General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive external benefits from their training. In this paper, training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion. At these high wages, only good workers are retained. This signals their productivity and reduces the external benefits if they subsequently quit. Regulation of apprenticeship length (a historically important feature) enhances efficiency. Appropriate subsidies enhance it further.     

Technology choice,relative performance pay,and worker heterogeneity

We identify a new problem that may arise when heterogeneous workers are motivated by relative performance pay: if workers’ abilities and the production technology are complements, the firm may prefer not to adopt a more advanced technology even though this technology would costlessly increase each worker’s productivity. Due to the complementarity between ability and technology, under technology adoption the productivity of a more able worker increases more strongly than the productivity of a less able colleague. As a consequence, both workers’ motivation to exert effort is reduced. We show that this adverse incentive effect is dominant and, consequently, keeps the firm from introducing a better production technology if talent uncertainty is sufficiently high and/or monitoring of workers is sufficiently precise.     

Pareto-improving firing costs?

We examine self-enforcing contracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms (the ‘invisible handshake’) in a labor market with search frictions. Employers promise as much wage-smoothing as they can, consistent with incentive conditions that ensure they will not renege during low-profitability times. Equilibrium is inefficient if these incentive constraints bind, with risky wages for workers and a risk premium that employers must pay. Mandatory firing costs can help, by making it easier for employers to promise credibly not to cut wages in low-profitability periods. We show that firing costs are more likely to be Pareto-improving if they are not severance payments.     

Who Benefits from Foreign Direct Investment in the UK?

The presumed higher productivity of foreign firms and resulting spillovers to domestic firms has led governments to offer financial incentives to foreign firms. We investigate if there is any productivity or wage gap between foreign and domestic firms in the UK and if the presence of foreign firms in a sector raises the productivity of domestic firms. Our results indicate that foreign firms do have higher productivity than domestic firms and they pay higher wages. We find no aggregate evidence of intra‐industry spillovers. However, firms with low productivity relative to the sector average, in low‐skill low foreign competition sectors gain less from foreign firms.     

THE GENDER PAY GAP UNDER DUOPSONY: JOAN ROBINSON MEETS HAROLD HOTELLING

This paper presents an alternative explanation of the gender pay gap resting on a simple Hotelling-style duopsony model of the labour market. Since there are only two employers, equally productive women and men have to commute and face travel cost to do so. We assume that some women have higher travel cost, e.g., due to more domestic responsibilities. Employers exploit that women on average are less inclined to commute and offer lower wages to all women. Since women's firm-level labour supply is for this reason less wage-elastic, this model is in line with Robinson's explanation of wage discrimination.     

A Quantile Regression Analysis of Wages in Panama

Differences in the effects of worker characteristics on wages in Panama at different points of the conditional wage distribution are investigated. Public sector employment increases wages relatively more at lower quantiles. Within the public sector, employment in that sector increases wages of the median worker and reduces wage inequality. Presence of a labor union increases relatively more private sector wages at lower quantiles. Unions reduce wage inequality within the union private sector and increase average wages within that sector. In the public sector, the presence of a labor union increases wages of men at lower quantiles at a lower rate than in the private sector. Self-employment decreases wages at lower quantiles and increases wages at higher quantiles. Urban location affects wages in a U-shaped pattern as one moves from lower to higher quantiles. Rates of return to experience are higher for men at higher quantiles. Experience increases men's wage inequality.     

Minimum wages and youth unemployment

This paper constructs a labor search model to explore the effects of minimum wages on youth unemployment. To capture the gradual decline in unemployment for young workers as they age, the standard search model is extended so that workers gain experience when employed. Experienced workers have higher average productivity and lower job finding and separation rates that match wage and worker flow data. In this environment, minimum wages can have large effects on unemployment because they interact with a worker's ability to gain job experience. The increase in minimum wages between 2007 and 2009 can account for a 0.8 percentage point increase in the steady state unemployment rate and a 2.8 percentage point increase in unemployment for 15–24 year old workers in the model parameterized to simulate outcomes of high school educated workers. Minimum wages can also help explain the high rates of youth unemployment in France compared to the United States.     

