显追随匹配视角,探讨中心化追随者原型和理想化追随者原型对领导者感知的领导-成员交换(L-LMX)影响以及工作要求的调节作用。通过问卷调查对一个157人的样本进行多时段施测,结果发现,内隐追随可分为中心化追随者原型和理想化追随者原型。相较于中心化追随者原型与外显追随的匹配,理想化追随者原型与外显追随的匹配同L-LMX之间的关系更为密切。领导者工作要求负向调节两种原型的作用效果。     

Quantifying central banks’ scientization: why and how to do a quantified organizational history of economics

ABSTRACT

A subset of research in the history of economics is organizational history – i.e. the study of the organizations producing, circulating and applying economic ideas. This article maintains that some research questions in organizational history call for quantitative methods because they ask about magnitudes. More precisely, we claim that quantitative methods should complement rather than replace other research methods when the research question is at least partly about magnitudes. We walk the walk with a study of one type of organization, central banks, and of its changing relationship with economic science. Our results point unambiguously toward a growing dominance of central banks in the specialized field of monetary economics. Central banks have swelling research armies, they publish a growing share of the articles in specialized scholarly journals, and these articles tend to have more impact today than the articles produced outside central banks.     

Rethinking the allocation of macroprudential mandates within the Banking Union – a perspective from east of the BU

This paper argues that reforms of the Banking Union should be aimed at increasing efficiency of the single market as well enhance financial stability in the European Union. We argue that this can only be achieved if the Banking Union becomes more accommodative to non-Eurozone Central and Eastern European countries. It can be achieved if within BU institutions, the allocation of competencies reflects the subsidiary demands of CEE governments. Using the example of macroprudential regulation, we develop a number of reform options that could result in the better functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and thus benefit all EU member states.     

Voting in small networks with cross-pressure

We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suffer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how parties may exploit this effect to their interest. We characterize the strong perfect equilibria of the game and show that, in equilibrium, the social network determines which party wins the election. We also show that to dispose of the citizens better connected in the network with the other faction is not a guarantee to win the election.      

Clientelism and aid

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider politicians with mixed motives: they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office. We label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power. We find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country (using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark) ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. When elasticity is low, the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set. This substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare-maximizing policy set.     

How do the media scrutinise central banking? Evidence from the Bank of England

Central bank independence has raised questions of accountability ever since its global diffusion in the 1990s, and especially since the financial crisis. Yet, whilst the literature on central banks’ legislative oversight has expanded, the role of the media as account holders has been left largely unexplored. We assess media scrutiny by using an original dataset of news articles about the Bank of England published between 1997 and 2020, and by analysing the relationship between central banking outcomes and scrutiny in the form of evaluative and negative coverage of the Bank. We find that the variation in such coverage can be traced back to policy outcomes, but the association is largely confined to the post-crisis period. The findings support a view of the media as instrumental in central bank oversight, but also show the limits of this form of accountability.     

WTO的挑战与银行业的改革

随着我国经济一体化进程的不断加快,中国加入WTO后,外资银行将凭借其雄厚的资本实力、健全的经营体制、丰富的融资品种和良好的人才结构,给我国整体竞争力较为低下的银行业带来巨大的冲击和挑战,但同时也会给我们带来一定的发展机遇。因此,我国银行业要以市场化为基本取向,进一步深化金融体制和融资模式改革,充实资本金、培育金融市场,创新金融服务,在渐进开放的过程中,充分发挥本土优势,努力提高我国银行业的整体竞争力。