Capital Regulation with Two Banking Sectors: Cyclicality and Implementation

We present a capital regulation policy in a model in which banks can choose to be unregulated, by operating in the shadow banking sector, when the cost of being regulated (restriction on portfolio risk) exceeds the benefit (cheaper funding/insurance). We show that the welfare maximizing capital requirement policy can be procyclical: lower requirement during booms and higher requirement during recessions. Our policy specifies the level of capital requirement as a function of the observed relative size of the unregulated and regulated banking sectors. This specification achieves the optimal aggregate risk exposure by obtaining the right mix of the two sectors.     

Competition and innovation: Evidence from financial services

This paper presents new evidence on the relationship between competition and innovation by extending previous literature from manufacturing to financial services. We introduce a new measure of overall innovation by estimating and enveloping annual minimum cost frontiers to create a global frontier. The distance to the global frontier constitutes each bank’s technology gap, which decreases if the bank manages to innovate. Our innovation measure enables us to derive and estimate the model of Aghion et al. (2005b) at the firm level for the US banking industry. Based on individual bank Call Report data for the period 1984–2004, consistent with theoretical and empirical work by Aghion et al., we find evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation that is robust over several different specifications. Further evidence on major structural changes in the US banking industry indicates that banks moved beyond their optimal innovation level and that interstate banking deregulation resulted in lower bank innovation. Policy implications to financial reform and prudential regulation are discussed also.     

Market concentration and bank competition in emerging asian countries over pre and post the 2008 global financial crisis

This paper examines the relationships between market concentration, bank competition, and efficiency in banking across six emerging Asian countries namely Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam over the period 2005 to 2012. The countries selected for this study operate commercial banking activities with a comparatively large number of both publicly listed and private commercial banks providing a broad range of commercial banking services. For example, banks in Bangladesh, India and Vietnam used to be predominantly state-owned. But over the last few decades, governments have been issuing licenses to private owners. The methodological approach taken by our study provides an important and original contribution to the extant literature by testing various hypothesis that investigate the relationship between competition and efficiency across banks from a select group of Asian countries. We find that market concentration has a positive effect whereas competition has a negative effect on the efficiency of banks operating in these countries. This finding conveys a critically important message to the regulators of banks in these countries: there is a trade-off between quantity and quality. Our analyses also reveal that the effect of bank size on efficiency is positive whereas the effect of liquidity risk on efficiency is negative. This again supports the conventional wisdom that large banks are in a position to provide cost efficient services because they have the ability to attain economies of scale and scopes. Here again, the regulators have very important roles to play: while they have to put in place effective mechanism preventing big banks from being an oligarchy; at the same time, they should make sure that banks get liquidity support as funding pressure builds up.     

Private Money and Banking Regulation

We show that a competitive banking system is inconsistent with an optimum quantity of private money. Because bankers cannot commit to their promises and the composition of their assets is not publicly observable, a positive franchise value is required to induce the full convertibility of bank liabilities. Under perfect competition, a positive franchise value can be obtained only if the return on bank liabilities is sufficiently low, which imposes a cost on those who hold these liabilities for transaction purposes. If the banking system is monopolistic, then an efficient allocation is incentive feasible. In this case, the members of the banking system obtain a higher return on assets, making it feasible to pay a sufficiently high return on bank liabilities. Finally, we argue that the regulation of the banking system is required to obtain efficiency.     

The impact of regulatory reforms on cost structure,ownership and competition in Indian banking

This paper evaluates the impact of financial sector reforms on the cost structure characteristics and on the ownership–cost efficiency relationship in Indian banking. It also examines the impact of reforms on the dynamics of competition in the lending market. We find evidence that deregulation improves banks performance and fosters competition in the lending market. Results suggest technological progress, once Indian commercial banks have adjusted to the new regulatory environment. This, however, does not translate in efficiency gains. There is also evidence of an ownership effect on the level and pattern of efficiency change. Finally, competition keeps building pace even in the re-regulation period and technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms.     

资本监管对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响研究

2004年《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》颁布后,我国开始真正意义上的资本监管。统一的资本监管标准．有利于银行业市场竞争的公平性。本文通过对资本监管与银行业市场竞争度的相关性分析和Granger因果检验,探讨了资本监管对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响。结果发现,资本监管与银行业市场竞争度存在相关性,但相关系数较低,且他们之间没有明显的因果关系,我国商业银行资本监管还有待进一步的改进和完善。     

