Regulation,Local Monopolies and Spatial Competition

Many regulated industries involve an oligopoly market structure. We examine optimal incentive regulation for a duopoly model of spatial competition when firms have private cost information. Market structure is endogenous as regulation determines market segments for firms and output distribution across consumers in each firm's market. By varying the assignment of consumers to firms, a relatively more efficient firm can be rewarded with a larger market, thus reducing quantity incentive distortions. We derive the optimal policy, assess the impact of asymmetric information relative to full information, and examine extensions to allow for ex ante asymmetries in firm structure.     

The effects of economic reforms on manufacturing dualism: Evidence from India

Dualism is a pervasive feature of the manufacturing sectors of less-developed countries, with large differences in productivity between the informal and the formal sectors. Policy distortions are viewed as an important factor behind the prevalence of manufacturing dualism. We examine whether tariff reforms, industrial de-licensing and the withdrawal of reservation of products for small firms implemented since the mid-1980s have had any effects on efficiency differentials between informal and formal firms in Indian manufacturing. We find strong evidence that economic reforms have exacerbated dualism by increasing the productivity differentials between the more efficient formal firms and the less efficient informal firms.     

Price Caps,Rate of Return Constraints and Universal Service Obligations

This paper evaluates the effects of modifying price cap regulation when firms are allowed to use non-linear tariffs. We consider a stylized network industry and analyze price cap regulation combined with rate of return regulation and with a universal service obligation. While both modifications can increase aggregate welfare by reducing the pricing distortions under price cap regulation, a universal service obligation is welfare superior if the firms profits and the size of its network are held constant.     

Optimal fiscal policy in sunspot‐driven oligopolistic economies

Economies with oligopolistic markets are prone to inefficient sunspot fluctuations triggered by autonomous changes in firms equilibrium conjectures. A well‐designed taxation‐subsidization scheme can eliminate these fluctuations by coordinating firms in each sector on a single equilibrium, left unaffected. The optimal taxation scheme must select the number of active firms that makes the best trade‐off (in terms of consumer welfare) between the markup and the scale inefficiency distortions. Implementing such stabilization policy leads to significant welfare gains, attributable to an “efficient stabilization effect,” typically ignored in usual computations of the welfare costs of fluctuations.     

Subsidy competition,industrial land price distortions and overinvestment: empirical evidence from China’s manufacturing enterprises

In China, offering inexpensive industrial land is a major means for local governments to participate in interregional subsidy competition, which caused regional industrial land price distortions. This article examines the effect of regional industrial land price distortions on the overinvestment of Chinese manufacturing enterprises. Chinese industrial enterprises data and land price monitoring data of 49 major cities in China between 1998 and 2007 are employed. This article has found that industrial land price distortions will significantly stimulate the overinvestment of manufacturing enterprises. Such a promoting effect varies among manufacturing enterprises of different ownership and industry attributes. Industrial land price distortions have the most significant promoting effect on the overinvestment of foreign-invested firms, followed by private firms, while state-owned enterprises are the least affected. Compared with private heavy-industry firms, industrial land price distortions have a more significant effect on the overinvestment of private light-industry firms. Compared with foreign-invested heavy-industry firms, industrial land price distortions have a more significant effect on the overinvestment of foreign-invested light-industry firms. This study represents a positive exploration and supplement to the existing studies on the effects of subsidy competition on corporate investment behaviours and the studies on Chinese-style subsidy competition.     

Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The Relevance of Imperfectly Competitive Eco‐Industries

Permit markets lead polluting firms to purchase abatement goods from an eco‐industry which is often concentrated. This paper studies the consequences of this sort of imperfectly competitive eco‐industry on the equilibrium choices of the competitive polluting firms. It then characterizes the second‐best pollution cap. By comparing this situation to one of perfect competition, we show that Cournot competition on the abatement good market contributes not only to a nonoptimal level of emission reduction but also to a higher permit price, which reduces the production level. These distortions increase with market power, measured by the margin taken by the noncompetitive firms, and suggest a second‐best larger pollution cap.     

Tax Uniformity: A Commitment Device for Restraining Opportunistic Behavior

We show that uniform and differentiated tax systems diverge in their propensity to generate distortionary opportunistic behavior. First, when firms choose investment before the government can commit to its taxes, the tax scheme creates strategic incentives for firms to distort their investment. Second, a system of differentiated taxes has a greater propensity to foster strategic distortions in investment than a uniform tax regime. While the paper makes these points in a set‐up in which polluting firms face an emission tax and invest in abatement, the main message is shown to hold for a wide class of tax policy games.     

