Empirical models of short-term debt and crises: Do they test the creditor run hypothesis?

A positive correlation between short-term debt and crises has been interpreted as evidence in favor of self-fulfilling creditor runs, which have been blamed for financial crises in developing countries. We show that this correlation can also be explained by a standard model of optimal borrowing without creditor runs. In such a model, imposing capital controls on short-term external debt is not Pareto-improving.     

Currency crises and foreign credit in emerging markets: Credit crunch or demand effect?

Currency crises of the past decade highlighted the importance of balance-sheet effects of large devaluations. Currency crisis literature identified a decline in credit as one of the channels through which such crises affect real economic activity. We find empirical evidence of the existence of this channel and quantify its extent and persistence: controlling for a host of fundamentals, we find a decline in foreign credit to emerging market private firms of about 25 percent in the first year following large depreciations. This decline is especially large in the first five months, is less pronounced in the second year, and disappears entirely by the third year. We show that only about a quarter of the initial decline in credit could be attributed to the “credit crunch,” while the rest of the decline is due to contracting demand. After six months, however, most of the credit decline could be attributed to supply effects.     

The Impact of a Disorderly Resolution of Global Imbalances on Global Wealth

Partly reflecting structural advantages such as liquidity and strong investor protection, foreigners have built up extremely large positions in US (as well as other dollar‐denominated) financial assets. This paper describes the impact on global wealth of an unanticipated shock to US financial markets. For every 10 per cent decline in the dollar, US equity markets, and US bond markets, total wealth losses to foreigners could amount to about 5 percentage points of foreign GDP. Four stylized facts emerge: (i) foreign countries, particularly emerging markets, are more exposed to US bonds than to US equities; (ii) over time US exposure has increased for most countries; (iii) on average, US asset holdings of developed countries and emerging markets (scaled by GDP) are very similar; and (iv) based on their reserves position alone, wealth losses of emerging market governments could on average amount to about 2¾ percentage points of their GDP.     

The composition of capital inflows when emerging market firms face financing constraints

The composition of capital inflows to emerging market economies tends to follow a predictable dynamic pattern across the business cycle. In most emerging market economies, total inflows are pro-cyclical, with debt and portfolio equity flowing in first, followed later in the expansion by foreign direct investment (FDI). To understand the dynamic composition of these flows, we use a small open economy (SOE) framework to model the composition of capital inflows as the equilibrium outcome of emerging market firms' financing decisions. We show how costly external financing and FDI search costs generate a state contingent cost of financing such that the cheapest source of financing depends on the phase of the business cycle. In this manner, the financial frictions are able to explain the interaction between the types of flows and deliver a time-varying composition of flows, as well as other standard features of emerging market business cycles. If, as this work suggests, flows are an equilibrium outcome of firms' financing decisions, then volatility of capital inflows is not necessarily bad for an economy. Furthermore, using capital controls to shut down one type of flow and encourage another is certain to have both short- and long-run welfare implications.     

Orderly exits from adjustable pegs and exchange rate bands

This paper examines the exit process from adjustable pegs and exchange rate bands, and the role of capital flows in these exits. It dwells on the experience of various countries, including Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, India, Poland, and Yemen. It begins by identifying conditions under which exits are sought. Next, it discusses the prerequisites for a successful exit, factors affecting the pace of exit, and the nature of the post‐exit regime. It then examines the behavior of private capital flows, interest rates, and official reserves before and after three successful exits (Chile, India, and Poland), and draws broad policy lessons.     

Does Financial Sector Development Augment Cross-Border Capital Flows?

