Democratization is the driving force for technological and economic change

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between democratization and technological innovation. In primis, the paper shows, through economic history, that democratization is an antecedent process (cause) to technological and economic change (effect). In particular, the primary finding is that democratization is a driving force for technological change: most free countries, measured with liberal, participatory, and constitutional democracy indices, have a higher level of technology than less free and more autocratic countries. In fact, “democracy richness” generates a higher rate of technological innovation with fruitful effects for the wellbeing and wealth of nations. These findings and predictions lead to the conclusion that policy makers need to be cognizant of positive associations between democratization and technological innovation paths in order to support the modern economic growth and future technological progress of countries.     

Minorities and Democratization

We analyze the process of democratization in a polity with groups that are divided along ethnic as well as economic lines. We show that: (i) the presence of ethnic minorities, in general, makes peaceful democratic transitions less likely; (ii) minorities suffer from discriminatory policies less in democracies with intermediate levels of income inequality; and (iii) in new democracies with low levels of income inequality, politics is divided along ethnic lines, and at greater levels of inequality economic cleavages predominate.     

Democratization and civil war

This article examines the impact of civil war on democratization, particularly focusing on whether civil war provides an opportunity for institutional reform. We investigate the impact of war termination in general, along with prolonged violence, rebel victory and international intervention on democratization. Using an unbalanced panel data set of 96 countries covering a 34-year period, our analysis suggests that civil war lowers democratization in the succeeding period. Our findings also suggest that United Nations intervention increases democratization, as do wars ending in stalemates. However, wars ending in rebel victories seem to reduce democratization. These findings appear robust to conditioning, different instrument sets, modelling techniques and the measurement of democracy.     

Democratization and Real Exchange Rates,

In this article, we combine two so far separate strands of the economic literature and argue that democratization leads to a real exchange rate appreciation. We test this hypothesis empirically for a sample of countries observed from 1980 to 2007 by combining a difference‐in‐difference approach with propensity score matching estimators. Our empirical results reveal a strong and significant finding: democratization causes real exchange rates to appreciate. Consequently, the ongoing process of democratization observed in many parts of the world is likely to reduce exchange rate distortions.     

The democratization process: An empirical appraisal of the role of political protest

This paper analyses the role of peaceful and violent protest in the democratization process. We interpret the democratization process as a sequence of phases so as to allow citizens' and elites' preferences for democracy to vary according to the particular phase that a country is experiencing. By doing so we jointly model the probability of protest and of moving through different phases of democracy taking into account time-constant and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, we develop a multivariate finite mixture model that introduces a latent variable to capture unobservable factors. On a sample of 171 countries from 1971 to 2010, we provide evidence that protest matters in all phases of democratization, especially peaceful citizens’ demonstrations. On the contrary, violent protest has ambiguous consequences, as it favours initial democratic transitions but at the cost of threatening democratic consolidation. We also find that, after conditioning for economic and institutional controls, there is evidence of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity.     

Political democratization, economic liberalization, and growth volatility

This study empirically investigates the effects of political and economic liberalization on growth volatility using a difference-in-difference method for a sample of 158 countries over the 1970-2005 period. The results show that, when examined separately, economic liberalization leads to a significant reduction in volatility while democratization is not followed by a decrease in growth volatility. For countries that undertake only one liberalization, opening up the economy to international trade reduces volatility in growth; becoming a democracy, on the other hand, seems to increase macroeconomic instability. For countries that implement both political and economic liberalizations, no statistically significant effect on volatility is detected. These results serve to provide additional support for the policy recommendation that developing countries should liberalize their economy first and then consider political liberalization.     

Trade liberalization,democratization, and technology adoption

A general equilibrium theory with heterogeneous skills predicts a complementarity between trade and democracy in creating demand for superior technologies. Trade liberalization or democratization alone may lead to vested interests that limit technology adoption. We use panel data on technology adoption, at a disaggregated level, for the period 1980–2000. Exploiting within-country variation over time and the heterogeneous timing of trade liberalization and democratization, we document a significant and sizable positive interaction between trade openness and democratization for technology adoption. The result that transitions to open democracies are beneficial for technological dynamics is robust to a large set of checks.     

