What Is Systemic Risk?

The traditional view of risk in a financial system is that it is the summation of individual risks within the system. However, the financial crisis that started in 2007 has driven home that this view of risk is inadequate. It is the interactions of financial institutions and markets that determine the systemic risks that drive financial crises. We identify four types of systemic risk. These are (i) panics—banking crises due to multiple equilibria; (ii) banking crises due to asset price falls; (iii) contagion; and (iv) foreign exchange mismatches in the banking system.     

THE ASIAN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION

The succession of financial crises that swept through Asia, Russia, and Latin America in 1997 and 1998 has led to considerable debate about both the role of the IMF and possible actions to limit further crises. Some have argued that international financial markets do not function well and are subject to periodic contagious panics that can be stemmed by an international lender of last resort. This paper argues that the IMF has neither the resources nor the superior information to play such a role. However, there may be a need for an international financial institution that can use its leverage to secure policy changes in the affected countries.
The paper also takes issue with the view that the IMF is simply bailing out imprudent international banks and that measures are needed to "bail them back in" again. The source of the Asian crisis lay in the real economy, but the effect of the crisis was greatly exacerbated by the financial structure of the affected countries. In particular, much of the risk was borne by domestic banks that borrowed dollars in the short-term interbank market and made longerterm loans in the local currency. Public policy needs to be directed to ensuring that the risks in emerging markets are distributed efficiently across both foreign and domestic investors. That involves greater use of equity finance and structured debt, as well as possibly a more direct role for foreign banks in funding local activities.     

Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They Happen?

The difficulties of the past year have convinced many observers that current risk management practices are deeply flawed, and that such flaws have contributed greatly to the current financial crisis. In this paper, the author challenges this view by showing the need to distinguish between flawed assessments by risk managers and corporate risk‐taking decisions that, although resulting in losses, were reasonable at the time they were made. In making this distinction, the paper also identifies a number of different ways that risk management can fail. In addition to choosing the wrong risk metrics and misidentifying or mismeasuring risks, risk managers can fail to communicate their risk assessments and provide effective guidance to top management and boards. And once top management has used that information to help determine the firm's risk appetite and strategy, the risk management function can also fail to monitor risks appropriately and maintain the firm's targeted risk positions. But if risk management has been mistakenly identified as the culprit in many cases, current risk management practice can be improved by taking into account the lessons from financial crises past and present. In particular, such crises have occurred with enough frequency that crisis conditions can be modeled, at least to some extent. And when models reach their limits of usefulness, companies should consider using scenario planning that aims to reveal the implications of crises for their financial health and survival. Instead of relying on past data, scenario planning must use forward‐looking economic analysis to evaluate the expected impact of sudden illiquidity and the associated feedback effects that are common in financial crises.     

The effects of systemic banking crises in the inter-war period

This paper examines the time-profile of the impact of systemic banking crises on GDP and industrial production using a panel of 24 countries over the inter-war period and compares this to the post-war experience of these countries. We show that banking crises have effects that induce medium-term adjustments on economies. Focussing on an eight-year horizon, it is clear that the negative effects of systemic banking crises last over the entirety of this time-horizon. The effect has been identified for GDP and industrial production. The adverse effect on the industrial sector stands out as being substantially larger in magnitude relative to the macroeconomic effect. Comparing the results across long-run historical periods for the same selection of countries and variables identifies some differences that stand out: the short term macroeconomic impact effects are much larger in the post-war period, suggesting that the propagation channels of shocks operate at a faster pace in the more recent period. Moreover, the time-profile of effects differs, suggesting that modern policies may be modulating the temporal shape of the response to banking crises shocks. However, the broad magnitude of the adverse effect of banking crises remains comparable across these time periods.     

Financial contagion and asset pricing

Asset market interconnectedness can give rise to significant contagion risks during periods of financial crises that extend beyond the risks associated with changes in volatilities and correlations. These channels include the transmission of shocks operating through changes in the higher order comoments of asset returns, including changes in coskewness arising from changes in the interaction between volatility and average returns across asset markets. These additional contagion channels have nontrivial implications for the pricing of options through changes in the payoff probability structure and more generally, in the management of financial risks. The effects of incorrectly pricing risk has proved to be significant during many financial crises, including the subprime crisis from mid 2007 to mid 2008, the Great Recession beginning 2008 and the European debt crisis from 2010. Using an exchange options model, the effects of changes in the comoments of asset returns across asset markets are investigated with special emphasis given to understanding the effects on hedging risk during financial crises. The results reveal that by not correctly pricing the risks arising from higher order moments during financial crises, there is significant mispricing of options, while hedged portfolios during noncrisis periods become exposed to price movements in times of crises.     

Taming Systemically Important Financial Institutions

We model a systemically important financial institution that is too big (or too interconnected) to fail. Without credible regulation and strong supervision, the shareholders of this institution might deliberately let its managers take excessive risk. We propose a solution to this problem, showing how insurance against systemic shocks can be provided without generating moral hazard. The solution involves levying a systemic tax needed to cover the costs of future crises and more importantly establishing a systemic risk authority endowed with special resolution powers, including the control of bankers’ compensation packages during crisis periods.     

