Strategyproof Cost Sharing of Multiple Excludable Public Goods

In a model of cost sharing of multiple excludable public goods, we examine the properties of mechanisms satisfying strategyproofness, no subsidy, outcome non‐bossiness, budget balance, individual rationality and consumer sovereignty. We show that such mechanisms in general will not satisfy the equity property of equal treatment of equals. This contrasts with the single excludable public good case.     

公共产品识别:基于本源属性还是现实属性

基于非竞争性和非排他性这些本源属性的公共产品界定不能解释人类社会发展所导致的某些公共产品与私人产品之间的相互转变。实际上,公共产品的性质更多地取决于政府的政策和人类的集体行为,故我们在区分产品的本源属性与社会所赋予的现实属性的基础上对公共产品的定义进行了扩展,认为公共产品是指那些具有非排他性的产品,或者说是那些具有事实上消费公共性的产品。在此定义下,通过公共性三角解释了消费的公共性和效用的公共性的区别。     

Discrimination via Exclusion: An Experiment on Group Identity and Club Goods

We study using laboratory experiments the impact on cooperation of allowing individuals to invest in group‐specific, excludable public goods. We find that allowing different social groups to voluntarily contribute to such goods increases total contributions. However, a significant proportion of that contribution goes toward the group‐specific club good rather than the public good, even when the latter has higher financial returns to cooperation. We find significant evidence of in‐group biases, which are manifested by positive in‐group reciprocity. That is, club goods allow subjects to display their preferences for interaction with their in‐group members, as well as positive in‐group reciprocity.     

Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion

A group of firms decides to cooperate on a project that requires a combination of inputs held by some of them. These inputs are non‐rival but excludable goods, i.e., public goods with exclusion such as knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms should be compensated for the inputs they contribute. We show that this problem can be framed within a cost sharing game for which the Shapley value comes out as a natural solution. The main result concerns the regular structure of the core that enables a simple characterization of the nucleolus. However, compared to the Shapley value, the nucleolus defines compensations that appear to be less appropriate in the context of data sharing. Our analysis is inspired by the problem faced by the European chemical firms within the regulation program REACH that requires submission by 2018 of a detailed analysis of all the substances they produce, import, or use.     

α‐SERIAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROVISION OF AN EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOOD

We present a new class of “α‐serial mechanisms” for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non‐consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy‐freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the “maximal efficiency loss” and “maximal manipulation” of α‐serial mechanisms and point out a trade‐off between these two properties.     

Efficient Bayesian Mechanisms for Collective Goods: Is a Deficit Inevitable?

This paper considers efficient Bayesian mechanisms for the provision of collective goods. We study the impact of excludability and the nature of externalities exhibited by collective goods upon incentives. We demonstrate that if a good is rivalrous only excludability of benefits allows a designer to restrict each agent's payoff enough to achieve efficiency in the limit. The more exclusive a rivalrous good, the smaller is the financial deficit in the mechanism relative to the size of the surplus of the economic activity. In contrast, if a good exhibits positive externalities, excludability is no longer necessary to achieve efficiency in provision.     

Economic Growth Evens Out Happiness: Evidence from Six Surveys

In spite of the great U‐turn that saw income inequality rise in Western countries in the 1980s, happiness inequality has fallen in countries that have experienced income growth (but not in those that did not). Modern growth has reduced the share of both the “very unhappy” and the “perfectly happy.” Lower happiness inequality is found both between and within countries, and between and within individuals. Our cross‐country regression results suggest that the extension of various public goods helps to explain this greater happiness homogeneity. This new stylized fact arguably comes as a bonus to the Easterlin paradox, offering a somewhat brighter perspective for developing countries.     

Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods

This paper provides a positive analysis of public provision of excludable public goods financed by uniform taxes or fees. Individuals differing in preferences decide, using majority rule, the provision level and financing instrument. The decisive voter has median preferences in a tax regime, but generally has above median preferences in a fee regime. Numerical solutions indicate that populations with uniform or left‐skewed distributions of preferences choose taxes, while a majority coalition of high‐ and low‐preference individuals prefer fees when preferences are sufficiently right skewed. Public good provision and welfare under fees exceeds that under taxes in the latter case.     