The economic effects of foreign bank presence: Evidence from the Philippines

This study examines the economic effects of the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the Philippines from 1990 to 2006. The findings provide strong evidence on the dominance of competition effects from foreign bank presence which lead to the reduction in the profitability and overhead costs of domestic commercial banks. These findings, which reveal that both the actual market penetration and mere presence of foreign banks seem to exert competitive pressure to domestic banks, imply that foreign banks may serve as an effective competitive force, reducing the excess profits earned by domestic banks and compelling domestic banks to update their production technologies and techniques to improve their cost efficiency.From a policy perspective, the findings on competition effects of foreign banks in the domestic banking system justify the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the Philippines. The main findings demonstrate that the goal of banking liberalization in transforming domestic banks to be more competitive and efficient works considerably well in the case of the Philippines. Aside from the policy of easing the entry of foreign banks, bank-specific conditions can have significant impact on the performance of domestic banks. Therefore, a sustained improvement in the efficiency of domestic commercial banks requires not only liberalizing the entry of foreign banks, but also on continued strengthening of domestic prudential regulation and supervision on the commercial banking system.     

The persistence of profits of banks in Africa

This paper analyses the profit persistence of African banking sector, focusing on the role of the level of competition and banks earnings management. We apply Markov chain to analyse the extent and mobility of profit persistence, dynamic auto regressive model to assess the speed of convergence and the quantile regression technique to examine the determinants of profit persistence of banks in Africa. The results show a high level of profit persistence and relatively low speed of convergence. There is also evidence that regulation and banks earnings management affect both the level and persistence of banks profitability. We also find that competition as well as 2007/2008 financial crisis reduce the level and the speed of profit persistence.     

How do bank competition,regulation, and institutions shape the real effect of banking crises? International evidence

This paper studies the influence of bank competition on the real effect of 36 systemic banking crises in 30 countries over the 1980–2000 period and how this influence varies across countries depending on bank regulation and institutions. We find that bank market power is not on average useful for mitigating the negative real effect of a systemic banking crisis. Market power promotes higher growth during normal times in industries that are more dependent on external finance but induces a bigger reduction in growth during systemic banking crises. We also find a country-specific effect depending on bank regulation and institutions. Stringent capital requirements and poor protection of creditor rights increase the benefits of bank market power for mitigating the negative real effect of a systemic banking crisis because bank market power has a positive effect on economic growth during both crisis and non-crisis periods in these environments.     

The Puzzle Between Banking Competition and Profitability can be Solved: International Evidence from Bank-Level Data

This article applies the GMM techniques for dynamic panels using bank-level data for 61 countries over the period 1992 to 2006 to re-investigate the impact of banking competition on profitability. The extant literature, which ignores influence factors, presents ambiguity towards the impact of banking competition on profitability. However, when the effects of a broad range of factors are taken into consideration, five conclusions are reached. First, along with the change in market structure, a higher degree of activity restriction enhances banks’ profits. Second, restrictions on the rights of commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and other non-banking-related business, along with restrictions on the entry of foreign banks into these markets, weaken the positive relationship between banking competition and profits. Third, a higher degree of efficiency within the judicial system and the added protection afforded to investors may weaken or else have no impact on the positive relationship. Fourth, the positive relationship may weaken in countries having a sound financial system or high income per capita. Finally, greater competitive pressure facing banks may weaken or eliminate the impact of banking competition on profit.     

Bank activity and funding strategies: The impact on risk and returns

This paper examines the implications of bank activity and short-term funding strategies for bank risk and return using an international sample of 1,334 banks in 101 countries leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. Expansion into noninterest income-generating activities such as trading increases the rate of return on assets, and it could offer some risk diversification benefits at very low levels. Nondeposit, wholesale funding in contrast lowers the rate of return on assets, while it can offer some risk reduction at commonly observed low levels of nondeposit funding. A sizable proportion of banks, however, attract most of their short-term funding in the form of nondeposits at a cost of enhanced bank fragility. Overall, banking strategies that rely prominently on generating noninterest income or attracting nondeposit funding are very risky, consistent with the demise of the US investment banking sector.     

资产透明度、监管套利与银行系统性风险

资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISK、MES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。     

关于集合资金信托成为信托业主流业务的探讨

按照现行规定,信托业目前可以开办信托业务、投资基金业务、投资银行业务、中间业务和其他业务,但最有条件成为信托业未来主流业务的当属集合资金信托业务.要完成这一使命,首先必须客观分析集合资金信托业务在与基金管理公司、商业银行开办的雷同业务竞争中所具有的优势与劣势,然后及时解决业务开展过程中所存在的各种不利于其快速健康发展的政策难题、技术难题.     

