Determinants of collateral

We estimate a comprehensive model of the determinants of collateral in loans extended to business firms. We use a panel data on a sample of bank loans to Spanish firms from 1984 to 2002. Consistent with theories that view collateral as a solution to adverse selection problems, our results provide direct evidence of a negative association between collateral and a borrower's risk. We also present evidence on previously unexplored determinants of collateral such as credit market competition, lender type, and the business cycle.     

Institutions and Bank Behavior: Legal Environment,Legal Perception,and the Composition of Bank Lending

This paper explores how the legal environment affects bank behavior in 20 transition economies. Based on a newly constructed data set we find that banks’ loan portfolio composition depends on the legal environment. If banks operate in a well‐functioning legal environment they lend relatively more to SMEs and provide more mortgages. On the other hand, banks lend more to large enterprises and to the government if the legal system is unsound. As a transmission channel we identify the banks’ willingness to accept collateral which depends on the bankers’ perceptions of the prevailing laws regarding collateral.     

How collateral laws shape lending and sectoral activity

We demonstrate the central importance of creditors’ ability to use movable assets as collateral (as distinct from immovable real estate) when borrowing from banks. Using a unique cross-country micro-level loan data set containing loan-to-value ratios for different assets, we find that loan-to-values of loans collateralized with movable assets are lower in countries with weak collateral laws, relative to immovable assets, and that lending is biased toward the use of immovable assets. Using sector-level data, we find that weak movable collateral laws create distortions in the allocation of resources that favor immovable-based production and investment. An analysis of Slovakia's collateral law reform confirms our findings.     

Copula‐Based Formulas to Estimate Unexpected Credit Losses (The Future of Basel Accords?)

The model used to estimate the capital required to cover unexpected credit losses in financial institutions (Basel II) has some drawbacks that reduce its ability to capture potential joint extreme losses in downturns. This paper suggests an alternative approach based on Copula Theory to overcome such flaws. Similarly to Basel II, the suggested model assumes that defaults are driven by a latent variable which varies as a response to an unobserved factor. On the other hand, the use of copulas allows the identification of asymmetric dependence between defaults which has been registered in the literature. As an example, a specific copula family (Clayton) is adopted to represent the association between the latent variables and a formula to estimate potential unexpected losses at a certain level of confidence is derived. Simulations reveal that, in most of the cases, the alternative model outperforms Basel II for portfolios with right‐tail‐dependent probabilities of default (supposedly, a good representation for real loan portfolios).     

Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan's SME Loan Market

This paper investigates the determinants of the use of collateral and personal guarantees in Japan's SME loan market. We find that firms' riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used. We find, however, that main banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively and that borrowers who have a long-term relationship with their main banks are more likely to pledge collateral. These findings are consistent with the theory that the use of collateral is effective in raising the bank's seniority and enhances its screening and monitoring. This incentive effect for the bank becomes tenuous for personal guarantees.     

Asset financing with credit risk

This paper develops a model for the unified valuation of all forms of real asset financing, such as bank loans, leases, securitization vehicles, and credit guarantees, secured by assets that generate a stochastic service flow to the operator, or a rental stream to the lessor, and depreciate over a finite economic life to their scrap value. Examples include mobile equipment, such as aircraft, railroad equipment, ships, trucks and trailers, as well as energy generation assets, heavy factory equipment and construction equipment. In the event of obligor default, after a repossession delay and incurring costs of repossession, maintenance, re-marketing and re-deployment, the lender repossesses the asset and sells it on the secondary market and is, thus, subject to the risk of decline in the market value of the asset. The model we develop in this paper treats all forms of asset financing in a unified fashion as contingent claims on the collateral asset and the credit of the borrower. As an application, we estimate the collateral asset model on historical secondary market data for aircraft values and calibrate the financing model to the Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificates (EETCs) issued in 2007 by Continental Airlines and secured by a fleet of new aircraft. We then apply the calibrated model to value private market financing, including bank loans, leases, and credit guarantees, consistently with the capital market financing, and assess the impact of repossession delays on credit spreads. This analysis leads to a policy insight suggesting that bankruptcy laws limiting asset repossession delays lead to lower costs of asset financing.     

Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans

Using a data set that records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercial borrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowers after loan origination. We find that banks request financial statements for half the loans and this variation is related to borrower credit risk, relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax returns, but in complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statement requests has an inverted U‐shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes and complements to financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristics and the degree of bank–borrower information asymmetry. Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for non–real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessible to lenders. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of a fundamental information demand for financial reporting in monitoring small commercial borrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their role as delegated monitors.     

