How Does Information Disclosure Affect Bank Systemic Risk in the Presence of a Deposit Insurance System?

ABSTRACT

This article establishes a dynamic game with incomplete information to theoretically analyze the influence mechanism of information disclosure on systemic risk in the presence of a deposit insurance system. To verify the mechanism, we use panel data on 247 global banks in 41 countries during the period 2006 to 2015 in an empirical analysis. Our article finds that a high degree of information disclosure can reduce deposit insurance premiums and weaken the negative incentive from a bailout by regulatory authorities. Moreover, the effect of deposit insurance on financial stability is not apparent, but the synergistic effect of deposit insurance and information disclosure reduces bank systemic risk. Furthermore, different deposit insurance designs affect bank behavior, so it is crucial for bank supervisors to create proper deposit insurance systems, which are helpful in strengthening market discipline and preventing moral hazard thus contributing to a stable financial environment. Therefore, under the deposit insurance system, regulatory authorities should strive to improve the standard of information disclosure to ensure systemic stability.     

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post‐bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank‐level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign‐bank loop.     

How Much of Bank Credit Risk Is Sovereign Risk? Evidence from Europe

We examine European banks' exposures to systematic and country‐specific sovereign risk. We organize our investigation around a multifactor affine credit risk model estimated on credit default swap data of different maturities. During the 2008–15 period, about one third of banks' credit risk is sovereign. However, banks strongly differ both in the magnitude and type of their sovereign exposures. Measures of indirect exposures, such as bank size and return on equity, capture these cross‐sectional differences better than measures of direct exposures. Furthermore, the properties of the distress risk premiums turn out to be important to understand the effect of sovereign risk on bank funding costs.     

Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk?

Several studies suggest that a firm distress risk factor could be behind the size and the book-to-market effects. A natural proxy for firm distress is bankruptcy risk. If bankruptcy risk is systematic, one would expect a positive association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent realized returns. However, results demonstrate that bankruptcy risk is not rewarded by higher returns. Thus, a distress factor is unlikely to account for the size and book-to-market effects. Surprisingly, firms with high bankruptcy risk earn lower than average returns since 1980. A risk-based explanation cannot fully explain the anomalous evidence.     

The Information Environment of China's A and B Shares: Can We Make Sense of the Numbers?

In 1990, three stock exchanges were opened in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing. Partial privatization of China's enterprises began with offering two types of shares: A shares are sold only domestically to locals and are denominated in local currency; B shares are denominated in dollars and are sold only to foreign investors. All listed firms offer A shares, but to qualify for offering B shares, the firm must prepare financial statements in accordance with International Accounting Standards and also meet other requirements. Firms issuing A shares only adopt domestic accounting regulations.As a way of generating capital funds, market segmentation has been a success. Both types of shares, however, have two different information environments. The environment of A shares appears to be dominated by local regulations and customs at the time of offering or trading. The information environment of A shares appears to be relatively unstructured and is affected by informal communication between various groups. Other than the roles played by state officials and appointed managers, external monitoring of A shares appears to be limited. Independence and social acceptance of auditing appear to be making slow progress, especially when the majority of domestic CPA firms are government owned. In contrast, the information environment for the B shares is more structured because (1) financial reporting adheres to International Accounting Standards, (2) financial statements are audited by CPA firms with international practice; and (3) foreign investors — mainly large financial institutions — also act as external monitors.We elaborate on the differences between these two information environments and suggest that accounting earnings and A share prices are not correlated, but earnings and share prices are correlated for B shares. In an event-study approach, we find results inconsistent with both hypotheses — for 1994 and 1995 we find that earnings and unexpected returns are correlated for A shares but not for B shares. The high price volatility, the significant and continuing dominance of government officials, and the thinness of trade in B shares are offered as possible explanation for these results.     

Can News Be a Major Source of Aggregate Fluctuations? A Bayesian DSGE Approach

We examine whether the news shocks, as explored in Beaudry and Portier (2004) , can be a major source of aggregate fluctuations. For this purpose, we extend a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) by allowing news shocks on the total factor productivity (TFP), and estimate the model using Bayesian methods. Estimation results on the U.S. and Japanese economies suggest that (i) news shocks play a relatively more important role in the United States than in Japan, (ii) a news shock with a longer forecast horizon has larger effects on nominal variables, and (iii) the overall effect of the TFP on hours worked becomes ambiguous in the presence of news shocks.     

The Effects of the Sharing Economy: How Does Internet Finance Influence Commercial Bank Risk Preferences?

