Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good

This paper analyzes the efforts made to influence a decision that can have two outcomes. First, the agents on the same side designate an agent to play the contest for them. The inactive agents can then decide to support this active agent, i.e. pay a percentage of his effort. It is optimal to designate either the agent with the lowest stake (who will receive support from everyone else) or the agent with the highest stake (who will not receive support) as the active agent. We find that the side with the higher aggregate stake may have the lower success probability.     

Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests

This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of rent-seeking contests in terms of the amount and the timing of effort they elicit from the participants. The optimal contest structure—the one that maximizes the discounted sum of efforts—is found to hinge on the degree of impatience of the contest organizers, the more patient of whom prefer longer contests consisting of pairwise matches among the contestants. Heterogeneity of the contestants' quality also turns out to play an important role in the comparison.     

The allocation of entrepreneurial efforts in a rent-seeking society: Evidence from China

This paper considers four types of entrepreneurial efforts: productive activities, aggressive rent seeking, defense against rent extraction, and leisure. It examines how entrepreneurs allocate efforts when facing dual-dealing relationships with politicians in a rent-seeking society: entrepreneurs not only pursue additional benefits through rent seeking, but also try to avoid extortions by politicians. Using unique city-level and firm-level data across China, we demonstrate that Chinese entrepreneurs survive in a twisted world: ordinary entrepreneurs would desire better institutional environment, but if institutional improvement is not available, they would prefer political connections which are often preoccupied by special interest groups and/or large-sized firms.     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

The immiseration of the landlords: rent in a Kaldorian theory of income distribution

This paper incorporates rent within a Kaldorian model of distributionwhere income shares depend on aggregate investment and the propensitiesto save out of profits, rents and wages. The model is used tointerpret the significance of the secular decline in rents asa share of national income and to specify the circumstancesunder which both the capital/output ratio and the wage shareof national income may rise. The author pursues Keynes's suggestiveremarks about land's liquidity value and shows how an increasein the demand for land, by producers, consumers or wealthholdersreduces the rate of profit and therewith the inducement to invest.     

Growth,deregulation and rent seeking in post-war British economy

Post-war political consensus about the need for government action to rectify market failure began to unravel in the 1970s, and even the need for prudential control of banking and finance began to be challenged by the start of the 1980s. Regulatory oversight was relaxed in the belief that emerging techniques in financial engineering would render irrelevant fears of sharp periodic downturns that have historically been the consequence of lightly regulated finance. The outcome of this new policy, embracing the idea of unregulated markets to deliver greater prosperity, is disappointing. We find that the average growth rate of UK GDP and output per person employed for three decades from the start of liberalization was no greater than that in the previous three post-war decades. Cyclical fluctuations were deeper. A remarkable feature of the second period is the sharp rise in income inequality in favour of the very top earners. An illusion of greater prosperity for a wider segment may have been created in the second period due to asset price bubbles and housing inflation.     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

“看病难和看病贵”经济学分析及对策

目前我国城乡居民仍然存在看病难和看病贵的问题,产生这个问题的经济学原因主要有:医疗资源总量供给不足,而且资源的配置极不合理;医疗需求和供给缺乏弹性;医患之间的信息不对称等。在分析原因的基础上提出了相关的政策建议。     

Fiscal crisis and fiscal reform in developing countries

In recent years, policy-makers in developing countries haveresponded to crisis of macroeconomic instability with two setsof measures: conventional stabilisation policies and policiesof economic liberalisation. The fiscal implications of thisdouble agenda are set out, following three lines of enquiry.First, how can policies be kept consistent, when some liberalisationmeasures have large adverse fiscal consequences? Second, cana fiscal deficit be reduced without damaging the provision ofpublic services vital for growth and poverty alleviation? Finally,since lack of tax revenue is usually the binding constrainton government intervention, how can this most easily be relaxed?     

The patterns and determinants of longevity in Russia's regions: Evidence from panel data

In this paper we examine whether regions of Russia have been converging or diverging in their longevity levels during the 1990s and evaluate the divergence effect of the 1998 financial crisis. We also estimate the impact of changes in poverty and public health spending on inter-temporal variations in longevity using regional-level panel data for 77 Russian regions from 1994 to 2000. Finally, we investigate the extent to which the gradual recovery in longevity observed after 1994 was derailed by the 1998 financial crisis and the public policy shifts required for regions to regain their Soviet-era levels of longevity. We find a significant negative effect of the 1998 crisis on longevity independently of the factors related directly to poverty and public health spending. In addition, a permanent negative shock to the incidence of poverty and the amount of publicly-provided health care in a region has enduring consequences on the population's health. Finally, the effect of increases in public health spending on longevity is related positively to the incidence of poverty. Journal of Comparative Economics 33 (4) (2005) 788–813.     

