What to maximize if you must

The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a central tenet in economics, often justified formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary arguments. In contrast, we show that in almost every game and for almost every family of distortions of a player's actual payoffs, some degree of this distortion is beneficial to the player, and will not be driven out by any evolutionary process involving payoff-monotonic selection dynamics. Consequently, under any such selection dynamics the population will not converge to payoff-maximizing behavior. We also show that payoff-maximizing behavior need not prevail when preferences are imperfectly observed.     

Entrepreneurial overconfidence and ambiguity aversion: dealing with the devil you know,than the devil you don't know

Various empirical studies find that entrepreneurs are systematically overconfident in their venture's probabilistic chances of success. Yet, entrepreneurs often face an ambiguous future that precludes them from making such probabilistic judgements. A theoretical framework based on ambiguity aversion is developed to explain an entrepreneur's overconfidence under complex and novel conditions of ambiguity. Unlike optimistic explanations, this ambiguity-averse form of overconfidence offers a non-probabilistic approach to entrepreneurial judgements of uncertainty.