Asset-based Reserve Requirements: Some Reservations

Abstract

Thomas Palley's (2004) paper ‘Asset-based reserve requirements: reasserting domestic monetary control in an era of financial innovation and instability’ has radical implications for monetary policy and the operations of central banks in the money markets. This comment argues that Palley's proposal may be impractical today because it overlooks banks' holding of excessive reserves (or claims on such reserves), and because reserves allocated for particular kinds of business cannot be isolated in bank balance sheets or markets. In particular, once differential reserves are imposed on particular kinds of business, banks may respond to changes in reserve requirements by varying their assets in less predictable ways than the scheme suggests. A central bank's willingness to use differential reserve requirements will be inhibited by the current policy doctrine that emphasises control of a stable money market rate of interest. In any case, it is doubtful if interest rates or reserve requirements could have the specific targeted effects that Palley's model suggests.     

Bank lending and interest on excess reserves: An empirical investigation

This paper econometrically tests for effects on bank lending of the Federal Reserve’s policy of paying interest on excess reserves (IOER). Following the 2008 financial crisis, US banks decreased their loan allocations and increased holdings of excess reserves. A model of bank asset allocation shows that when the rate of IOER is higher than other short-term rates, banks will switch from zero excess reserves to a regime with higher excess reserves and lower lending. Using a sample of panel data on US banks from 2000 through 2018, we find evidence of a switch to a positive excess reserve regime in the post-crisis period. Controlling for market interest rates, loan demand, and economic activity, we find that IOER accounts for the majority of the decline in bank lending after the financial crisis.     

THE NEW THEORY OF COMMERCIAL BANKING AND BANK LENDING BEHAVIOR

This paper studies the bank's lending decision, based on three observed phenomena: banks earn substantial profits from off‐balance sheet activities and services, which they take into account in their lending decisions. Secondly, the critical point in the customer relation is the loan decision: the probability of the customer staying with the bank is a function of the loan extended each time one is applied for. Third, what is at stake in the loan decision is the expected value of the entire customer relation, which is the probability times the present value of expected future profits. The bank is a maximizer of this expected present value, while making decisions on individual loan applications. It is shown that the bank is in a corner solution with respect to its good customers, and other customers often have an incentive to get to a corner. Therefore, corner solutions may be the rule rather than the exception in the bank's customer relations, and there is no mechanism making the bank indifferent, at the margin, between lending to different customers. It can be optimal to extend loans to (present and expected future) good customers at an interest rate loss. A rationed customer with a concave enough probability function can receive a larger loan by asking for less. Loyalty increases the customer's value to the bank but improves its loan terms only if the customer makes it conditional on the loan extended.     

Fiscal limits and monetary policy: default vs. inflation

This paper studies the monetary policy trade-off between low inflation and low sovereign risk in the environment where fiscal authorities fail to fully ensure the sustainability of government debt. Building on the Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) and the Fiscal Theory of Sovereign Risk (FTSR), this paper differs in its baseline assumption about the monetary policy objective, which is neither to rule out defaults regardless of inflation costs (as in FTPL), nor to follow inflation targeting regardless of associated sovereign risk (as in FTSR). Instead, we study the case in which the central bank controls the risky interest rate to minimize the probability of default while ruling out large inflation hikes. We show that this policy regime can mitigate default risks only when the central bank is expected to allow sufficient increases in inflation. When agents believe that the central bank's tolerance toward inflation hikes has increased, equilibrium risk premium goes down, suggesting that information concerning changes in the central bank's preferences over inflation directly impacts default risks.     

The link between the federal funds rate and banking system distress: An empirical investigation

We investigate the association between deviations of the monetary policy rate from its benchmark, and systemic risk between 2001 and 2017. We adopt an impulse response function framework that uses the local projections method model proposed by Jorda (2005). We find that paying interest on reserves by the Fed beginning in 2008 introduced a monetary policy regime shift between the period that the Fed did not pay interest on reserves and the period that it did. Consequently, while we identify a positive and significant link between deviations of the policy rate from its benchmark and systemic risk in the former period, this link was broken in the latter period. During the former period, upsurges in the fed funds rate raised bank costs and increased bank distress. In contrast, during the latter period, interest payment on reserves exceeded the policy rate, except for 2009Q1, and as a result, banks did not expand lending in response to the Fed's reserve injections, instead, holding large amounts of excess reserves. This practice produced greater bank profitability and reduced bank liquidity risk and credit risk, without increasing systemic risk.     

International knowledge spillovers through the import of information technology commodities

Since banks often lend via commitments, their lending and deposit-taking may be two manifestations of one primitive function: the provision of liquidity on demand. We explore this function under a cap-based valuation. We find that (i) the strike price of the cap-based valuation increases the bank's liquid asset holdings by increasing its loan rate and loan commitment rate (with the strategic rate-adjustment complements) and decreases the bank's external finance need by increasing its deposit rate, when the bank realizes a less risky state of the world and (ii) the number of caplet days decreases the bank's liquid asset holdings by decreasing its loan rate and loan commitment rate (with the strategic rate-adjustment complements and the strategic timing substitutes) and increases the bank's external finance need by decreasing its deposit rate (with the strategic timing substitutes), when the bank realizes a more risky state. Our findings provide alternative explanations concerning the bank's liquidity function under the cap-based optimization.     

国际资本流动“突然停止”、消费平滑与最优外汇储备持有量*

通常认为外汇储备具有抵御外部冲击、平滑居民消费、增进社会福利的作用。循此逻辑,文章构建了三部门模型模拟了货币当局面临资本流动“突然停止”时,出于平滑消费目的的最优储备持有行为。研究发现：中国静态最优外汇储备量约占GDP的1926%;中国实际储备与最优储备的差额自2010年起稳定在18万亿美元;最优外汇储备量与“突然停止”发生概率及其导致的产出损失、短期外债规模、居民存款规模及危机时的资产置换比率、风险规避程度正相关,与银行备付金比率、国际风险溢价程度负相关;从危机应急的角度看,提高银行备付金比率、控制居民存款置换外币比例能有效节约外汇储备,但从长远来看控制国内短期外债规模、确保银行稳健运营才是应对国际资本“突然停止”风险的关键。     

Preventing bank panics: The role of the regulator's preferences

How do the preferences of a banking authority affect its decision making in periods of distress and thus financial stability? We study this question in a version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with a monopolistic bank and a time-consistent policy response by a banking authority. We show that limited commitment on the part of the banking authority may induce fragility but the banking authority's incentives are also an important determining factor in the degree of financial stability. In particular, under a simple suspension scheme, delegating a banking authority who places sufficient weight on a banker's welfare acts as a commitment device and prevents runs, in analogy with how a Rogoff (1985) “conservative” central banker helps reduce inflation bias. In contrast, once interventions take the form of payment rescheduling, the scope for the bank's susceptibility to a panic increases should the banking authority put more weight on monopoly rents. Identifying such an aspect of vulnerability suggests that appointing a banking authority whose objective function deviates from that of depositors may have unintended consequences.     

ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVE HOARDING IN KOREA

Since the Asian financial crisis, Korea's accumulation of international reserves has substantially exceeded benchmark levels. The present paper examines the interaction between international reserve hoarding and mercantilist motives, in the context of Korea's policy of maintaining export competitiveness through exchange rate management. An estimation of cointegration and error correction has found that in both the long term and the short term, Korea has stockpiled reserves as a result of heightened concerns regarding export competitiveness. The short‐run dynamics entail precautionary motives that have contributed to reserve accumulation. A variance decomposition test suggests that the mercantilist motive has been the main driver of reserve accumulation.     

银行非自愿超额准备金与宏观经济波动:来自中国的经验证据

基于将银行超额准备金分解为预防性超额准备金和非自愿超额准备金,以及将非自愿超额准备金作为银行体系流动性衡量指标,并对非自愿超额准备金的波动机制及其对宏观经济波动影响机制进行考察,发现1998-2010年期间,在外汇占款和银行贷款的综合作用下,非自愿超额准备金率经历了先降后升,然后再次下降的走势。而且从短期看,非自愿超额准备金的累积会对产出、价格和银行贷款产生负向效应,但从长期看,则又体现为正向效应,从而放大和加剧了宏观经济波动。在此情况下,货币当局在流动性管理过程中,应审慎针对非自愿超额准备金展开微调性操作,从而实现宏观经济的平稳运行。     

Central bank reserve management: Aggregate targets and interest payments on reserves

Tindall and Spencer [1997] presented a dynamic stochastic theory of borrowed reserves that explained the observed nonlinear relationship between borrowing and the spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate. It showed that borrowed reserves are a function of deposit variation. This paper extends that research, providing a general dynamic model of all key bank reserve aggregates. Nearly all reserve aggregates, which can be used as operating targets by the Federal Reserve, are subject to the influence of deposit variation and are nonlinearly related to the spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate, complicating their use as targets. Additionally, it is found that the Federal Reserve's proposal to pay interest on bank reserves could generate substantial distortions in reserve aggregate behavior where interest is paid on excess reserves as well as required reserves, effectively resulting in potentially large discount-window policing problems.     

