A Revelation Mechanism for Soft Information under Moral Hazard

This paper constructs a revelation mechanism to address a problem of moral hazard under soft information. The agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action, which she reports to the principal. Therefore the principal also faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. Economically relevant restrictions induce constraints on the principal's choice of mechanism and the Revelation Principle fails to apply. Specifically, a direct mechanism induces some pooling, which does not replicate the allocation obtained using a larger message space. Pooling also weakens the ex ante incentives. The Revelation Principle is extended to obtain type separation. A better audit relaxes frictions.     

金融危机背景下信用违约互换道德风险研究

2007年爆发的金融危机中,信用违约互换蕴含的道德风险使其成为危机发生和发展的助推器。本文通过构建信用违约互换交易的合约设计模型,研究该产品的作用以及控制其道德风险的最优合约设计。分析发现:交易双方资金成本差异决定了信用违约互换具有优化配置信用风险、提高银行收益和拓宽市场主体投资渠道等有利作用,但信用违约互换交易会降低银行监督信贷资产的努力水平,导致信用风险积聚和增加。通过引入不完全保护机制,我们给出了有效控制信用违约互换道德风险的最优合约。本文的研究结论为防范和控制信用衍生品隐含的道德风险提供了借鉴,有利于促进其发挥分散信用风险等积极作用。     

Policy Measures to Alleviate Foreign Currency Liquidity Shortages under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

During the recent global financial crisis, certain central banks introduced two innovative cross‐border operations to deal with the problems of foreign currency liquidity shortages: domestic liquidity operations using cross‐border collateral and operations that supply foreign currency among central banks based on standing swap lines. We show theoretically that central banks improve the efficiency of equilibrium under foreign currency liquidity shortages using these two innovative temporary policy measures.     

Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision

This paper analyzes a model of private unemployment insurance under limited commitment and a model of public unemployment insurance subject to moral hazard in an economy with a continuum of agents and an infinite time horizon. The dynamic and steady‐state properties of the optimum private unemployment insurance scheme are established. The interaction between public and private unemployment insurance schemes is examined. Examples are constructed to show that for some parameter values increased public insurance can reduce welfare by crowding out private insurance more than one‐to‐one and that for other parameter values a mix of both public and private insurance can be welfare maximizing.     

道德风险存在下董事责任保险市场的保费水平分析

本文通过对董事责任保险市场的介绍,指出在董事责任保险市场中存在着严重的道德风险问题,通过对市场中保险双方行为的博弈分析,得到在道德风险存在下的保费变动范围,并指出防止或减轻董事责任保险市场中道德风险的方法.     

化解道德风险问题的风险资本分阶段投资策略

由于风险投资存在因信息严重不对称而引起的道德风险问题,风险投资家就采用资本分阶段注入这一强有力的控制机制来收集信息,监控企业进程,并保持定期退出低质投资项目的选择权,从而降低因决策不当所造成的潜在损失,并实现对风险企业家的有效激励。     

Verifiability and Contract Enforcement: A Model with Judicial Moral Hazard

I model the litigation of a contract containing a variable notobservable by courts, hence nonverifiable, unless the rationaland self-interested judge exerts effort. He values the correctruling but dislikes effort. Judicial effort is discretionary.I show that effort cost is inconsequential—"always breach"is equilibrium for any effort cost. But there exists anotherequilibrium where a small breach rate is achieved even withsignificant effort costs. Maximal remedies for breach are notoptimal. Because effort is discretionary, low effort cost increasesbreach. Pretrial negotiations can have a substantial negativeimpact on verifiability under arbitrarily small deviations fromfull rationality.     

委托代理视角下国有企业经营者道德风险的防范

随着公司法人治理结构在国有企业的逐步建立和规范,国有资产所有者和经营者之间建立起一种委托-代理的契约关系,作为代理方的经营者为了谋求自身效用最大化而损害委托人利益的道德风险现象日益突出.本文基于委托代理理论的视角,对国有企业经营者道德风险的表现及成因进行了分析,并认为要有效防范此风险需从强化监督力度、健全激励机制、加快职业化进程和加强思想道德教育等方面着手.     

风险投资家的最优激励契约模型研究--一种基于逆向选择和道德风险条件下的博弈模型分析

为减少风险投资融资中风险投资家的逆向选择和道德风险,风险投资者必须设立一套有效的激励机制来让风险投资家选择,从而根据风险投资家选择的结果来甄别其真实能力类型,同时又能激励其努力工作。文章建立了风险投资家能力类型和努力都是不可观测条件下的最优激励契约模型,并根据显示原理,利用最优控制理论求出了最优解进而进行了分析。得出的结论是:最优激励契约能使高能力风险投资家乐于选择具有高强度激励、低固定收入和风险小的项目,同时又能激励其签约后更加努力工作。     

忠诚折扣、转售价格维持组合与非对称零售服务投资

忠诚折扣与转售价格维持组合可以实现零售服务异质条件下的非对称最优投资,这一新的发现不仅解决了长期困扰转售价格维持服务理论的一个难题,而且为转售价格维持反垄断效率识别提供了一个可操作的维度.当需要以转售价格维持解决零售服务"搭便车"、同时还需要以非对称零售服务投资实现异质零售服务有效供给时,如果制造商信息不完全、但零售商信息完美,两部收费与转售价格维持组合即可实现非对称最优零售服务投入;但若制造商信息不完全及零售商信息不完美同时存在,则仅有忠诚折扣与转售价格维持组合才能够保证最优零售服务投资实现.原因在于,忠诚折扣能够通过事后销量识别零售商投资是高或低,从而有效解决不完全信息条件下非对称零售服务投资的识别和差别补偿问题.相较于两部收费,忠诚折扣与转售价格维持组合不仅有利于制造商利润最大化,而且能够改善社会福利.在事前对称的市场环境中,忠诚折扣内生形成事后非对称的零售商市场结构,其中低投资零售商的降价激励强于高投资零售商,这一特征有助于识别并检验转售价格维持合约的真实动机.     