WAGE SIGNALING: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTRAFIRM BARGAINING AND ASYMMETRIC LEARNING*

The article analyzes the effect of employer–worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of asymmetric information between current and potential employers. A failure to reach an agreement leads to output loss. Because the disagreement points depend upon the worker's productivity, productive workers separate themselves from less productive workers and signal their ability through wages. In existing models of asymmetric learning, wages are attached to publicly observable characteristics and wage growth occurs only when there is a change in observable characteristics. This model, in contrast, generates an increase in earnings dispersion in cohorts of workers with similar observable characteristics.     

Export Destination,Product Quality and Wages in a Middle‐Income Country. The Case of South Africa

A robust finding in the firm‐level literature is that exporting firms pay higher wages. Using South African data this paper investigates the relationship between export destination and wages at a worker level. South Africa, a middle‐income country, has two distinct main export markets—a regional market where per capita incomes are lower than at home, and an international market with higher per capita incomes. Our estimates show that workers in firms that export to the region earn less than those that produce for the domestic market. Those in firms that export outside the region earn more than either domestic producers or region‐only exporters. Much of this difference in wages can be explained by the premium the different types of exporters pay for skills. These results support previous studies which suggest that export destination is related to product quality which in turn is related to worker quality and therefore wages.     

Unobserved Heterogeneity,Exit Rates,and Re‐Employment Wages

Exit rates from unemployment and re‐employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance‐related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.     

Do Foreign Experts Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms?

While most countries welcome (and some even subsidize) high‐skilled immigrants, there is very limited evidence of their importance for domestic firms. To guide our empirical analysis, we first set up a simple theoretical model to show how foreign experts can affect the productivity and wages of domestic firms. Using matched worker–firm data from Denmark and a matching difference‐in‐differences approach, we then find that firms that hire foreign experts instead of domestic experts become more productive, in the sense that they pay higher wages to high‐skilled co‐workers.     

Wage-shifting effects of severance payments savings accounts in Colombia

In 1990, Colombia replaced its traditional system of severance payments with a new system of severance payments savings accounts (SPSAs). Although severance payments are often justified on the grounds that they provide insurance against earnings loss, they also increase costs for employers and distort employment decisions. The extent of these distortions depends largely on how much of the costs of severance pay can be shifted from employers to workers. One reason why the effects of severance pay may not be completely shifted is that workers may fear the firm will “take the money and run” by declaring bankruptcy. A system of SPSAs eliminates this moral hazard problem, so it should facilitate the shifting of severance payments' costs to workers in the form of lower wages. Empirical results using the Colombian National Household Surveys (NHS) indicate that the introduction of SPSAs lowered wages by between 60% and 80% of total severance payment contributions. These results are consistent with increased shifting after SPSAs were introduced.     

Search efficiency,wage dynamics and welfare

Advances in information technology have improved the job-search process in the labor market. We analyze the effects of this improvement by constructing a search-and-matching model with two sectors: a risky sector with firm-specific productivity shocks and a risk-free sector. The risky sector is characterized by a low level of commitment between employers and workers – either party can end the employment relationship. We show that a better job-search process generates more job matches in the risky sector, and this benefits workers by improving their outside options. The effect on employers is subtle: while it is easier to fill vacancies, workers become more expensive. At the same time, the ease of finding new workers makes it harder for employers to keep their wage promises to workers and increases wage volatility. Our paper contributes to the literature by offering a novel explanation for the observed rise in wage volatility.     

