试论交易成本的影响面与经济优化

自从科斯在《企业的本质》提出交易成本以来，传统的经济学一直用这一理论解释企业代替市场的原因，本文试图把科斯近理论用来解释帕累托效率和经济制度变迁的理论，说明在交易成本存在的情况下，现的经济只能达到帕累托“次”优，而非理想中的帕累托最优；同时，交易成本的存在也会延缓制度的变迁，从而不能实现理想的制度演化。     

我国技术中介市场的“脱媒效应”及其经济学解释——基于阶层结构模型的视角

"脱媒效应"是技术中介市场上游环节不健全的集中体现,不同转型路径的帕累托改善条件主要由层级收益指数的大小决定,层次收益的方向与强度将对不同路径的层级值产生影响,同时由交易型路径直接向创业创新型路径转型的改善条件最优。我国技术中介市场顶层设计的关键是促进技术中介市场由支持交易型向支持创业创新型直接转变,将技术中介的功能分工与政府的作用相结合,围绕阶层结构的不同环节对中介功能与组织进行多层次整合。     

当代经济科学2006年总目录（1—6期）

第1期构建后WTO时代金融稳定的长效机制……………何德旭中国货币替代现象的VEC模型:1994-2005……李强中国金融发展与城乡收入差距关系的再检验———基于面板单位根和VAR模型的估计…………………………………尹希果,陈刚,程世骑农民工的社会网络与职业阶层和收入:来自深圳调查的发现…………李树茁,杨绪松,任义科,靳小怡新农村建设:一个政治经济学视角的解析…………高帆层级结构合作博弈、帕累托改善悖论和中国经济制度变迁………………………………何晓琦,蒋志永二元性问题的讨论:我们忽略了什么———一个基于资源占有非均衡的分…     

信息揭示与资本市场效率—信息有效与配置有效

本文运用信息不对称理论和随机鞅理论分别从基于可得信息集和完全信息集这两个角度深入地探讨了资本市场的信息有效性与资源配置最优性和次优性。在理性预期和交易成本为零的假定下,其基本结论有四：一是资本市场（条件）有效等价于事后帕累托最优,资本市场完全有效等价于事前帕累托最优;二是资本市场事后帕累托最优的充要条件是信息强对称;三是资本市场事前帕累托最优的充要条件是信息强对称和信息强完全;四是不满足信息强对称的资本市场一般只能实现事后帕累托次优,而不同时满足信息强对称和信息强完全的资本市场一般只能实现事前帕累托次优。最后,根据上述观点提出了实现资本市场完全有效或事前帕累托最优的对策建议。     

电子商务市场价格离散度的收敛分析

本文运用信息不对称理论和随机鞅理论分别从基于可得信息集和完全信息集这两个角度深入地探讨了资本市场的信息有效性与资源配置最优性和次优性。在理性预期和交易成本为零的假定下,其基本结论有四:一是资本市场(条件)有效等价于事后帕累托最优,资本市场完全有效等价于事前帕累托最优;二是资本市场事后帕累托最优的充要条件是信息强对称;三是资本市场事前帕累托最优的充要条件是信息强对称和信息强完全;四是不满足信息强对称的资本市场一般只能实现事后帕累托次优,而不同时满足信息强对称和信息强完全的资本市场一般只能实现事前帕累托次优。最后,根据上述观点提出了实现资本市场完全有效或事前帕累托最优的对策建议。     

人力资本管理中的帕累托法则

帕累托法则又称为二八法则,它揭示了成本与收益、原因与结果之间普遍存在的不平衡关系,即起关键作用的少部分因素通常能对整个组织的产出,盈亏和成败起决定性的作用.帕累托法则已成功运用于商业、教育、娱乐、医疗卫生等领域,但在人力资本管理过程中尚未充分运用.本文将对帕累托法则在人力资本管理过程中的运用进行初步的研究和总结.     