多种要素扭曲是否推动了中国企业出口

本文使用1999-2007年工业企业数据样本分析了包括资本、劳动及中间品在内的要素市场相对扭曲程度,并考察其是否能解释中国企业出口的独特成本优势。结论认为：中国制造业企业存在严重要素价格扭曲,不同要素的价格扭曲程度差异化较大。劳动力价格扭曲现象普遍存在,经济发展以牺牲劳动力价格市场化为代价。国有企业比重较大的行业资本价格相对较低,而私营企业比重较大的行业则资金成本较高。能源、原材料相关行业以及外资企业比重较大的行业中间品价格偏低;经过实证检验,要素市场扭曲的确对企业出口倾向起到推动作用,企业将获得的成本优势转化为出口优势,这表明低廉的要素价格是中国产品在国际市场中具有竞争力的重要原因。     

Foreign-owned versus Domestically-owned Firms: Economic Performance in Japan

This paper utilizes micro‐panel data for firms located in Japan and examines differences in corporate performance between foreign‐owned and domestically‐owned firms in the 1990s. We find that foreign‐owned firms not only reflect superior static characteristics, but also achieve faster growth. Moreover, foreign investors appear to invest in firms that may not be immediately profitable, but those that are potentially the most profitable in the future. There is also no evidence that foreign investor is “foot‐loose.” These imply that foreign investors bring useful firm‐specific assets into the Japanese market, which may work as an effective catalyst for necessary structural reform.     

THE SCOPE FOR NON‐PROFIT OBJECTIVES IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY UNDER INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We ask how the scope for non‐profit objectives in a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) in a mixed oligopoly changes because of competition from firms in another country. There is no change if costs and demand are given, unless the trade partner is a low‐cost country. However, the scope for non‐profit objectives is limited by the country's relative size if wages are market‐clearing and if workers and firms are stationary, because of reduced competitiveness caused by higher real wage rates. The total surplus is then not affected by the actions of the SOE. International trade does not otherwise reduce the scope for its non‐profit objectives if workers and firms are mobile, but productivity differences might require restrictions in order to avoid a complete relocation of the workforce in either country.     

Footloose Capital and Comparative Advantage

We investigate the effect of country size differentials and Ricardian technology differences on firms’ location decisions using a two‐country, two‐good (homogeneous agricultural good and differentiated manufacturing products), two‐factor (labour and footloose capital) simple new economic geography model. We found that manufacturing firms may agglomerate in a country where the manufacturing sector has a comparative disadvantage. In addition, when country size differentials and Ricardian technology differences exist between two countries, the key factor influencing firms’ location decisions changes according to the level of trade liberalization, from being market size‐dependent to becoming technology‐dependent.     

A theory of return‐seeking firms

We introduce a theory of return‐seeking firms to study the differences between this and profit‐maximising models. A return‐seeking objective takes into account the opportunity cost of each additional resource input to a firm's production as being a potential capital input choice in an alternative project. We find that firm supply curves cease to exist in perfectly competitive markets, that supply curves may slope up as well as down, that economies of scale are necessary for any production to occur and that firms always produce on a decreasing portion of their cost curve.     

The impact of corporate and personal income taxes on the location of firms and on employment: some panel evidence for the Swiss cantons

The impact of corporate income taxes on location decisions of firms is widely debated in the tax competition literature. Tax rate differences across jurisdictions may lead to distortions of firms’ investment decisions. Empirical evidence on tax-induced relocation and subsequent economic development in the US and Europe is still inconclusive. Much the same applies to Switzerland. While there is some evidence on personal income tax competition between Swiss cantons, evidence on the impact of intercantonal corporate income tax differences on the location of business within Switzerland is missing. In this paper, we present econometric evidence on the influence of corporate and personal income taxes on the regional distribution of firms in 1981 and 1991 and on cantonal employment using a panel data set of the 26 Swiss cantons from 1985 to 1997. The results show that corporate and personal income taxes deter firms to locate in a canton and subsequently reduce cantonal employment.     

OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PRODUCT R&D WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY ORDERING: ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY*

We examine the optimal R&D subsidy/tax policy under a vertically differentiated duopoly. In a significant departure from the existing work, we consider the case of asymmetric costs of product R&D where there is a small technology gap between firms. In our analysis, the endogeneity of quality ordering is explicitly taken into account. We demonstrate the possible anti‐leapfrogging effect of R&D subsidy/tax policy. By committing to a firm‐specific subsidy schedule contingent on firms’ quality choices, the government can not only correct distortions in product quality but also select the socially preferred equilibrium. The latter role is fulfilled by preventing the technologically inferior firm from becoming a quality leader in the industry. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are analysed.     