The Effects of Formal and Informal Contracting in Credit Availability

This paper investigates how the use of collateral (formal contracting), along with the market power of banks (which facilitates relational contracts), affects the availability of credit for business firms. Using loan data from the Spanish Credit Register, we show that the average credit quality of borrowers in a provincial market decreases with market concentration and the availability of collateral. Additionally, the marginal effect of each variable decreases with the higher values of the other variable. We also find that credit line interest rates increase with the availability of collateral, although the increase is lower for banks operating in more concentrated credit markets. Therefore, market power (relations) and collateral (formal contracting) act as substitutes to increase the availability of bank finance under asymmetric information.     

Collateral pricing

We examine how collateral affects the cost of debt capital. Using a novel data set of secured debt issued by U.S. airlines, we construct industry-specific measures of collateral redeployability. We show that debt tranches that are secured by more redeployable collateral exhibit lower credit spreads, higher credit ratings, and higher loan-to-value ratios—an effect which our estimates show to be economically sizeable. Our results suggest that the ability to pledge collateral, and in particular redeployable collateral, lowers the cost of external financing and increases debt capacity.     

Capital Structure and Assets: Effects of an Implicit Collateral

This paper analyses a firm's capital structure choice when assets have outside value. Valuable assets implicitly provide a collateral and increase tax shield exploitation. The key feature in this paper is asset value uncertainty, implying that it is unknown ex ante whether the equity holders ex post optimally sell the assets or re‐optimise the capital structure. Ex ante, more uncertain asset value decreases leverage, but not firm value, and selling the assets becomes less likely. Firms should tend to invest in assets whose value is less correlated to changes in earnings and, in addition, asset sales are less likely when this correlation is low.     

Foreign bank entry and firms’ access to bank credit: Evidence from China

This paper studies the impact of foreign bank entry on domestic firms’ access to bank credit using a within-country staggered geographic variation in the policy of foreign bank lending in China. The paper finds that after foreign bank entry profitable firms use more long-term bank loans; whereas firms with higher value of potential collateral do not. It also finds that non-state-owned firms become able to substitute some trade credit with long-term bank loans. The findings suggest that less opaque firms and non-state-owned firms benefit more from foreign bank entry and that collateral may only play a limited role in mitigating the problem of information asymmetry when creditors’ rights are not well protected in a host country.     

Loan collateral and financial reporting conservatism: Chinese evidence

We examine the relation between the use of collateral and financial reporting conservatism for a sample of Chinese firms. In the absence of flexibility in risk pricing through interest rates and strong contract enforcement in China, we find that lenders reduce collateral requirements from more conservative borrowers and that this negative relation is significantly moderated by borrowers’ poor credit quality and low asset tangibility. Our finding that conservatism can result in a tangible benefit in the form of lower collateral requirements indicates that lenders value financial reporting conservatism. However, the benefit from financial reporting conservatism is muted as lenders become more concerned about borrowers’ default risk or ability to pledge tangible assets as collateral against loans.     

Collateral,debt capacity,and corporate investment: Evidence from a natural experiment

This paper examines how a shock to collateral value influences firms’ debt capacities and investments. Using a source of exogenous variation in collateral value provided by the land market collapse in Japan, I find that collateral has a statistically and economically significant impact on corporate investments. I also provide direct evidence on the workings of such a collateral channel. Exploiting a unique dataset of matched bank-firm lending, I show that firms with greater collateral losses are less likely to sustain their banking relationships and tend to obtain a smaller amount of bank credit.     

Internal Capital Markets and Capital Structure: Bank Versus Internal Debt

We argue that domestic business groups are able to actively optimise the internal/external debt mix across their subsidiaries. Novel to the literature, we use bi‐level data (i.e. data from both individual subsidiary financial statements and consolidated group level financial statements) to model the bank and internal debt concentration of non‐financial Belgian private business group affiliates. As a benchmark, we construct a size and industry matched sample of non‐group affiliated (stand‐alone) companies. We find support for a pecking order of internal debt over bank debt at the subsidiary level which leads to a substantially lower bank debt concentration for group affiliates as compared to stand‐alone companies. The internal debt concentration of a subsidiary is mainly driven by the characteristics of the group's internal capital market. The larger its available resources, the more intra‐group debt is used while bank debt financing at the subsidiary level decreases. However, as the group's overall debt level mounts, groups increasingly locate bank borrowing in subsidiaries with low costs of external financing (i.e. large subsidiaries with important collateral assets) to limit moral hazard and dissipative costs. Overall, our results are consistent with the existence of a complex group wide optimisation process of financing costs.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE USE OF FOREIGN‐EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES BY BANKS