城市的力量:农民工层级迁移与工资溢价

中国特有的城市行政层级体系,以"资源配置的行政中心偏向"为特征,强化了农民工向高行政层级城市迁移的惯性趋势.文章利用2013年和2019年的千村调查数据,研究农民工的层级迁移行为及工资溢价效应.结果显示:首先,行政级别高的城市更容易吸引文化程度高、工作经验丰富和有配偶随迁的农民工,而携带子女随迁的农民工更倾向于普通地级市.其次,行政级别高的城市促进了集聚经济的正外部性,通过提升劳动生产率提高工资水平.最后,研究发现城市的行政级别会通过房价、基础设施、公共服务的中介作用产生工资溢价.总之,城市的发展是一个动态增长的过程:初始阶段,行政层级通过城市集聚效应、生活成本补偿的市场价格力量产生工资溢价.随着要素集聚导致城市扩张,基础设施的承载力跟不上人口的增速,就通过行政力量再次分配公共服务资源来调节人口流动.因此,需要平衡城市的行政力量和市场力量,构建合理的"等级-规模"分布层级结构,并且均等分配公共服务资源,引导异质性农民工分类分层迁移和实现劳动力资源优化配置.     

产学研协同创新成本分摊机制研究

产学研协同创新是推动技术创新的一条重要路径,但创新成本分摊机制是影响产学研协同合作的一个重要问题。通过构建充分竞争市场下的多阶段博弈模型,从成本分摊机制角度探究了如何有效推进产学研协同创新。通过模型扩展与求解,获得成本分摊后的帕累托改善以及产学研协同创新的可行路径。结果表明：企业和学研方基于自身收益最大化而进行的成本分摊协商无法实现帕累托最优,而轮流出价博弈模型下的成本分摊形成机制能够有效改善各方收益,并使整体收益达到帕累托最优,因此是一条现实可行的帕累托改善路径,其中,各方获得的收益增量与耐心程度的对比有关。     

人力资本的市场失灵及其矫正

工业产品的生产一旦出现了市场失灵,其产量就会偏离帕累托最优水平;同理,人力资本投资如果存在市场失灵,那么,产量也不会实现帕累托最优。尽管度量人力资本还存在着技术困难,但只要正确认识并消除了市场失灵,做到既定资源投资到人力资本与物质资本上的边际报酬相等,帕累托最优水平的人力资本投资量仍可能实现。该文在全面认识人力资本市场的失灵后,从新古典主义、新兴古典主义、新制度主义经济学角度出发,分别给出了消除市场失灵,实现人力资本投资帕累托改进的措施。     

"帕累托效率原理"与构建和谐社会

文章通过对帕累托改进原理内在逻辑的分析,结合中国经济改革实践的讨论,在肯定阿马蒂亚·森对帕累托最优原理适用于"从地狱到天堂"的质疑具有合理性的同时,认为帕累托改进原理具有巨大的普适性,"从地狱到天堂"的景象应通过,也可以通过帕累托改进而加以避免.在此基础上,文章还就中国经济改革如何调整帕累托改进的选择方向,努力实现社会和谐,提出了若干政策建议.     

The firm's administrative structure: Theory,measurement and applications to growth accounting and income distribution

This paper attempts to analyze the implications of the organizational structure of the firms on economic growth and income distribution. The approach used byBeckmann [1977] is generalized and used explicitly as the starting point. The impact of the administrative structure on output growth is then studied using an extension of the Growth-Accounting-Method incorporating the quality of the labor force. Regarding income distribution it is shown that the coefficients of Pareto distributions can be obtained from the characteristics of the administrative structure. Their contribution to growth is evaluated.     

Participation constraints of matching mechanisms

Matching mechanisms have been proposed to improve public good provision in voluntary contributions. However, such decentralized subsidizing mechanisms may not be Pareto‐improving and may suffer from incomplete information and incredible commitment. This paper examines participation constraints of matching mechanisms with small matching rates in two cases of equilibria. At interior equilibria, there always exist small Pareto‐improving matching schemes regardless of preferences. This universal existence is useful for cooperation among heterogeneous players in the context without global information of preferences or at the international level without central governments. At corner equilibria, matching schemes work in different ways and have distinct welfare effects in certain cases, and the existence of Pareto‐improving matching schemes is not universal but is possible under certain conditions. The paper further characterizes Pareto‐improving matching schemes, and shows that it is easier to reach Pareto‐improving matching outcomes if players value more on public goods and have stronger substitution between private and public goods.     

Externality Policy Reform: A General Equilibrium Analysis

We characterize Pareto‐improving and equilibrium‐preserving policy reforms in a second‐best (Diamond/Mirrlees) world with a consumption externality. A counterintuitive finding is that, starting from an initial equilibrium with no direct quantity control on the externality, it is possible that all Pareto‐improving and equilibrium‐preserving directions of change require an increase in a negative externality. We provide intuition for these results by establishing a nexus between Guesnerie's approach to designing (tax) policy reforms and the standard Kuhn–Tucker technique for identifying the manifold of feasible Pareto‐optimal states, given the instruments available to the policy maker.     