In this article, we provide an evidence on the effects of the sharing economy by studying internet finance. It aims to explore how internet finance affects the relationship between commercial bank risk preferences and monetary policy, and discusses whether this impact varies across heterogeneous banks. The results suggest that having a loose monetary policy encourages a preference for risk. In addition, internet finance alters the sensitivity of bank risk behavior to monetary policy. Internet finance has a heterogeneous influence, depending on a bank’s ownership (i.e., state or private) and size. At privately owned banks, internet finance has only a moderate impact on the bank risk-taking transmission channel of monetary policy, unlike the subsample of large banks.     

Does Risk Management Add Value? A Survey of the Evidence

The fact that 92% of the world's 500 largest companies recently reported using derivatives suggests that corporate managers believe financial risk management can increase shareholder value. Surveys of finance academics indicate that they too believe that corporate risk management is, on the whole, a valueadding activity. This article provides an overview of almost 30 years of broadbased, stock‐market‐oriented academic studies that address one or more of the following questions:

• ? Are interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price risks reflected in stock price movements?
• ? Is volatility in corporate earnings and cash flows related in a systematic way to corporate market values?
• ? Is the corporate use of derivatives associated with reduced risk and higher market values?

The answer to the first question, at least in the case of financial institutions and interest rate risk, is a definite yes; all studies with this focus find that the stock returns of financial firms are clearly sensitive to interest rate changes. The stock returns of industrial companies exhibit no pronounced interest rate exposure (at least as a group), but industrial firms with significant cross‐border revenues and costs show considerable sensitivity to exchange rates (although such sensitivity actually appears to be reduced by the size and geographical diversity of the largest multinationals). What's more, the corporate use of derivatives to hedge interest rate and currency exposures appears to be associated with lower sensitivity of stock returns to interest rate and FX changes. But does the resulting reduction in price sensitivity affect value—and, if so, how? Consistent with a widely cited theory that risk management increases value by limiting the corporate “underinvestment problem,” a number of studies show a correlation between lower cash flow volatility and higher corporate investment and market values. The article also cites a small but growing group of studies that show a strong positive association between derivatives use and stock price performance (typically measured using price‐to‐book ratios). But perhaps the nearest the research comes to establishing causality are two studies—one of companies that hedge FX exposures and another of airlines' hedging of fuel costs—that show that, in industries where hedging with derivatives is common, companies that hedge outperform companies that don't.     

Can Time‐Varying Risk of Rare Disasters Explain Aggregate Stock Market Volatility?

Why is the equity premium so high, and why are stocks so volatile? Why are stock returns in excess of government bill rates predictable? This paper proposes an answer to these questions based on a time‐varying probability of a consumption disaster. In the model, aggregate consumption follows a normal distribution with low volatility most of the time, but with some probability of a consumption realization far out in the left tail. The possibility of this poor outcome substantially increases the equity premium, while time‐variation in the probability of this outcome drives high stock market volatility and excess return predictability.     

Do Solicitations Matter in Bank Credit Ratings? Results from a Study of 72 Countries

Would the credit ratings of unsolicited banks be higher if they were solicited? Alternatively, would the credit ratings of solicited banks would be lower if they were unsolicited? To answer these questions, we use an endogenous regime-switching model and data from 460 commercial banks in 72 countries, excluding the United States, for the period 1998–2003. The answer to both questions is yes. Our results show that the observed differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings can be explained by both the solicitation status and financial profile of the banks. This finding is a new contribution to the literature.     

Trust in a High‐concern Risk Controversy: A Comparison of Three Concepts

A community survey examined factors affecting the trust of four groups involved in a high concern controversy over the risks posed by motor boats to the quality of a municipal water supply. In an effort at conceptual integration the survey results were used to examine the relationships between three concepts of trust. Perceived agreement in values between self and four controversy‐involved groups was found to be the most powerful predictor of trust of all four groups, as expected by the salient value similarity perspective. “Fairness” and “competency,” as expected by the “dimensions” of trust perspective were also found to be significant predictors of trust. However, judgments of “fairness” and “competency” were context specific as indicated by significant correlations with judgments of salient value similarity and self interests. This violates the assumption of universality of the “dimensions” of trust perspective. Judgments of similarity of values between self and the controversy‐involved groups were significantly correlated to self interests. This indicates a conceptual overlap between the salient values similarities perspective and the encapsulated trust perspective.     

A Note on Loadings and Deductibles: Can a Vicious Circle Arise?

