A DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY*

The paper points out a crucial difference between the conventional disequilibrium macro model and partial equilibrium models of wage bargaining, In the former the real wage is constrained to be less than or equal to the marginal product, whereas in the latter the real wage is frequently constrained to be greater than or equal to the marginal product. The paper builds a disequilibrium model under bilateral monopoly, paying explicit attention to the labour market. The well-known union model of McDonald and Solow forms the basis of the labour market analysis. Just as the three regions of Keynesian Unemployment, Classical Unemployment and Repressed Inflation are configured in the conventional case, an equivalent exercise is undertaken but with the addition of a collectively negotiated wage. The particular wage agreement used is the Nash bargain. The framework is then used to account for the unusual events that occurred in the UK labour market 1979–81, particularly the unprecedented rise in unemployment with no diminution of the inflation rate. It suggests that there was a shift in bargaining advantage in favour of employers, which resulted in an increased share of profits in national income. This regime change exacerbated the unfavourable circumstances for labour, which existed at that time.     

Industrial Relations Reform: Chasing a Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow?

This article reviews the economy‐wide effects of the Work Choices and Fair Work reforms to Australia's industrial relations system. Outcomes examined are wages growth and earnings inequality, labour market adjustment, labour productivity growth and industrial disputes. Little evidence is found of an effect from the industrial relations reforms made in the 2000s. I argue that this is consistent with the nature of the reforms, being primarily oriented to distributive rather than efficiency goals. I finish by describing how private interest can explain current lobbying for further reform to Australia's industrial relations system.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTION

This paper will set up a general equilibrium model with a distorted labour market to explore the effects of an environmental tax and union bargaining power on formal employment and the informal competitive wage. We find that when the government raises the environmental tax, both formal employment and informal competitive wage would fall. In addition, we confirm that a policy of labour market reform would increase both formal employment and the informal competitive wage.     

Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism

The objective of the article is to explain the rising share of short-term employment in Europe. In a matching model, it is shown that a slowdown in the growth of labour productivity leads to the emergence of temporary (short-term) jobs and increases their share of total employment. Higher population growth also increases the share of temporary jobs. Finally, the much blamed firing costs are found to be neutral when there is no floor on wages. In addition, in periods of low growth, the rise in the share of short-term jobs weakens workers' bargaining position.     

Fiscal policies, environmental pollution and economic growth

This paper develops a model of endogenous economic growth with special consideration to the role of productive public expenditure and environmental pollution; and analyses the properties of optimal fiscal policy in the steady state growth equilibrium. We consider the level of consumption as the source of pollution. Government allocates its tax revenue between pollution abatement expenditure and productive public expenditure. Optimum ratio of productive public expenditure to national income is equal to the competitive output share of the public input, when productive public expenditure is depicted as tax revenue minus abatement expenditure. However, the proportional income tax rate exceeds the competitive output share of the public input. There is no conflict between the social welfare maximizing solution and the growth rate maximizing solution in the steady state growth equilibrium. The unique steady state growth equilibrium appears to be a saddle-point when the growth rate is above a critical level and the steady state equilibrium growth rate in the market economy is not necessarily lower than the socially efficient growth rate.     

Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic Perspective

Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.     

Bargaining with revoking costs

A simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed. The players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie. If the demands add up to more than one, the players simultaneously choose whether to stick to their demand or accept the other?s offer. While both parties sticking to their offers leads to an impasse, accepting a lower share than the original demand is costly for each party. The set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the game is characterized for continuously differentiable payoff and cost functions, strictly increasing in the pie share and the amount conceded, respectively. Higher cost functions are shown to improve bargaining power. The limit equilibrium prediction of the model, as the cost functions are made arbitrarily high, selects a unique equilibrium in the Nash Demand Game that corresponds to a Proportional Bargaining Solution of Kalai (1977).     

Strategic Bargaining and Competitive Bidding in a Dynamic Market Equilibrium

This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature, such as Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), by considering a new matching process. We assume that a central information agency exists, such as real estate agencies in the housing market and employment agencies (or newspapers) in the labour market, which puts traders into direct contact with each other. With heterogeneity of trader preferences, equilibrium trade is characterized by existing traders on each side of the market trying to match with the flow of new traders on the other side (since existing traders have already sampled and rejected each other). Two procedures of trade co-exist, namely a strategic bilateral bargaining process and a competitive bidding process, depending on the number of potential matches a new trader obtains. We characterize the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium to this stochastic trading game.     