The taxation of trades in assets

When the asset market is incomplete, there typically exist taxes on trades in assets that are Pareto improving. This fiscal policy is anonymous, it is fully and correctly anticipated by traders, and it results in ex post Pareto optimal allocations; as such, it improves over previously proposed constrained interventions.     

Global public goods and unilateral matching mechanisms

While conventional agreements on international public goods require bilateral or multilateral cooperation, we show that unilateral action through matching mechanisms with a self‐commitment device can possibly generate Pareto‐improving outcomes. Even without commitment, unilateral matching may also benefit both players at corner situations. We further characterize the conditions under which this desirable outcome is achieved, particularly highlighting the role of the income distribution and its interplay with the preferences. Moreover, we propose a variant of unilateral matching that can generate Pareto‐improving outcomes regardless of the preferences and the income distribution, indicating that income inequality may not be an obstacle for improving public good provision through unilateral matching.     

The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test

In collaborative negotiation, stakeholder representatives are charged with the development of a mutually acceptable set of public policies. Although this approach has become popular in environmental negotiations, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached. In this paper, we employ an Edgeworth box framework to investigate the nature of bargaining over public goods (environmental policies) that have multiple attributes. We then design and conduct laboratory experiments within this framework to test whether negotiated outcomes satisfy standard axiomatic bargaining predictions under a variety of conditions. Specifically, we test whether two parties with Pareto inefficient endowments of two goods will trade to Pareto improving and Pareto efficient outcomes, and to the Nash bargain in particular. We vary whether the Nash bargain coincides with or diverges from the outcome that maximizes the joint payoff, or the outcome that equalizes payoffs, and whether subjects are provided full or partial information. We find that bargainers reach Pareto improving and efficient outcomes across treatments, but withdraw support for the Nash bargain when it generates unequal payments or when payoff information is private. We conclude that this experimental framework offers a promising method for studying multi-attribute negotiations.     

Threatened Species as Public Goods and Public Bads

This paper discusses Pareto efficient allocations of an environmental commodity, which is both a public good and a public bad, with an application to the Scandinavian problem of conserving wild predators that are killing semi-domesticated reindeer. The paper begins by briefly outlining this conflict. This is followed by a theoretical analysis employing a diagrammatic tool called the Kolm triangle, which is an analogue of an Edgeworth box in an economy with a public good. Bargaining, Pareto improving reallocations and the shape of the Pareto set are discussed, using a simple model, where one of the agents is involountarily contributing to a public good. The paper concludes with an analysis of income-loss compensations and incentives for illegal hunting of predators.     

Welfare and excess volatility of exchange rates

We study the properties of a GEI model with nominal assets, outside money (injected into the economy as in Magill and Quinzii (J Math Econ 21:301–342, 1992)), and multiple currencies. We analyze the existence of monetary equilibria and the structure of the equilibrium set under two different assumptions on the determination of the exchange rates. If currencies are perfect substitutes, equilibrium allocations are indeterminate and, generically, sunspot equilibria exist. Generically, given a nonsunspot equilibrium, there are Pareto improving (and Pareto worsening) sunspot equilibria associated with an increase in the volatility of the future exchange rates. We interpret this property as showing that, in general, there is no clear-cut effect on welfare of the excess volatility of exchange rates, even when due to purely extrinsic phenomena.     

银行业结构影响中小企业信贷能力? ——基于分层线性模型实证

中小企业融资问题引起了我国普遍关注。基于wind数据库,利用分层线性模型考察了企业规模与银行业结构对中小企业信贷能力的影响,并引入了商业信用环境变量,研究不同商业信用环境下,该影响是否会发生变化。研究发现,企业规模越大,银行业结构越分散,企业信贷能力越强,但该影响程度随着商业信用环境的提高而减弱。本研究对于如何提高中小企业信贷能力具有重要参考意义。     

Liberal parentalism

What normative constraints should bind parents (or policy makers) if they intervene in the choices of children (or constituencies) whose preferences evolve over time? For a sophisticated child who anticipates correctly his preference change, we prove that generically there exist parental interventions that are Pareto improving over the backward induction path that the child will follow on his own. If, in contrast, the child misperceives his future preferences, Pareto improving interventions might not exist, and even nudges might be painfully sobering. The parent may then choose to minimize the maximal disappointment along time that her benevolent intervention would cause.