We examine the effect of managerial compensation and ownership on the use of foreign‐exchange derivatives by U.S. bank holding companies. We focus on derivatives used for purposes other than trading to investigate derivative use in a hedging framework. We use instrumental variables probit and sample‐selection models to estimate the effects of endogenous and exogenous factors on the probability and extent of foreign‐exchange derivatives used. We find that the use of derivatives is inversely related to option awards but positively related to managerial ownership. Finally, our results suggest that ownership by large institutional shareholders provides incentive for managers to hedge.     

A Generalized Earnings‐Based Stock Valuation Model with Learning

We present a stock valuation model in an incomplete‐information environment in which the unobservable mean of earnings growth rate (MEGR) is learned and price is updated continuously. We calibrate our model to a market portfolio to empirically evaluate its performance. Of the 8.84% total risk premium we estimate, the earnings growth premium is 4.57%, the short‐rate risk contributes 3.38%, and the learning‐induced risk premium on the unknown MEGR is 0.89% (a nontrivial 10% of the total risk premium). This result highlights the significant learning effect on valuation, implying an additional risk premium in an incomplete‐information environment.     

Repo Auctions and the Market for Liquidity

What is the nature of imperfections in the market for liquidity? Studying bidder level data from European Central Bank (ECB) repo auctions, we find that this market appears to be informationally efficient in the sense that participants do not have private information about future short‐term rates. However, auction allocations affect banks' subsequent behavior in a way that is consistent with a degree of allocational and operational inefficiency. Also, large bidders appear to have better access to the interbank market than small ones. Finally, the evidence suggests that the ECB uses collateral haircuts that do not equilibrate opportunity costs.     

Responding to a Shadow Banking Crisis: The Lessons of 1763

In August 1763, northern Europe experienced a financial crisis with numerous parallels to the 2008 Lehman episode. The crisis affected merchant banks that were funded by short‐term credit instead of deposits. We use archival data to show that these “shadow” banks suffered a sudden loss of funding after the failure of a major bank. The central bank at the hub of the crisis, the Bank of Amsterdam, responded by broadening the range of collateral it accepted. The data also show how this emergency liquidity helped to contain the crisis, by preventing the collapse of at least two other major banks.     

Which Creditors’ Rights Drive Financial Deepening and Economic Development?

Since the 1990s financial economists have documented the essential role of creditors' rights in encouraging lenders to provide credit. This article demonstrates the central importance of creditors' ability to use movable assets such as inventories and accounts receivable (as distinct from immovable assets like real estate) as collateral when lending to business enterpriseses. Using a unique cross‐country, micro‐level loan data set that contains loan‐to‐value ratios for different assets, the authors found that the loan‐to‐values of loans that are collateralized with movable assets were lower in countries with weak collateral laws for movable assets, and that lending in such countries was biased toward the use of immovable assets. Using sector‐level data, the authors also found that weak movable collateral laws were associated with distortions in the allocation of resources that favored immovable‐based production and investment. The effects of resources that favored immovable‐based production and investment. The effects of the collateral law reform enacted in Slovakia in 2003 were held up as providing support for the authors' findings. The authors also investigated which aspects of movable assets collateralization regimes are most important for facilitating the use of movable assets as collateral. They concluded that the two critical features of such regimes are the registration of collateral interests—which facilitates monitoring of collateral and avoids double pledging—and the ability of creditors to avoid lengthy court proceedings when taking possession of collateral. These findings suggest that it would be relatively easy for many countries to increase their supply of credit because reforming these aspects of legal regimes is fairly straightforward with few political obstacles.     

The Cost of Debt

We use exogenous variation in tax benefit functions to estimate firm‐specific cost of debt functions that are conditional on company characteristics such as collateral, size, and book‐to‐market. By integrating the area between the benefit and cost functions, we estimate that the equilibrium net benefit of debt is 3.5% of asset value, resulting from an estimated gross benefit (cost) of debt equal to 10.4% (6.9%) of asset value. We find that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute only half of the total ex ante costs of debt.