Alternative Estimator for Industrial Gender Wage Gaps: A Normalized Regression Approach

Using normalized regression equations, we propose an alternative estimator of industrial gender wage gaps which is identified in the sense that it is invariant to the choice of an unobserved non‐discriminatory wage structure, and to the choice of the reference groups of any categorical variables. The proposed estimator measures the pure impact of industry on gender wage gaps after netting out wage differentials due to differences in characteristics and their coefficients between men and women. Furthermore, the proposed estimator is easy to implement, and hypothesis testing is straightforward. We compare the proposed estimator with existing estimators using samples from the 1998 US Current Population Survey.     

Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic Perspective

Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.     

中国地区工资水平差异的影响因素分析

本文运用模块数据和空间计量学的方法考察了中国改革开放以来影响地区工资水平及地区工资非均衡的各种政策体制因素和经济因素。实证结果表明,中国的地区工资水平及其差异既受制度变迁的影响又受市场机制的作用,具有典型的转型特征。具体而言,工资体制、对外开放、所有制改革、地方保护、教育水平和资本投入等因素对地区工资水平及其差异都有不同程度的影响作用。     

道德风险和多产出条件下技术许可中的技术定价机制

利用现代契约经济学的分析方法,从机制设计的角度,分析了道德风险和多种产出条件下技术许可中的技术定价机制。得出如下结论:当道德风险存在于技术使用者一方时,技术所有者采用纯固定费用的技术定价形式;在道德风险和多种产出的条件下,技术所有者确定的固定价格随着似然率的增大而减小,如果似然率具有单调似然率的特点,那么技术所有者确定的固定价格是技术产品产出或其状态的单调递减函数。     

广东省高参合率下新型农村合作医疗制度道德风险研究

新型农村合作医疗保险制度工作已经进入全面开展阶段。广东目前已经呈现高参合率的态势,而高参合率将会引发一系列道德风险。新型农村合作医疗保险道德风险主要表现为骗赔、浪费医疗资源、套取医疗基金等。这将会威胁基金安全,降低医疗保障水平、浪费资源,甚至滋生犯罪。新型农村合作医疗保险制度道德风险的成因主要有信息不对称、筹资比例失衡、监管力度缺乏等,为此必须采取相应措施规避新农合高参合率下的道德风险。     

Downward Wage Rigidity in Europe: A New Flexible Parametric Approach and Empirical Results

Abstract. We suggest a new parametric approach to estimate the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity in ten European countries between 1995 and 2001. The database used throughout is the User Data Base of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The proposed approach is based on the generalized hyperbolic distribution, which allows to model wage change distributions characterized by thick tales, skewness and leptokurtosis. Significant downward nominal wage rigidity is found in all countries under analysis, but the extent varies considerably across countries. Yearly estimates reveal increasing rigidity in Italy, Greece and Portugal, while rigidity is declining in Denmark and Belgium. The results imply that the costs of price stability differ substantially across Europe.     

Capital Mobility In A Second–Best World: Moral Hazard With Costly Financial Intermediation

The paper studies financial integration in the presence of moral hazard, where banks may mitigate excessive risk by costly monitoring. The author shows that a drop in banks' cost of funds, less efficient intermediation technology, higher macroeconomic volatility, and a more generous deposit insurance raise the riskiness of projects in a competitive equilibrium. Overborrowing would arise even in the absence of deposit insurance in circumstances where the cost of risk monitoring is high, the banks' cost of funds is relatively low, and macroeconomic volatility is high. Reforming an inefficient banking system and improving its operation is a precondition for successful financial integration.     

Central Wage Setting under Multiple Technological Equilibria: A Mechanism for Equilibrium Elimination

Instituting an initial round of centralized wage setting before an ultimate round of decentralized wage bargaining may actually raise employment. A general multi–equilibrium model is set up with strategic complementarities in the implementation of a new technology through aggregate demand spillovers. In this model, centralized wage setting to establish an outside option wage, which is selectively binding on lo–tech firms, may achieve the "big push" to a hi–tech general equilibrium with higher employment, output, wages and profits.     

Take Your Time to Grow: A Field Experiment on the Hiring of Youths

We investigate the effect of spells of no formal employment of young Germans on their chances of entering the labor market through an apprenticeship. We also study whether the potential negative effects of such spells can be mitigated by publicly provided training measures. In a field experiment, the fictitious applications of three young women were sent to firms advertising apprenticeships for the position of office manager. One application was from a fresh school‐leaver and two from applicants who had been out of school for two years, where one of them had participated in a training measure. We find that applicants who have been out of school for two years and have participated in the training are more successful than older applicants without additional training. We do not find a significant difference between older applicants with or without training and fresh school leavers. Our findings show that training measures increase the attractiveness of applicants and that the potential stigma of spells of no formal employment after school are compensated by informal work experience or age or a combination of both.