创新风险、创新环境与三维最优专利制度设计

借鉴已有研究方法和成果,引入创新风险、创新环境,从专利长度、专利宽度和专利高度3个维度探讨持续创新中最优专利制度的设定,最后结合实际提出模型的应用。通过分析发现:最优专利制度是一种动态的制度而不是静态的制度;新兴行业的专利制度组合方向为长期限、宽范围和高距离;最优专利制度必须合理融合专利长度、专利宽度和专利高度。     

持续创新中最优专利长度与宽度设计

自主创新能力的提高、创新型国家的建立要求我们必须持续创新。最优专利制度的制定是政府在建设创新型国家中的重要目标和职能。借鉴已有的研究方法和成果,引入持续创新,考虑利率贴现和市场初始容量等因素,探讨了在持续创新中最优专利宽度和长度的设定,最后提出我国目前的专利政策应是(短期限,宽范围)。     

专利保护宽度和累积创新竞赛中的信息披露

该文将专利保护宽度定义为累积创新厂商之间的许可比率,考察其对累积创新竞赛中厂商信息披露决策的影响.我们发现:强的专利保护宽度有利于信息披露,但其对社会福利和技术进步率的影响却呈近似的倒U型,故在不同的情况下都存在一个专利保护宽度的最优取值区间.与事后许可相比,事前许可能在反托拉斯法的框架下导致社会福利的帕累托改进.如果双方对专利诉讼的结果具有相同的预期,则专利保护宽度的确定和实施就是无成本的.     

独立许可条款下竞争性专利联盟累积创新效应比较研究

由于技术标准间竞争加剧,在高新技术产业内形成了基于不同技术标准的多个竞争性专利联盟并存的格局。此外,随着对专利联盟垄断性审查的加强,同时为了更好地保护联盟内企业利益,鼓励其创新,很多联盟采用了独立许可条款。为此,运用动态博弈理论分别构建无独立许可条款和有独立许可条款下竞争性专利联盟累积创新效应的分析模型,对阻碍性专利的创新效应进行比较研究。结果表明：竞争性专利联盟创新效应受独立许可条款、专利类型、专利联盟技术标准间差异化程度、联盟内企业所持有的必要专利数量等因素影响,具有复杂性。但总体上,竞争性专利联盟可降低专利许可费,促进专利的使用,有利于提高社会福利,促使企业增加研发投入,鼓励企业创新。     

机密还是专利?

在传统社会中,为保护创新成果,人们通常只能将其保留为技术机密或他人无法共享的私有知识,这不但降低了创新效率,也会增加技术的失传风险。有识于此,本文将专利看做政府向创新者提供的一种机密交换契约,并借此论证了引入"事后"专利保护的合理性:人们为了要获得排他性的专利保护,就必须将其私有知识公开披露,而这消除了技术失传风险。但只有当专利利润高于商业机密利润时人们才会申请专利,故专利保护会导致更大的垄断扭曲。社会最优专利期限就是在机密失传风险和垄断定价扭曲之间权衡的结果,只要存在技术失传风险,事后最优专利期限就必须是正的。     

网络效应新产品实施合作竞争战略的动机和条件

研究了开发网络效应新产品的创新企业实施合作竞争战略的动机和条件,发现网络效应强度、创新产品与模仿产品的质量差异使得创新企业有动机实施合作竞争战略,创新企业和模仿企业的边际成本则决定了模仿企业是否有动机生产模仿产品和愿意进入市场参与竞争。     

中国海外专利申请与出口贸易

创新驱动是出口贸易高质量发展的重要引擎,海外专利申请则是一国创新水平的重要反映.利用中国省份2009-2017年在美国专利局的专利申请数据以及各省份41个行业的出口贸易数据,实证研究了海外专利申请对出口的影响.结果 表明:(1)海外专利申请促进了产品向专利申请国市场的出口.随着海外专利数量的增加,海外专利的保护范围和技术覆盖范围随之扩大,带来出口的进一步增加.(2)对专利价值进行综合评估后发现,专利价值度越高,对出口促进作用越大.(3)外国在华专利和市场化程度对海外专利促进出口具有调节作用.外国在华专利布局越多的行业和市场化程度越高的地区,海外专利申请发挥的出口促进效应越大.     

最优专利制度、技术进步方向与工资不平等

本文把专利分类为技能密集型产业的技术专利和劳动密集型产业的技术专利,它们分别与熟练劳动力和非熟练劳动力匹配。本文的研究表明,两类专利的最优宽度都是有限的,且受到劳动力禀赋结构的影响。当非熟练劳动力多于(少于)熟练劳动力时,劳动密集型产业的技术专利宽度宽于(窄于)技能密集型产业的技术专利。本文的研究也表明,劳动力禀赋结构可以通过影响最优专利制度来影响技术进步方向,从而对熟练劳动力和非熟练劳动力之间的工资不平等产生影响。     

高校专利转化中产品与服务组合效应研究

结合“产品与服务”和“组合效应”的内涵,针对当前高校与企业在专利合作过程中存在的“重产品轻服务”和“忽视产品与服务组合效应”的现象,通过划分高校专利技术后续服务模式以及分析企业对高校专利需求的层次与特点,构建了基于企业需求的高校专利产品与服务组合选择矩阵和转化模型,为高校如何在操作层面上发挥产品与服务的组合效应提供指导。     

