Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer–Shepsle versus Stackelberg

We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters’ type space is either uni‐ or bidimensional. We study two voting procedures widely used in the literature. The Stackelberg (ST) procedure assumes that votes are taken one dimension at a time according to an exogenously specified sequence. The Kramer–Shepsle (KS) procedure also assumes that votes are taken separately on each dimension, but not in a sequential way. A vector of policies is a Kramer–Shepsle equilibrium if each component coincides with the majority choice on this dimension given the other components of the vector. We study the existence and uniqueness of the ST and KS equilibria, and we compare them, looking for example at the impact of the ordering of votes for ST and identifying circumstances under which ST and KS equilibria coincide. In the process, we state explicitly the assumptions on the utility function that are needed for these equilibria to be well‐behaved. We especially stress the importance of single‐crossing conditions, and we identify two variants of these assumptions: a marginal version that is imposed on all policy dimensions separately, and a joint version whose definition involves both policy dimensions.     

Gaining power through enlargement: Strategic foundations and experimental evidence

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain even if voters are bargaining over a fixed budget. We show that this phenomenon can occur as an equilibrium of a non-cooperative bargaining game based on the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining. We implement this game in the laboratory and find that power can be gained by adding new members as the theory predicts.     

Monetary and banking policy transmission through interest rates: an empirical application to the USA,Canada, the UK and the Eurozone

The main purpose of this paper is an examination of the pass‐through interest rate transmission from the wholesale rates (central bank and/or money market rates) to the retail rates (deposit and lending rates) of the banking system. Knowledge of the transmission substantially helps us to calculate the pass‐through interest rate margin or mark‐up in the banking systems under examination (USA, Canada, the UK and the Eurozone). The selection of the wholesale interest rate is also an important part of this pass‐through transmission framework because it is related to the money supply process and therefore the central bank's policy capabilities. In the empirical part, a Johansen (1988) cointegration based error‐correction procedure (ECM‐GE) is implemented for the wholesale interest rate selection. Then an LSE–Hendry general‐to‐specific model (GETS) is applied, for the revelation of the banking sector pass‐through interest rate behaviour. In the empirical part, on the issue of the wholesale interest rate selection, the USA and the Eurozone seem to favour the Money Market rate while the UK and Canada favour the central bank policy rate. The results indicate two types of interest rate pass‐through behaviour, with market structure implication – namely, the US and UK banking systems contrasted with Canada–Eurozone.     

Storable votes

Motivated by the need for more flexible decision-making mechanisms in the European Union, the paper proposes a simple but novel voting scheme for binary decisions taken by committees that meet regularly over time. At each meeting, committee members are allowed to store their vote for future use; the decision is then taken according to the majority of votes cast. The possibility of shifting votes intertemporally allows agents to concentrate their votes when preferences are more intense, and although the scheme will not achieve full efficiency, storable votes typically lead to ex ante welfare gains over non-storable votes. Welfare gains can be proven rigorously in the case of 2 voters. With more voters, counterexamples can be found, but the analysis suggests that the welfare improvements should continue to hold if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) the number of voters is above a minimum threshold; (ii) preferences are not too polarized; (iii) the horizon is long enough.     

Long-run scarring effects of meltdowns in a small-scale nonlinear quadratic model

We build a small-scale nonlinear quadratic (NLQ) model in which credit feedback and regime switches in the output gap affect the adjustment path of the economy towards a steady state. The central bank solves a finite-horizon decision problem where the policy rate also can be zero or negative. We estimate this model by nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression method (NLSUR) and using the parameters to explore policy scenarios. The latter projects long-run dynamics after a large demand contraction leading to scarring effects on the economy. We point out three main results. First, while scars are dominant when the central bank follows a standard Taylor rule, unconventional monetary policy (UMP) – such as Quantitative Easing – mitigates the output decline in both the short and the long run. Second, a zero natural interest rate curtails the central bank’s ability to adjust the economy and mitigate scars. Third, financial constraints leave the deepest scars even if UMP is active.     

ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFERENCE,INTEREST‐RATE RULES,AND INDETERMINACY*

This paper extends the Benhabib et al. flexible‐price, money‐in‐the‐utility‐function model by considering endogenous time preference and re‐examines equilibrium indeterminacy in response to alternative interest‐rate rules. We show that either an active or a passive interest‐rate feedback rule can generate local indeterminacy even if consumption and real money balances are Edgeworth independent. This result is in sharp contrast to that in the related literature. We also find that in the presence of endogenous time preference, local indeterminacy may occur regardless of whether the monetary policy is based on the interest‐rate feedback rule or money growth‐rate targeting.     

Determining a Modified Currency Board's Two-Period Exchange Rate Strategy

Is it preferable for a modified currency board (MCB) to disguise its true characteristics and preferences and renege later? This paper analyzes a model in which a MCB determines its first-period exchange rate strategy to maximize a two-period welfare function. The inflation rate anchored by a classical currency board (CCB) is always a benchmark to the MCB in its first period decision. If the benchmark inflation rate is either sufficiently low or sufficiently high, the MCB chooses the optimal exchange rate in both periods without playing a credibility game over time. However, if the benchmark is at a moderate level, a strategy of overtly deceiving the public by pretending to be a CCB is shown to be superior to a strategy of concealing through policy randomization.     

NOMINAL GDP TARGETING AND CENTRAL BANK CONSERVATIVENESS

In the literature on monetary economics, there is the ‘inflationary bias’ result which predicts that the rate of inflation will be biased towards a higher level under discretionary monetary policy than under a rule‐based policy regime. It is established that a credible nominal target can eliminate this ‘inflationary bias’. In this paper, we examine the case of nominal GDP targeting, which is a rule‐based monetary regime. Depending on the degree of conservativeness by the central bank, we show in a stylized model the choice of different combination of inflation and real GDP targets can still result in an ‘inflationary bias’, and there also exists the possibility of a ‘dis‐inflationary bias’.     