ABSTRACT

The sharp increase in volatility of capital flows in recent years has resulted in many countries altering the regulations governing the flow of foreign capital only to find such changes having a limited impact. We postulate that one reason for the limited effectiveness of such changes in regulations is the level of financial sector development in the country. As a country enhances its level of financial sector development, it also develops more and more sophisticated financial instruments. The more advanced the domestic financial instruments are, and the deeper is the integration of the domestic financial markets with the world markets, the greater is the likelihood of developing strategies to bypass capital account management measures. In this paper, we use various empirical techniques to identify the impact of financial sector development on capital flows, after accounting for regulatory regime. The empirical results indicate that there is a threshold effect in the financial sector development capital flow relationship. In particular, financial sector development augments greater integration with global capital flows only above a threshold level. Below the threshold level we find financial development reduces the extent of integration with global capital markets.     

Currency crises and the real economy: The role of banks

This paper attempts to explain the divergent output effects of currency crises through a very simple and intuitive model that relates the effects of a devaluation not only to the financial fragility of banks, but also to the degree of financial market imperfection. The model shows that countries with higher degrees of financial market imperfection and/or a banking sector whose balance sheets are weak, in terms of having low net worth and high foreign currency exposure, are much more likely to suffer a contraction in the wake of a currency crisis.     

资本账户开放与系统性金融危机

本研究以全球范围内具有代表性的55个国家的跨国数据为基础,通过实证分析系统考察了资本账户开放和系统性金融危机之间的相关关系.实证结果表明,在资本账户开放和系统性金融危机的联系机制方面,重要的是开放方式的选择,而不是开放程度的高低:长期中资本账户开放程度的提高不会诱发金融危机,但激进式的资本账户开放方式会显著增加金融危机的发生概率.     

Changing International Financial Architecture: Growing Chinese Influence?

It is often said that the 21st century will be the Asian century. Based on population and gross domestic product projections, it certainly looks as if this will be so. Will the existing international financial institutions give more voices, votes, and top positions to Asia? Or will Asia create its own institutions that would rival the old architecture? This present paper argues, first, that China, and possibly India, will be in a position to be so influential that the international financial architecture may have to go through significant changes. Second, the three large crises in the last 20 years have made Asian countries more confident that they can manage capital flows by accumulating large foreign reserves and by adopting sound macrofinancial policies. After 2009, China started to push various initiatives that will amount to creating its own sphere of influence with new regional institutions in the future.     

论投机性泡沫的内生性——基于一个模拟投机交易过程的经验模型

通过一个简约的模拟投机交易的经验模型,阐述了投机性泡沫是投机者对资产价格预期的一种自我实现①,它内生于投机者对资产价格进行无约束的套利交易过程中,其内在机制是交易数量的加速膨胀和预期的资产价格增长的相互作用。并据此认为政府管理部门首先应根据经济宏观和微观运行状况,结合资产的特点,为资产价格确立一个目标区域,并运用结构性的货币政策、延展交易资产的持有时间以及征收交易税等手段对资产价格进行有效管理,以防范投机性泡沫的形成和扩展。     

Globalization, rent protection institutions, and going alone in freeing trade

We construct a two-country North-South Product-cycle model of trade with endogenous growth and trade barriers. We remove the scale effects on growth by incorporating rent protection activities by Northern incumbents. We examine the effects of two forms of globalization - an expansion of the relative size of the South and unilateral trade liberalization by either country. We find that the location of rent protection institutions and the sectoral trade structure determine whether or not globalization raises steady-state economic growth. We demonstrate that for accelerating worldwide economic growth, contrary to conventional wisdom, unilateral Northern trade liberalization is preferable to bilateral trade liberalization.     

What do capital inflows do? Dissecting the transmission mechanism for Thailand, 1980–1996

This paper examines the effects of private financial (non-FDI) capital inflows in Thailand in the pre-crisis period (1980:I–1996:IV). Private capital inflows are found to be associated with higher asset prices, lower lending rates, surges in bank lending and domestic spending driven by higher investment, higher output, modest inflation, and modest real exchange rate appreciation. Inflows are also associated with a greater vulnerability to a liquidity crisis, but not with greater external solvency risk. Current account deficits are temporary, thus sustainable, as exports catch up with higher imports within two years. Consequently, the Thai crisis appears to be more of a liquidity crisis than an external solvency crisis.