IMPROVING THE ANALYTICAL AND DATA FRAMEWORK OF THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR FOR NATIONAL GOALS ACCOUNTING*

Provision of “market goods” follows the decision rules of traditional microeconomics; pricing and resource allocation for such goods tend towards Pareto optimality. The provision of “collective goods,” by contrast, depends on political (or quasi-political) collective decision processes; beneficiaries often receive a share of collective goods free of charge or well below average or marginal (private or social) costs. No inherent tendency towards optimality may be presumed and separate analysis of collective goods becomes an essential part of national goals accounting. The national-income-accounts (NIA) distinction between personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and government purchases of goods and services corresponds roughly to a division between market goods bought by the consumer and a major category of “collective goods” (i.e. “public goods” provided by government). However, a significant proportion of PCE represents “collective goods” paid for by government, business, or nonprofit organizations and provided on behalf of the consumer, whereas a part of NIA government purchases represents services paid for by the consumer (i.e. “market goods”). This article develops operationally meaningful distinctions among “market goods,”“collective goods,” and “tied aid” (a mixed category with market-good and collective-good characteristics). These distinctions are determined by the nature of the decision processes–rather than by the characteristics of the beneficiary or the supplier. This classification is related to the national income accounts and major discrepancies are pinpointed. The blurring of the distinction among market goods, collective goods and tied aid is found to be most consequential in the NIA treatment of “education” and “medical care” services. NIA data for these two services are restructured for national goals accounting purposes in order to illustrate both the quantitative importance and the empirical feasibility of classifying benefits by their respective decision processes.     

Public Goods Provision: On Generalizing the Jackson–Moulin Mechanism

Jackson and Moulin (1992) proposed a simple mechanism to implement a wide class of cost‐sharing rules for the provision of a binary public good. Bag (1997) generalized this mechanism to divisible public goods under the assumption of “constant marginal benefit.” This paper generalizes the Jackson–Moulin mechanism to a broader setting, including the cases of both decreasing and constant marginal benefit. Moreover, this paper shows the impossibility of generalizing the mechanism further.     

Race‐to‐the‐bottom Tariff Cutting

Unilateral tariff liberalization accounts for the lion's share of trade liberalization since the 1980s and has accompanied the most successful trade‐led development model of the past 50 years, “Factory Asia”. Understanding what drove this liberalization is therefore crucial to our grasp of the process of economic development. This paper provides empirical evidence for seven Asian emerging economies from 1988 to 2006 consistent with a tariff race to the bottom driven by a competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). The identification is two‐pronged. First, it is shown that tariffs on parts and components, intermediates and capital goods, crucial locational determinants for assembly firms, are correlated in competitive space, i.e. across countries at a similar level of development, but not across all countries. Second, it is shown that the tariff correlation in competitive space is significantly higher for inputs than consumer goods.     

The Trade Effects of Indian Antidumping Actions

Antidumping (AD) has emerged as the most widespread policy impediment to trade in the last 25 years. One of the surprise proliferators of AD in the lesser developed world has been India, which has filed an outstanding number of 285 cases between 1992 and 2002. In this paper, I study empirically the effect of Indian AD cases on trade flows from other countries. I also look at the effect of AD cases on trade diversion from countries subject to or “named” in AD investigations to non‐subject or “non‐named” countries and conclude that Indian AD policy is effective. I use a unique dataset combining AD data from the World Trade Organization with trade data from Comtrade. The empirical model is estimated via the Arellano–Bond procedure.     