区域协同发展中碳排放转移规制策略研究

碳转移规制的目的是为了有效推进区域协同发展与环境质量的共同提升,因而碳转移规制设计必须有利于能源结构转型和区域协同治理。区域碳转移规制模式基本架构应为：出台全国性的污染税替代目前运行不佳的污染收费制;设定汽车燃油标准并鼓励企业积极研发低碳技术;以区域差异化碳税模式为主体制度,辅以污染权许可跨区域交易制度,以有偿竞争竞拍等方式发放有期许可证,并对各区域内部诸多类型企业经营主体均持开放原则。同时,应积极调整优化产业结构,完善低碳基础设施,提升能源协同效率,改善能源供需结构,构建区域碳排放收敛机制。     

政企合谋、环境规制与企业全要素生产率*

本文利用中国工业企业数据库和地级市层面的企业治污投资数据构建了一个2003—2007年的面板,实证检验了环境规制对企业全要素生产率的影响以及政企合谋在背后的作用。实证结果表明,用企业治污投资占工业增加值比重衡量的环境规制强度每上升1%,企业当期的生产率下降约1%。当政企合谋可能性上升时,环境规制对企业生产率的边际影响在减弱,说明政企合谋带来的监管放松和处罚不力弱化了环境规制对合谋企业生产率的影响。本文的政策启示在于中央政府应加强环保领域统一执法,破解囚徒困境式的环境规制。同时,本文的发现为环保机构监测监察执法垂直管理制度改革提供了合理性依据。     

Small firms,bigger changes: health insurance coverage take-up rates in small firms after the ACA

Measuring the impact of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) on employer-sponsored health insurance is essential in an era of constant changes to health policy. Using data from the Kaiser Family Foundation Employer Survey, we focus on firms with fewer than 50 employees in order to isolate the effect of the ACA on small firms. We utilize a differences‐in‐differences approach with a time fixed effect structure to provide analysis for a treatment group of small firms and a control group of large firms. After excluding firms with grandfathered plans, we find that the ACA provisions reduced health insurance coverage take-up rates in small firms by 1.96 to 2.67 percentage points (compared to large firms).     

Does the stock market affect investment by Chinese firms? Some new evidence

During the 1990s, the Chinese government increasingly relied on the stock market as the major tool for state‐owned enterprise (SOE) reform and for the allocation of investment resources. This paper investigates the impact of stock market development in China on firm‐level capital investment by using a panel data set constructed by the author of all Chinese listed firms for the period 1992 to 1999. The results show that stock market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s q, has a highly independent, significant and positive influence on listed firms’ investment decisions, particularly during the stock market boom from 1996 to 1999. Given the sizable real effects of the stock market, deviations of stock prices from fundamentals can have substantially negative consequences. As a result, this study suggests that sensible regulation of the Chinese stock market is needed in order to enhance the efficiency of stock prices and facilitate an effective channeling of investment funds.     

Price Effects of Target Ratcheting: A Progress Report on Medical Devices

Regulators, who have asymmetric information concerning the technology of regulated firms, often rely on incentive‐based regulation. While such a scheme is well known to be vulnerable to the adverse incentives of regulated firms, empirical research that quantifies the magnitude of distortion caused by incentive regulation is scarce. This paper is a progress report of our recent project on target ratcheting with an application to medical devices in Japan. A casual observation of detailed product‐level transaction data and reduced‐form analyses indicate the existence of pricing distortion in the wholesale market. The paper also proposes a two‐period bilateral bargaining model to match the data. A preliminary analysis finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that target ratcheting distorts the pricing of regulated firms, but the magnitude of the distortion is estimated to be economically small.     

Experimentation by firms,distortions, and aggregate productivity

Recent empirical research has documented that distortions of allocative efficiency among heterogeneous firms can have large aggregate consequences. This paper evaluates the size of these effects when distortions affect not only resource allocation but also the evolution of firm-level productivity itself. To this end, we partially endogenize the evolution of firm-level productivity in a standard heterogeneous firm model by allowing firms to engage in costly, purposeful experimentation: Firms can engage in risky experiments, which take the form of productivity shocks. Results from failed experiments can be discarded. We then show that endogenous productivity implies up to twice as large effects of productivity-dependent distortions on aggregate consumption.