Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in a System of Hierarchical Governments

Tax policies of two levels of government (state and federal) with overlapping tax bases are considered. This overlap leads to “vertical” fiscal externalities are considered when several different commodities are in the tax base and the tax bases of the two levels of government may not be identical. When the governments share a tax base, the mix of combined taxes is optimal. With different tax bases, combined taxes are no longer optimal as federal tax rates are adjusted to reflect state public service levels. When grants are available, a welfare-maximizing mix of taxes and public services is obtained.     

Fiscal consolidation and its cross-country effects

We build a new Keynesian DSGE model consisting of two heterogeneous countries in a monetary union. We study how public debt consolidation in a country with high debt (like Italy) affects welfare in a country with solid public finances (like Germany). Our results show that debt consolidation in the high-debt country benefits the country with solid public finances over all time horizons, while, in Italy, debt consolidation is productive in the medium and long term. All this is with optimized feedback policy rules. On the other hand, fiscal consolidation hurts both countries and all the time, if it is implemented in an ad hoc way, like an increase in taxes. The least distorting fiscal mix from the point of view of both countries is the one which, during the early phase of pain, Italy cuts public consumption spending to address its debt problem and, at the same time, reduces income tax rates, while, once its debt has been reduced in the later phase, it uses the fiscal space to further cut income taxes.     

The new view of the property tax A reformulation

The ‘new view’ of the property tax is reformulated within the context of a model with interjurisdictional competition, endogenous local public services, individuals who are segregated into homogeneous communities according to tastes for local public services, a simple form of land use zoning, and a political or constitutional constraint on the use of head taxes by local governments. Expressions for the ‘profits tax’ and ‘excise tax’ effects of the property tax are derived. The effects of a ‘consumption distortion’ away from government services due to local reluctance to tax mobile capital are also examined.     

Long-run growth and welfare effects of public policies with distortionary taxation

In a one-sector growth model with infrastructure investment, we study the impact of fiscal policies on growth. The government collects taxes on labor income and profits. The government uses these revenues to purchase infrastructure investment, provide utility enhancing government services, and to provide transfer payments to the households. We show that the balanced growth rate is an increasing function of the percent of government revenues that goes to infrastructure. We find that the growth maximizing mix of taxes depends on the elasticity of substitution between inputs. In particular, with distortionary taxes, the growth maximizing tax rate on capital is higher the lower the elasticity of substitution between private physical capital and public capital. In addition, the growth maximizing size of the government is higher when the elasticity of substitution between public and private inputs is low. We also investigate welfare effects of other public expenditures as well. Depending on the elasticity of substitution in production, the welfare implications of different public policies can be substantial.     

Sources of Public Revenue that Make Nations Richer

Among sources of public revenue that make nations richer, the most beneficial are charges for harms, such as pollution and congestion, and charges for the private benefits from public services. Increases in the money supply sufficient to keep price changes in line with expectations are also beneficial. Taxes on concentrations of wealth are beneficial if wealth inequality is considered harmful. Properly administered taxes on land do no harm and are beneficial when markets are imperfect. Among taxes that cause harm, the combination of a tax on labour income and a tax on inheritances is probably the least damaging.     

The Role of Land Tenure,Taxation, and Monetary Systems in Achieving and Enjoying Free Trade

Civilizations rise and fall based on the effectiveness of their socio-political arrangements and institutions. The institutions that matter most are the laws and customs that govern 1) production and exchange of goods (trade), 2) land tenure and the distribution of the surplus associated with it, 3) the levying of taxes to provide public goods and services, and 4) the monetary systems adopted to facilitate such activities. If those institutions distribute the benefits of civilization equitably to all members of society, the result is likely to be peace and prosperity. However, if the rules of a society are designed to protect the interests of an elite, conflict is likely to ensue. Unrestricted trade across national borders (“free trade”) has the potential to produce socially beneficial outcomes, but it is not sufficient to overcome systemic injustices associated with flawed systems of land tenure, taxation, and monetary management. This article makes use of historical examples to examine trade in relation to the other institutions to show why just social arrangements must be considered an essential part of trade policy.     

Taxes, Federal Grants, Local Public Spending, and Growth

In a dynamic model with both private and local public capital accumulation, this paper examines how federal and local income taxes, local consumption tax, and federal matching grants for local public consumption and local public investment affect the long-run equilibrium (equilibria) of private consumption, private capital accumulation, local public consumption, and local public capital stock.     

