INNOVATION CYCLES AND LEARNING AT THE PATENT OFFICE: DOES THE EARLY PATENT GET THE DELAY?*

We study the relationship between the length of patent review and the importance of inventions. We build a simple model of the U.S. patent review process. Among the model predictions are that, controlling for a patent's position in a new technology cycle, more important innovations would be approved more quickly. Also, the approval delay is likely to decrease as an industry moves from the early stages of an innovation cycle to later stages. These predictions are in line with the evidence we obtain from a data set on U.S. patents granted in the field of genetically modified crops from 1983 to 1999. We also show that failing to account for the innovation lifecycle – as previous studies have done – is likely to bias upwards the estimates of the relationship between delay and importance.     

THE ADVANCE OF THE VECTOR—VALUED FUNCTIONS AND ITS APPLICATIONS

<正> We shall make a survey of the advance of the problems according to the following six as-pects:1 Vector—valued holomorphic functions1.1 In 1976 R.M.Aron,J.Globevnik and M.Schottenloher study ranges of vector-valuedholomorphic functions and their expression.If Ω is a non-empty connected open subset of a sepa-table complex F-space then there is a function f:→Ω such that(i)f is continuous on X-{1}     

工程师CEO吃香?

正细节至上、善于分析、擅长系统地解决问题——一名工程师的种种基础能力,能使其完美转型为顶级CEO。如今,全球企业呈现这样的趋势:工程师的智慧加上顶尖商学院的MBA证书,成为通往核心管理层的大道。诸如微软CEO萨蒂亚·纳拉德、通用汽车CEO玛丽·巴拉、还有亚马逊CEO杰夫·贝索斯都是工程师出身。世界五百强CEO也多有工程师背景,甚至世界经济论坛的创始人兼执行主席克劳斯·施瓦布也拥有一个工程博士学位。     

CEO:仅仅是“名字不同”吗?

决策权与执行权统一 ,使职业经理人作为一种十分稀缺的资源 ,以一种崭新姿态进入了生产要素市场 ,这是所有权与经营权分离以来又一个深刻的变化。     

CEO合同:旧貌换新颜

Magma Design Automation的首席执行官Rajeev Madhavan经历过由雇佣合同带来的愉快的和痛苦的回忆,如今,他很乐意在没有合同的情况下工作.     

谁来任免CEO?

董事会的首要职责是选任和罢免CEO,然而对大多数中国公司而言,董事会的这项权力并没有得到很好的行使。这其中重要的原因还是将CEO当作相应职级的官员来看待。     

COMMENTS CONCERNING “ON THE PARK-THUESEN INDEX AND THE VALUE OF EARLIER UNCERTAINTY RESOLUTION”

Surveys find that the majority of firms utilize credit limits. However, most trade-credit models show a dichotomous result: either credit is granted or it is refused. In this paper, a single-period model of the trade credit-granting decision is developed which incorporates the portfolio effects of credit granting on the seller's cash inflows and therefore on its probability of cash stockout. In this model, the credit limit serves as a mechanism to control these portfolio effects and thus hedge against such stockouts.     

祁玉民:福布斯最佳CEO前五强

<正>企业家当然都希望能够拥有优秀的员工,那员工呢?他们也同样渴求一位优秀的领导。充满睿智,不怕困难,无论何种情况,都能带领企业前行。有这样的领导人,是企业之幸,也是员工之幸。于是有人在寻找,也有人在评选。2013年7月3日,福布斯中文版发布"2013年中国最佳CEO"榜单,华晨汽车集团董事长、总裁祁玉民位列第四,跻身前五强。     

彭小峰效仿施正荣? 佟兴雪履新赛维CEO

在企业处于巨大危机之时,尚德创始人施正荣曾通过"卸任首席执行官,仅担任执行董事长兼首席战略官"来缓冲外界对他的压力。日前,同病相怜的另一位光伏大腕——赛维LDK创始人彭小峰也步其后尘。11月5日,赛维LDK宣布,创始人彭小峰卸任CEO,由总裁佟兴雪兼任CEO一职,彭小峰仍继续担任公司董事会主席。此外,公司还增加了5名董事。之前,     