In a recently reprinted paper Borch wonders whether an increase in insurance loadings, together with the consequent increase in customers' deductibles, may be the start of a vicious circle, in which higher deductibles produce higher loadings and vice versa, ad infinitum. This paper rules out the possibility of a vicious circle, in a model à la Borch. First of all, increases in costs of the type considered by Borch are not necessarily followed by increases in loadings. Second, increases in loadings are not necessarily followed by increases in deductibles, since in equilibrium insurance may be Giffen. Last but not least, loadings do not increase with deductibles, because the only viable equilibrium is a Stackelberg one.     

Can We Explain Inflation Persistence in a Way that Is Consistent with the Microevidence on Nominal Rigidity?

This paper adopts the impulse-response methodology to understand inflation persistence. It has often been argued that existing models of pricing fail to explain the persistence that we observe. We adopt a common general framework that allows for an explicit modeling of the distribution of contract lengths and for different types of price setting. We also evaluate how far the theories are consistent with recent evidence on price and wage rigidity. We find that allowing for a distribution of durations can take us a long way to solving the puzzle of inflation persistence, but not all the way yet.     

Risk and Return in Fixed-Income Arbitrage: Nickels in Front of a Steamroller?

We conduct an analysis of the risk and return characteristicsof a number of widely used fixed-income arbitrage strategies.We find that the strategies requiring more "intellectual capital"to implement tend to produce significant alphas after controllingfor bond and equity market risk factors. These positive alphasremain significant even after taking into account typical hedgefund fees. In contrast with other hedge fund strategies, manyof the fixed-income arbitrage strategies produce positivelyskewed returns. These results suggest that there may be moreeconomic substance to fixed-income arbitrage than simply "pickingup nickels in front of a steamroller."     

What Have We Learned from a Decade of Manufacturing Enterprise Surveys in Africa?

In the early 1990s the World Bank launched the Regional Programon Enterprise Development (RPED) in several African countries,a key component of which was to collect data on manufacturingfirms. The data sets built by these and subsequent enterprisesurveys in Africa generated considerable research. This articlesurveys the research on the African business environment, focusingon risk, access to credit, labor, and infrastructure, and onhow firms organize themselves and do business. It reviews theresearch on enterprise performance, including enterprise growth,investment, and exports. The article concludes with a discussionof policy lessons.      

Too much of a good thing? A theory of short-term debt as a sorting device

This paper shows that the liquidity risk associated with short-term debt financing can be used to sort insolvent firms out of financial markets when their solvency risk is private information. Notwithstanding this sorting role of short-term debt, unregulated financial firms tend to choose an inefficiently short debt maturity structure. This inefficiency arises for two reasons. First, by issuing more short-term debt, low-risk firms reduce their expected funding costs. This leads to a misalignment of private and social incentives as firms fail to fully internalize the social costs of becoming illiquid. Second, while the sorting role of short-term debt is reflected in a decline of long-term interest rates when more short-term debt is issued, creditors’ inability to observe firms’ solvency risk leads to an excessive reduction of long-term interest rates. This further distorts firms’ funding choice towards short-term debt.     

Bank shareholding and lending: Complementarity or substitution? Some evidence from a panel of large Italian firms

The paper studies the motivations behind banks’ shareholding of non-financial firms using a panel of large Italian companies in the period 1994–2000. Empirical evidence shows that banks are shareholders of companies that are less profitable, have experienced slower growth, are more indebted, are endowed with collateral and have hard time to repay their debt out of current income. Banks are more likely to hold shares in companies they lend to. Overall the evidence suggests that there is complementarity between bank equity holding and lending. A plausible explanation is the shareholder–debtholder conflict, the evidence is weakly compatible with governance and information hypotheses.     

Can Co-Owners Agree to Disagree? A Theoretical Examination of Voting Rules in Co-Ownerships

Does there exist a voting rule to be, for example, inserted into the constitution of a newly constructed apartment building, which is likely to attract the greatest number of consumers? We analyze this and other questions within a framework in which co-owners resolve future debates by voting. We examine the conditions under which a co-owner optimally opts for unanimous, special majority, simple majority, and minority voting rules. The main innovation of the analysis is that co-owners with distinct characteristics may yet unanimously agree on the optimal voting rule. Among the other results are that the optimal level of the voting rule is non-decreasing (non-increasing) in one’s level of disutility from opposing (favoring) an accepted (a rejected) proposal. Also, while our results are generally in line with the predictions of Ellickson (1982) and the evidence of Barzel and Sass (1990), according to which heterogeneous (homogeneous) voters require (less than) a super majority voting rule, we show a possible exception to this generalization: heterogeneity, in some circumstances, may optimally lead to a minority voting rule. The results are applicable for groups such as general assemblies in apartment buildings, neighborhood councils, and others.