Services liberalization and productivity of manufacturing firms

Employing a unique database of Ukrainian firms in 2001–07, we use the external push for liberalization in the services sector as a source of exogenous variation to identify the effect of services liberalization on total factor productivity (TFP) of manufacturing firms. The results indicate that a standard deviation increase in services liberalization within a firm is associated with a 9.2 percent increase in TFP. The effect is stronger for firms with high productivity, bringing about a reallocation of resources within an industry. Industry‐level results show that the effect of reallocation on industry productivity is almost as strong as the within‐firm effect. The dynamic interaction of services liberalization and TFP through the investment channel reinforces the effect. The effect is robust to different estimation methods and to different sub‐samples of the data. In particular, it is more pronounced for domestic and small firms.     

Imported carbon emissions: Evidence from French manufacturing companies

This paper analyzes imported carbon emission at the firm level. To do so, we combine information on emissions, imports, imported emissions and energy prices for French manufacturing firms between 1997 and 2014. We document a significant increase of the carbon emissions embedded in imports of French manufacturing companies over the period 1997 to 2014 that is attributable mainly to a shift towards more carbon-intensive products and countries. We then estimate the impact of imported emissions on domestic emissions and emission intensity using a shift-share instrumental variable strategy based on third countries supply shocks. We do not find compelling evidence of an impact of carbon imports on total emissions, but emission efficiency improves significantly in companies offshoring emissions abroad. A 10% increase in carbon offshoring causes a 4% decline in emission intensity. In addition, we find that the elasticity of domestic emission intensity to imported emissions is stronger in energy-intensive sectors, on high-productivity companies and among exporters. Reassuringly, the relationship between imported emissions and emission intensity does not seem to be driven by a pollution haven motive.     

Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition

In a differential game between two symmetric firms, provided with a clean and a dirty production activity, it is analyzed how investment and emissions are affected by environmental regulation. If both firms face the same environmental policy, a stricter policy reduces long-run investment in the dirty activity, while the impact on the clean activity is ambiguous. Both long-run emissions of each firm and total emissions decrease. This result does not necessarily hold if both firms face different policy instruments: Each firm's investment levels increase with a stricter environmental policy towards its rival, which causes more emissions by this firm.     

Environmental Goods and Measures for Their Promotion: An Analysis Using a Fair Wage Model

In this paper, we model a two‐sector small open economy with emissions and unemployment associated with the fair wage effort hypothesis, and investigate the environmental and employment impact of an emission tax, a subsidy for purchasing environmental goods in the downstream polluting industry, and a subsidy to the upstream eco‐industry. We then show that if the eco‐industry is skilled labor intensive relative to the polluting final goods industry, while a subsidy for purchasing environmental goods decreases the unemployment rate of unskilled labor, it may increase total emissions. In contrast, the emission tax and the subsidy to eco‐industry firms worsen the unemployment rate, though both policies decrease total emissions. Hence, if the emission tax is set equal to the marginal environmental damage, and either a downstream or upstream subsidy is used to mitigate unskilled unemployment, the optimal subsidy to purchase the goods is positive whereas the optimal subsidy to the eco‐industry is negative, i.e., a tax on the eco‐industry.     

Tariff Rate as a Public Good

If domestic firms lobby for protection, the tariff rate is a public good to all domestic firms, whether they engage in lobbying or not. This paper analyzes how the endogenous tariff rate as a public good depends on the group size in two‐stage lobbying models. The result depends not only on whether domestic firms lobby cooperatively or not, but also on whether domestic firms incur indirect lobbying costs or not. This paper shows that if free riding is not very serious and if the number of domestic firms is small compared to the number of foreign firms, entry of a domestic firm is likely to increase the equilibrium tariff rate.     