Financial intermediary's choice of borrowing

This research investigates several dynamic stochastic models of a bank's management problem of the term structures of its assets and liabilities. A bank can either eliminate most of its interest risk with appropriate options, or it can utilize its expertise in its core business and seek extraordinary profits. This research concerns a bank with the latter goal. In this model, the bank seeks to maximize the expected present value of dividend issued subject to the Federal Reserve's regulatory constraint and liquidity constraint. With this model, we find that if the available deposits are not too high and the level of liquid assets is high enough, then it is optimal for a bank to accept all of the available deposits. However, if the level of liquid assets is too low, then a bank should not issue a dividend or to accept any deposits. The properties are still valid even if the bank is not risk neutral.     

Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

INFLATION PERSISTENCE AND FLEXIBLE PRICES*

If the central bank follows an interest rate rule, then inflation is likely to be persistent, even when prices are fully flexible. Any shock, whether persistent or not, may lead to inflation persistence. In equilibrium, the dynamics of inflation are determined by the evolution of the spread between the real interest rate and the central bank's target. Inflation persistence can be characterized by a vector autocorrelation function relating inflation and output. This article shows that a flexible‐price, general‐equilibrium business cycle model with money and a central bank using an interest rate target can account for such inflation persistence.     

Religiosity versus rationality: Depositor behavior in Islamic and conventional banks

This study investigates the behavioral aspects of Islamic bank depositors in a dual banking system. By categorizing depositors into groups based on the amount of their deposited funds, we estimate the responses of these groups to interest rate changes. We take the findings of conventional banks as a comparative baseline and investigate the extent to which the changes in different Islamic depositor groups differ from conventional depositor groups. The findings show that depositors in both Islamic and conventional banks respond to interest rate changes. The analysis indicates that Islamic bank depositors are more responsive when their deposit sizes are larger. When Islamic bank depositors’ opportunity costs rise due to a rise in the interest rate, they do not hesitate to withdraw deposits. The relation between interest rate changes and deposits is more robust in Islamic banks than in conventional banks.     

Currency Boards when Interest Rates are Zero

In a fixed exchange rate system, any expectation that the peg may be abandoned will normally be reflected in an interest rate differential between instruments denominated in domestic and anchor currencies: the possibility of a revaluation will drive domestic interest rates below those in the anchor currency, for example. However, when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound, there is limited scope for exchange rate expectations to be reflected in interest rate differentials. Here we introduce a new mechanism, based on the central bank balance sheet, which works to bring about equilibrium in currency markets even when interest rates are zero. An expectation of exchange rate appreciation will cause foreign exchange reserves to swell, increasing the cost to policy‐makers of allowing an appreciation and, therefore, lowering the likelihood of the fixed exchange rate being abandoned. Under normal circumstances, this channel reinforces the equilibrating effect of interest rate differentials. When interest rates cannot adjust only this channel operates, implying that much larger changes in reserves are required to equilibrate currency markets. We develop a simple model to illustrate these arguments and find support for the predictions of the model using data for Hong Kong, the world's largest economy with a currency board.     

A Theory of Conflicts of Interest in Banking Relationships

Abstract

This paper highlights a dark side of banking relationships by elucidating the conditions under which a pre-existing relationship between a lending bank and a borrower can be detrimental to positive valuation effects of loan announcements. The effect of a pre-existing relationship is more likely to be negative when the pre-existing loans are large and firms' screening costs are low. A theoretical model shows that loan announcement's positive effect on borrowers' value due to the standard information advantage can be more than offset by the bank's conflict of interest when the bank's asset quality reputation is poor, i.e. when the probability of the bank holding a bad loan is large.     

“Interest Rate Trap”, or Why Does the Central Bank Keep the Policy Rate Too Low for Too Long?

In this paper, we provide a framework for modeling one risk‐taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism whereby financial intermediaries' incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank's reaction to a financial crisis. The anticipation of the central bank's reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation, triggering an “interest rate trap” – the economy will remain stuck in a long‐lasting period of suboptimal, low interest rate equilibrium. We demonstrate that interest rate policy as a financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent, and the constrained efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements.     

ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.     

BANK RUNS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS*

Diamond and Dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs. We extend the Diamond–Dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. We find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first‐best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first‐best allocation.