Discerning the Impact of Derivatives on Asset Risk: The Case of Canadian Banks

The Canadian banks have shown remarkable resilience to the financial crisis that intensified in the late 2008. The interesting question is whether this stability is due to their prudent lending practices to limit the original risk exposures or due to effective risk management through hedging by using financial derivatives. In this paper, we implement the option‐theoretic model of Merton to calculate the implied asset risk and discern the impact of these derivatives on the aggregate risk for Canadian banks over the period 1997–2008. An algorithm of iterative procedure is developed to impute asset value and risk from bank stock prices. Our estimates show that the risk for Canadian banks is low and even decreasing till the unfolding of the recent crises in 2008. Further analyses reveal that such low risks are not due to reliance on hedging, nor is it related to trading in derivatives, after disentangling the intertwined effects of hedging and trading. These results suggest that involvements in derivatives, in and of themselves, should not be blamed for causing the bank crises; rather, it is conservatism in controlling original risk exposures that remains fundamental for safeguarding a healthy financial system.     

Regulation and Emergency Management: An Exclusive Domain for the Experts?

The technology of communications regularly brings news about crises and emergencies across the globe, but it does virtually nothing to inform our understanding of risk, nor of the regulatory frameworks that are appropriate to controlling it. This article considers the risks from industrial applications of modern technology, compares the institutional responses to controlling them and finally poses the question of what role ordinary citizens should have in the process of regulation.     

A characterisation of the methodology of qualitative research on the nature of perceived risk: trends and omissions

The issue of how risk is ‘perceived’ is one of significant research interest and immense practical importance. In spite of this wide interest, however, it is probably fair to say that most emerging ‘risk’ crises – whether related to natural or technological phenomena – come as a surprise to researchers and to society as a whole. Prediction of human responses to novel potential hazards (or novel manifestations of old hazards) is neither reliable nor complete; strategies to ameliorate inappropriate concerns when they arise (or to make realistic inappropriate absences of concern) do not appear totally effective. It therefore seems apt to ask the question: just what have we learned about ‘risk perception’? In this paper we conduct a structured review of qualitative research on perceived risk – to be followed by a subsequent analysis of quantitative research in a later paper – focusing upon methodological issues. Qualitative research often precedes quantitative research, and ideally informs it; it seeks depth and meaning from few subjects rather than identifying patterns within larger samples and populations. Without adequate qualitative research, quantitative research risks misanalysis of the target phenomenon, at the very least by the omission of relevant factors and inclusion of irrelevant ones. Our analysis here – of qualitative studies conducted across a range of disciplines, not all of which will be familiar to the readers of this journal – suggests that this research suffers from an incomplete coverage of the ‘risk perception universe’, typified by a focus on atypical hazards and study samples. We summarise the results of this research, while pointing out its limitations, and draw conclusions about future priorities for research of this type.     

Margin practices and requirements during the National Banking Era: An early example of macro‐prudential regulation

The New York stock market was plagued by a series of financial crises during the National Banking Era, culminating in the Panic of 1907. The traditional view holds that the crises were rooted in structural flaws related to trade settlement as well as excessive and indiscriminate margin lending that remained unaddressed until the formation of the Federal Reserve Bank. An examination of the historical record, however, shows that brokers sought to control contagion and spillover effects through reform of the settlement process and by modulating margin lending rates and maintenance requirements according to macroeconomic conditions, counterparty credit‐worthiness and market volatility. Using newly gathered archival data, we show that the New York Stock Exchange enacted macro‐prudential regulations that may have reduced the severity of crises during this period. By providing early evidence of private sector responses to rising systemic risk, the paper addresses an important aspect of early market microstructure.     

How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline

This paper analyzes in an international sample of banks from 104 countries if the sensitivity of the cost of deposits to bank risk varies across banks depending on their systemic and absolute size. We analyze a period before the 2007 financial crisis and control for endogeneity of bank size, intervention policies in past banking crises, and soundness of countries’ public finances. Our results are consistent with the predominance of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, although this effect is stronger in countries that did not impose losses on depositors in past banking crises and in countries with sounder public finances.     

Credit risk transfer and contagion

Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.     

How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?

This paper empirically examines how capital affects a bank’s performance (survival and market share) and how this effect varies across banking crises, market crises, and normal times that occurred in the US over the past quarter century. We have two main results. First, capital helps small banks to increase their probability of survival and market share at all times (during banking crises, market crises, and normal times). Second, capital enhances the performance of medium and large banks primarily during banking crises. Additional tests explore channels through which capital generates these effects. Numerous robustness checks and additional tests are performed.     

Does risk aversion drive financial crises? Testing the predictive power of empirical indicators

There are several types of risk aversion indicators used by financial institutions. These indicators, which are estimated in diverse ways, often show differing developments, although it is not possible to directly assess which is the most appropriate. Here, we consider the most well-known of these indicators and construct others with standard methods. As financial crises generally coincide with periods in which risk aversion increases, we try to check if these indicators rise just before the crises and also if they are able to forecast crises. We estimate logit and multilogit models of financial crises – exchange rate and stock market crises – using control variables and each of the risk aversion indicators. In-sample simulations allow us to assess their respective predictive powers. Risk aversion indicators are found to be good leading indicators of stock market crises, but less so for currency crises.     