Do environmental variables affect the performance and technical efficiency of the European banking systems? A parametric analysis using the stochastic frontier approach

The paper compares the efficiency of the European banking systems in view of the constitution of the European Monetary Union. Since competition among banks will increase, it is important to identify the most efficient banking system able to play a role in that market. A parametric approach is adopted, based on the estimation of a stochastic cost frontier. This methodology enables one to measure X-inefficiency and to model it as a function of environmental variables which may influence firms' efficiency. By means of this analysis it is possible to identify the most efficient banking systems and to focus on the determinants of deviations from cost minimizing. The analysis highlights significant efficiency gaps among the performances of banks in different countries and of different institutional types. In particular, it is found that the Mittel-European model is the one that operates closest to the efficient frontier. This may indicate that, compared with separated banks, the universal banking system allows for production plans which come closer to the optimal frontier. The analysis suggests that, at the beginning of European Monetary Union, national barriers and regulatory frameworks are still responsible for deviation from the efficient frontiers.     

Restructuring,consolidation and competition in Latin American banking markets

This study examines the competitive conditions in the banking industries of eleven Latin American countries for the period 1993–2000. For these countries, the time interval under examination corresponds to an era characterized by substantial reforms to restructure their banking systems, increased consolidation and foreign bank penetration. The banks in our sample are found to be earning their revenues as if operating under monopolistic competition, as in many other developed and emerging financial systems. The results indicate that, overall, market concentration is not significantly related with competitive conduct. At the country level, however, we do observe a decline in competition for Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela in late 1990s which may be attributable to increased consolidation. Further, we observe that deregulation and opening up of the financial markets for foreign participation serves as an important catalyst to increase the competitiveness of banking markets. Higher degree of competition in the sector, in return, is associated with reduced bank margins and profitability but improved cost efficiency.     

银行业集中、竞争与稳定的研究述评

传统的观点认为银行业的集中有助于系统的稳定,这导致众多国家采取各种监管政策来限制竞争。但是,对于银行系统的竞争与集中对稳定性的影响,理论分析与实证研究均给出模糊的结论。本文分析各种度量竞争与稳定的方法,并在对1990~2010年间有关竞争、集中与稳定性的文献进行综述的基础上,提出了相应的政策建议,以期为我国银行业的监管提供启示和借鉴。     

中国影子银行的经济学分析:定义、构成和规模测算

2008年国际金融危机以后,中国金融体系发生的重大变化之一是影子银行的较快发展,其规模迅速膨胀,交易结构日趋复杂,各类市场主体都牵涉其中。这些变化吸引了政策制订者和学术界的广泛关注。本文给出了中国影子银行的功能性定义,即依赖于银行信用、从事银行业务、但又没接受严格的银行业监管的金融业务,具体指传统的银行表内贷款和债券投资以外的,具备完整的信用转换、期限转换和流动性转换功能的金融业务。本文逐项分析影子银行业务,详细总结各类型业务的交易结构、业务主体、业务实质、资金来源、法律基础、资产负债表表示,准确测算了2002年至今影子银行总量和资产负债表结构月度数据。只从资产负债表的负债端着手加总,既完整地涵盖了影子银行的全部业务,得到其宏观总量,又剔除了重复计算。本文测算数据为后续研究打下了基础。     

Multiple bank regulators and risk taking

The potential for banks to arbitrage between regulators exists both in the US, with its multiple federal banking regulators, and in Europe, due to multinational banking. This paper models multiple regulators that have an agency bias, which can give rise to a “race to the bottom”. The model is used to analyze the interaction between the regulatory equilibrium and several salient pre-crisis features: rising bank leverage; wholesale funding with asymmetric information; and increasing supervisional costs to disentangling bank asset exposures. Each of these raises bank risk taking on its own, but regulatory competition is shown to be an amplification mechanism.     

How Does Cross‐Border Activity Affect EU Banking Markets?

Cross‐border activity in the EU is widely viewed as a necessary condition for the implementation of a single banking market and therefore as a positive factor for the enhancement of competition and cost performance in the region. In this paper, we analyse the relevance of this view by investigating whether cross‐border activity really promotes competition and cost efficiency in EU banking markets. We also consider the potential role of a bank's mode of entry by comparing existing domestic banks that foreign banks take over (mergers and acquisitions) with new branches created by foreign banks, often through subsidiaries (greenfield operations). We consider the impact of cross‐border banks on cost efficiency (measured by the stochastic frontier approach), profitability (assessed through return on assets) and competition (measured by the Lerner index). We find that greenfield banks enhance cost efficiency and competition, while mergers and acquisitions hamper competition and cost efficiency. Therefore, our results suggest that EU authorities should promote only greenfield banks rather than all cross‐border entries.     

Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system it is necessary to raise the level of bank information disclosure. However, its influence on bank competition – which is an important factor affecting the efficiency and stability of the banking system – is left out of consideration. To test whether greater bank information disclosure is associated with both lower market power and lower concentration in the banking markets, we use country-level data covering the years 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010. Our findings show that countries with higher levels of bank transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and market power is less pronounced. We also show that the reduction of competition due to stricter disclosure requirements depends on bank credit risks and the relationship is U-shaped.