Revisiting the Link Between Stock Prices and Goods Prices in OECD Countries

Fisher hypothesis postulates positive relation between stock return and inflation; however early studies document negative relationship between the two and they conclude that stock cannot be used as a hedge against inflation. In this paper we explore long‐run nonlinear relationship between stock price and goods price. Our sample consists of 19 OECD countries; all or some of these countries have been studied before with the findings of linear cointegration between the stock index and goods price index. Based on unit root tests and linear cointegration test, we apply threshold cointegration tests, Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration test and panel VAR method. With all these econometric methods we arrive at heterogeneous findings as follows: two countries have linear cointegration, five countries have threshold cointegration, nine countries do not have any cointegration and finally two countries provide inconclusive results. Estimates of Fisher coefficient provided by linear and nonlinear cointegration methods, which range between 1.27 and 1.86, are consistent with previous studies. Impulse response analysis from panel VAR for countries having no cointegrating relation shows that shock to inflation produces negative response in stock return, which supports findings of earlier studies.     

Understanding Japan's Capital Goods Exports

Japan is the leading supplier of sophisticated capital goods to East Asian countries. These goods embody advanced technologies and facilitate learning and productivity growth. Capital goods also represent 30–40% of Japan's exports. This paper investigates the determinants of these exports. Results from dynamic ordinary least squares estimation indicate that exports depend on exchange rates, income in the importing countries and downstream countries' exports to the rest of the world. Results from out‐of‐sample forecasts indicate that Japanese exports crashed in 2009 because of the perfect storm of a yen appreciation, a global slowdown and a collapse in Asia's exports.     

EU Banks Rating Assignments: Is There Heterogeneity between New and Old Member Countries?

We model EU countries' bank ratings using financial variables and allowing for intercept and slope heterogeneity. Our aim is to assess whether “old” and “new” EU countries are rated differently and to determine whether “new” ones are assigned lower ratings, ceteris paribus, than “old” ones. We find that country‐specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous intercepts) are a crucial determinant of ratings. Whilst “new” EU countries typically have lower ratings than “old” ones, after controlling for financial variables we also discover that all countries have significantly different intercepts, confirming our prior belief. This intercept heterogeneity suggests that each country's rating is assigned uniquely, after controlling for differences in financial factors, which may reflect differences in country risk and the legal and regulatory framework that banks face (such as foreclosure laws). In addition, we find that ratings may respond differently to the liquidity and operating expenses to operating income variables across countries. Typically ratings are more responsive to the former and less sensitive to the latter for “new” EU countries compared with “old” EU countries.     

Does Preferential Trade Benefit Poor Countries? A General Equilibrium Assessment with Nonhomothetic Preferences

We develop a Ricardian model of trade with nonhomothetic preferences to analyze preferential trade agreements (PTAs) among countries of different stages of economic development. The richer a country is, the more likely will PTAs improve its terms of trade, also when it is a non‐member. Rich non‐member countries are also less likely to incur welfare losses from PTAs. PTA membership only guarantees welfare gains for countries that are too poor to import the goods rich countries produce. For all other countries, the welfare effects of joining PTAs depend on the world income distribution and on the strength of comparative advantages.     

A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions

We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis‐à‐vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.     

Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross‐border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non‐cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first‐ or second‐mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result, we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, each of them may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk‐dominance to select the leading government. Finally, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.     

Market Entry Regulation and International Competition*

We analyze a non‐cooperative two‐country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto‐efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is “significant,” production will be located in the cost‐efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even “substantial,” the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is “insignificant,” production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.     

Nonstationarity and Stochastic Stability of Relative Income Clubs

The recent literature on “convergence” of cross‐country per capita incomes has been dominated by the two hypotheses of “global convergence” and “club‐convergence,” pertaining to limits of estimated income distribution dynamics. Utilizing a new measure of “stochastic stability,” we establish two stylized facts regarding short‐ and medium‐term distribution dynamics. The first is non‐stationarity of transition dynamics, in the sense of changing transition kernels, and the second is emergence, disappearance, and re‐emergence of a “stochastically stable” middle income group. This middle income group emerges as the gap between rich and poor clubs gets larger, and it changes the dynamics of transition to and from the rich and poor clubs, eventually narrowing the gap between the poor and rich as the middle club vanishes. Analyzing the stochastic stability of middle‐income groups is thus a first step toward understanding higher‐order dynamics of narrowing or widening of the gap between rich and poor countries.