Has globalization shrunk manufacturing labor share in transition economies?

The objective of this paper is to investigate the nexus between the labor share and globalization in transition economies, with a reference to the skill intensity. We put these developments in the context of the structural and reform developments in transition economies. We rely on the predictions of the efficient bargaining model, whereby globalization forces are set to affect workers’ market bargaining power, which then produces certain developments in the labor share. We use industry-level data for 23 transition economies of Central and Southeast Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States over the late transition period of 2000–2015. Results robustly suggest that globalization forces played important role for the stagnant labor shares in transition economies, mainly in low-skill industries. Workers’ shares in high-skill industries largely remained intact. Results further suggest that the negative effect has been the strongest for the low-skilled workers in the early transition phase and then lessened or vanished as countries turned a higher development stage. The key finding advises that if governments of transition countries attempted to or undertook steps to seize globalization by offering ‘cheap labor’, then it has been the wrong strategy.     

Relative wages, labor specialization and bargaining patterns

The goal of this paper is to study the effects of centralized and decentralized bargaining patterns on wage inequality when there are two different types of labor, skilled and unskilled. We present two models where labor is specialized between firms, that is, there are two types of firms, each one employing one type of labor. We show that the revenue shares of the production factors in each type of firm and the union power are crucial determinants of the relative wage. In contrast, the relative expected wage is the same across models and bargaining patterns.     

Fiscal policies,frictional labor market,and endogenous growth

This paper considers the spillover effects from public spending, and studies optimal fiscal policies in frictional labor markets. We obtain that the optimal shares of government spending in production and consumption are the same as those in a frictionless labor market under the Hosios condition. However, as higher capital accumulation increases the cost of job creation and maintenance, the optimal tax rate of capital income is positive. In addition, when the labor market is frictional, the marginal benefit of labor is larger than the marginal utility of leisure. Thus, consumption and labor should not be taxed uniformly any more. Our calibration suggests that all of the three tax rates should be positive. Moreover, in the situation in which the Hosios condition does not hold, the shares of public productive spending and public consumption both increase when the worker’s bargaining power is greater than the elasticity of search in the matching function.     

Wages,Profits, and Rent‐Sharing in an Open Economy

This paper examines the link between international trade and labor market bargaining power. It reviews simple theories of rent‐sharing in closed and open economies. Earlier studies on the issue of rent‐sharing implicitly assume a closed economy. This assumption may provide some misleading results, especially for studying current developments in the US labor market. Empirical results suggest that the apparent decline in labor’s bargaining power in US manufacturing may be attributable to growing international integration.     

Intraindustry Trade and Relative Factor Endowments

This article investigates the relationship between relative factor endowments and intraindustry trade shares in bilateral trade flows. While Helpman and Krugman's theoretical framework predicts a negative relationship, empirical studies often report contrary results. We, however, argue that previous empirical studies fail to provide an exact link between the theory and the data. New empirical evidence based on the estimating equation derived directly from the theoretical framework demonstrates that the theory finds support in the data once the sums of capital–labor ratios are controlled for.     

Globalization and electoral outcomes: Evidence from Italy

We study whether and to what extent the electoral dynamics in Italy over the 1994–2008 period can be explained by the development of economic factors associated with globalization. To measure the level of exposure to globalization for local labor markets, our main unit of analysis, we use the intensity of import competition from China and the presence of immigrants. Looking at parties’ political positions and employing an estimation strategy that accounts for endogeneity and time‐invariant unobserved effects across local labor markets, we find that both immigration intensity and exposure to import competition from China have contributed positively to the electoral outcomes of far‐right parties, whereas only immigration intensity has increased the vote shares of right‐wing and traditionalist/authoritarian/nationalist parties. Some evidence, albeit not robust, shows that immigration may have also had a positive impact on far‐left parties, thus possibly further contributing toward political polarization. Moreover, electoral turnout has responded negatively to an increased presence of migrants. While the above effects seem to work through the mediation of labor markets, our results, especially those related to immigration, suggest that other mechanisms at the level of local communities are also at play.     

A THEORY OF WAGES AND LABOR DEMAND WITH INTRA‐FIRM BARGAINING AND MATCHING FRICTIONS*

This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within‐firm strategic bargaining. We yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital. The solution exhibits overemployment. We show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups, with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power. Similarly, the hold‐up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital.     

Investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model

We analyze the interactions between investment and local wage bargaining in a putty-clay model where the investment decision commits the firm to a particular capital intensity. This technological precommitment is used strategically in order to manipulate the bargaining outcome. We show that this strategic behavior induces a nonmonotonic relationship between the capital and labor demands of the firm and most of its environmental parameters (e.g., the bargaining power of the union, its minimum wage requirement, the capital cost). The results we obtain in our putty-clay framework thus contradict several conclusions of the standard literature on wage bargaining and investment.     

Labor and india's economic reforms

Before liberalization in 1991, India had developed exceptionally complex labor regulations which strengthened the bargaining power of unions and increased job security in the formal economy, at the cost of employment. Deregulation and privatization can be expected to strengthen competition, accelerate productivity growth, narrow gaps between formal and informal labor markets outcomes, and weaken union power. Is this happening in post-1991 India? Because India liberalized its economy so recently, and so gradually, it is too early to tell. Key areas of the economy continue to be highly regulated, including labor markets. Yet, there are signs that industrial relations are changing. Increased competition in product markets and dissipation of rents are eroding the protection labor regulations once afforded workers in formal labor markets. In a more competitive environment, the same labor regulations that once increased job security, might expose workers to greater risks.     

Labor market dynamics in urban China and the role of the state sector

This paper studies the effect of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the dynamics of the Chinese urban labor market. Using longitudinally matched monthly panel data, we document very low labor force dynamics in the state sector, which leads to a high long-term unemployment rate. We develop and estimate an equilibrium search and matching model with three differences between the state and non-state sectors: labor productivity, labor adjustment cost, and workers’ bargaining power. Counterfactual analysis shows that, among the three channels, reducing the bargaining power of state sector workers is most effective in reducing unemployment duration and unemployment rate.     

Labor shares in the old and new EU member states - Sectoral effects and the role of relative prices

The paper studies the labor share among countries of the European Union, with a particular attention to the newer member states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEU). We find that CEEU countries typically have lower labor shares than older EU member states, both in the aggregate and at the sectoral level. Structural change, while quite pronounced among the CEEU economies, plays only a minor role in the evolution of the labor share. The exception is agriculture, which for some countries has a sizable impact on the level and dynamics of the labor share - partly because of important measurement problems. We also find that a significant part of the difference in conventionally measured labor shares between the more developed EU countries and less developed CEEU countries can be attributed to differences in relative prices. This is consistent with a productivity-based explanation: we show that a simple, calibrated two-sector model with sectoral productivity differentials can explain 36–71% of cross-country variations in the non-agricultural labor share.     

Access to infrastructure and women’s time allocation: Implications for growth and gender equality

Improved access to infrastructure is commonly viewed as a critical step to increase women’s labor force participation and promote economic growth in developing countries. This positive relationship is first established in a basic gender-based, overlapping generations model with collective households and congestion costs. The model is then extended to account for endogenous gender bias in the market place and women’s bargaining power, as well as fertility choices and rearing time. Numerical experiments, based on a calibrated version of the extended model, show that increased access to infrastructure may induce women to devote more time to child rearing – in line with the model’s predictions and some of the empirical evidence – thereby mitigating the increase in time allocated to market work. As a result, it may weaken the benefits of increased female labor force participation in terms of reduced gender bias in the market place, improved women’s bargaining power in the family, and higher growth rates in the long run.     

Capital market integration and gender inequality

This study explores the effects of globalization on gender inequality. Specifically, we describe how, in terms of capital market integration, globalization alters the gender gap in wage rates through changes in labor demand for capital‐intensive sectors. Consequently, via changes in the bargaining positions of men and women, globalization leads to opposite effects on the couple's labor supply and fertility decisions in capital‐importing and capital‐exporting countries. Moreover, by considering the properties of the industrial structures of capital‐importing and capital‐exporting countries, we show that globalization induces empirically observed declines in fertility rates throughout the world.     

Is more mobility good?: Firm mobility and the low wage–low productivity trap

This paper explores the possibility that unregulated FDI flows are causally implicated in the decline in labor productivity growth in semi-industrialized economies. These effects are hypothesized to operate through the negative impact of firm mobility on worker bargaining power and thus wages. Downward pressure on wages can reduce the pressure on firms to raise productivity in defense of profits, contributing to a low wage-low productivity trap. This paper presents empirical evidence, based on panel data fixed effects and GMM estimation for 37 semi-industrialized economies that supports the causal link between increased firm mobility and lower wages, as well as slower productivity growth over the period 1970–2000.     