Optimal fiscal policy under learning

This paper characterizes optimal fiscal policy when agents learn about future taxation. A benevolent and fully rational government chooses taxes on labor income and state-contingent bonds to finance public spending, considering that private agents form their expectations through a learning algorithm. Facing a trade-off between distortionary taxes and distorted expectations, the Ramsey planner chooses the policy that minimizes the total cost of distortions. The analysis produces two main results. First, the government will use fiscal variables to manipulate expectations, reducing taxes and issuing debt at times of pessimism and doing the opposite at times of optimism. This speeds up learning. Second, the expectation-dependent fiscal plan is also history-dependent, and it prescribes taxes that are not as smooth and more persistent than under rational expectations. These findings are robust to alternative learning algorithms.     

Annexation: An Economic Analysis

A bstract . Cost/revenue analysis is used to determine the economic feasibility for annexing various types of land uses into a municipality. Operating costs for municipal services within existing municipal boundaries are apportioned to land uses according to the percent of the service utilized by each. Capital expenditures Site averaged over the expected life of the capital facility Sind then allocated to land uses in the same proportional manner as operating expenditures. Tax yields by land use type are estimated by allocating property taxes and income taxes to land uses which generate them. For example, income taxes are allocated to the commercial and industrial land uses where the employment resulting in tax yields is found. Tax yields are then compared by land use through use of an areal average of one acre. Estimates of revenue to be produced through annexation would result from comparing tax yields with service costs using the same acre average. Thus a city is in a better position to make a decision about the economic merits of specific annexation proposals.     

Public housing units vs. housing vouchers: Accessibility,local public goods,and welfare

We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice and study the effects of two housing aid policies, public housing units and housing vouchers. Land is differentiated by both residential accessibility and local public goods, and the provision levels of local public goods are determined by property tax revenues and neighborhood compositions. Households differ in their incomes and preferences for local public goods. Housing aid policies are financed by general income taxes. We discuss how the location of public housing units is a fundamental policy variable, in addition to the numbers and sizes of units, and argue that vouchers not only cause less distortion for social welfare compared to public housing, but may also improve overall welfare.     

Federalism,taxation, and economic growth

We present a model of endogenous growth where government provides a productive public good financed by income and capital taxes. In equilibrium, a decentralized government chooses tax policy to maximize economic growth, while a centralized government does not do so. Furthermore, these conclusions hold regardless of whether governments are beholden to a median voter or are rent-maximizing Leviathans. However, a decentralized government will under-provide public goods which benefit citizens directly, while a central government beholden to the median voter will optimally invest in such public goods.     

CAPITALIZATION AND THE THEORY OF LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE: AN INTERPRETIVE ESSAY

Abstract. The Tiebout hypothesis that consumer mobility and interjurisdictional competition leads to efficient provision of local services has provoked much controversy and debate in recent years. This article summarizes the opposing and conflicting viewpoints on this subject and presents a synthesis of the theoretical and empirical literature. The basic conclusion of this literature is that only under very restrictive assumptions will foot-voting and interjurisdictional competition ensure allocative efficiency in the local public sector. Nevertheless, the Tiebout mechanism offers important insights for public policy debates on the assignment of taxes and services and the design of equalization grants. Oates' suggestion that capitalization of fiscal differentials into residential property values provides an empirical test of the Tiebout hypothesis also generated an intense debate on the theoretical validity of this procedure and a heightened interest in its empirical applications. This debate is evaluated and an overview is given of the leading empirical approaches to test the efficiency and equity implications of the Tiebout mechanism. Controversial empirical issues such as the choice of the tax price term, the level of aggregation and econometric estimation problems are highlighted in this part of the survey.     

The choice of tax base by local authorities: voter preferences, special interest groups, and tax base diversification

We analyze local jurisdictions’ behaviors when selecting the type of tax levied in support of local services. Our analysis focuses on taxes that must be approved by voters. Taxes differ in their incidence; thus, even when proposed revenue amounts are held constant, voting patterns and the aggregate level of voter support differ among potential revenue sources. We use a general model of political cost minimization to derive three hypotheses about local tax authorities’ behaviors. Using Ohio school district data, we find that the expected probability of passage is a highly important determinant of tax choice. Further, there is evidence that special interest groups wield influence greater than their direct impact on voting behavior, and evidence that tax authorities attempt to diversify their tax structure.     

Public infrastructure investment,output dynamics,and balanced budget fiscal rules

We study the dynamic macroeconomic effects of public infrastructure investment under a balanced budget fiscal rule, using an overlapping generations model of a small open economy. The government finances public investment by employing distortionary labor taxes. The balanced budget rule implies a negative short-run output multiplier that exceeds (in absolute terms) the positive long-run output multiplier. Larger public capital spillovers sharpen the intertemporal output tradeoff. In contrast to conventional results regarding public investment shocks, we obtain dampened cyclical responses for plausible parameter values. The cyclical dynamics arise from the interaction between the labor tax rate, the tax base, and the intergenerational spillover effects. We show that financing scenarios involving public debt creation can substantially reduce the short-run output contraction and the transitional macroeconomic fluctuations induced by public investment.     

Optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government

State and local government services are enjoyed by, and taxes borne by, two groups, residents and non-residents. This paper addresses the question: if state and local governments maximize their residents' welfare, and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non-residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups, what set of taxes (subsidies) and public goods should they choose? Some of the results obtained are: (i) even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored, the existence of non-resident consumption makes uniform taxation non-optimal; (ii) in some cases, whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own-price elasticity; (iii) central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents; and (iv) the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy.     

企业所得税对债务融资影响分析——基于我国上市公司的实证研究

本文主要研究了企业所得税对企业债务融资决策产生的影响。研究结论支持了修正的MM理论关于税收对企业的债务融资决策有影响的观点。研究表明:在我国上市公司的债务融资决策中,企业所得税是考虑的因素之一,主要表现在其他条件相同的情况下,实际税率较高的企业债务融资的利用程度较高,享受税盾利益的动机相对较强。同时在我国上市公司中,债务性税盾与非债务性税盾的替代作用并不明显。     

Edge versus center: finding common ground in the capitalization debate

A continuing debate questions whether capitalization of taxes and public services into house price occurs. The current study argues for an inverse relationship between housing supply elasticity and capitalization rates. A sample is split into houses on the interior and edge of the urban area. Capitalization of schooling and crime occurs everywhere, but it is weaker toward the edge of an urban area where housing supply elasticities and developer activity are greater. Tax results are less robust, but the capitalization rates of crime and school quality are roughly twice as strong on the interior than on the urban fringe.     

The social profitability of business incubators: a measurement proposal

Abstract

Public business incubators are services placed at the disposal of original, generally newly-created projects, to which physical accompaniment, supervision and location are offered at prices below market value. They have as their aim to help set in motion and consolidate these firms during the stages in which they are weaker. The ultimate goal consists in favouring the generation of innovative firms, inducers of high-quality jobs, which can diversify the local business fabric, thus becoming a key tool in local development. The present paper provides a methodology to study the economic – but above all social – impact of business incubators, based on the examination of 40 from the 42 incubators existing in the Valencian Community (a Spanish autonomous region with five million inhabitants). Data analysis allows us to state that, although business incubators are not economically profitable since they need financial aids and public investment to start operating, they do have social profitability, insofar as the activity developed by entrepreneurs permits to provide public administrations – via taxes – with returns exceeding what was invested in these incubators. It has been determined that 2.8 euros (which can be applied to a variety of social areas) are collected via taxes for each euro spent to start them up.     

A general-equilibrium analysis of airport pricing,capacity, and regulation

Using a general-equilibrium model that includes consumers, airlines, and an airport with both aeronautical services and non-aeronautical services, this study investigates the airport's decisions on its aeronautical charge and capacity, as well as the size of its non-aeronautical services. In contrast to the existing literature, we formally model an airport's non-aeronautical services by taking into account the endogenous determination of the size of the airport's non-aeronautical services. First, we characterize the results for welfare maximization, and find that the self-financing property does not hold. Apart from carriers’ market power as a source of the failure for the self-financing property, we identify the presence of non-aeronautical services as a new source. Further, we show that the common practice of cross-subsidizing from the non-aeronautical to aeronautical services is incompatible with welfare maximization because welfare maximization requires exact self-financing within the non-aeronautical sector. Second, we derive the results for profit maximization by a monopolistic airport, and demonstrate that the imposition of two taxes, one on the airport's aeronautical services and the other on its capacity investment, can recover the welfare-maximization results. Third, we analyze the two types of regulation, single till and dual till, which are often used in practice, and show that dual-till regulation yields higher welfare than single-till regulation, as long as the profit from non-aeronautical services is positive. This result is in contrast to the prevailing wisdom in the literature, which in general favors single-till regulation.     

Tax avoidance in different firm types and the role of nonfamily involvement in private family firms

This study simultaneously distinguishes between private family firms, private nonfamily firms, public family firms, and public nonfamily firms. We show that private family firms avoid taxes less than public family firms and public nonfamily firms; however, we do not find a difference between private family firms and private nonfamily firms. Therefore, building on family firm heterogeneity, our results indicate that tax avoidance in private family firms differs depending on the involvement of nonfamily owners and/or managers. We find that private family firms that are wholly owned and managed by family members indeed avoid taxes less than private nonfamily firms.