International Trade, Regional Free Trade Agreements, and Economic Development

In 1991, Krugman illustrated that natural (regional) free trade agreements (FTAs) are likely to be welfare-enhancing if intercontinental costs are prohibitively high, but are likely to be welfare-reducing if such costs are zero. In 1995, Frankel, Stein and Wei extended the analysis to consider positive but nonprohibitive transport costs. This paper extends these models to allow for countries of different economic size. Large countries will tend to have higher relative wages, influencing the relative gains and losses from natural FTAs. For even modest differences in size, intracontinental FTAs are welfare-enhancing for larger countries, regardless of strong preferences for diversity or low intercontinental transport costs.     

Partial Free Trade Agreements and Economic Welfare: Reconsidering GATT Article 24

This paper generalizes the Kemp–Wan theorem on the customs union to cover partial and incomplete free trade agreements emerging all over the world and elucidates the conditions which ensure that they are potentially conducive to the economic welfare of member countries without harming the rest of the world. In the light of this generalization, it also reconsiders two well‐known conditions stipulated in Article 24 of the GATT required for the formation of FTAs.     

移民网络、国际贸易与区域贸易协定

本文从移民网络的角度探讨了区域贸易协定(FTA)缔结的动因问题,提出并证明了"移民网络促进FTA缔结"这一假说,并发现移民网络因素的加入可以将既有FTA缔结动因相关研究的模型预测准确率提升约4%,具有重要的意义。进一步的机制检验发现,移民网络主要通过促进双边贸易流来提升两国FTA的签订概率,表现为"移民网络—国际贸易—FTA缔结"这一核心发生机制。本文拓展性的细化研究还发现,无论从时间趋势或FTA缔结数量而言,移民网络对FTA缔结所起到的促进作用都呈现出边际递减规律;"移民网络—国际贸易—FTA缔结"机制在"南-北"国家对组合中会得到增强,但在"北-北"国家对组合中的表现较弱。本文的结论意味着,移民网络是发展中国家参与区域经济合作的重要资源,在当前贸易自由化多边进程受阻、逆全球化思潮涌动、国际秩序和规则面临重塑的背景下,充分发挥和利用"移民红利",对我国FTA战略的推进及世界FTA领域"中国范本"的探索有重要意义。     

Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying

This paper assesses the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the presence of lobbying by organized foreign interest groups. The assessment is based on a model in which external tariffs and the decision to form an FTA are endogenously determined. The findings demonstrate that, in the presence of an organized lobby group in a prospective partner country, an FTA may initiate an increase in the level of protection against imports from third countries and impede trade with non‐member countries. Further, this study finds that a foreign lobby may encourage the local government to enter a welfare‐reducing trade‐diverting FTA. Finally, this paper shows that an FTA increases the lobbying power of the organized lobby groups of the member countries, which can potentially obstruct the viability of welfare‐improving multilateral trade liberalization.     

Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Feasibility of Multilateral Free Trade

We studied how the pursuit of bilateral free‐trade agreements (FTAs) affects the likelihood of achieving multilateral free trade. We derive and compare the stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization: in the FTA game, each country can either form an FTA with one of its trading partners or both of them or none of them, whereas in the (restricted) No FTA game, purely bilateral FTAs are not permitted. The major result is that there exist circumstances under which the freedom to pursue (discriminatory) bilateral FTAs is necessary for achieving multilateral free trade.     

Networks of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements as a network formation game. We consider an n‐country model in which international trade occurs between economies with imperfectly competitive product markets. In each country, the labor market is either unionized or non‐unionized. We show that, if all countries are non‐unionized, the global free trade network is both the unique pairwise stable network and the unique efficient network. If all countries are unionized, the global free trade network is pairwise stable and the unique efficient network among the class of symmetric networks. If some countries are unionized while others are non‐unionized, other networks apart from the global free trade network may be pairwise stable. However, the efficient network is still the global free trade network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur. Moreover, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, all sequences of networks due to continuously profitable deviations do not lead (in most cases) to the global free trade network, even when global free trade is stable.     

