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1.
This study investigates whether the transfer paradox (donor enrichment and/or recipient impoverishment) occurs when a donor and a recipient have different population growth rates by using a one‐sector, two‐country overlapping generations model. We show that if the population growth rates differ, neither donor enrichment nor recipient impoverishment occurs in the steady state under dynamic efficiency. This result is in stark contrast to the existing results that the transfer paradox might occur when a donor and a recipient country have different marginal propensities to save, assuming that both have the same population growth rate. Furthermore, we present the condition for the transfer problem to occur on the transition path and show that the transfer paradox is less likely to occur as the economy converges to the steady state. Our result shows that the prevailing finding that the transfer paradox can occur in an overlapping generations model is limited to the special case of countries having the same population growth rate.  相似文献   

2.
This study examines the transfer problem between two countries when either the donor or the recipient has aspirations, based on parents’ standards of living, in a one-sector overlapping generations model. Focusing on whether and how aspirations impact the welfare effect of a transfer, we demonstrate the following results. First, when the donor forms aspirations, as the degree of his/her aspirations to their parents increases, a transfer is more likely to cause donor enrichment. However, this does not affect the recipient’s welfare at all. In contrast, when the recipient forms aspirations, whether the increase in the degree of these aspirations causes immiserization depends on whether the transfer raises the recipient’s consumption. Second, we show that if the donor’s or recipient’s marginal utility increases with their respective aspirations, the transfer is more likely to cause recipient immiserization. However, whether donor enrichment occurs depends on the situation. These results imply that there are two types of effects that aspirations can have on the welfare of both countries: effects caused by the aspirations, and effects that occur through the capital market. Furthermore, we find that these two effects on welfare do not necessarily work in the same direction.  相似文献   

3.
This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structures (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, and Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases toward a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government.  相似文献   

4.
This paper shows that even untied aid is Pareto-improving if and only if the marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor country is sufficiently larger than in the recipient country.  相似文献   

5.
Buying Influence: Aid Fungibility in a Strategic Perspective   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
I study equilibria of non‐cooperative games between an aid donor and a recipient when there is conflict over the allocation of their combined budgets. The general conclusion is that a donor's influence over outcomes is increasing in the share of the available resources it controls; if this share is large enough, aid fungibility is not important as the donor achieves its most preferred allocation. The game‐theoretic approach to fungibility is contrasted with the traditional non‐strategic approach. I argue that the former is superior as it derives final allocations instead of assuming them, making analysis of the sources of influence over outcomes possible.  相似文献   

6.
This paper analyses the effects of altruistic parental transfers on the welfare gains of marriage. To that end, it develops a sequential game which, in a first stage, determines the optimum level of the transfer between the altruistic donor (the parent) and the recipient (the daughter/son). In the second stage, the levels of consumption and provision of a family good are deduced by way of a Nash bargaining solution, with the threat point being represented by divorce. We find that the degree of altruism of the recipient has a null effect on the gains in welfare derived from the marriage by the recipient’s spouse, and a positive effect on those derived by the recipient. Additionally, the degree of altruism of the donor has a positive effect on the gains in welfare derived from the marriage by the recipient’s spouse, and an ambiguous effect on those derived by the recipient.  相似文献   

7.
This paper aims to determine an optimal allocation of the European Cohesion Fund (ECF) and compares it with the observed allocation. This optimal allocation is the solution of a donor optimization problem which maximizes recipient countries' GDP per capita to achieve economic convergence in the European Union. Compared to the observed allocation, our solution can identify the recipient countries that can benefit from higher ECF transfers than the observed levels, as those having low relative GDP per capita, large population size and where the ECF has a strong capacity to support economic growth. Result is robust to changes in the specification of the donor's utility function.  相似文献   

8.
We analyze the impact of donor fragmentation on the quality of government bureaucracy in aid-recipient nations. A formal model of a donor's decision to hire government administrators to manage donor-funded projects predicts that the number of administrators hired declines as the donor's share of other projects in the country increases, and as the donor's concern for the success of other donors' projects increases. The model's predictions are consistent with results from cross-country empirical tests, using an index of bureaucratic quality available for aid-recipient nations over the 1982–2001 period.  相似文献   

9.
The paper demonstrates that changing the numeraire from Hicks' to Sraffa's does not affect the location and, a fortiori, the number of switch points between two given techniques. This negates some recent claims to the contrary, and supports the earlier general position that the choice of numeraire has no bearing on reswitching, even though it does have a bearing on capital reversal. In the process the paper shows that the rate of growth of the economy and the marginal propensity to save also do not affect the switch points, which may thus be regarded as depending essentially on technical factors alone.  相似文献   

10.
We examine the provision of family public goods using experimental economics methods. With sufficient altruism and shared resource arrangements, families can provide the efficient level of family public goods. Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem asserts that transfers from altruistic parents will induce children to maximize family income even if children are not altruistic toward other family members. Consistent with altruism, parents and children contributed more to a public good when in groups with family members than when in groups with strangers. In contrast to the predictions of the Rotten Kid Theorem, however, children's behavior fell short of maximizing family income.  相似文献   