扶贫信贷中“寻租”行为的模型分析

本文通过建立不完全信息的动态博弈模型，对农村扶贫信贷中贷方负责人的行为进行分析，找出“寻租”行为的存在原因，从而探讨防范农村扶贫信贷中“寻租”行为的有效模式。     

The impact of recall periods on reported morbidity and health seeking behavior

Between 2000 and 2002, we followed 1621 individuals in Delhi, India using a combination of weekly and monthly-recall health questionnaires. In 2008, we augmented these data with another 8 weeks of surveys during which households were experimentally allocated to surveys with different recall periods in the second half of the survey. We show that the length of the recall period had a large impact on reported morbidity, doctor visits; time spent sick; whether at least one day of work/school was lost due to sickness and; the reported use of self-medication. The effects are more pronounced among the poor than the rich. In one example, differential recall effects across income groups reverse the sign of the gradient between doctor visits and per-capita expenditures such that the poor use health care providers more than the rich in the weekly recall surveys but less in monthly recall surveys. We hypothesize that illnesses – especially among the poor – are no longer perceived as “extraordinary events” but have become part of “normal” life. We discuss the implications of these results for health survey methodology, and the economic interpretation of sickness in poor populations.     

Inequality and income: The mediating effects of social spending and risk

This paper estimates models of social spending, income risk, and per capita income levels using data from a post-war panel of OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. The objective is to test two theories about the pathway from inequality to per capita income. According to one theory, inequality reduces incomes because it induces social spending, which acts as a drag on the economy. The results here suggest, however, that inequality does not seem to induce social spending, and social spending does not seem to lower per capita incomes. According to a second theory, inequality causes upheaval which adds to the volatility of per capita income, which may reduce the level of per capita income. The results suggest, however, that volatility, measured here as the standard deviation of per capita income, has little measurable impact on either per capita income or social spending. The mainsprings of per capita income are more likely to be the traditional factors: the work force, human capital, and physical capital.
JEL classification: E6.     

The social cost of living index

Household cost of living indexes reflect household preferences; analogous indexes for groups of households require a corresponding concept of group preferences. In this paper I investigate the ‘social cost of living index’, a group index based on the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. I first define the index and examine its properties under the assumption that the investigator constructing it expresses his distributional judgments in an explicit Bergson- Samuelson social welfare function; I then examine the ‘maximizing society’ and the ‘independent society’, two cases in which the index can be constructed from the information contained in the market demand functions. In these two cases a Laspeyres index (i.e. the fixed weight index based on the reference consumption pattern) is an upper bound on the exact social cost of living index. In general, however, the assumptions required to place bounds on the social cost of living index are much more likely to be satisfied than those required to place analogous bounds on a household's cost of living index.     

股权再融资、盈余管理与大股东的寻租行为

我国上市公司处于大股东的超强控制状态,大股东与中小股东之间存在严重的信息不对称,导致大股东在股权再融资过程中表现出强烈的盈余管理动机.本文研究了我国资本市场参与者的行为与盈余管理之间的关系,并分析了对资本配置效率的影响效应.大股东通过操纵报告盈余来改变会计盈余的时间分布和误导投资者,从而攫取更多的隐性收益,造成资本市场配置效率的降低.研究结果表明:(1)大股东通过盈余管理在股权再融资过程中可以获得中小股东无法得到的隐性收益;(2)大股东的收益随着盈余管理程度的增加而提升,中小股东的财富随着盈余管理程度的增加而降低;(3)盈余管理程度的增加将降低上市公司的资本配置效率和企业价值.因此,大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应,造成了上市公司资本配置效率、公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降.     

A reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists

Summary. One version of the Coase Theorem is, If property rights are fully allocated, competition leads to efficient allocations. This version implies that the public goods problem can be solved by allocating property rights fully. We show that this mechanism is not likely to work well in economies with global externalities because the privatized economy is highly susceptible to strategic behavior: The free-rider problem manifests itself as a complementary monopoly problem in an associated private goods economy. Thus, our work relates the validity of the Coase Theorem to the literature on the incentives for strategic behavior in economies with complementarities. Received: 12 May 1999; revised version: 9 July 1999     

Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers

This paper incorporates rent seeking from state coffers into a general equilibrium model of economic growth and endogenous policy. Self-interested individuals try to extract, for personal benefit, part of tax revenues that could be used to finance public investment. We solve for a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in individual agents' behavior. The determinants of rent seeking in general equilibrium are identified and we consider the efficient size of public sector given the rent-seeking activity. Cross-country data from 108 rich and developing countries provide support for our predictions.     

Public spending and growth: The role of government accountability

This paper examines the role of institutions in the nexus between public spending and economic growth. Empirical results based on a newly assembled dataset of 80 countries over the 1970–2010 period suggest that particularly when institutions prompt governments to be accountable to the general citizen does public capital spending promote growth. Taking account of the type of financing for this spending, we show that the growth-promoting effect under an accountable government appears to prevail for various financing sources, including a reallocation from current spending, an increase in revenue, and a rise in the budget deficit. However, government accountability does not seem to play a key role in the growth effects of current spending.     

The second-best use of social cost estimates

A significant literature has developed to estimate the damages to third parties from new electricity generation technologies. This paper focuses on how such estimates can be profitably used in the present regulatory environment, and in the potential new environment that may result from restructuring in the electricity industry.     

Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision.