REIT Dividend Policies and Dividend Announcement Effects During the 2008–2009 Liquidity Crisis

Real estate investment trust (REIT) dividend policies and dividend announcement effects during the 2008–2009 liquidity crisis are examined. Multinomial logit results indicate that REITs with higher market leverage or lower market‐to‐book ratios are more likely to cut dividends, suspend dividends or pay elective stock dividends. These results imply that mitigating going‐concern risk is an important motive for REITs adjusting dividend policies during the crisis and support dividend catering theory where investor demand for dividends impacts corporate dividend policies. Moreover, REITs that cut or suspend dividends experience positive cumulative abnormal returns during the post‐announcement period after controlling for the potential influence from simultaneous funds from operation announcements. The positive market response over the post‐announcement period supports the notion that dividend decisions convey information to investors and is also consistent with the broad catering theory of dividend policy.     

Dividend Policies and Dividend Announcement Effects for Real Estate Investment Trusts

Previous research on real estate investment trusts (REITs) assumes that their dividend policies are determined solely by tax regulations. We observe, however, that REITs often pay out more dividends than are required by tax rules. This paper examines the dividend policies of REITs by drawing inferences from agency-cost theory and tests for the determinants of REIT dividend payout ratios. The study also considers whether the stock market responds differently to the dividend announcement effects of equity and mortgage REITs based on asymmetric information. Our results support agency-cost explanations for dividend policy and suggest a differential announcement effect.     

An Examination of REIT Dividend Payout Policy

This paper proposes a new methodology for decomposing real estate investment trust (REIT) dividends into discretionary and nondiscretionary components. By examining the tax characteristics of dividends, I am able to accurately measure the discretionary component of a REIT's dividend. This methodology provides new insights into our understanding of REIT dividend payout policy. Unlike previous studies that find limited explanations for discretionary dividend payouts, I find a systematic explanation. Discretionary dividends tend to be large on average making up between 18% and 35% of a REIT's total dividend and display considerable variation through time and across firms. The main determinant of these discretionary dividends appears to be dividend smoothing. There is an inverse relationship between discretionary and nondiscretionary dividends. Even if a REIT has excess cash flow it could distribute in discretionary dividends, it will tend not to do so if it has a high dividend payout due to its nondiscretionary dividends. In this sense, REITs appear to use discretionary dividends to smooth their payout ratios.     

Dividend Pricing Models and REITs

Dividend pricing/present value models relate current stock prices to expectations of future dividends. In this study we apply the West and Campbell–Shiller tests of the dividend pricing relation to an index of real estate investment trusts (REITs). REITs provide a unique test of these models since, during our study period, REITs were mandated to pay out at least 95% of taxable income as dividends. While our results complement previous research which finds that the dividend pricing model cannot be rejected if share repurchase is included as part of dividends, our data contain a much less significant amount of share repurchase, so that our approach to the issue of the viability of dividend pricing models offers an alternative insight. Our research suggests that, for our REIT population, dividend pricing models cannot be rejected.     

REIT Dividend Determinants: Excess Dividends and Capital Markets

The determinants of excess dividend payments above mandatory requirements in real estate investment trusts (REITs) are evaluated. Payment of excess dividends is related to factors associated with reduced agency costs, strong operating performance, the implementation of a stock repurchase plan and an ability to access short-term bank debt. Recognizing that access to external capital is essential for long-term growth, REITs manage dividend policy to allow for capital acquisition in the form of both equity and debt. The acquisition and use of short-term bank debt provides REIT management flexibility in determining dividend policy.     

Dividend Policy and Cash-Flow Uncertainty

We explore the role of expected cash-flow volatility as a determinant of dividend policy both theoretically and empirically. Our simple one-period model demonstrates that, given the existence of a stock-price penalty associated with dividend cuts, managers rationally pay out lower levels of dividends when future cash flows are less certain. The empirical results use a sample of REITs from 1985 to 1992 and confirm that payout ratios are lower for firms with higher expected cash-flow volatility as measured by leverage, size and property-level diversification. These results are consistent with information-based explanations of dividend policy but not with agency-cost theories.     

The Impact of Dividend Reinvestment Plans on Firm Payout Choices—Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

This study investigates whether firm dividend payout choices are influenced by the presence of a Dividend Reinvestment Plan (DRIP). Given that DRIPs help retain capital, we show that dividend‐paying firms with a DRIP will tend to pay a high dividend and maintain a stable payout policy. Using a multinomial logistic model, we show that in comparison to REITs without DRIPs, REITs with DRIPs have a higher payout ratio and are less likely to: (1) pay regular dividends with extra dividends and share repurchases, (2) distribute extra dividends, repurchase shares, yet omit regular dividends and (3) omit all payouts. In addition, we find that REITs with a capital‐retaining DRIP invest more aggressively and such increased investment activities are undertaken without raising the reliance on external financing.     