NEGLECTED WOMEN AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH

Comparable worth proposals presume that the gender wage gap is a result of occupational segregation. The proposals argue that females are channeled into "women's jobs" and that overcrowding depresses women's wages below the "value" of the work performed. Comparable worth legislation proposes replacing the idea of equal pay for equal work with a principle of equal pay for different work of comparable worth determined by job evaluations. Such job evaluations are feasible only for the public sector and large private employers. The analysis in this paper recognizes that comparable worth wage adjustments are to be limited to the large employers. It examines how employers in the covered sector tend to alter their pay packages and hiring standards. Comparable worth legislation also affects wages in the uncovered sector populated by small employers. The rationing of women's jobs and the changes in hiring standards for men's jobs in the covered sector tend to redound to the benefit of smart, energetic women and dull, indolent men.     

Wage and Technology Dispersion

This paper explains why firms with identical opportunities may use different technologies and offer different wages. Our key assumption is that workers must engage in costly search in order to gather information about jobs (Stigler (1961)). In equilibrium, some firms adopt high fixed cost, high productivity technologies, offer high wages, and fill job openings quickly. Other firms adopt less capital-intensive technologies and offer low wages, hiring mostly uninformed workers. In equilibrium, the amount of wage dispersion leaves workers indifferent about whether to gather information, and the fraction of informed workers leaves firms indifferent about their wage and technology choice. We show that worker search, which would appear to be a rent-seeking activity in partial equilibrium, may be efficiency-enhancing in general equilibrium.     

WORKER INVESTMENTS IN SAFETY,WORKPLACE ACCIDENTS,AND COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS

The theory of compensating wage differentials (CWDs) assumes that firms supply and workers demand workplace safety, predicting a positive relationship between accident risk and wages. This article allows for safety provision by workers, which predicts a countervailing negative relationship between individual risk and wages: Firms pay higher wages for higher safety‐related productivity. Using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel data and data on fatal and nonfatal accidents, our precise CWDs imply a value of a statistical injury of $45.4 thousand and a value of a statistical life of $6.3 million. In line with our model, individual risk and wages are negatively correlated.     

Is it the wage premium that targets worker turnovers?

The literature on FDI shows that there exists a wage premium that multinational enterprises (MNEs) pay to local workers and link this to a technology spillover argument. The MNEs pay higher wages to prevent worker turnovers and technology leakages. Literature relates the wage premium aspect of FDI using worker mobility data and uses worker turnovers and the technology spillover argument. We relate stock options in the FDI context of worker mobility and find in a simplified framework that the turnover of workers would depend on the relative payments of stock options.     

The Role of Expectation on Job Search and the Firm Size Effect on Wages

We formulate dynamic games which give a rationale to the firm size–wage effect that the sheer firm size increases wages. We postulate that past wages of large firms are known to new employees, while those of small firms are not. Large firms can credibly induce workers to expect high future wages and reduce turnover, while small firms have no choice but to be myopic and pay low wages. The equilibrium wage differential obtains under the same worker characteristics and production function. We provide empirical evidence that workers' expectations depend on firm size and affect wages as predicted by our model.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

Occupational self-selection in a labor market with moral hazard

This paper studies the determinants and implications of self-selection when firms imperfectly observe worker effort. The effects of the resulting moral hazard problem on the self-selection mechanism are analyzed in a model in which workers simultaneously choose an employment sector and an effort level. The implications of the model reveal that in the presence of moral hazard, workers’ effort decisions become an additional mechanism determining the pattern of selection into sectors. Workers’ sector-specific endowments impact sectoral allocation through their effect on workers’ comparative advantage as well as their effect on workers’ shirking propensity. The model is then used in an empirical application that analyzes workers’ self-selection into white collar and blue collar occupations. The estimation results, based on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, suggest that workers’ occupational self-selection leads to higher wages and lower dismissal rates in both occupations, compared to an economy in which workers are randomly assigned to each occupation. The difference in dismissal rates between the two occupations is driven by the higher expected productivity in the white collar sector. The positive effects of occupational sorting diminish as the labor market becomes increasingly characterized by moral hazard. Results also suggest that human capital investments in skills that are most relevant to blue collar jobs may generate higher wages and lower dismissal rates in both white collar and blue collar occupations.