The Interplay between Regulations and Financial Stability

The crisis demonstrated that microprudential regulation focusing on the risks taken by individual banks is not sufficient to prevent crises. This is because it ignores systemic risk. Six types of systemic risk are identified, namely: (i) panics – banking crises due to multiple equilibria; (ii) banking crises due to asset price falls; (iii) contagion; (iv) financial architecture; (v) foreign exchange mismatches in the banking system; (vi) behavioral effects from Knightian uncertainty. We focus on the first three as they are arguably the main causes of the 2007–9 crisis and consider regulatory and other policies to counteract them.     

Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd–Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance,a review

This article is a review of a 531 page book that in turn is a review and evaluation of the 2319 page Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by Congress on July 16, 2010. The overriding theme of the book is to pose two approaches to attaining financial stability in the future. One approach is to establish a council of wise men and women supported by an army of highly skilled professional financial economists to formulate and implement regulations designed to prevent future financial crises that wreak havoc on the real economy and require financial support from taxpayers. This is the approach of the Dodd–Frank Act. The second approach proposed by the authors of this book is to design a taxing system that taxes systemically important financial institutions on the basis of their contribution to systemic risk. Borrowing ideas from the literature on the taxation of negative externalities their view is that financial institutions that create crises should pay for the clean-up. They also argue that requiring the financial polluters to pay for the creation of systemic risk will reduce the supply of systemic risk. The reader is invited to decide which approach is best.     

An empirical study of the value-relevance of using proportionate consolidation accounting for investments in joint ventures

This research examines bond risk premiums to determine whether creditors of companies with investments in joint ventures reflect legal or implicit measures of the debts of joint ventures. The legal view suggests that the amount of potential loss from an investment in a joint venture is limited to the investment. The implicit view suggests that the operations of the joint venture and the venturer are interdependent. Equity method accounting reflects the legal view and proportionate consolidation reflects the implicit view.The study examines whether bond risk premiums are more highly associated with accounting numbers from proportionate consolidation than equity method accounting. The study uses data from 10Ks, the Wall Street Journal, and Moody's Bond Record from May 1, 1995 through April 30, 1998. These 4 years are used because US interest rates were fairly stable during this period, which is an important factor when examining bond risk premiums. Additionally, the companies in the study needed to remain stable across the window of study – no mergers, acquisitions, buy-outs, or liquidations – in order to maintain a comparative sample over the entire time period. The risk premium model uses measures of default that change between equity method accounting and proportionate consolidation. Differences in the explanatory power of the model determine how creditors view the joint venture debts.The study shows that approximately half of equity investments represent investments in joint ventures. Furthermore, the average joint venture uses debt to finance about two-thirds of the assets. The results show that proportionate consolidation fails to improve the explanatory power of the model when examining the entire set of companies that invest in joint ventures. However, the data reject the null hypothesis of no improvement with proportionate consolidation when examining companies who guarantee the debt of their joint venture. The policy implication of this study indicates that a change to proportionate consolidation would provide more value-relevant information to creditors when companies guarantee the debt of the joint venture.     

Exchange rate regimes,capital controls,and currency crises: Does the bipolar view hold?

This paper empirically examines the link between de facto exchange rate regimes and the incidence of currency crises in 84 countries from 1980 to 2001 using probit models. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find no evidence that, as the bipolar view argues, intermediate regimes have a significantly higher probability of currency crises than both hard pegs and free floats. Using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find that hard pegs with capital account liberalization have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than intermediate regimes with capital controls and free floats with capital controls. Hence, the bipolar view does not strictly hold in the sense that intermediate regimes are significantly more prone to currency crises than the two extreme regimes. However, the fact that hard pegs with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to currency crises is worthy of note.     

This Time Is the Same: Using Bank Performance in 1998 to Explain Bank Performance during the Recent Financial Crisis

Are some banks prone to perform poorly during crises? If yes, why? In this paper, we show that a bank's stock return performance during the 1998 crisis predicts its stock return performance and probability of failure during the recent financial crisis. This effect is economically large. Our findings are consistent with persistence in a bank's risk culture and/or aspects of its business model that make its performance sensitive to crises. Banks that relied more on short‐term funding, had more leverage, and grew more are more likely to be banks that performed poorly in both crises.     

Are Market‐Based Measures of Global Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions Useful to Regulators and Supervisors?

We analyze whether four market‐based measures of the global systemic importance of financial institutions offer early warning signals during three financial crises. The tests based on the 2007–2008 crisis show that only one measure (?CoVaR) consistently adds predictive power to conventional early warning models. However, the additional predictive power remains small and it is not normally confirmed for the Asian and the 1998 crises. We conclude that it is problematic to identify a market‐based measure of systemic importance that remains valid across crises with different features. The same criticism also applies to several conventional proxies of systemic importance, of which size is the most consistent performer.