Capital account openness and the labour share of income

This paper investigates the relationship between capital accountopenness and the share of labour in national income. Employinga new index of financial openness and a cross-country panelof labour shares available from the United Nations System ofNational Accounts, the author shows a robust negative correlationbetween the degree of openness and the labour share. Althoughthis effect is not present for low income countries, the directnegative relationship holds for all other subsamples and inthe presence of a variety of controls. A plausible explanationis that openness alters the conditions of bargaining betweenlabour and capital. By increasing the bargaining strength ofcapital vis-a-vis labour, increased capital mobility raisesrents accruing to capital. Thus, capital account openness mayreduce labour's share of income in the firm, and thereby, atan economy-wide level, its share of national output.     

Conflict,growth, distribution,and employment: a long-run Kaleckian model

This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model in which (i) the rate of capacity utilization, the profit share, and the rate of employment are adjusted in the medium run, and (ii) the normal rate of capacity utilization and the expected rate of capital accumulation are adjusted in the long run. The long-run equilibrium is a continuum of equilibria and is characterized by hysteresis in that the long-run position of the economy depends on where it starts. An increase in the bargaining power of workers lowers the rate of unemployment in both the medium-run and the long-run equilibrium.     

Public Expenditure,Environment, and Economic Growth

This paper attempts to develop a model of endogenous growth with special consideration to the role of productive public expenditure in the presence of congestion effect of private capital and environmental pollution. We analyze the properties of the optimal fiscal policy in the steady‐state equilibrium when the level of production of the final good is the source of emission. Government allocates its income tax revenue between pollution abatement expenditure and productive public expenditure. In the steady‐state equilibrium, optimum ratio of productive public expenditure to national income is less than the competitive output share of the public input; and this ratio varies inversely with the magnitude of the emission‐output coefficient. The steady‐state equilibrium appears to be a saddle point; and the market economy growth rate is not necessarily less than the socially efficient growth rate in the steady‐state equilibrium.     

Cyclical growth in a Goodwin–Kalecki–Marx model

This paper presents a disequilibrium macrodynamic model that incorporates certain elements from Goodwin (the dynamics of the rate of employment and income distribution), Kalecki (an investment function independent of savings, and mark-up pricing in oligopolistic goods markets), and Marx (the reserve-army and reserve-army-creation effects). The model has a system of differential equations for the rate of utilization, profit share, and rate of employment. We show that there exist limit cycles that depend on the sizes of the reserve-army effect and reserve-army-creation effect. This implies that there exists a situation in which the economy experiences endogenous and perpetual growth cycles. Moreover, we show that if the stable long-run equilibrium corresponds to the profit-led growth regime, an increase in the bargaining power of workers increases the rate of unemployment; conversely, if the equilibrium corresponds to the wage-led growth-regime, an increase in the bargaining power of workers decreases the rate of unemployment.     

Profit Sharing,Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment*

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options, increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options, this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections—measured by the bargaining power of trade unions—are sufficiently strong and the benefit–replacement ratio is sufficiently high. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.     

Efficient bargaining versus right to manage: A stability analysis in a Cournot duopoly with trade unions

The present study considers a unionised (nonlinear) duopoly with two different labour market institutions, i.e. efficient bargaining (EB) and right to manage (RTM), to analyse product market stability under quantity competition with trade unions. We show that when the preference of unions towards wages is small, (i) the parametric stability region under RTM is higher than under EB, and (ii) a rise in the union power in the Nash bargaining played between firms and unions monotonically increases (resp. reduces) the parametric stability region under RTM (resp. EB). In contrast, when the preference of unions becomes larger, an increase in the union's bargaining power acts: (1) as an economic stabiliser when the union power is small; (2) as an economic de-stabiliser when the union power is high. In addition to established results with regard to equilibrium outcomes, our findings shed some light on the effects of how the labour market regulation affects out-of-equilibrium behaviours in a Cournot duopoly.     