11.
We study the design of public long‐term care (LTC) insurance when the altruism of informal caregivers is uncertain. We consider non‐linear policies where the LTC transfer depends on the level of informal care, which is assumed to be observable, while children's altruism is not. Our policy encompasses two policies traditionally considered in the literature: topping up policies consisting of a transfer independent of informal care, and opting out policies entailing a positive transfer only if children fail to provide care. We show that both total and informal care should increase with the children's level of altruism. This is obtained under full and asymmetric information. Public LTC transfers, on the other hand, may be non‐monotonic. Under asymmetric information, public LTC transfers are lower than their full information level for the parents whose children are the least altruistic, while it is distorted upward for the highest level of altruism. This is explained by the need to provide incentives to highly altruistic children. In contrast to both topping up and opting out policies, the implementing contract is always such that social care increases with informal care.  相似文献   

12.
The competition on foreign aid, as a means for securing foreign policy and other benefits by the donor, can lead to diplomatic rivalry. This article utilizes a game theoretic model to analyze the existing rivalry for foreign aid and international status between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Similar to the role of political contributions in the public choice theory, foreign aid is taken a means of international lobbying, to realize the donor's objective. Research results, based on the policy effect consideration, indicates that the equilibrium aid policy, which is endogenously determined, renders an inability on the part of the donors, which affects the recipient's optimal foreign policy. How does a donor obtain favorable outcomes when such rivalry exists? Strengthening diplomatic endeavors to realize the access effect has been proved an effective method. Analytical results have shown that this method not only complements aid rivalry but also increases the welfare of the donor.  相似文献   

13.
The aim of the present paper is to investigate whether in the case of Greece and within the framework of the existing national accounting system, significantly different marginal propensities to save are attached to different income categories. We establish that the marginal propensity to save out of property income is significantly higher, in fact double, than the marginal propensity to save out of agricultural income and income from wages and salaries of the other sectors of the economy.  相似文献   

14.
This paper develops a two‐period model in which the recipient faces borrowing constraint and the donor is a Stackelberg follower to address two important policy questions: (i) whether foreign aid can lead to the efficient level of capital investment in the recipient country and (ii) how does the form (e.g. budgetary transfers, capital transfer) and the timing of aid affect the recipient's financial savings and capital investment. It finds that the disincentive effect of the capital transfer on the capital investment by the recipient is larger than the budgetary transfers. It makes financial savings more attractive relative to the capital investment for the recipient. In the absence of capital transfer, the multi‐period budgetary transfers not only lead to the efficient level of capital investment by the recipient, but also achieve the same allocation as under commitment. The capital transfer can lead to the efficient level of capital investment, but in this case, it completely crowds out the recipient's own capital investment.  相似文献   

15.
Tcha MJ 《Economics Letters》1995,49(4):441-445
"This paper considers the effect of altruism on the relationship between the size of households and the migration decision. It is shown that when the parent has higher altruism toward her children, (i) the household is more likely to migrate, and (ii) the marginal gain from migration increases as the size of the household increases."  相似文献   

16.
Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0  
International donors usually have particular goals they want to achieve with their foreign aid, e.g., poverty alleviation. In the international aid story lobbying by potential recipient groups attempting to capture the donor's support plays a potentially important role for non‐governmental organizations. We model this situation as a hierarchical contest and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process with non‐governmental organizations as intermediaries.  相似文献   

17.
This paper extends Becker's theory of altruism in the family to social interactions in the workplace, using motives measured by social psychologists. Altruism in the family is measured by a transfer of money income to the spouse which is motivated by affiliation. Data from the first nationwide survey of TAT-measured personality dispositions are used to show that a head of household with children maximizes family income only if he is motivated by affiliation towards his wife and has a stronger motive for power than affiliation in managerial situations. Additional motive patterns are found which account for significant differences in family income.  相似文献   

18.
Abstract

This paper reformulates the Kaldor–Pasinetti model of income and profit distribution by introducing the interest rate from the very outset of the model but maintaining other Kaldor–Pasinetti assumptions intact. It is shown that the profit rate and the share of profits in national income are not independent from either the capitalists' or workers' propensity to save. Many contributors to the theory of income and profit distribution have erred in attributing a potentially positive impact of the interest rate upon profits. The interest rate is always and everywhere a tax on functional and personal incomes together. This result explains Schumpeter's observation that ‘Interest acts as a tax upon profit.’ In an alternative model, workers receive a share of profits instead of fixed contractual interest. It is shown that the profit rate and share are not independent from either propensity to save. Furthermore, the workers' share of profits has a positive impact on the rate and share of profits. This implies that a profit sharing regime could be more conducive to capital accumulation and job creation. It is found that Pasinetti's Cambridge Equation is more akin to a profit sharing regime.  相似文献   

19.
Diamond's neoclassical growth model with National Debt is reconsidered with respect to dynamic welfare considerations. Conditions under which capital deepening implies increasing welfare are dependent upon the stability of the steady state, the interest elasticity of savings, and the relationship between the marginal propensity to save and the elasticity of substitution in production.  相似文献   

20.
The tendency of various scholarship has been so to interpret Kahn's multiplier article as to invite wonder that Keynes did not break through earlier to his consumption function and effective demand. And while Keynes was independently along this road it is difficult to believe that Jens Warming, deploying a personal propensity to save within the investment multiplier mechanism, did not help him to arrive. Ironically Kahn, who resisted Warming's innovation, did incidentally point the way to a formulation of the effective demand problem which was alternative to that of Keynes.  相似文献   

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