REIT and Commercial Real Estate Returns: A Postmortem of the Financial Crisis

In the years surrounding the financial crisis, the share prices of equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) were much more volatile than the underlying commercial real estate prices. To better understand this phenomenon we examine the cross‐sectional dispersion of REIT returns during this time period with a particular focus on the influence of their capital structures. By looking at both the debt ratio and the maturity structure of the debt, we separate the pure leverage effect from the effect of financial distress. Consistent with leverage and financial distress costs amplifying the price decline, we find that the share prices of REITs with higher debt‐to‐asset ratios and shorter maturity debt fell more during the 2007 to early‐2009 crisis period. Although REIT prices rebounded with the bounce back in commercial real estate prices, financial distress costs had a permanent effect on REIT values. In particular, we find that REITs with more debt due during the crisis period tended to sell more property and issue more equity in 2009, when prices were depressed.     

关于股票分割原因的研究综述

上市公司在派发股利时,既可以派发现金股利,也可以派发股票股利,也有的公司进行股票分割。随着我国证券市场的不断发展和完善,上市公司为了各种不同的目的而运用股票分割日益增多。上市公司为什么要进行股票分割呢?本文的目的是对上市公司股票分割原因作一述评,了解这些内容对上市公司股利分配政策的研究是有利的。     

股权分置改革后上市公司股利政策研究

2006年我国股权分置改革基本完成，这种制度变革是否对上市公司2006年的股利政策产生了影响。通过对2006年上市公司股利政策进行统计分析，结果显示2006年上市公司的股利政策具有股利分配形式以现金股利为主、整体分红水平提高不多、异常派现行为减少等特征。在对这些特征进行分析的基础上，提出了应加强现金流量管理和大力发展机构投资者。     

上市公司现金持有:权衡理论还是啄食理论

本文根据2000—2005年沪深股市586家A股上市公司的数据,考察了上市公司现金持有比率的决定因素。实证发现投资水平、资产负债率、现金替代物与现金持有比率负相关,债务期限结构和每股股利与现金持有比率正相关,现金流、企业规模、现金流波动率和财务实力的影响随不同的成长性而不同。实证结论更多地支持了啄食理论。     

The Ex–Dividend Pricing of REITs

Past studies have shown that ex–dividend stock prices are not fully reflective of dividend payments. A tax–induced clientele effect and micromarket limitations in stock pricing have been used to explain this pricing anomaly. This study focuses on the ex–dividend behavior of real estate investment trusts (REITs). Due to a low correlation between dividend size and dividend yield, REITs permit a cleaner examination of a tax–induced clientele effect. The results indicate that tick constraints in pricing ex–dividend stocks create the appearance of a tax–induced clientele effect in REITs when none should exist.     

Parameter Stability and the Valuation of Mortgages and Mortgage‐Backed Securities

The recent financial crisis was triggered by large and unexpected losses on mortgages and mortgage‐related securities. Here we examine model risk arising from innovations in mortgage markets and the effect on asset values. In particular, we examine the effect of parameter instability in the prepayment function. Using carefully constructed microdata, we find that the refinancing propensity was greater in 1998 for a 1997 issue given the same incentives, compared to the 1993 performance of a 1992 issue. The associated change in cash flow patterns produces economically significant changes in asset prices. Results are robust to alternative term structure models.     

基于企业生命周期理论的现金股利分配实证研究

本文在回顾西方股利政策理论的基础上,基于生命周期理论对股利政策的影响因素进行实证分析。我们以留存收益资产比作为企业生命周期的代理变量,选取沪市528家A股上市公司作为样本,采用2000—2008年间的数据,运用Logit模型、Tobit模型分别考察留存收益资产比和一些控制变量对上市公司是否支付现金股利、股利支付率的影响。研究发现,我国上市公司是否支付现金股利呈现生命周期特征,而现金股利支付率则不具有生命周期特征;在选取的控制变量中,增长率变量与股利发放显著负相关,从增长率这一角度看,暗合生命周期特征,资产收益率和公司规模变量与股利发放显著正相关。根据研究结论,本文建议证监会分行业制定公司的现金股利分配政策。     

