Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts

We establish that non‐linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent's contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival. The optimal contract we describe is a three‐part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent's marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. The optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry.     

Strategic Reaction of Vertically Integrated Firms to Downstream Entry: Deterrence or Accommodation

The purpose of this paper is to analyze strategic behavior of vertically integrated firms when there is downstream entry, taking into account the balance between competition in the market and competition for the market. This analysis can serve to explain diverse distributional structures, including the coexistence of vertically integrated firms and independent retailers. And it shows that the relative efficiency of downstream entrants and the level of competition among incumbents are two major factors in determining equilibrium configuration.     

加入WTO对铁路企业的影响

世界贸易包括货物贸易、服务贸易和技术贸易(知识产权)三方面内容。我国加入WTO以后,铁路将分三阶段开放货运市场。第一阶段,加入之际,允许外资参股中外合营铁路货运企业,外资比例不超过49％。第二阶段,加入WTO满3年后,允许外资在铁路货运公司中控股。第三阶段,加入WTO满6年后,允许设立外商独资的铁路货运公司,同时承诺开放与铁路货运有关的仓储和货运代理业务。这样铁路企业不     

A "Tragedy of the Clubs": Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions

We model club formation as a noncooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular type of collective inefficiency, namely, excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the "tragedy of the clubs." The tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.     

Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages

This paper estimates the importance of network effects in the market for Yellow Pages. I estimate three simultaneous equations: consumer demand for usage of a directory, advertiser demand for advertising and a publisher's first-order condition (derived from profit-maximizing behaviour). Estimation shows that advertisers value consumer usage and that consumers value advertising, implying a network effect. I find that internalizing network effects would significantly increase surplus. As an application, I consider whether the market benefits from monopoly (which takes advantage of network effects) or oligopoly (which reduces market power). I find that a more competitive market is preferable.     

Inter‐Jurisdictional Competition for Firms*

Regions inhabited with an immobile population of disabled and able individuals compete to attract mobile firms that provide jobs. The redistributive goal of regional governments is to support the disabled, who cannot work. Able individuals may work, be involuntary unemployed because of frictions in the labor market, or choose to be voluntary unemployed. Labor force participation decisions depend on regional redistributive policies. Both the size of workforce and tax on firms affect profits and therefore, firms’ location decisions. Allowing regions to engage in tax competition may be efficient. If regions cannot tax firms, they compete by implementing inefficient redistributive policies.     

Hotelling–Downs Competition with Free Entry When Voters Have an Option to Contest

Osborne shows that for almost all distributions of voters’ preferences, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist in the classical Hotelling–Downs model of electoral competition with free entry. We show that equilibrium is generically possible if in addition one allows voters an option to announce their candidacy to compete side‐by‐side with office‐seeking players. The model studied in this paper renders Osborne and the celebrated citizen‐candidate model à la Osborne and Slivinski as two extreme cases. We characterize the equilibrium set with two central questions: (i) can there be equilibria where only voters contest? and (ii) are equilibria with contesting office‐seeking players possible? We also show that in our general setting, extremists are typically voter‐candidates so that in every two‐party contest, office‐seeking politicians stay out of competition.     

进入壁垒、生产能力扩张与证券审计市场的竞争

本文从产业组织的视角,利用2001～2005年我国A股审计市场的面板数据,分析了进入壁垒、生产能力扩张这两种竞争因素对我国证券审计市场竞争的影响。结果表明,2000年后证券审计市场政策性进入壁垒提高后,短期内证券审计市场价格竞争有所削弱。但在长期,外生的需求增长导致各事务所生产能力快速扩张,使得市场竞争加剧。从整个研究时期看,进入壁垒提高带来的减缓竞争效应仍大于生产能力扩张带来的竞争效应。     

Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions

Motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the Texas Department of Transportation (TDoT), we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry. Our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications. For the first time, we show that even within an independent private value paradigm, as the number of potential bidders increases, bidders' equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive, and the expected procurement cost may rise because the "entry effect" is always positive and may dominate the negative "competition effect". We then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration, controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity, and use the recently developed semi-parametric Bayesian estimation method to analyse the data. We select the model that best fits the data, and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the "entry effect" and the "competition effect" with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost.     

The Effects of Macroeconomic Policy with a Disparity in Price Elasticity Between Private‐ and Public‐ Sector Demands

We introduce a disparity in price elasticity between government demand and consumption demand into a simple money‐in‐the‐utility‐function model. This extension demonstrates that the effect of fiscal policies on production may be positive, negative, or neutral depending on the disparity in price elasticity between sectors. Because the effect of an increase in nominal money supply with constant nominal government expenditure is the opposite to that of a fiscal policy, a fiscal policy financed by seigniorage can have positive, negative, or no effects depending on parameter values. Moreover, the effect of simultaneous implementation of expansionary–contractionary policies depends on how they are combined.     

保险市场竞争程度与市场结构的关系研究

本文运用H统计量研究我国财寿险市场的竞争程度,并进一步通过回归分析与相关分析研究竞争程度与市场结构的交互影响因素.研究结果表明,1999-2006年间我国的财险市场可以判断为垄断竞争的市场结构,而同期我国寿险市场则属于寡头垄断的市场结构.2003年保险业费率市场化的改革对财险和寿险都有明显的影响,直接加剧了竞争程度.竞争度与财险市场公司数量正相关,与寿险市场公司数量负相关.竞争度与集中度的关系在财险业为负相关,而在寿险业根据采用不同的集中度指标的不同考察结果会有所不同.     