Global sourcing and credit constraints

This paper incorporates credit constraints into a model of global sourcing and heterogeneous firms. Following Antràs and Helpman ( 2004 ), heterogeneous firms decide whether to outsource or integrate input suppliers. Financing of fixed organizational costs requires borrowing with credit constraints and collateral based on tangible assets. The party that controls intermediate inputs is responsible for these financing costs. Sectors differ in their reliance on external finance and countries vary in their financial development. The model predicts that increased financial development decreases the share of integration relative to outsourcing in a country. The effect is more pronounced in sectors with a high reliance on external finance. However, this effect is mitigated by higher productivity (TFP) and headquarter intensity. Empirical examination confirms the predictions of the model. An improvement in financial development from the 25th to the 75th percentile in industries at the 75th percentile in finance dependence relative to those at the 25th percentile is associated with a 16.8% decrease in the median share of US intra‐firm imports. An increase in TFP from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the TFP triple interactions increase the share of US intra‐firm imports at the median by 3.2%. An increase in headquarter intensity from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the headquarter intensity triple interactions increase the share of US intra‐firm imports at the median by 21%.     

Tax Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets with Environmentally Conscious Consumers

This paper analyses the effects of tax competition on environmental product quality, pollution and welfare in a two-country, vertically differentiated, international duopoly, in which consumers are environmentally conscious. The firm in each country chooses first the environmental quality of its product (which reflects the emissions generated in the production process) and then the price. In equilibrium one country will be more polluted than the other because firms choose different levels of environmental quality of their products. We find that a country’s optimal commodity tax is higher if the domestic firm is the more polluting supplier. Furthermore, non-cooperative commodity tax rates are inefficiently high in equilibrium. This is because, in this framework with environmentally aware consumers, commodity taxes affect the choice of firms regarding their emissions. Therefore, a domestic tax reduction not only raises the profits of the foreign firm but also lowers its emission levels, resulting in higher welfare for the other country. We also analyse the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative commodity and emission taxes with border tax adjustments. With these two policy instruments available, commodity taxes are higher.     

Emission taxes for genuine altruistic firms

This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.     

Reaching up and reaching out: The impact of competition on firms’ productivity and export decisions

Using firm‐level data from 139 countries, this paper investigates the effect of competition in both the domestic and foreign markets on firm productivity and export decisions. Applying a sample selection endogenous treatment (SSET) Poisson model that tackles both the issue of endogenous sample selection and endogenous treatment at the same time, we document robust evidence that strong competition in the domestic market propels firms to be more productive, and decreasing domestic competition increases firms’ propensity to export. However, firms’ export intensity (i.e. how much they export) is not directly influenced by competition in the domestic market. Moreover, lower competition in the foreign market increases the propensity of domestic firms to export, enlarging the set of exporting firms to include firms with relatively smaller export amounts.     

Intermediate good sourcing,wages and inequality: From theory to evidence

This paper examines the consequences of offshoring and outsourcing on domestic wages and wage inequality. I highlight the role of labor market frictions in impacting firms’ outsourcing and offshoring decisions; specifically, how differential costs of matching with workers affect the location of production (onshore or offshore) and how differential costs of assessing worker quality affect the ownership of intermediate production (intra‐firm or inter‐firm). I demonstrate how firm sourcing decisions can depend crucially on the industry skill intensity, which reflects the importance of worker–firm match quality, and as a result, the effect of offshoring on domestic labor depends on occupation and industry characteristics, as well as the ownership regime of trade. Bringing the theory to the data I rely on plausibly exogenous variation in the cost of inter‐ and intra‐firm offshoring to identify the effects of a change in each type of offshoring on domestic wages. I find strong evidence that the effect of offshoring on domestic wages—both on the average and on the wage distribution—is governed by the type of offshoring (inter‐ vs. intra‐firm), the skill intensity of the industry, and the offshorability of the occupation.     