华为轮值CEO:进取还是无奈

4月23日,华为总裁任正非在2011年度财报发布时表示,华为实施轮值CEO制度,并呼吁员工不要百般挑剔这项制度。在《董事会领导下的CEO轮值制度辨》一文中,任正非指出:华为的轮值CEO是由一个小团队组成,但他们的决策是集体作出的。这样是为了规避意外风险带来的公司运作的不确定性。坚持以客户利益为核心价值观的华为董事会,授权一群聪明人作轮值CEO,让他们集体的智慧作出决策,每人任期6个月。这就是华为     

CEO compensation in EU telecom companies: Does the state design the right incentives?

This paper analyzes the structure of CEO pay in European fixed telecommunication companies, focusing on the impact of state ownership. Results show that, under the (partial or total) control of the state, the level of CEO compensation is lower and pay-performance sensitivity is higher than in privately-controlled firms. This finding suggests the state provides an incentive as well as a monitoring effect. However, when the state holds the majority of the shares, the pay level is significantly affected by the CEO power, suggesting that in these firms, CEOs are more likely to be entrenched with boards and succeed in raising their pay.     

沃顿商学院 技术公司的CEO该何时卸任?

太阳微系统公司的创办人、22年来一直担任公司CEO职务的斯科特·麦克尼利最近宣布卸任,成为大型技术公司继任问题中的又一里程碑事件。我们认为,由于此类技术公司的增长速度异常迅猛,加之创办者多数都是年轻有为之士,所以常常产生其他行业不曾面临的继任问题。     

飞兆:新任CEO交出漂亮成绩单

“她就象一支成熟的蒲公英,经微风轻轻一吹就把创新的种子撒落在硅谷的各个角落。”——苹果公司CEO乔布斯上面这个有名的比喻,说的就是Fairchild——美国飞兆半导体公司。在美国工商界流传着一种说法,即“先有Fairchild,     

The use of variance decomposition in the investigation of CEO effects: How large must the CEO effect be to rule out chance?

Variance decomposition analysis is often used to examine the degree to which CEOs influence their companies' performance (the so‐called CEO effect). Such studies play an important role in a body of literature that investigates the effect of leadership on organizations. In this paper, I argue that these previous studies have an important underlying flaw. Empirically, these studies wrongly attribute the performance effect of randomness—of chance—to the CEO. I demonstrate how randomness can affect the measured effects in a variance decomposition analysis, and I show that this is especially problematic for the measurement of CEO effects. I demonstrate how this results in a greatly inflated CEO effect and develop an approach to correct for it. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

明导科技CEO:EDA迎来好年景

在经历数年的停滞之后,EDA市场在今年上半年出现令人兴奋的复苏势头。全球第三大EDA工具厂商Mentor Graphics(明导科技)主席兼首席执行官Wally Rhines日前在北京表示,2006将是EDA工具厂商的一个好年景,上半年明导科技的营收业绩令人兴奋。他说,不仅我们,据了解,Cadence、     

Independent director death and CEO acquisitiveness: Build an empire or pursue a quiet life?

Research summary : This study examines the relationship between an independent director's death and CEO acquisitiveness. Using a sample of large U.S. public firms, we find that CEOs who have experienced an independent director's death undertake fewer acquisitions in the post‐director death period, in particular fewer large acquisitions. Our findings are consistent with the prediction of posttraumatic growth theory that mortality awareness can induce CEOs to reevaluate their life priorities and reduce the importance of extrinsic goals in their decision making. This study contributes to the strategic leadership literature by highlighting the influence of the death of CEOs ' social peers on CEOs ' strategic decisions . Managerial summary : Does the death of CEOs ' social peers influence CEOs ' strategic decisions? We find that CEOs who have experienced an independent director's death engage in fewer acquisitions in the post‐director death period, in particular fewer large acquisitions. One likely explanation for our findings is that the death of an independent director may heighten CEOs ' mortality awareness, lead the CEOs to pursue a quieter life, and weaken their propensities for undertaking decisions (i.e., acquisitions) that increase their compensation and social status . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.