Bilateral versus Multilateral Free Trade Agreements: A Welfare Analysis

Why is a proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between certain types of countries observed instead of progress in attaining global free trade through a multilateral FTA? This paper answers this question by exploring the enforceability of different types of FTAs through comparing minimum discount factors that are necessary to sustain them in an infinitely repeated game framework. The authors search for the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are sustainable under different conditions. The results depict that transportation costs, differences in country sizes and comparative advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA. Accordingly, international development policies conducted for the removal of such obstacles should be the main goal toward achieving a multilateral FTA, which is shown to be the first‐best solution to the maximization problem of global welfare.     

Barriers to Global Free Trade through Bilateral Agreements

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a dynamic noncooperative bargaining game with a random proposer. We show that global free trade (a grand coalition) does not necessarily occur unless transfer payments among countries are allowed. When transfer payments are possible, bilateral FTAs always achieve global free trade, but the ex‐ante and ex‐post inequalities of social welfare among countries are larger than those when all countries are independent because of the strategic bargaining behavior.     

Free Trade and Economic Growth

This paper extends the Das (2005) model to set up an equilibrium growth model with heterogeneous labor to analyse the growth effects after trade openness. We prove that if the terms of trade large enough before opening trade, then it is more likely that opening trade would accelerate economic growth for a small open country, vice versa.     

Free Trade Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia

Trade policy in East Asia has switched from non-discriminatory unilateral liberalization, reinforced by General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) commitments, to discriminatory free trade agreements (FTA). The paper surveys the FTA activity of the major regional players: China, the ASEAN countries, Japan, and South Korea. It concludes that emerging FTAs are weak and partial. A hub-and-spoke pattern of dirty FTAs will not drive regional economic integration or further integration with the global economy. Rather, it could be a force of regional economic disintegration – especially if the multilateral trading system weakens further. At the same time, FTA activity is distracting attention from the WTO, and, more fundamentally, from unilateral liberalization and domestic structural reforms. Hence, East Asian trade policies need to be rebalanced, with better-quality FTAs and more focus on the WTO. However, more important than the WTO and FTAs is a fresh spurt of unilateral liberalization and structural reform outside trade negotiations.     

Free Trade Agreements and Domestic Politics: The Case of the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement

What is the role of domestic politics in facilitating or constraining a government's decision to participate in free trade agreements (FTAs)? This paper seeks to answer this question by focusing on the domestic politics in Japan over the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). In particular, we ask why the opposition to the TPP encompasses a much broader segment of society than is predicted by trade theorems. We show that a broader protectionist coalition can emerge through persuasion and policy campaigns by the elites, in particular, powerful protectionist interests expending resources to persuade the uncertain public.     

Regional Trade Agreements and Cross‐border Lobbying: Empirical Evidence from the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement Negotiations

This paper documents participation of special interest groups in negotiations of the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement. Using data on the tariff reduction schedules mandated by the agreement, it shows that industries represented by strong lobby groups were faced with more favorable tariff reduction paths in both countries: phase‐out periods were longer at home and shorter in the partner country. This result provides evidence on the involvement of industry lobbying in negotiation of regional trade agreements and suggests that countries negotiating trade agreements are responsive to the interests of lobbying groups from across the border. Both results provide important implications for the political economy theory of trade agreements.     

Regional Integration Agreements,Trade Flows and Economic Crisis: A Static and Dynamic Gravity Model

Regional trade agreements (RTA) strengthening is a crucial component of the contemporary global economy. These agreements are considered beneficial in many senses (economics: trade, FDI, growth, etc.) and are a stabilizing factor in international relations (politics). In this paper, I study the effects of RTAs on exports between members and non-members taking into account the Viner specification. I also try to estimate the effect of the recent economic crisis on the export flows and achievement of RTAs. I use a static and dynamic gravity model to 40 countries belonging to 6 heterogeneous RTAs for the period 1980–2011. This model is estimated taking into account the latest estimation techniques that treats endogeneity effects of integration and the existence of dynamic effect.     

