The Optimal Duration of Real Estate Listing Contracts

The length of the real estate listing contract is examined as a means of providing an incentive for brokers to act in the best interest of home sellers. A limitation on the duration of the contract accomplishes this objective by imposing a cost (namely, the foregone commission) on brokers who fail to complete a sale before the contract expires. The seller's optimal contract duration balances the benefits of improved incentives against the expected cost of renegotiating a new contract in the event of a failure bv the broker.     

The Multiple Listing Service, Commission Splits, and Broker Effort

This paper examines the impact of split commissions on broker effort in MLS sales. The joint effort of brokers to find a buyer for a given listing is maximized when the broker who locates a buyer first receives the entire commission. In contrast, splitting the commission between the listing and finding broker (when they differ) maximizes the joint profits of brokers. When competition among brokers to acquire listings is considered, however, the split brokers most prefer entails a smaller (though still positive) share for the listing broker in order to reduce wasteful competition for listings. While sellers still prefer to pay only the broker who finds a buyer, brokers may not be willing to acquire and share listings under such an arrangement.     

Real Estate Brokers, Nonprice Competition and the Housing Market

Given a fixed commission rate and easy entry, economic profits must be competed away on some nonprice margin in the real estate brokerage market. This paper focuses on nonprice competition in the level or quality of services offered buyers and sellers in the market, examining the equilibrium adjustment process, comparative static predictions and efficiency implications. In contrast with earlier studies focusing on wasteful advertising, this paper demonstrates that higher commission rates can either increase or decrease deadweight loss, depending upon how broker services affect buyer and seller transaction costs.     

A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets

This paper examines the impact of brokers on buyers' and sellers' search behavior and on the transaction prices in real estate markets. It is shown that the seller and the buyer search less intensively if the house is listed with a broker. The seller gets a higher price when he employs a broker, but the increase in price is smaller than the commission fee. More specifically, the portion of the commission covered by the increase in price is directly related to the bargaining powers of the buyer and the seller. In the special case where the price is determined according to the Nash bargaining solution, the increase in price is shown to be half of the commission fee. It is also shown that an increase in the commission rate increases the equilibrium price but decreases the equilibrium search intensities.     

The Principal-Agent Relationship in Real Estate Brokerage Services

This article investigates the principal-agent relationship between the owner of a house and her real estate broker. The principal's (owner's) problem is to design a contract that induces the agent (broker) to adopt a selling strategy that maximizes the owner's expected return. A sequential search model is utilized to analyze this principal-agent relationship. Three different systems for paying the broker are considered: fixed-percentage commission, flat-fee, and consignment. Both the discount factors of the owner and the broker and the net costs of ownership incurred while attempting to sell the house play a central role in determining the nature of the optimal contract. The analysis demonstrates that the fixed-percentage commission system is the only one of the three systems considered that can induce a first-best, incentive-compatible contract. A numerical analysis provides insights regarding the effect of the fixed-percentage commission system on competition in the real estate brokerage industry.     

Matching of Buyers and Sellers by Brokers: A Comparison of Alternative Commission Structures

This note characterizes the set of Pareto optimal and stable matchings among buyers and sellers and examines the optimality of matching strategies employed by brokers under different commission structures. It is shown that the profit-maximizing matching strategy for the broker under percentage commission and flat-fee systems also maximizes the number of houses sold, but it minimizes the buyers' and sellers' surplus. On the other hand, net listing results in the sale of fewer houses, but it yields larger surplus for buyers and sellers.     

An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Intermediaries on the Outcome of Bargaining Games

We conduct an experimental analysis of the bargaining between a buyer and a seller of the exchange of a single good by means of an intermediary or broker. We examine how an intermediary affects the price, the likelihood of a successful negotiation, and the time it takes to complete a negotiation. We first examine the impact of the intermediary as a pure middleman, and then as an information source about the distribution of seller and buyer reservation prices. The results show that an intermediary, whether or not informed, increases the sale price, reduces the likelihood of an agreement, and increases the time to reach an agreement (though the number of bargaining rounds declines). The results suggest that the benefits of brokerage may be predominantly in the matching of buyers and sellers rather than in facilitating bargaining.     

Exclusionary discounts

We consider a two-period model with two sellers and one buyer. Although we assume it is efficient for the buyer to purchase from both sellers in each period, we show that when the buyer's valuations are inter-temporally linked and at least one seller is financially constrained, exclusion can sometimes arise in equilibrium (i.e., the buyer purchases all of its requirements from the same seller in each period). The exclusionary equilibria are supported by contract offers in which the excluding seller's incremental price to supply the contestable part of demand is below its marginal cost and sometimes negative. Our findings contribute to the literatures on market-share contracts, bundling, all-units discounts, and loyalty discounts.     