标准专利许可中可变价格的社会福利效应:基于产品差异化的视角

技术标准在产品生产过程中的使用越来越广泛,标准专利许可定价形式问题关系到技术标准所有者和产品生产者的收益,有待拓展研究。通过构建古诺竞争模型,从产品差异化角度对标准专利许可中可变价格形式的社会福利效应进行分析,得到的主要结论为:当产品市场达到均衡,且标准专利许可采用的价格形式是可变价格时,社会总福利随着产品差异化程度的提高而增加,随着差异化产品市场中标准专利使用者数量的增加而增加,随着可变价格中可变费用比率的提高而降低;均衡产量随着产品差异化程度的提高而增大,随着可变价格中可变费用比率的提高而降低;均衡价格与产品差异化程度呈现出倒“U”型关系,临界点为特定的市场规模;标准专利使用者的均衡利润随着产品差异化程度的提高而增大。由此可见,标准专利许可的可变费用比率下降有利于激励技术标准使用者生产更多的差异化产品,提升社会总福利。     

Innovation or imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms’ R&D strategy choice

In this paper a firm’s R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firm characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. This yields three types of equilibria, in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms’ equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms’ incentives to engage in R&D, while excessive competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics.     

Private patent protection in the theory of Schumpeterian growth

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with privately optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement and investigate the implications for intellectual property and R&D policies. In our setting, successful innovators undertake costly rent protection activities (RPAs) to enforce their patents. RPAs deter innovators who seek to discover higher quality products and thereby replace the patent holder. RPAs also deter imitators who seek to capture a portion of the monopoly market by imitating the patent holder's product. We investigate the role of private IPR protection by considering the impact of subsidies to RPAs on economic growth and welfare. We find that a larger RPA subsidy raises the innovation rate if and only if the ease of imitation is above a certain level. With regards to welfare, we find that depending on the parameters it may be optimal to tax or subsidize RPAs. Thus a prohibitively high taxation of RPAs is not necessarily optimal. We also show that the presence of imitation strengthens the case for subsidizing R&D.     

市场结构、环境税与福利效应分析

运用短期局部均衡分析方法研究完全竞争市场和垄断市场条件下环境税对社会福利的影响.结果显示:在完全竞争市场条件下,对企业征收环境税可以增进社会福利.而在垄断市场条件下,环境税的福利效应具有不确定性,这取决于垄断造成的扭曲程度.如果垄断造成的扭曲较小,环境税仍然可以提高社会福利.但无论是增进抑或降低社会福利,对垄断企业征收环境税都不可能实现最优化,因为环境税在矫正污染外部性的同时,垄断造成产量水平下降导致福利损失增加,所以只能追求一个次优的结果,次优环境税低于完全竞争条件下的标准环境税.     

Patent term extensions and commercialization lags in the pharmaceutical industry: A growth-theoretic analysis

Due to the lags in commercialization, the effective life of a patent is generally less than its statutory term. We introduce commercialization lags into the Schumpeterian growth model and explore the effects of patent term extensions on pharmaceutical R&D and social welfare. Our results show that extending patent terms stimulates the consumption of homogeneous goods but generates an ambiguous effect on the consumption of pharmaceuticals. When patent extensions have an inverted-U effect on social welfare, the optimal patent extension increases with the length of commercialization lags but decreases with the input intensity of commercialization lags. Finally, we calibrate the model and find that increasing patent breadth reduces the optimal patent extension.     

Runner‐up Patents: Is Monopoly Inevitable?

Exclusive patents sacrifice product competition to provide firms incentives to innovate. We characterize an alternative mechanism whereby later inventors are allowed to share the patent if they discover within a certain time period of the first inventor. These runner‐up patents increase social welfare under very general conditions. Furthermore, we show that the time window during which later inventors can share the patent should become a new policy tool at the disposal of the designer. This instrument will be used in a socially optimal mix with the breadth and length of the patent and could allow sorting between more or less efficient firms.     

Optimal patent length and breadth in an economy with creative destruction and non-diversifiable risk

In this paper, I examine the optimal patent shape in an economy in which R&D firms innovate and imitate, households face non-diversifiable risk and there is externality in production and R&D. With non-diversifiable risk, a household’s consumption and investment decisions are interlinked. This economy contains industries of two kinds: monopoly industries with an innovator only, and duopoly industries with an innovator and an imitator. I define patent length as the expected time in which an innovation is imitated, and patent breadth as the innovator’s profit share in an industry after a successful imitation. The government can control patent length by the requirements for accepting a substitute for a patented good, and patent breadth by imposing compulsory licensing and royalties for the patentee after a successful imitation. I show that the stronger the externality in production relative to R&D is, the slower the optimal growth rate, the larger the optimal proportion of duopoly industries, and the longer and narrower the optimal patent.     

Brand/product innovation and the optimal length of trademark/patent protection

A simple CES model of product differentiation is used to consider brand innovation and compulsory trademark licensing. Judd has used a different but closely related model to study product innovation and optimal patent length. Under Cournot assumptions, computer simulations show that the optimal length of trademark/patent protection is finite and varies in an intuitive way with the costs of innovation and production, interest rates and taste parameters.     

Patents,imitation and welfare

We consider the effects of product and process patents on profits and welfare. In a duopoly model, we show that if the cost of imitation is not very large, prisoner's dilemma occurs under process patent, thus creating lower profit of each firm under process patent than under product patent. Welfare is higher under process (product) patent for very small (not very small) cost of imitation. Although the possibility of cross-licensing never makes lower welfare under process patent for all costs of imitation, welfare is never lower under product patent under infinitely repeated game.