Easter Island’s collapse: a tale of a population race

The Easter Island tragedy has become an allegory for ecological catastrophe and a warning for the future. In the economic literature the collapse is usually attributed to irrational or myopic behavior in the context of a fragile ecosystem. In this paper we propose an alternative story involving non-cooperative bargaining between clans to share the crop. Each clan’s bargaining power depends on its threat level when fighting a war. The biggest group has the highest probability of winning. A clan’s fertility is determined ex ante by each group. In the quest for greater bargaining power, each clan’s optimal size depends on that of the other clan, and a population race follows. This race may exhaust the natural resources and lead to the ultimate collapse of the society. In addition to well-known natural factors, the likelihood of a collapse turns out to be greater when the cost of war is low, the probability of succeeding in war is highly responsive to the number of fighters, and the marginal return to labor is high. We analyze whether these factors can account for the difference between Easter and Tikopia Islands. The paper also makes a methodological contribution in that it is the first fertility model to include strategic complementarities between groups’ fertility decisions.      

Wage bargaining, labor-tax progression, and welfare

This paper analyzes the effect of labor-tax progression on employment and welfare in an economy with a unionized labor market. The government influences wage bargaining through its tax policies. Wages can be reduced by increasing the marginal labor-tax rate. If there are no restrictions on profit taxation, a first-best optimum with full employment is realized; this first-best optimum can always be implemented by a progressive tax schedule. If profit taxation is restricted, unemployment may arise. For this case, we show that the welfare-maximizing degree of tax progression is influenced by a variety of factors, in particular the wage elasticity of labor demand, the distribution of bargaining power, and the existence of unemployment benefits. Examples are given for both progressive and regressive tax structures. Comparative-static analysis reveals that a decline in union bargaining power, an increase in unemployment benefits, and an increase in the overall work force reduce the efficient degree of tax progression.     

Labor standards, labor-management bargaining and international rivalry

Using the labor union's bargaining power as an indication of government policy on labor standards issues, we analyze the competition between a domestic (North) firm and a foreign (South) firm, and their relationship with optimal labor standards (LS). First, we show that the optimal level of LS is higher when labor unions are employment-oriented than when they are not. Second, it is higher under free trade than under the optimal tariff system if labor unions are employment-oriented. Third, ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS occurs in the case of wage-oriented unions. Fourth, the North's imposing a tariff to force the Southern government to raise its LS is effective only if the Southern union is wage-oriented. In order to raise Southern LS, both countries may need some deeper form of economic integration, if the North does not want to abandon its free trade system.     

Improving Assessments of Gender Bargaining Power: A Case Study from Bangladesh

Gender bargaining power has entered into mainstream economic theory and public policy. However, common empirical measures are only loosely related to the theoretical concept, and research has not produced consistent results regarding the causal chains underlying women’s empowerment. This study critically examines accepted measures of bargaining power, arguing that participation in specific household decisions is not directly associated with the theoretical concept of bargaining power. The study analyzes the relationship between measures of participation in household decisions and individual and household characteristics thought to contribute to bargaining power. Using Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data on Bangladesh over the period 1999–2011, the study finds that despite the loose relationship of the survey questions to the theoretical construct bargaining power, the decision-making questions provide relatively consistent and theoretically supported measures of this unobservable characteristic. Simple changes in using the measures would contribute to more robust and consistent findings.     

A dynamic theory of the declining aggregated labor income share: Intangible capital vs. tangible capital

Reports of the literature documenting the declining labor share of income have increased greatly in the past few years, which is opposed to one of the famous “Kaldor's stylized facts” of growth. The declining labor income share has been observed since the 1980s in a number of countries, and especially in the United States. Recent studies have revealed the following five major driving forces of the declining labor share: (i) supercycles and boom-busts, (ii) rising and faster depreciation, (iii) superstar effects and consolidation, (iv) capital substitution and automation, and (v) globalization and labor bargaining power. We set up a two-sector optimal growth model with the R&D intermediate sectors producing intangible capital. By integrating driving factors (ii) through (iv) above into the model, we demonstrate the long-run decline of the aggregated labor income share.     

Structural Changes in the Labor Market and the Rise of Early Retirement in France and Germany

The rise of early retirement in Europe is typically attributed to the European system of taxes and transfers. A model with an imperfectly competitive labor market allows us to consider also the effects of bargaining power and of matching efficiency on pre‐retirement. We find that lower bargaining power of workers and declining matching efficiency have been important determinants of early retirement in France and Germany. These structural changes, combined with early retirement transfers and population aging, are also consistent with the employment and unemployment rates, labor share and seniority premia.