Optimal Price and Selling Effort from the Perspectives of the Broker and Seller

This paper uses numerical solutions of a dynamic optimization model to examine the principal-agent relationship between the seller and broker in residential real estate markets. Potential conflict of interest is quantified in two dimensions, the level of selling effort the broker puts forth, and the reservation price for the property. The dynamic optimization model reveals that the use of a finite duration listing contract will induce the broker to increase his or her effort level compared to an unlimited duration contract, and that the broker's optimal effort will increase over time, becoming greater as the listing contract expiration time draws nearer ("rational procrastination"). The numerical analysis indicates that with plausible parameter values, conflict of interest problems regarding broker effort level are minor or nonexistent near the end of the listing contract, but potentially important near the beginning of the contract. In contrast, the conflict of interest regarding reservation price is more severe near the end of the listing contract and is exacerbated by the use of finite duration contracts, the more so the shorter the contract.     

The origins of power in buyer–seller relationships

Who, or what, holds power in business-to-business buyer–seller relationships is a debate at the heart of power theory. Power in buyer–seller relationships is variously seen as the property of organizations, individuals or relationships yet to be theoretically valid and useful to management, integration of these schools of thought needs to be operationalized. This paper opens up future research avenues through identifying how buyers and sellers understand the origins of power and the nature of self perceived and countervailing power. The paper presents results from 10 focus groups of both buyers and sellers revealing the underlying origins of experienced power. The results support the proposition that power in buyer–seller relationships is a pluralistic concept and that extant theories focused on organizational, individual or relational elements of power are independently too narrow in their reflections of the power construct; rather, they are all part of the same broad construct.     

The Strategic Role of Listing Price in Marketing Real Estate: Theory and Evidence

The seller of a real estate property and his broker have two primary goals: to sell the properly for as high a price as possible and as quickly as possible. While these are separate objectives, they are closely related through the listing price of the seller. The listing price affects how long it takes to find a buyer (i.e., Time On the Market = TOM), and TOM influences the price that results from the bargaining between the seller and the buyer. This leaves the seller and his agent with an important question: What is the optimal price to be asked for the property? The objective of this research is to provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of listing price on TOM and the transaction price.     

The Housing Market and Real Estate Brokers

The major development in this paper concerns the failure, in earlier studies, to consider interaction between alternative methods of arranging sales in the housing market. A seller may market a house by direct negotiations with buyers, without the intermediation of real estate brokers, or by listing the house with a broker. A rational seller would choose the option which offers the higher expected return on the house. In a sequence of models we argue that the seller's option of a method of sale induces competitive pressure in the choice of the commission rate by the broker. We also consider the split rate in a multiple listing system, ease of entry of brokers and the cartel hypothesis as applied to brokers. We conclude that the competitive pressure of direct negotiations between sellers and buyers, relative free entry of brokers and the inappropri-ateness of the cartel hypothesis cast serious doubt about a general consensus of opinion that the brokerage system is characterized by price fixing, excessive commissions and excessive marketing costs.     

The Real Estate Brokerage Market and the Decision to Disclose Property Condition Defects

This article presents a theoretical model of the decision to disclose property condition defects by a real estate broker. The model introduces the costs and benefits of disclosure into the broker's profit function. The comparative static results of the model show that a number of factors will have a deterministic influence on the broker's expected profit and, hence, the broker's decision to disclose. Whether voluntary disclosure occurs depends upon the costs of repairing the defect, prevailing market conditions, commission rates and the legal environment in which the broker operates.     

Managing risk in contract pricing with multiple incentives

A significant amount of industrial marketing occurs in response to efforts initiated and managed by the buyer through a contracting process. Often the contract involves research, engineering, development, and test/evaluation of products with considerable risks. This article discusses techniques used to evaluate sources of risk in contracting and methods to distribute and manage these risks between the buyer and seller, focusing principally on multiple incentive, multiple-formula pricing mechanisms.     