Deterrence and knowledge of the law: The case of drunk driving

While it is necessary that researchers make choices in order to estimate inequality, the reasons for the measurement choices and their impact on inequality estimates have not been widely assessed. This paper uses Canadian data from the 1980s to analyse whether inequality estimates are sensitive to common measurement choices. Seemingly minor technical choices about the treatment of outlying observations, such as the use of top-income coded data, exclusion of very high and low observations, and differences among data sets in the capture of very high observations affect estimates of inequality. Further, the impact of the treatment of outlying observations on inequality estimates are at least as large as the impact of measurement choices of a conceptual nature, such as the income definition and population selection. The sensitivity of inequality estimates to measurement choices, which often remain invisible, affect inferences about the relative degree of inequality at a given point in time among countries and changes over time.     

制度-垄断地租与中国地方政府竞争:一个马克思主义分析框架

竞争性地方政府作为改革以来形成的重要制度形式,在相当程度上决定了中国社会主义市场经济体制的特点。本文不仅承续了既有文献中将地方政府的经济动机归于租金,并将土地财政视为地方政府利用租金开展战略投资的观点,而且试图在一个马克思主义框架内进一步发展这一观点。为此我们对租金的生产性利用和国家的经济作用的关系做了初步探讨,并将大卫·哈维的制度-垄断地租理论运用于分析中国地方政府围绕营建环境的投资活动。本文的基本结论是,中国地方政府在以土地财政为核心的战略投资中,充当了租金的生产性分配者和使用者的角色,并因之嵌入了原本由企业之间的竞争所带来的相对剩余价值生产过程,形成了中国经济特有的相对剩余价值生产双重结构,从而在相当长的时间内造就了世所罕见的高投资率,推动了中国经济的持续快速增长。     

The Entry Cost Shock and the Re‐rating of Power Prices in New South Wales,Australia

Australia has long been the beneficiary of low, stable power prices. A decade‐long state of oversupply underpinned this result and while plant capital costs had been rising, the cost of capital had been declining. These offsetting effects locked the wholesale market into an average cost of $35–$40/MWh. However, from 2007, a simultaneous and sharp rise in new entrant plant capital costs and the cost of capital occurred. The combined effects crept up on the industry while it was in a state of oversupply. This ‘entry cost shock’ disrupted a 7 year long equilibrium price, with average power system cost rising to $60/MWh.     

Developing Country Second‐Mover Advantage in Competition Over Environmental Standards and Taxes

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a “second‐mover advantage.” In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental standard levels. We introduce this feature to an otherwise familiar model of fiscal competition. Four distinct outcomes can be characterized by varying the marginal cost to firms of an environmental externality: (1) the outcome may be efficient; (2) the developing country may be a “pollution haven”—a place to escape excessively high environmental standards in the developed country; (3) the developing country may “undercut” the developed country and attract all firms; (4) the developed country may be a pollution haven.     

税费关系及税费改革的理论分析

税和费作为财政收收入的两种形式,均有其存在的客观性和必要性。它们各有所长,各司其职。在税费改革的过程中,应对税和费有个明确的认识,找出并针对不规范税费关系形成的原因,寻求治理规范的方法。     

Middle Men: The Visible Market‐Makers

This paper presents a framework in which middlemen emerge to intermediate between ex‐ante homogeneous buyers and sellers in the presence of search frictions. Middlemen announce prices, and hold an inventory to provide more sure services. Middlemen can mitigate trade imbalances with price competition. Using this framework I illustrate how the frictionless limit can emerge and how middlemen can implement the short‐side principle for the market price to be Walrasian. The recent progress in the literature on intermediation will also be discussed.     

Is There a Trade‐Off Between Inflation Variability and Output‐Gap Variability in the EMU Countries?

This paper examines the performance of monetary policy in eleven EMU countries for the whole period of the EMS. This is based on the trade‐off between inflation variability and output‐gap variability. To this end, we examine whether the introduction of an implicit inflation targeting by the EMU member countries after the Maastricht Treaty, changed the trade‐off between inflation variability and output‐gap variability. We employ a stochastic volatility model for two sub‐periods of the EMS (i.e. before and after the Maastricht Treaty). We find that the trade‐off varies amongst EMU countries. The implication of these findings is that there are asymmetries in the euro area, due to different economic structures among the member countries of the EMU.     

The Dynamic Relationship Between Corruption–Inflation: Evidence From Panel Vector Autoregression

This paper aims to explain the mixed causality nexus between corruption and inflation. For that, we apply a panel vector autoregression model on a large sample of 180 countries over the period 1996–2014. Using two corruption indexes and subsample estimations, results provide evidence that the inflation–corruption nexus is bidirectional. The causal effect is more important from corruption to inflation. Interactions remain significant but heterogeneous across subsamples with different income levels. The corruption effect is persistent only in low–middle income economies and its adverse effect on inflation is weaker in high‐income economies. The two‐way relationship between inflation and corruption reflects the inability to control inflation and the situation of the poverty trap in some countries.     

Tax‐and‐Transfer Tensions: Designing Direct Tax Structures

Direct tax structures are regularly revised and debates over changes are heated. Taxes affect the behaviour of individuals and families in ways which are hard to predict, but which impose constraints on governments trying to achieve their objectives. Attempts to help one group of individuals often have unintended consequences on other groups. Views about the role of a tax system vary substantially but, in debates, the basic value judgements which influence policy recommendations are seldom made explicit. This article attempts to clarify the main tensions involved in tax planning and to explain why consensus is unlikely ever to be achieved.