Economic Growth, Inequality, Democratization, and the Environment

We augment the Stokey (1998) model by allowingagents to differ with respect to environmentalquality and income in order to analyze theimpact of income and environmental inequality,and of democratization on aggregate pollution.We find that the impact of a more equal incomedistribution depends on the degree ofdemocracy. In a complete democracy a more equalincome distribution generates, ceterisparibus, less pollution, which is consistentwith indirect empirical evidence, whereas theopposite is the case if democratic rights arehighly restricted. Furthermore, ademocratization is argued to typically lowerboth the income and the environmental qualityof the median voter. In this case, if, inutility terms, the fall in environmentalquality is worse than the fall in consumptionthe median voter decides to tightenenvironmental legislation so that aggregatepollution decreases.     

Democracy,rent seeking,public spending and growth

Does democratization imply faster growth, less corruption and less inefficiency? Past studies yield ambiguous results on the effects of democracy on economic performance and growth. We develop a simple two-sector endogenous growth model that shows both very young and mature democracies grow faster than countries in mid stages of democratization, producing a ‘U’ effect. This effect results from the pattern of rent seeking as it diverts from the provision of public goods. Rent-seekers act as monopolistic competitors. Initially, more democracy increases their number, raising aggregate rents. However, rents per rent-seeker fall with the number of rent seekers. Due to this crowding effect and the increased competition among rent seekers, aggregate rents fall in mature democracies. Thus, rents show an ‘inverted-U’ effect in relation to democracy. We find fairly robust supportive evidence for the latter.     

Economic downturns,inequality, and democratic improvements

This paper explores the extent to which discrete improvements in the democratic quality of political institutions can be explained by income inequality. Empirical tests of this relationship have generally yielded null results, though typically test an unconditional relationship. Guided by a theoretical nuance of the “new economic view” of democratization and using an instrumental variable strategy, we re-examine the relationship conditional on the state of the macroeconomy. We demonstrate that the more unequal are societies, the higher the probability of experiencing democratic improvements following economic downturns. Following growth periods, higher income inequality has a slight negative or null effect on the likelihood of democratic improvement. The conditional result provides a simple explanation for why previous literature has found largely null results concerning inequality and democratization and offers additional evidence in support of the new economic view.     

法学与政治：内生民主化

作者指出，经济发展增加了一国发生民主化转变的可能性。他们的这一结论与Przeworski及其合作者的观点相抵触，后者认为，发展只能起到维持既存民主的作用，而无法促成民主化转变的发生。通过全面地处理样本选择及模型规范方面的问题，作者发现，经济增长的确导致了非民主国家向民主化方向转变的发生。他们指出，在十九世纪中叶到二战前这百余年时间里，经济增长对于民主化转变发生可能性的影响十分明显，甚至比它在维持民主稳定方面的作用更加显著。同时，他们指出，在未来的几十年里，一些取得了一定程度的经济发展但仍由独裁政权统治的国家，发生民主化的几率会随着它们的经济发展水平的提高而提高。例如，当一国人均收入达12000美元时，该国有望最快在三年之内实现民主化。     

Democracy-growth nexus and its interaction effect on human development: A cross-national analysis

This paper examines the democracy-growth nexus and its interactive effect on human development by using cross-national panel data spanning over 20 years incorporating the effect of democratization process. We find evidence that the effect from democracy to human development is nonlinear and varies depending on the levels of growth and democracy. The results confirm that the interaction effect of democracy-growth nexus has a positive impact on human development but the effect is sensitive to democratization process and the level of a country's economic development. It is established that democracy is more crucial in developed countries, whereas economic growth is vital in developing countries. The findings imply that the role of democracy in enhancing human development should not be overemphasized as economic growth is vital in the developing countries.     

Resource discovery and the politics of fiscal decentralization

If the central government is a revenue maximizing Leviathan then resource discovery and democratization should have discernible impacts on the degree of fiscal decentralization. We systematically explore these effects by exploiting exogenous variation in giant oil and mineral discoveries and permanent democratization. Using a global dataset of 77 countries over the period 1970–2012 we find that resource discovery has very little effect on revenue decentralization but induces expenditure centralization. Oil discovery appears to be the main driver of centralization and not minerals. Resource discovery leads to centralization in locations which have not experienced permanent democratization. Tax and intergovernmental transfers respond most to resource discovery shocks and democratization whereas own source revenue, property tax, educational expenditure, and health expenditure do not seem to be affected. Higher resource rent leads to more centralization and the effect is moderated by democratization.     

