Does devaluation improve trade balance in small island economies? The case of Fiji

A number of countries, mostly small and island economies manage fixed exchange and often devalue it as a stabilisation strategy. The current paper investigates the effectiveness of devaluation in improving trade balance with reference to Fiji. A small island economy has limited exportable and hence highly depends on imports for both consumption and production purposes. A devaluation, therefore, inflates domestic price and appreciates the real exchange immediately by raising importable consumption and discouraging imports used in domestic production. The paper applies various econometric models for empirical investigation of its impact and transmission mechanism. Strong long-run relationship found between real exchange rate and trade balance explains that appreciation of currency has been responsible for the rising trade deficit in the economy. Moreover, the devaluation did not demonstrate J-curve phenomenon. The effect of devaluation strongly contributed to the domestic inflation has been while quite weak on stimulating aggregate demand.     

MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.     

Exchange Rates and Outward Foreign Direct Investment: US FDI in Emerging Economies

This paper investigates the effect of exchange rates on US foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to a sample of 16 emerging market countries using annual panel data for the period 1990–2002. Three separate exchange rate effects are considered: the value of the local currency (a cheaper currency attracts FDI); expected changes in the exchange rate (expected devaluation implies FDI is postponed); and exchange rate volatility (discourages FDI). The results reveal a negative relationship between FDI and more expensive local currency, the expectation of local currency depreciation, and volatile exchange rates. Stable exchange rate management can be important in attracting FDI.     

UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS

It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two‐sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to ‘busts’ than ‘booms’. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.     

Collapsing exchange rate regimes in the presence of a parallel market

This paper develops a model of an economy where the fixed exchange rate is overvalued and coexists with a parallel market for foreign currency. Such a situation persists because the parallel marker is used by the central authorities as an instrument to delay policy changes. Using the Haïtian experience, this paper estimates a rationing parameter of foreign currency in the official market which translates the extent of tolerance of the parallel market. The paper also produces estimates of onestep-ahead probability of devaluation. Rationing has been severe and the probability of collapse has reached high levels during the period studied.     

Corrupt Importers,Domestic Producers & Welfare: Role of Trade Policy

Stringent regulatory foreign exchange and trade policies create distortions and lead to mis‐invoicing of imports and exports. Such legally prescribed opportunistic behavior is alleged to be common in LDCs because of their lack of openness and restrictive policies. This paper focuses on the impact of various trade and currency policies like tariffs, quotas, different exchange rates, and devaluation and administrative policy instruments like monitoring and penalties on import mis‐invoicing under Cournot quantity competition. A framework is developed to analyze the impact of those policies on importers and domestic producers both under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes.     

Why should Southern economies stay in the Euro Zone? The role of labor markets

We assume a world of two countries in a fixed exchange rate system. These countries differ in the features of their labor markets. The home country is characterized by a dual labor market, with formal and informal sectors. In the foreign country, a nominal wage rigidity exists. In this context, the situation of the labor markets in each country is not optimal owing to a misallocation of workers between sectors in the domestic economy and unemployment in the foreign economy. We show that a devaluation of domestic currency implies a fall in production in each country and deterioration of labor markets in both countries.     

The Effects of Devaluation on Aggregate Output: Empirical Evidence from Africa

This paper tests the contractionary devaluation hypothesis in the context of select African countries. The output effect of devaluation is examined within an empirical model that controls, among others, for the parallel currency premium, the rate of net capital inflow, the degree of capacity utilization and political instability. The model is estimated on pooled data drawn from 20 African countries, employing alternative indicators of devaluation and pooling procedures. The results indicate that the contemporaneous output effect of nominal devaluation is negative, providing statistical support for the hypothesis that devaluation is contractionary in the short run. On the other hand, the coefficient of the lagged rate of devaluation is found to be positive, implying that the contractionary problem is temporary. The magnitude of the observed contractionary effect appears to depend on the rate of net capital inflow and the degree of capacity utilization. Devaluations accompanied by augmented net capital inflow and implemented in the presence of excess capacity are found to be less contractionary than otherwise equivalent exchange‐rate changes. The results also seem to imply that devaluations launched in the context of sizeable unofficial markets for foreign exchange are less injurious to aggregate economic activity than other exchange‐rate adjustments.     