Imported inputs and privatization in downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

This paper examines welfare implications of privatization in a mixed oligopoly with vertically related markets, where an upstream foreign monopolist sells an essential input to public and private firms located downstream in the domestic country. The impact on domestic welfare of privatizing the downstream public firm is shown to contain three effects. The first is an output distortion effect, which negatively affects welfare since privatization decreases the production of final good for consumption. The second is an input price lowering effect resulting from a decrease in derived demand for the input. When the level of privatization increases, a decrease in final good production lowers input demand, causing input price to decline and domestic welfare to increase. The third is a rent‐leaking effect associated with foreign ownership in the downstream private firm. The rival domestic firm strategically increases its final good production, causing profits accrued to foreign investors to increase and domestic welfare to decline. Without foreign ownership in the downstream private firm, the optimal policy toward the public firm is complete privatization as the output distortion effect is dominated by the input price lowering effect. With foreign ownership, however, complete privatization can never be socially optimal due to the additional negative impact on domestic welfare of the rent‐leaking effect. We further discuss implications for domestic welfare under different privatization schemes (e.g., selling the privatization shares to the upstream foreign monopolist or to the rival domestic firm).     

Chinese competition and product variety of Indian firms

Using detailed firm-product-year data across manufacturing industries in India, and exploiting the exogenous nature of China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, we investigate the link between the impact of import penetration from China on the product variety of Indian manufacturing firms. We find: (i) robust and significant effects of product drop, with the effect coming only from competitive pressure in the domestic market; (ii) robust evidence of product drop or ‘creative destruction’ only for firms belonging to the lower-half of the size distribution; (iii) firms drop their peripheral/marginal products and concentrate on the core ones; and (iv) the result is strongest for firms producing intermediate goods. For an average Indian manufacturing firm, a 10 percentage point increase in India’s Chinese share of imports in the domestic market reduces the product scope of firms by 1.7–4.4%. In contrast, we find positive effects on product scope when firms are importing intermediate goods. We also find evidence of significant productivity effects and within-firm factor reallocation. Our results are consistent to a battery of robustness checks and IV estimation.     

Political Influence of Firms in the Tradables and Non‐Tradables Sectors: A Cross‐Country Analysis

Recent theoretical studies have shown that firms lobby government agencies to influence the structure of trade policies. This article empirically examines whether firms classified as either exporting or import‐competing (i.e. firms in the tradables sector) have differential levels of political influence relative to domestic firms that only produce non‐traded goods (i.e. firms in the non‐tradables sector). We use a rich firm‐level, cross‐sectional dataset from the World Business Environment Survey to achieve this objective. Results from the analysis reveal that exporting or import‐competing firms do have more political influence relative to domestic firms that neither export nor produce import‐competing goods. Market structure, firm age, firm size, government ownership, and dependence on public infrastructure also affect the extent of political influence that firms have.     

Emission Taxes and Product Differentiation in the Presence of Foreign Firms

Industries characterized by differentiated products are important contributors of greenhouse gases and currently subject to market‐based policies such as emission taxes. In the context of developing countries, fears about foreign investment leaving the country are often used as an argument not to address industry emissions through emission taxes. This paper develops a Cournot model with product differentiation in the presence of abatement efforts where host and foreign firms are subject to an emission tax. The analysis indicates that abatement efforts and differences in pollution intensity coefficients across firms may play a significant role in the characterization of optimal policy. The analysis also suggests that the government may opt to encourage foreign, less pollution‐intensive firms via higher taxation. Additionally, this paper examines how an optimal emission tax may be adjusted as products become more differentiated; industry emissions may fall/rise as a result of more differentiated products. One important contribution of this paper is that it emphasizes the role of abatement efforts, product differentiation, and differences in pollution intensity coefficients across firms in the characterization of the optimal emission tax.     

Who invests more in advanced abatement technology? Theory and evidence

We study firm investment in abatement technology under a heterogeneous‐firm framework. We find that more‐productive firms make more (less) investment in abatement technology if investment and productivity are complements (substitutes). Under linear demand, firms’ abatement investments exhibit an inverted U‐shape with respect to productivity level. This finding is in contrast to results in existing studies. We also find that in response to tightened environmental regulations, more‐productive firms raise their respective investments in abatement technology, whereas less‐productive firms do the opposite. More‐productive firms have lower pollution emission intensity. The key theoretical predictions are confirmed by empirical tests using Chinese data.     

Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS

A well-known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm. I show that this result breaks down when taking the interaction between input and output markets into account, even if the dominant firm perceives market power in the permit market alone. I then examine the empirical evidence for price manipulation by the ten largest electricity firms during phase I of the EU ETS. I find that some firms’ excess allowance holdings are consistent with strategic price manipulation, and that they cannot be explained by price speculation or by precautionary purchases to insure against uncertain future emissions. My results suggest that market power is likely to be an empirically relevant concern during the early years of emission permit markets.     

Corporate social responsibility,vertical product differentiation and international competition

Would a foreign firm’s consumer‐oriented corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities be rewarded by an importing country’s voluntary tariff reduction? The current paper addresses this question in an import‐competing duopoly model with vertical product differentiation. It is shown that the tariff will decrease if the foreign firm switches from a purely profit‐driven firm to a CSR firm. A consumer‐oriented CSR strategy will always hurt the domestic firm’s profit, whereas the relationship between the foreign firm’s profit and CSR sensitivity (the degree to which a firm cares about consumer welfare) is invertedly U‐shaped. When firms’ decisions to switch to CSR are endogeneized, only the foreign firm will become a CSR firm.     

Domestic R&D,Foreign Direct Investment and Welfare

This paper provides a new rationale to examine the two‐way relationship between domestic research and development (R&D) and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as their impacts on domestic welfare. Our analysis is based on the strategic interaction in cost‐reducing investment decisions between domestic firms and a foreign firm, which is different from the common factors that are discussed in the literature such as spillovers and technology sourcing. Our results are as follows. We show that domestic R&D investment may either increase or decrease the foreign firm's FDI incentives. Further, depending on the marginal cost of domestic firms, domestic R&D incentives can always increase regardless of the effects of domestic R&D investment on the foreign firm's FDI decision. Finally, we find that domestic welfare improves under domestic cost reduction if the slope of the marginal cost of domestic R&D investment is sufficiently small.     

Interrelationship among foreign presence,domestic sales and export intensity in Chinese manufacturing industries

Using panel data on six Chinese manufacturing industries over the period 2005–2007, this article explores the interrelationship among foreign presence, domestic sales and export intensity of local firms. We find that the domestic sales and exports are complementary for local firms in China’s pharmaceutical industry, whereas in the case of the textile, transportation equipment, beverage, communication equipment and general equipment manufacturing industries, domestic sales and exports are substitutes. An increase in the average domestic sales increases foreign presence in all industries. The same applies to an increase in the average export intensity. An increase in the level of competition in China’s textile industry increases the export intensity as well as domestic sales of local textile firms. However, an increase in the level of competition in the pharmaceutical industry leads to a very large decrease in export intensity of local pharmaceutical firms. In the case of China’s transportation equipment manufacturing industry, an increase in the level of competition decreases domestic sales of local firms. Furthermore, an increase in the firm size increases domestic sales of Chinese firms in all six manufacturing industries.     

Firm heterogeneity and trade-induced layoffs: An empirical investigation

We use a novel data set with verified observations of trade-induced layoffs by U.S. firms to study the interaction between firm productivity and trade liberalization as key determinants of firm-level job destruction due to trade. We find that patterns of trade-induced layoffs are broadly consistent with the predictions for firm-level employment generated by the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firms theory – the number of trade-induced layoffs increases with firm productivity for non-exporting firms but decreases with firm productivity for exporting firms. The fact that exporting firms incur trade-induced layoffs at all invites a refined interpretation of the theory. Our findings suggest that exporting firms may lay off some workers who work in production for their shrinking domestic segments, while also engaging in some within-firm reallocation of workers. We also find that, even after controlling for productivity and export status, larger firms lay off more workers due to trade competition.