Trade Agreements in the Shadow of Lobbying

This paper presents a model of international trade agreements in which the executive branches of each government negotiate agreements while the legislative branches, subject to political pressure from firms, can disrupt them. Lobbying is in the style of Grossman and Helpman's ‘Protection for Sale’ model with a new feature: all actors face uncertainty arising from the complexity of the legislative process. I demonstrate that the higher the executives set tariffs in a trade agreement, the less effort lobbies put forth to prevent its ratification. Thus trade agreements act as a domestic political commitment device: executives set relatively high tariffs to discourage lobbying and increase the chance that the agreement will be ratified. The model sheds light on the empirical puzzle surrounding governments’ welfare weights in the Grossman and Helpman model and provides a new explanation for failures to ratify trade agreements.     

论区域协定和服务贸易的政策问题

原载:《世界银行政策研究工作报告》第2852号,002年6月一、前言有关货物贸易一体化协议的成本和收益的文献可谓众多,但分析服务贸易中这类协议的涵义的文献却几乎没有①,这是令人感到奇怪的,因为几乎每一部主要区域协定都涉及到服务领域。人们不禁要问:是否因为服务贸易是如此的不同。以至我们必须修改迄今为止适用于货物贸易领域的结论呢?尤其是,如果一国的自由化的服务贸易在区域的环境下比在多边环境下更快会出现什么情况?要是一国获得优先的国外货物市场准入并从中受益,那么是否表明该国理应以国内市场服务领域的优先准入来交换呢?我们…     

Reciprocal Trade Agreements in Gravity Models: A Meta-Analysis

The gravity model is a workhorse tool applicable in a wide range of empirical fields. It is regularly used to estimate the impact of reciprocal trade agreements (RTAs) on trade flows between partners. The studies report very different estimates since there is a significant difference in datasets, sample sizes, and independent variables. This paper combines, explains, and summarizes a large number of results using a meta-analysis approach. We provide pooled estimates, obtained from fixed and random effects models of the RTAs' effect size on bilateral trade: the hypothesis that there is no effect of RTAs on trade is robustly rejected at standard significance levels. The information collected on each estimate allows us to test the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications and differences in the control variables considered, as well as the impact of the publication selection process.     

中国东盟自由贸易区建设与我国经济安全

在经济全球化时代,经济安全不仅成为整个国家安全的重要组成部分,而且成为整个国家安全的基础.我们要实现党的十六届六中全会提出的构建社会主义和谐社会的宏伟目标,就必须确保我国的经济安全,就必须努力营造一个和谐宽松的国际环境.加强中国东盟自由贸易区建设,就是我国主动塑造外部环境的重要战略举措.对于确保我国经济安全和构建社会主义和谐社会宏伟目标的实现,具有重大的战略意义.     

区域经济一体化对多边自由贸易体制的影响——一个简单的制度经济学解释

区域经济一体化组织的出现是否有利于推动多边自由贸易的实现,这一问题已经引起了学者们的广泛关注.从制度经济学的角度看,先走区域经济一体化的道路,然后再进行区域经济组织的自由贸易合作,从而最终实现全球贸易的自由化,能够比"一味地"等待世界所有国家同时实现贸易的自由化给各利益主体带来更大的现期净收益.因此,相比WTO所推行的多边贸易自由化而言,区域经济一体化具有更多的现实性和可行性,它将为世界自由贸易的实现做阶段性准备.当然在此过程中,还应该注意加强WTO对区域经济一体化组织的监督和协调,以引导它向更有利于提高世界福利和贸易自由化的方向发展.     

Understanding the Welfare Implications of Preferential Trade Agreements

This paper examines various implications of preferential trade agreements, namely customs unions and free trade areas, in the context of a multicountry general equilibrium model. The model is calibrated to represent countries with symmetric endowments, and aggregate and disaggregate welfare change measures are used to quantify the welfare effects of preferential trade agreements. It is found that free trade areas are better than customs unions on welfare grounds for the world as a whole. Welfare decompositions suggest that a significant fraction of the welfare changes is explained by the volume-of-trade effect for both types of preferential trade agreements.