关于货币危机后经济衰退的经验分析

文章以1990年以来的近200次货币危机为样本,对货币危机后的经济衰退进行了经验分析.研究发现,危机前的经常账户状况、外债余额占GDP比例、国际流动性指标等经济变量以及危机后的汇率制度都不会显著影响到危机后的经济衰退.另外,危机后的经济衰退与危机国政府在危机中是否抛售外汇储备、是否采取汇率贬值都没有明显关系.但是经济分析的结果表明,危机前的失业率和汇率制度以及危机中是否提高利率等因素对危机后的经济衰退有显著作用.     

Devaluation,stabilization policies and the developing countries: A macroeconomic analysis

This paper analyzes the short-run effects of traditional balance-of-payments policies for a small developing country. The country is assumed to be running persistent payments deficits under a fixed exchange rate regime. This paper illustrates how conventional results are affected by the presence of (a) imported intermediate inputs, (b) partial wage indexation, and (c) a large initial trade deficit. Stagflationary effects of a currency devaluation are particularly noteworthy. A tariff/subsidy policy that leaves the price of imported inputs unaffected is shown to be likely to achieve the payments objectives without creating significant adverse supply-side effects.     

Exchange Rate,Income Distribution and Technical Change in a Balance-of-Payments Constrained Growth Model

This article develops a formal model that accounts for the net effect of an exchange rate devaluation on the long-term balance-of-payments constrained growth rate. Such a model investigates how a currency devaluation impacts on the home country non-price competitiveness via changes in income distribution and the rate of technological innovation. The model is built upon two plausible hypotheses. First, it is assumed that the rate of technological innovation is directly related to the income elasticity of demand for exports and inversely related to the income elasticity of demand for imports. Second, it is assumed that a redistribution of income between labor and capital has an ambiguous direct impact on the income elasticities ratio. The model shows that the net impact of a currency devaluation on growth can go either way depending on the institutional framework of the economy.     

The J-Curve

If a country with a balance of payments problem, that is, insufficient foreign exchange receipts to meet foreign exchange requirements, seeks to remedy the situation by currency devaluation, things may get worse before they get better. This so-called J-curve effect occurs if the domestic-currency prices of exports are sticky, whether because they are cost based or subject to longer term contracts, so that export prices in foreign currency fall. Until favourable volume effects outweigh the unfavourable price effect, the balance of payments deteriorates. Such a J-curve effect should be distinguished both from the longer term erosion of the beneficial effects of devaluation as domestic costs and the prices of non-tradables rise and from the apparent J-curve due to the ‘valuation effect’. If the current account is in deficit before devaluation, as will usually be the case, devaluation will widen the deficit in domestic currency because domestic-currency imports rise by a larger amount than exports. This is a pure valuation effect, of no significance for external balance. But it is liable to lead to unduly pessimistic judgements about the effectiveness of devaluation. In Australia during 1985–86, the current account deficit increased by $A3.5 billion, despite substantial depreciation of the $A. The main reason was a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade which is estimated to have worsened the current account by $A4.25 billion. Most of this was exogenous, though J-curve effects may have made a contribution. In addition, the valuation effect contributed a further, illusory, widening of the deficit, valued in domestic currency, by over $A1 billion. To avoid misleading inferences from the valuation effect, it is suggested that the balance of payments should, if possible, be presented in foreign currency.     

Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks

We develop a model in which government guarantees to banks’ foreign creditors are a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. Absent guarantees, such crises are not possible. In the presence of guarantees banks borrow foreign currency, lend domestic currency and do not hedge the resulting exchange rate risk. With guarantees, banks will also renege on their foreign debts and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. We assume that the government is unable or unwilling to fully fund the resulting bailout via an explicit fiscal reform. These features of our model imply that government guarantees lead to self-fulfilling banking-currency crises.     

Currency Boards when Interest Rates are Zero

In a fixed exchange rate system, any expectation that the peg may be abandoned will normally be reflected in an interest rate differential between instruments denominated in domestic and anchor currencies: the possibility of a revaluation will drive domestic interest rates below those in the anchor currency, for example. However, when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound, there is limited scope for exchange rate expectations to be reflected in interest rate differentials. Here we introduce a new mechanism, based on the central bank balance sheet, which works to bring about equilibrium in currency markets even when interest rates are zero. An expectation of exchange rate appreciation will cause foreign exchange reserves to swell, increasing the cost to policy‐makers of allowing an appreciation and, therefore, lowering the likelihood of the fixed exchange rate being abandoned. Under normal circumstances, this channel reinforces the equilibrating effect of interest rate differentials. When interest rates cannot adjust only this channel operates, implying that much larger changes in reserves are required to equilibrate currency markets. We develop a simple model to illustrate these arguments and find support for the predictions of the model using data for Hong Kong, the world's largest economy with a currency board.     