On the real voting power index

Both formal and real voting power indices completely disregard the significance of voting methods to processes of coalition formation. This may result in misleading figures of voting strength if estimated probabilities of certain coalitions are utilized in the indices. It is shown that application of the real voting power index of Stenlund, Lane and Bjurulf (a measure closely related to the Banzhaf index) to parliaments using the amendment voting procedure, is problematical. If a parliament votes upon three or more alternatives, the winning coalition on the issue depends more or less on the order of voting. The measurement of real voting power is distorted both if the formation of the voting order is based on application of general voting order rules, or if it is totally unregulated.     

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank

The first six years of ECB monetary policy are examined using a general framework that allows central bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation, output and the interest rate from their reference values. The empirical analysis on synthetic euro‐area data suggests that the objective of price stability is symmetric, whereas the objectives of real activity and interest‐rate stabilizations are not. Output contractions imply larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size, while movements in the interest rate are larger when the level of the interest rate is relatively high. The hypothesis of M3 growth‐rate targeting is rejected.     

Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members

Abstract. This paper starts by describing the composition of monetary policy committees (MPCs) in inflation‐targeting and non‐targeting countries. The experience of MPC members on their inflation performance is then compared, opposing inflation targeters with non‐targeters. Our sample covers the major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, in the period 1999–2008. Our results first show that MPCs are different in inflation‐targeting (versus non‐targeting) countries. They also reveal that policy‐makers' backgrounds influence inflation, and that the influence of MPCs' experience is much greater in inflation‐targeting countries, while size effects are more important for committees that do not target inflation.     

析货币政策的科学性与艺术性

货币政策的制定和实施离不开科学原则作指导,但货币政策的实时决策又是极其复杂的,需要中央银行家的审时度势和敏锐判断,也即货币政策的艺术性。详细分析了货币政策科学性和艺术性的具体表现,认为货币政策的科学性与艺术性在实践中是难以分割和同等重要的,好的货币政策总是需要好的政策实施者,需要将科学性原则与中央银行家们的决策艺术完美地结合起来。     

EMU in Reality: The Effect of a Common Monetary Policy on Economies with Different Transmission Mechanisms

The theory of optimal currency areas states that a single currency zone should have symmetry of shocks and structures across regions. Research on monetary union in Europe has either assumed these conditions to hold close enough not to cause problems, or has focussed on asymmetries in shocks. But what if economic structures and/or market responses differ between countries or regions? This paper examines the consequences of a single monetary policy when there are asymmetries in i) the monetary transmissions; ii) the wage/price transmissions; and iii) private sector asset holdings. We find the first and last destabilise the business cycle, and put countries out of phase with one another in a way that cannot be corrected by deficit constrained fiscal policies. The effect is to delay convergence.     

Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination

Most international monetary policy games are modelled as prisoners' dilemma games. Political scientists suggest however that other game-theoretic structures (chicken, stag-hunt and deadlock games) could be more appropriate to describe international monetary coordination. This paper provides some empirical evidence on this issue, by studying the case of European monetary coordination from 1979 to 1989. First, central banks' and governments' preferences are revealed through an analysis of their actual behaviour. Then, the dynamic game describing policymakers' interactions is simulated under alternative institutional arrangements: coordination, defection, sub-group coalitions, etc. The main conclusion is that the stylised facts derived from those experiments seem not to be consistent with the implications of the prisoners' dilemma framework. Consistency is instead found with the features of a stag-hunt game. CEPR and FEEM This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH THE STICKY INFORMATION MODEL OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT: INFLATION OR PRICE‐LEVEL TARGETING?

I investigate the optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian macroeconomic framework with the sticky information model of price adjustment. The model is solved for optimal policy, and welfare implications of three alternative monetary policy regimes under this optimal policy are compared when there is a cost‐push shock to the economy. These monetary policy regimes are the unconstrained policy, price‐level targeting and inflation targeting regimes. The results illustrate that optimal policy depends on the degree of price stickiness and the persistence of the shock. Inflation targeting emerges as the optimal policy if prices are flexible enough or the shock is persistent enough. However, the unconstrained policy or price‐level targeting might be preferable to inflation targeting if prices are not very flexible and the shock is not very persistent. The results also show that as prices become more flexible, the welfare loss usually gets bigger.     

Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting

This paper shows that it is preferable for monetary policy to be conducted by a committee instead of a single policy maker if there is uncertainty about potential output. We examine three decision procedures - an optimal procedure, averaging and voting - and find that the latter is the appropriate way to reach decisions if policy makers are not equally skilled. Finally, we demonstrate that efficient decision procedures reduce the persistence of shocks.     

Spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why do fiscal instruments matter?

Using a two‐country DSGE model, we analyse the spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union. Based on a non‐Walrasian labour market with a labour force participation decision and involuntary unemployment and a detailed fiscal sector, we focus on the relative cross‐border effects of different kinds of fiscal shocks (government expenditure and tax shocks). Among the major lessons from this analysis, five general and striking results are worth highlighting : (1) spillover effects differ widely according to the fiscal instrument, (2) all fiscal instruments produce positive spillover effects on foreign GDP except a rise in government consumption, (3) the response of unemployment is not always negatively correlated with the response of output (4) the different fiscal shocks trigger different effects on foreign inflation and the term of trade, which implies heterogeneous interest‐rate and trade channels, and (5) a more accommodative monetary policy and a scenario of ‘fiscal dominance’ alter greatly the effects of fiscal policy shocks.