Trade uncertainty,income, and democracy

Existing studies establish a strong correlation between income and democracy. Little, however, is known about whether income shocks driven by non-economic fundamentals matter for political transitions. This study employs trade uncertainty as a non-economic fundamental and examines the effect that trade uncertainty driven income variations have on democratic transitions over the period 1960–2013. We find that higher income fosters democratic transitions, but this effect works mainly for developing than developed countries. Specifically, using trade uncertainty as an instrument, we find that the Polity2 score, a measure of democracy, increases by at least 2.3 points following a 1 percentage point increase in GDP growth. This positive association is robust to exploiting conditional heteroskedasticity for identification, using different time periods, including lagged Polity2 as a regressor, and using alternative measures of GDP and democracy.     

RMB Appreciation,Output Growth,and Inflation

Following Dibooglu and Kutan(2005),we construct a structural VAR model to investigate the impact of RMB(the Chinese currency)appreciation on growth and inflation in China.The empirical results show that RMB appreciation has negative effects on output growth and inflation while neither effect is statistically significant.However,exchange rate shocks are important in the fluctuations of output growth and inflation.We also simulate the scenario of a sharp currency appreciation compared to the gradual approach adopted by the Chinese government.In the counterfactual analysis we find that a sharp appreciation would lead to more violent shocks in economic growth and inflation compared to the gradual approach.     

Chinese import competition,crime, and government transfers in US

This paper exploits the exogenous rise of Chinese imports in US to investigate the effect of import competition on crime at the county level. The results indicate that counties with high exposure to Chinese import competition have high crime rates. The exposure effect on property crime is much larger than that on violent crime. A one standard deviation increase in exposure causes 32 more violent crimes in the county, while such increase in exposure causes 256 more property crimes. Interestingly, we find that the crime impact of exposure to Chinese import competition becomes smaller in counties with high government transfers.     

Does democratic progress deter terrorist incidents?

This paper examines the democracy-terrorism linkage that can be distinguished at different stages of democracy. We first attempt to identify the level of democracy where terrorism is peaked, and then investigate if there is a significant reduction of terror incidents as a country advances to higher levels of democracy from the peaked level of terrorism.Using data from 124 countries covering the period 1984–2017, the study finds that the terrorism-increasing effect of democratization is peaked when a country is at the very middle level of democracy. Furthermore, there is evidence that terrorism may not be deterred as a country incrementally progresses to higher levels of democracy from the peak unless the country reaches the very highest level of democracy.The study also presents evidence that terror attacks become more prevalent with a lower level of economic development, a larger population, or an increase in instability of governance. However, economic growth, urbanization, and globalization are not significantly related to terrorism.     

Does democratization spur growth?

Many studies have considered how democratization affects economic growth. We expand this work by allowing short‐ and long‐run effects of democracy upon growth to differ since effects during political transitions need not coincide with those under established democracies. We also allow these short‐ and long‐run effects to differ across world regions since history, demography and geography vary across regions. Using annual, cross‐county data from 1960 to 2010, we find that democratizations increased growth rates in sub‐Saharan Africa both in the short run and in the long run but lowered them in Europe. Effects in other regions appear less strong. Our results suggest that democracy could be most beneficial for growth in poorer, less stable regions. We also do not find any evidence of a transitional cost. Stronger evidence arises that these effects come from rising productivity rather than through greater investment. Finally, some support though mixed suggests that democracy's ability to mitigate the effects of ethnic heterogeneity provides a partial explanation for the cross‐regional heterogeneity.     

Trade, democracy, and the gravity equation

Does democracy affect trade? There are several channels by which democracy may affect trade, with differing implications. First, democratization in the exporting country can improve product quality and reduce trade costs, increasing bilateral trade. Second, democratization in the importing country may increase trade barriers and thus reduce imports. In this paper, I analyze the effect of democracy on trade by augmenting the gravity equation with democracy. Using a rich panel data set and controlling for the endogeneity of democracy, I find empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that democracy fosters trade. This finding is robust to various econometric methods and to the use of disaggregated specifications.