Systemic banks and the lender of last resort

We propose a model where systemic and non-systemic banks are exposed to liquidity shortfalls so that a lender of last resort policy is required. We find that it is socially optimal to override the decision of the central bank by the unconditional provision of liquidity support when the shortfall is large enough, i.e. in crisis times. The existence of systemic banks provides a rationale for the central bank to act as lender of last resort for non-systemic banks in a larger range of their liquidity shortfalls. However, the impact of systemic risk on the optimal allocation of the lender of last resort responsibilities for systemic banks depends on the relative size of counteracting effects.     

Macroeconomic shocks and banking supervision

We build a simple model of banking in the presence of macroeconomic shocks where the comparative roles of private and public monitors can be analyzed. This model provides endogenous justifications for prudential regulation (capital requirements) and emergency liquidity assistance by the Central Bank (lender of last resort). We show that market discipline can be helpful, but does not solve the fundamental problem of regulatory forbearance. We propose some directions of reform of the regulatory system that could improve the management of banking crises.     

Liquidity provision during the crisis of 1914: Private and public sources

Caught between the end of the National Banking Era and the beginning of the Federal Reserve System, the crisis of 1914 provides an example of a banking panic avoided. We investigate how this outcome was achieved by examining data on the issues of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates to New York City institutions that identify the borrower and the quantity requested for each type of temporary liquidity measure. The extensive provision of temporary credit to a wide array of financial intermediaries was, in our opinion, essential to the successful alleviation of financial distress in 1914. Empirical results indicate an important role for clearing house loan certificates that is distinct from the influence of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency issues.     

The lender of last resort and the federal safety net

Under the aegis to the New Deal, the government established a safety net consisting of deposit insurance, a lender of last resort, and regulation. In the postwar period when the inflation rate was low, the economy stable, and the bank failure rate low, the safety net appeared to be an effective instrument to deliver financial stability. In the unstable economy since the 1970s, the functioning of each element of the safety net has been questioned. A reconsideration of the role assigned to each constituent is timely. I begin with a review that brings up to date since 1933, first, the role of regulation, second, deposit insurance, and third, the lender of last resort. Finally, I discuss how each of these might be reshaped in light of the changes since the 1970s.This paper was prepared for a conference in memory of Michael J. Hamburger at the Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University, March 12, 1987.     

对后危机时代最后贷款人法律制度创新的思考

无论一种制度如何先进,与动态的社会而言,其都是一个此一时彼一时的问题。若具有相对真理性的制度意图\"常青不败\",那么它就必须与时俱进。虽然古典的最后贷款人制度实现了既定史命,但是金融自由化、金融电子化与国际化已从另一侧面检测着该制度的精致或拙劣。是急流勇退,还是迎难而新,这是后危机时代该制度因时而化中所必须权衡的重大问题。     

Securitization markets and central banking: An evaluation of the term asset-backed securities loan facility

In response to the near collapse of US securitization markets in 2008, the Federal Reserve created the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, which offered non-recourse loans to finance investors’ purchases of certain highly rated asset-backed securities. We study the effects of this program and find that it lowered interest rate spreads for some categories of asset-backed securities but had little impact on the pricing of individual securities. These findings suggest that the program improved conditions in securitization markets but did not subsidize individual securities. We also find that the risk of loss to the US government was small.     

Bank stability and transparency

A number of recent policy initiatives have called for enhanced transparency of banking firms. While the hope is that enhanced transparency may improve incentives ex ante, it is less clear whether transparency is necessarily a good thing ex post, when a bank might have hit hard times and provision of information could have a destabilising effect. This paper provides a synopsis of these different effects and provides some new, bank-level evidence in an attempt to clarify empirically whether, taking ex ante and ex post effects together, transparency is likely to reduce or increase bank stability. The analysis suggests that, on balance, transparency reduces the chance of severe banking problems and thus enhances overall financial stability.     

Aggregate liquidity shortages, idiosyncratic liquidity smoothing and banking regulation

This paper develops a model of banking fragility driven by aggregate liquidity shortages. Inefficiencies arise from a failure of the interbank market to smooth the available liquidity in such a shortage. We find that a standard lender of last resort policy is ineffective in restoring efficiency as it leads to offsetting changes in the banks’ supply of liquidity. In contrast, subsidizing the purchase of assets from troubled banks increases welfare by improving the banks’ liquidity holdings. The first best, however, is achieved by redistributing existing liquidity from healthy to troubled banks in a crisis.     

Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative

This paper offers a historical perspective on the evolution of central banks as lenders of last resort (LOLR). Countries differ in the statutory powers of the LOLR, which is the outcome of a political bargain. Collateralized LOLR lending as envisioned by Bagehot (1873) requires five key legal and institutional preconditions, all of which required political agreement. LOLR mechanisms evolved to include more than collateralized lending. LOLRs established prior to World War II, with few exceptions, followed policies that can be broadly characterized as implementing “Bagehot's Principles”: seeking to preserve systemic financial stability rather than preventing the failure of particular banks, and limiting the amount of risk absorbed by the LOLR as much as possible when providing financial assistance. After World War II, and especially after the 1970s, generous deposit insurance and ad hoc bank bailouts became the norm. The focus of bank safety net policy changed from targeting systemic stability to preventing depositor loss and the failure of banks. Statutory powers of central banks do not change much over time, or correlate with country characteristics, instead reflecting idiosyncratic political histories.     