Managing Seller–Buyer Relationships during New Product Development*

Ineffective relationship management with potential buyers during new product development (NPD) can be an important contributor to new product failure in technology‐based, industrial markets. However, empirical research on managing these relationships remains underdeveloped. This study addresses this deficiency by developing an empirically based taxonomy of relationship approaches used by sellers to develop technology‐based, industrial innovations, identifying situational characteristics that correlate with the choice of a particular relationship approach, and evaluating sellers' satisfaction with their relationship approach. The study's conceptual model is rooted in transaction cost analysis (TCA) and draws from extant literature on seller–buyer relationships during NPD. It was tested with data from 334 small to mid‐sized firms in a variety of technology‐based industrial markets. The results indicate that sellers use three basic relationship approaches during NPD: a bilateral approach, a buyer‐guided approach, and a seller‐guided approach. While the bilateral approach relies on a mutual exchange of information, the buyer‐guided and seller‐guided approaches do not. Juxtaposed with the high levels of satisfaction experienced by sellers in the sample, the study suggests that no one relationship approach is universally desirable. Therefore, managers may need to engage in a portfolio of relationship approaches with buyers during NPD; further, these approaches should correlate with buyer‐related (i.e., perceived buyer knowledge and prior relationship history) and innovation‐related (i.e., product customization and technological uncertainty) characteristics. Collectively, these results can help sellers optimize their relationships with buyers during NPD.     

Assessing the Market Value of Real Estate Property with a Geographically Weighted Stochastic Frontier Model

In this study we consider the problem of sellers, buyers and real estate appraisers in determining the price for a house, taking into account the characteristics of the house and its location as well as the goals of these three different parties. The appraiser's job is to determine the fair market value of the house, while the buyer and seller want to find, respectively, the lowest and highest feasible price for it. We combine recent developments in geography and econometrics to develop an approach that determines local estimates of property values from the perspectives of the buyer, seller and appraiser, taking into account the characteristics of the house as well as its location. We illustrate our approach analyzing closing prices in one residential real estate market.     

Housing Market Conditions, Listing Choice and MLS Market Share

In some housing markets, a seller may hire a broker to multiple list or exclusively list a property for sale or may bypass the brokerage industry and list the property privately as a "sale by owner." This article introduces a new model that illustrates the factors which will impact on the broker's and seller's preferred type of listing. An implication of the model is that if the choice is available, sellers and real estate brokers will employ a multiple listing service more often during slower market periods where the volume of sales is low and properties are more difficult to sell. An empirical analysis of Vancouver data yields results consistent with these arguments.     

When Do Large Buyers Pay Less? Experimental Evidence

The rise of mega‐retailers has precipitated a growing literature on large‐buyer discounts. According to Rotemberg and Saloner [1986] and Snyder [1998], large buyers' ability to obtain price discounts depends on their relative size and the degree of seller competition. I test experimentally implications of this theory concerning the number of sellers and the sizes of buyers in the market. The results track the comparative‐statics predictions to a surprising extent. Subtle changes in the buyer‐size distribution or number of sellers can create or negate large‐buyer discounts. The results highlight the previously unexplored role of the demand structure in determining buyer‐size discounts.     

Building trust in US-Japanese business relationships: Mediating role of cultural sensitivity

While evidence suggests trust plays a fundamental role in maintaining successful buyer-seller relationships in Japan, little is known conceptually as to how foreign sellers can best develop trust in the minds of their Japanese customers. In this research, we develop and test a multi-component model of US seller actions that manifest key trust-building processes (intentionality- and capability-processes) which sellers find effective in building trust with their Japanese buyers. In this unique cultural context, theory suggests trust develops when sellers demonstrate benevolent intentions toward the buyer and exhibit a strong capability to fulfill business promises. An analysis of 181 US sellers in Japan demonstrates that a combination of trust-building efforts is recognized as being critical in seller attempts to develop and sustain trust on the part of their Japanese customers. Importantly, cultural sensitivity mediates the impact of intentionality-based practices on buyer trust, while capability-based activities directly influence trust.     

Seller reputation: From word-of-mouth to centralized feedback

Reputation is one of the most important incentives for trade and cooperation. Using the complete selling history of 125,135 sellers on Eachnet.com (an eBay equivalent in China), we show that sellers with a longer successful selling record enjoyed more repeat business, reached more buyer regions, sold in more product categories, and had a higher completion rate even before Eachnet introduced a centralized feedback system. Since the centralized feedback system, the difference between reputable and non-reputable sellers has decreased in terms of repeat business but enlarged in terms of market expansion. These findings suggest that while reputation can facilitate trade through buyer experience and word-of-mouth, it is not as effective as centralized feedback. Our study also shows that, although completion rate and transaction price are the two outcomes most often examined in the literature, seller reputation is important for buyer clientele, market reach, business scope and market survival.