Credibility costs in the monetary integration game*

Euro candidates are expected to maintain the value of their currency within the fluctuation band of the new exchange rate mechanism for at least two years. This paper highlights some unpleasant macroeconomic effects that could occur during this interval. The problem is cast as a two‐stage sequential game between private agents and the government of the applicant country. The policy‐maker decides whether to devaluate the domestic currency or not at two distinct dates; it makes a last choice just before accession to the monetary union. Under an assumption of incomplete information of private agents about the government's priorities on inflation and economic activity, the game presents a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the pooling configuration, an initial policy of zero devaluation does not signal the final devaluation decision. As private agents cannot completely rule out the risk of a ‘last devaluation’, a premium adds to interest rates and entails a systematic output loss.     

Evaluating currency crises: A Bayesian Markov switching approach

In this paper we examine the nature of a currency crisis. We do so by employing an out-of-sample forecasting exercise to analyse the Mexican crisis in 1994. Forecast evaluation was based on modern econometric techniques concerning the shape of forecaster’s loss function. We also extend the empirical framework suggested by Jeanne and Masson [Jeanne, O., Masson, P., 2000. Currency crises and Markov-switching regimes. Journal of International Economics 50, 327–350] to test for the hypothesis that the currency crisis was driven by sunspots. To this end we contribute to the existing literature by comparing Markov regime switching model with a time-varying transition probabilities with two alternative models. The first is a Markov regime switching model with constant transition probabilities. The second is a linear benchmark model. Empirical results show that the proxy for the probability of devaluation is an important factor explaining the nature of currency crisis. More concretely, when the expectation market pressure was used as a proxy of probability of devaluation, forecast evaluation supports the view that currency crisis was driven by market expectation unrelated to fundamentals. Alternatively, when interest rate differential is used as a proxy for probability of devaluation, currency crisis was due to predictable deterioration of fundamentals.     

Trade Balance and Exchange Rate: Unit Roots, Co-integration and Long Memory in the US and the UK

This paper deals with the relationship between the balance of trade and the exchange rate in the US/UK case. Many authors have studied this issue for many countries, but despite the intensive research, there is still no agreement about the effectiveness of currency devaluation to increase a country's balance of trade. We first analyse the relationship between the two variables using unit roots and co-integration methods, and the results are ambiguous. We try a new approach based on fractional integration. The unit root hypothesis is rejected in case of the trade balance in favour of smaller orders of integration, while this hypothesis is not rejected for the exchange rate. Thus, the two series do not possess the same order of integration. We sort this problem out by taking the exchange rate as an exogenous variable, and including it in a regression model where the residuals might follow a fractionally integrated model.     

The mystery of the Chinese exchange rate regime: basket or no basket?

Economists have taken for granted the claim made by the Chinese government that the policy shift introduced in July 2005 constituted a change in the exchange rate regime from a fixed peg to a basket peg. We demonstrate that neither the stylized facts nor the empirical evidence support the proposition of a basket peg and suggest several reasons as to why China has not adopted this regime. The results could prove useful for identifying the Chinese exchange rate regime in the aftermath of the perceived policy shift following the August 2015 devaluation.     

Imperfect credibility and risk premia in the European Monetary System

The paper deals with the estiamation of models for the expected rate of depreciation within the currency bands of the French franc and the Italian lira against the deutshmark, both unconditional and conditional upon no realignment, as well as the estimastion of models for risk premia. Using these estimates,estimates are constructed for the expected rate of depreciation, the expected rate of realignment and the expected rate of devaluation of these exchange rates during their EMS period by appropriate adjustment of interest rate differentials. It is found that these adjustments are of non-trivial magnitude.     

Adjustment to monetary policy and devaluation under two-tier and fixed exchange rate regimes

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether a two-tier exchange rate regime is more effective than a fixed rate regime in increasing a country's ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. The analysis compares adjustment to a monetary policy and to a devaluation in the two exchange rate regimes in a portfolio model under imperfect assets substitutability. It is shown that a two-tier exchange rate regime is capable of reducing the current account effects of monetary injection or devaluation only in the long run. In the short run, however, we can get a larger current account response under a two-tier regime. These results reflect the trade-off between quantity and price adjustment.