我国中央银行会计信息透明度研究

中央银行会计信息作为公众评价货币政策效果和形成货币政策预期的重要渠道,对其增强透明度的呼声越来越高。本文探讨了中央银行会计信息透明度的内涵及其理论基础,阐述了我国中央银行增强会计信息透明度的动因,分析了目前我国中央银行在增强会计信息透明度方面存在的不足,并提出了相关政策建议。     

"大而不倒"救助政策的理论和实证研究

由于大银行倒闭的巨大破坏性,最后贷款人在救助中通常奉行"大而不倒"政策。考虑到救助成本是银行资产规模的增函数,如果救助银行是最优的,那么救助任何一个更大的银行将也是最优的,这也意味着"大而不倒"救助政策在理论上的成立。在"大而不倒"政策下,规模和风险之间存在相互影响的关系。"大而不倒"救助政策影响银行的规模选择和资产风险的组合选择,导致银行追求变得更大且更具风险。     

关于透明度原则中国银行业与新巴塞尔资本协议的要求还差多远

新巴塞尔资本协议较旧巴塞尔协议最大的突破是在银行监管中引入了透明度原则,即信息披露制度.该制度立足于社会利益论、立足于银行是一个公众公司.信息披露制度是市场约束的基础和保障、是第一支柱和第二支柱的补充、是一种有限信息披露的理念.但该制度要求范围过于宽泛增加了银行的无效成本,在统一标准方面尚存在一些问题.     

商业银行的流动性转换职能

利用Diamond的两个模型说明商业银行流动性转换职能的性质及其发展趋势.在信息技术不发达、人们的市场参与程度比较低时,传统商业银行的流动性转换是有效的,然而它有内在的不稳定性,容易受到挤兑的冲击.随着信息技术的改善、人们的市场参与度提高,金融市场的流动性转换职能将逐渐变得重要.     

O.M.W. Sprague (the man who “wrote the book” on financial crises) and the founding of the Federal Reserve

O.M.W. Sprague was America's leading expert on financial crises when America was debating establishing the Federal Reserve. His History of Crises under the National Banking System is the most enduring intellectual legacy of the National Monetary Commission; a still frequently cited classic. Since the Commission recommended a central bank, and its recommendation after some modifications became the Federal Reserve System, it might be assumed that Sprague was a strong supporter of establishing a central bank. But he was not. Initially, Sprague favored far more limited reforms, a position that he did not abandon until the Federal Reserve became a fait accompli. Here I discuss the sources of Sprague's opposition to a central bank and the relationship of that opposition to his understanding of the history and structure of the American banking system at the turn of the nineteenth century.     

新西兰储备银行的流动性监管新政策及启示

金融危机后,新西兰储备银行致力于加强银行体系流动性的审慎监管,近期对商业银行推行核心融资比率,此项新型流动性监管政策被称为继通胀目标制之后,新西兰储备银行首推的又一项新的货币政策工具。本文对其推出背景、总体框架及作用进行了研究,并在此基础上提出对我国银行流动性监管的启示。     

Bank runs, welfare and policy implications

This paper studies the welfare implications of various government policies that have been used to prevent bank runs. The benchmark model suggests that a bank run is a business-cycle-state-related phenomenon and it leads to the failure of the risk-sharing mechanism provided by the banking sector. Extensions of the model show that a number of policy instruments, including the suspension of convertibility of deposits, the taxation on short-term deposits, reserve requirement and blanket guarantee, turn out to be inefficient. Instead, I propose that a limited-coverage deposit insurance scheme or capital requirements can be welfare-improving.     

Corporate bond liquidity before and after the onset of the subprime crisis

We analyze liquidity components of corporate bond spreads during 2005-2009 using a new robust illiquidity measure. The spread contribution from illiquidity increases dramatically with the onset of the subprime crisis. The increase is slow and persistent for investment grade bonds while the effect is stronger but more short-lived for speculative grade bonds. Bonds become less liquid when financial distress hits a lead underwriter and the liquidity of bonds issued by financial firms dries up under crises. During the subprime crisis, flight-to-quality is confined to AAA-rated bonds.     

Theories of bank behavior under capital regulation

This paper reviews academic studies of bank capital regulation in an effort to evaluate the intellectual foundation for the imposition of the Basel I and Basel II systems of risk-based capital requirements. The theoretical literature yields general agreement about the immediate effects of capital requirements on bank lending and loan rates and the longer-term impacts on bank ratios of equity to total or risk-adjusted assets. This literature produces highly mixed predictions, however, regarding the effects of capital regulation on asset risk and overall safety and soundness for the banking system as a whole. Thus, the intellectual foundation for the present capital-regulation regime is not particularly strong. The mixed conclusions in the academic literature on banking certainly do not provide unqualified support for moving to an even more stringent and costly system of capital requirements. These widely ambiguous results do suggest, however, that assessing the implications of capital regulation for balance-sheet risk and monitoring effort in diverse banking systems is an important agenda for future theoretical research in the banking area.