Corporate governance in Taiwan: The nonmonotonic relationship between family ownership and dividend policy

This study considers an important aspect of corporate governance: the relationship between cash flow rights and dividend payout policy of listed family firms in Taiwan, an economy characterized by a predominance of family-controlled firms. Dividend payout levels are important because they are crucial to governing the firm and managing its investments. The empirical results show that at a low level of controlling families’ cash flow rights, the threat to lose control at any time makes controlling families claim more in dividends. This yields a positive relationship between dividend payout and the cash flow rights of controlling families at this level. Meanwhile, at a moderate level of controlling families’ cash flow rights, the entrenchment effect becomes more robust and creates a negative relationship with dividend payout. Finally, at the very highest level of controlling families’ cash flow rights, excessive firm-specific risk again helps to again create a positive relationship. This nonmonotonic relationship between controlling family cash flow rights and dividend payout also holds for financially mature firms that have a high earned to contributed capital mix.     

REIT Capital Structure Choices: Preparation Matters

Sun, Titman and Twite find that capital structure risks, namely, high leverage and a high share of short‐term debt, reduced the cumulative total return of U.S. REITs in the 2007–2009 financial crisis. We find that mitigating capital structure risks ahead of the crisis by reducing leverage and extending debt maturity in 2006 was associated with a significantly higher cumulative total return 2007–2009, after controlling for the levels of those variables at the start of the financial crisis. We further identify two systematic cross‐sectional differences between those REITs that reduced capital structure risks prior to the financial crisis and those that did not: the exposure to capital structure risks and the strength of corporate governance. On balance, our findings are consistent with the interpretation of risk‐reducing adjustments to capital structure ahead of the crisis as a component of managerial skill and discipline with significant implications for firm value during the crisis.     

Contagion Channels between Real Estate and Financial Markets

The recent crisis has demonstrated the linkages between asset classes within a country as well as the association between assets internationally. We provide for a better understanding of some of these linkages by conducting an empirical investigation of the channels underlying the risk of contagion between real estate investment trusts (REITs) and stocks in the United States. We test for three financial mechanisms potentially driving contagion. A behavioral dimension in the crisis propagation is also examined by considering investor sentiment and panic risk. We find that contagion prevails between REITs and stocks and that this phenomenon is driven by behavioral and liquidity mechanisms.     

Corporate Governance and Performance: The REIT Effect

Real estate investment trusts (REITs) offer a natural experiment in corporate governance due to the fact that they leave little free cash flow for management, which reduces agency problems. We exploit a unique and leading corporate governance database to test whether corporate governance matters for the performance of U.S. REITs. We document for a sample including governance ratings of more than 220 REITs that firm value is significantly related to firm-level governance for REITs with low payout ratios only. Repeating the analysis with the complete database that includes more than 5,000 companies and a control sample of firms with high corporate real estate ratios, we find a strong and significantly positive relation between our governance index and several performance variables, indicating that the partial lack of a relation between governance and performance in the real estate sector might be explained by a REIT effect.     

The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock Repurchases

This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we examine how executive and employee stock option holdings influence the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a stock repurchase. Using a sample of REIT repurchase announcements, we find that the market reacts more favorably to announcements by firms where executives have larger option holdings and the chief executive officer is not entrenched. Our results with respect to the roles of stock option holdings of executives and nonexecutives differ from those reported for a cross-section of non-REIT firms. While we find evidence supporting the importance of executive stock options in aligning the incentives of management and reinforcing the positive signaling associated with a repurchase announcement, we find little evidence that the market views REIT repurchases as being used primarily to fund option exercise. We attribute these findings to greater dependence by REIT investors on internal governance mechanisms (such as stock option programs) as a result of regulatory restrictions that limit external monitoring such as hostile takeovers.     

股份流动性、股权制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应--来自1999-2003年中国上市公司的证据

本文基于国内外的相关研究，从公司治理的角度提出六个研究假设，然后构建回归模型研究因为我国股市“同股同权不同价”的股权分置现象而导致的现金股利的“隧道效应”，具体探讨非流通股和流通股流动性、股权监督制衡机制对于上市公司派发现金股利的影响。实证结果显示．非流通股股东（通常为控股股东）和流通股股东（通常为中小股东）之间的确存在严重的利益冲突。各类非流通股和流通股股东的持股比例、所持股份类型以及他们之问的监督制衡作用对派发现金股利的“隧道效应”存在重要影响。本文最后给出六点建议试图限制非流通股股东通过现金股利的“隧道效应”谋取私利．