管理层权力对企业绩效的影响研究——基于企业内部治理机制视角

以我国主板上市企业数据为基础,实证检验了上市企业管理层权力对企业绩效的影响,内部治理机制对管理层权力——企业绩效敏感性的影响。实证结果表明,内部治理机制影响管理层权力与企业绩效之间关系的敏感性,当不考虑内部治理机制时,企业绩效与管理层权力综合变量在1%水平上显著正相关,具有较高教育背景和持有企业股权的管理层,能为企业带来更好的业绩。当考虑内部治理机制时,企业绩效与管理层权力综合变量仅在10%水平上正相关。管理层权力综合变量对股权制衡度较低和独立董事比重较高的企业的绩效具有显著正向影响。     

管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效

合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。     

管理层权力对房地产企业绩效的影响研究——基于股权集中度的调节效应

依据房地产行业上市公司2014-2019年数据,借鉴Finkelstein的权力模型,基于股权集中度的调节效应,考量管理层权力对房地产企业绩效的影响。结果表明：管理层权力与企业绩效之间存在明显的正相关关系,股权集中程度对两者之间的关系产生调节作用。其中,结构权力与企业绩效显著正相关,股权集中会削弱二者的正相关关系;所有者权力与企业绩效显著正相关,股权集中会削弱所有者的激励效果;声望权力与企业绩效显著正相关,股权集中会削弱二者的正相关关系;专家权力与企业绩效之间关系不显著。     

股权性质、治理结构与制造企业服务化——来自中国上市公司的证据

长期以来,学者们在探讨制造企业服务化影响因素时,忽略了公司治理因素的作用。利用2013年沪深A股上市制造企业数据,从不同的控股权性质出发,实证检验了管理层个体特征、董事会治理、管理层激励和股权集中度对制造企业服务化水平的影响。结果表明国有控股企业和民营控股企业的服务化水平和公司治理结构有显著差异,同时管理层个体特征与服务化水平无关,后三个因素对服务水平存在显著影响,但在不同的控股权性质下,影响作用存在一定差异。     

上市证券公司内部治理与公司经营绩效的实证分析

本文以18家已上市证券公司为样本,对其内部治理与公司经营绩效之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明:中国上市证券公司股权集中度与公司经营绩效呈负相关关系;股权制衡度对公司经营绩效的影响不显著;国有控股性质有助于提高公司经营绩效;董事会规模对公司经营绩效呈正相关关系,但影响不显著;独立董事比例与公司经营绩效呈显著正相关关系;董事长与总经理的职位分离有利于提高公司经营绩效,但在统计上不显著;监事会规模与公司经营绩效呈显著负相关关系;管理层报酬与公司经营绩效呈显著正相关关系,管理层规模与公司经营绩效呈正相关关系,但影响不显著。     

管理层权力、法制环境与企业并购商誉北大核心CSSCI

本文以中国2007—2018年A股上市公司新增并购商誉为样本,实证检验了管理层权力对企业并购商誉的影响。研究表明:(1)管理层权力与企业并购商誉存在显著的正相关关系;(2)法制环境具有调节效应,即相对于法制环境弱的地区,法制环境好的地区会弱化管理层权力与企业并购商誉的正相关关系。进一步研究还发现:高管年龄高低也会影响管理层权力与企业并购商誉的关系;并购商誉在高管理层权力组对短期财务业绩具有正向影响,对长期财务业绩具有负向影响。因此,本文建议各监管部门完善法制环境,企业要加强内部治理机制,以制衡管理层权力,减少商誉泡沫,降低资本市场的系统性风险。     

企业社会责任对财务绩效影响研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

在披露意愿、股权性质、经济周期调节变量的基础上研究企业社会责任对财务绩效的影响,考虑企业社会责任的时间滞后效应,加入滞后一期的CSR研究对财务绩效的影响。实证结果表明：当期企业社会责任与当期财务绩效呈正相关但不显著,滞后一期的企业社会责任显著正向影响当期财务绩效;当期企业社会责任与披露意愿、经济周期的交互作用表明,相对于经济繁荣期,在经济收缩期企业当期自愿披露企业社会责任报告会更显著提高当期财务绩效;当期企业社会责任与股权性质的交互作用表明相对于非国有企业,国企当期承担企业社会责任会显著提高当期财务绩效;滞后一期的企业社会责任与股权性质、经济周期的交互作用表明在经济收缩期,国有企业上一年履行企业社会责任会显著降低当期财务绩效。     