Unemployment,long-term employment relations and the determination of unit labour cost growth in US manufacturing industries

This paper examines the effect that unemployment and long-term employment relations exert on the determination of unit labour costs. The paper proceeds in three sections. Section one analyses the relationship between labour market conditions and unit labour costs by developping a simple model of a firm that relies upon dismissal threats to elicit work effort. The comparative static properties of this model suggest that a tightening of labour markets may result in an increase in unit labour costs. In addition, it is argued that the labour market disequilibrium that occurs at full employment levels of unemployment will likely result in an increase in the growth rate of unit labour costs. The second section of the paper reviews diverse theories of long-term employment relations (LTERs), each of which suggest that the presence of LTERs ought to reduce the effect that labour market conditions exert on unit labour costs. The third section of the paper presents empirical estimates of the effect unemployment and LTERs exert on unit labour costs. The central empirical findings can be briefly summarized. First, movements towards full employment increase the growth rate of wages, reduce the growth rate of labour productivity and increase the growth rate of unit labour costs. Secondly, where long-term employment relations are prevalent, the effect of unemployment on wage, labour productivity, and unit labour cost growth is diminished. The paper concludes by discussing the implications these findings have for effort regulation models and the macroeconomic foundations of microeconomic labour market structures     

THE DRIVING FORCES BEHIND THE FALLING LABOUR SHARE AND PERSISTENT UNEMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN

Like in most advanced countries, the labour income share in Japan has been falling since the mid‐1970s. However, in contrast to other advanced economies, Japan experienced an exceptional recessive period in the 1990s and 2000s, with the rate of unemployment rising to a historical maximum of 5.5% in 2002, to persist above 4% in subsequent years. In the present paper, we examine the main causes behind the paths followed by the labour income share and the unemployment rate during the post‐1997 crisis period (1997–2002) and the transition years that followed (2002–2009). We do so by estimating a multi‐equation macro model that allows us to look separately at the various components of this particular labour market: wages, output, and employment. Our main finding is that the fall in the labour share can be attributed to the changes that took place within the labour relations system (the weakening of unions mainly) and that the surge in unemployment can be altogether ascribed to the distorting effects of the sizeable and increasing public debt.     

International factor mobility,informal interest rate and capital market imperfection: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper makes an attempt to provide a theory of determination of interest rate in the informal credit market in a less developed economy in terms of a three-sector static deterministic general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ labour from the informal labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs labour at an institutionally fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal credit market. We show that an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour raises (lowers) the informal (formal) interest rate but lowers the competitive wage rate in the informal labour market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the informal agricultural sector. International factor mobility, therefore, raises the degrees of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.     

Endogenous technological change,income distribution,and unemployment with inter-class conflict

This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model that incorporates endogenous technological change. The model endogenously determines the rate of capacity utilization, the rate of economic growth, income distribution, and the employment rate in addition to technological change. The paper shows that whether or not an increase in the relative bargaining power of workers raises the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate depends on which regime is realized in the long-run equilibrium. If, for example, the long-run equilibrium corresponds to the wage-led growth regime, a rise in the relative bargaining power of workers leads to a decline in the unemployment rate. This result is never obtained from the mainstream NAIRU model.     

Franchise fee,contract bargaining,and economic growth

This paper combines the industrial organization (IO) theory and the R&D-based endogenous growth theory in a model of a successive imperfect competitive economy. The current study assumes that firms between upstream and downstream industries bargain over both the price of intermediate goods and the franchise fee. Findings show that the intermediate goods firm with a R&D sector charges the price equal to the marginal cost. Economic rent may also be partly transferred into the franchise fee determined by the relative bargaining power. In particular, the traditional double marginalization result, such as in Spengler (1950), does not take place here due to the above-mentioned bargaining scheme. Finally, this work shows that final goods firms in vertically linked industries play an important role in an economic growth model. The more bargaining power the final goods firms have (or the more returns to specialization upstream firms have, or the less substitution elasticity the final goods have), the more the economy grows. However, the consumer preference for diversity seemingly does not affect economic growth rate.     

Coordination versus flexibility in wage formation: a focus on the nominal wage impact of productivity in Germany,Greece, Ireland,Portugal, Spain and the United States

Wage coordination between countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) aims at aligning nominal wage growth with labour productivity growth at the national level. We analyse the developments in Germany, the EMU’s periphery countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain along with the United States over the period 1980 to 2010. Apart from the contribution of productivity to nominal wages, we take into account the contributions of prices, unemployment, replacement rates and taxes by means of an econometrically estimated nonlinear equation resulting from a wage bargaining model. We further study the downward rigidities of nominal wages. The findings show that in past times of low productivity, price inflation and reductions in unemployment still put significant upward pressure on nominal wage growth. The periphery countries are far from aligning nominal wage growth with productivity growth. German productivity is a major wage determinant, but surely not the only one. Within the context of a free bargaining process between employers and labour unions, policy-makers can effectively use the replacement rate to steer the nominal wages outcome.