高管薪酬、团队特征与公司业绩敏感性——来自A股制造业上市公司的经验证据

本文以679家A股制造业上市公司2007～2009年间1946个时间序列的观测值为研究样本,实证检验了高管薪酬、团队特征与公司业绩之间的敏感性。实证结果表明:对制造业上市公司而言,高管薪酬与业绩是同向变化的;高管年龄越大,企业经营的惰性越大;高管的教育水平没有显著影响公司业绩;两职兼任利于管理层制定高薪酬,但是并没有显著提高企业绩效;管理层股权激励并没有显著提高公司业绩,但有助于管理层利用权力获取高额薪酬;财务杠杆成为拉低高管薪酬的反向力,一定程度上既有助于激励管理层实现组织目标,又能限制管理层利用权力从企业获得高薪酬。     

资本结构、股权结构与中小企业成长性——基于中小企业板数据的实证分析

本文以中小企业板上市企业2004-2009年数据为基础,以资产市值账面比衡量企业成长性,分析了我国中小上市企业资本结构和股权结构对成长性的影响。实证结果表明,资产负债率和长期负债率均对成长性具有显著正向影响,意味着较高的负债能降低外部权益成本,有利于中小上市企业的成长。成长性与股权集中度显著正相关,表明股权集中有利于股东对管理层进行监督,降低代理成本并能促进中小上市企业成长。管理层持股比重的改变对中小上市企业的成长性无显著影响。     

机构投资者、审计质量与环境绩效——来自中国重污染行业上市企业的经验证据

本文以2007—2011年我国沪深两市重污染行业上市企业为研究样本,考察审计质量对环境绩效的影响效应。研究发现:审计质量越高,企业环境绩效越好;对于股权集中度高的上市企业,审计质量与环境绩效无显著关系;对于股权集中度低的上市企业,审计质量与企业环境绩效具有显著的正相关关系。进一步研究发现,在股权集中度高的企业中,随着机构投资者持股比例的增加,审计质量对企业环境绩效影响更加显著。本文的研究有利于科学认识审计在环境绩效评价与治理方面的重要监督作用,也对我国制定环境绩效政策与完善企业治理具有参考价值。     

Common ownership and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from China

This study focuses on the impact of common ownership on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity using a sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2008 to 2020. We find common ownership significantly improves executive pay-for-performance sensitivity and plays a monitoring and governance role. Meanwhile, the impact of common ownership on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity is more significant in non-state-owned firms (non-SOEs) and when a firm faces a highly competitive product market. The mechanism tests indicate that common ownership affects executive pay-for-performance sensitivity through the information and governance mechanisms. Further analyses show that the portion of compensation explained by common ownership significantly enhances future firm performance. Overall, our findings validate the positive role of common ownership in corporate governance.     

Internal Governance Does Matter to Equity Returns but Much More So During “Flights to Quality”

Although few doubt that good internal governance helps firms perform better, the statistical evidence is actually mixed because the positive effects of good corporate governance matters much more so at some times than others. The statistical link is strongest during “flights to quality,” when market sentiment turns bearish and pessimistic but weakens for long periods of time during bull markets and low market volatility. Using more than ten years' evidence from Australian firms, the authors show that internal governance is related to both firm value and performance and that firms with stronger governance are less risky, generate higher equity returns and perform significantly better during market downturns. When risk aversion is high, demand for well‐governed firms increases and investors discount the value of firms with potential agency conflicts. This time‐varying relationship between internal governance and returns may explain both the limited explanatory power of governance on firm value and the mixed empirical evidence reported in previous studies. Firms with strong internal governance do earn significantly higher stock returns compared with firms with weak governance; but that also means that the value of governance is not fully incorporated into prices, thereby explaining the limited explanatory power of governance on firm value.     

Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled Chinese firms

We compare the sensitivity of managerial cash compensation to firm performance, the level of long term managerial incentives, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance for three types of state-controlled Chinese firms: A shares (firms incorporated and listed in mainland China), H shares (firms incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong), and Red Chip shares (firms incorporated outside mainland China and listed in Hong Kong). We find no difference in the three pay-for-performance sensitivity measures between H shares and A shares. The cash pay-for-performance sensitivity and the level of long-term managerial incentives are higher for Red Chip shares than for the other two firm types. However, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is insignificant for all three firm types. Our study illustrates the complexity in the influence of mainland China’s versus Hong Kong’s institutional forces on state-controlled Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong.     

Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany

Recent empirical work shows evidence for higher valuation of firms in countries with a better legal environment. We investigate whether differences in the quality of firm‐level corporate governance also help to explain firm performance in a cross‐section of companies within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a broad corporate governance rating (CGR) for German public firms, we document a positive relationship between governance practices and firm valuation. There is also evidence that expected stock returns are negatively correlated with firm‐level corporate governance, if dividend yields are used as proxies for the cost of capital. An investment strategy that bought high‐CGR firms and shorted low‐CGR firms earned abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual basis during the sample period.     

Managerial power, compensation gap and firm performance — Evidence from Chinese public listed companies

We study the relationship between compensation gap and firm performance in the Chinese market. Extant studies have shown that, for the publicly traded companies in China, compensation gap between senior executives plays a tournament role and motivates managers to achieve higher level of performance. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results confirm the above result. However, simultaneous regression results indicate that the tournament effect is more significant in firms with high managerial powers. Our finding suggests that previous findings using OLS might be incomplete. We also show that firms with better performance and greater managerial power tend to have greater compensation gap. Meanwhile, the relationship between managerial power and firm performance is, on average, negative.     

Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts

I investigate whether corporate governance is associated with the level of agency conflicts in firms. I employ exploratory principal components analysis on 22 individual governance variables to obtain seven factors that represent the different dimensions of governance for a firm. I measure the level of agency conflicts in firms based on seven proxies for agency conflicts used in the literature. I find that firms with greater agency conflicts have better governance mechanisms in place, particularly those related to the board, audit committee, and auditor. I also find that the composition and functioning of the board, the independence of the auditor, and the equity‐based compensation of directors are significantly associated with firm performance, but primarily for firms with high agency conflicts. Overall, the results support the theory that the existence and role of various governance mechanisms in a firm are a function of the level of agency conflicts in the firm.     

The Roles of Performance Measures and Monitoring in Annual Governance Decisions in Entrepreneurial Firms

This paper analyzes annual corporate governance decisions at firms making initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock between 1996 and 1999. Our objective is to examine relations between firms' corporate governance decisions and the informativeness of available measures of managerial performance. We consider financial measures such as earnings and stock return, as well as direct monitoring. We collect a sample of IPO firms from the manufacturing, Internet, and technology (non-Internet) industries, and examine how the use of various performance measures in annual compensation grants and turnover decisions varies with the information environment of the firm and with the extent of venture capital influence. Consistent with prior research that finds earnings are of limited usefulness in firm valuation for Internet firms, we find Internet firms place less importance on earnings and greater importance on stock returns in determining compensation grants than do non-Internet firms. We also find that compensation grants of firms with little or no venture capital influence display significantly stronger association with accounting and stock performance measures than those of firms with more intense monitoring by venture capitalists. This result is consistent with direct monitoring and the use of explicit performance measures acting as substitute governance mechanisms.     

Does corporate tax avoidance promote managerial empire building?

We examine the association between corporate tax avoidance and empire building using 35,060 firm-year observations from the United States (US) for the period 1991–2015. We build a composite empire building measure by conducting a factor analysis on four popular empire building proxies used in the literature. We find a positive association between this composite measure and the four proxies used to represent the tax avoidance of firms in our sample. As our results suggest, agency problems are inflicted upon firms employing tax avoidance strategies which, in turn, facilitate managerial rent extraction through aggressiveness in growth and the accumulation of assets. Furthermore, the relationship of corporate tax avoidance to managerial empire building is found to be more pronounced in firms with weak governance, poor monitoring mechanisms, greater Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power and weak corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. We also find that empire building-motivated tax avoidance leads to lower firm valuation. Our results remain insensitive even when employing several robustness tests.     

Electing Directors

Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendations, have little economic impact on shareholder votes—even poorly performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless, fewer votes lead to lower "abnormal" CEO compensation and a higher probability of removing poison pills, classified boards, and CEOs. Meanwhile, director votes have little impact on election outcomes, firm performance, or director reputation. These results provide important benchmarks for the current debate on election reforms.     

Corporate governance and operating performance of Chinese listed firms

In this paper, we investigate the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation in China. Our study introduces a composite measure of corporate governance to measure the association between corporate governance and Chinese firms’ performance and valuation. Because agency theory suggests that companies with better corporate governance standards perform better, we propose that better governed Chinese firms would have greater performance and higher valuation. We find that our composite measure of corporate governance is positively and significantly associated with firm performance and valuation. These findings have implications for policy makers, researchers, managers, and investors in general and those in emerging markets in particular.