Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good

This paper analyzes the efforts made to influence a decision that can have two outcomes. First, the agents on the same side designate an agent to play the contest for them. The inactive agents can then decide to support this active agent, i.e. pay a percentage of his effort. It is optimal to designate either the agent with the lowest stake (who will receive support from everyone else) or the agent with the highest stake (who will not receive support) as the active agent. We find that the side with the higher aggregate stake may have the lower success probability.     

Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests

This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of rent-seeking contests in terms of the amount and the timing of effort they elicit from the participants. The optimal contest structure—the one that maximizes the discounted sum of efforts—is found to hinge on the degree of impatience of the contest organizers, the more patient of whom prefer longer contests consisting of pairwise matches among the contestants. Heterogeneity of the contestants' quality also turns out to play an important role in the comparison.     

The allocation of entrepreneurial efforts in a rent-seeking society: Evidence from China

This paper considers four types of entrepreneurial efforts: productive activities, aggressive rent seeking, defense against rent extraction, and leisure. It examines how entrepreneurs allocate efforts when facing dual-dealing relationships with politicians in a rent-seeking society: entrepreneurs not only pursue additional benefits through rent seeking, but also try to avoid extortions by politicians. Using unique city-level and firm-level data across China, we demonstrate that Chinese entrepreneurs survive in a twisted world: ordinary entrepreneurs would desire better institutional environment, but if institutional improvement is not available, they would prefer political connections which are often preoccupied by special interest groups and/or large-sized firms.     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

The immiseration of the landlords: rent in a Kaldorian theory of income distribution

This paper incorporates rent within a Kaldorian model of distributionwhere income shares depend on aggregate investment and the propensitiesto save out of profits, rents and wages. The model is used tointerpret the significance of the secular decline in rents asa share of national income and to specify the circumstancesunder which both the capital/output ratio and the wage shareof national income may rise. The author pursues Keynes's suggestiveremarks about land's liquidity value and shows how an increasein the demand for land, by producers, consumers or wealthholdersreduces the rate of profit and therewith the inducement to invest.     

On the optimality of social status seeking

We present an endogenous growth model in which households display their social status by holding not only capital but also bonds. According to conventional wisdom, the quest for social status provides an incentive for individuals to accumulate wealth, which stimulates economic growth and elevates it to a socially optimal level. Instead, we show that portfolio allocation is crucial to the growth-enhancing effect of the quest for social status. If households exhibit their social status by accumulating physical capital and holding government bonds, the quest for social status may not increase economic growth. As a result, social status seeking cannot achieve the social optimum. Calibrating our model to data, we find that if government bonds constitute part of the wealth for households’ quest for social status, the quest for social status decreases economic growth.     

New evidence on the historical growth of government in Europe: The role of labor costs

We document a robust positive correlation between the size of government and the labor share of income in data from European countries covering the period 1869–1975. Following Facchini et al. (2017), we interpret this correlation as evidence that labor costs drive public spending. The long-term increase in the labor share observed over this period explains half of the overall growth of central government. The relationship holds when the labor share is instrumented with movements in technological change at the frontier. When decomposing public spending, transfers, not intensive in labor, are the only component not associated with the labor share.     

Growth,deregulation and rent seeking in post-war British economy

Post-war political consensus about the need for government action to rectify market failure began to unravel in the 1970s, and even the need for prudential control of banking and finance began to be challenged by the start of the 1980s. Regulatory oversight was relaxed in the belief that emerging techniques in financial engineering would render irrelevant fears of sharp periodic downturns that have historically been the consequence of lightly regulated finance. The outcome of this new policy, embracing the idea of unregulated markets to deliver greater prosperity, is disappointing. We find that the average growth rate of UK GDP and output per person employed for three decades from the start of liberalization was no greater than that in the previous three post-war decades. Cyclical fluctuations were deeper. A remarkable feature of the second period is the sharp rise in income inequality in favour of the very top earners. An illusion of greater prosperity for a wider segment may have been created in the second period due to asset price bubbles and housing inflation.     

“看病难和看病贵”经济学分析及对策

目前我国城乡居民仍然存在看病难和看病贵的问题,产生这个问题的经济学原因主要有:医疗资源总量供给不足,而且资源的配置极不合理;医疗需求和供给缺乏弹性;医患之间的信息不对称等。在分析原因的基础上提出了相关的政策建议。     

Policies to Reduce Rent Seeking in Controlled Markets

Abstract

We analyze the effects of various policies to reduce rent seeking in the controlled market in which buyers have heterogeneous valuation regarding the coveted good. The good is allocated according to the buyer-specific signal (‘test score’), which is determined by the quantity of wasteful ‘rent seeking’ exerted by the buyer. We consider three common forms of market control: minimum qualification score, quota, and price ceiling. The potential buyers with higher valuations are more likely to receive the good in equilibrium, while they exert more rent-seeking efforts. Marginally relaxing market control does not necessarily decrease the aggregated amount of rent-seeking activities, and the effectiveness of policy measures usually depends on the current degree of competitiveness in the market.     

The welfare implications of resource allocation policies under uncertainty: The case of public education spending

In this paper, we examine whether policy interventions, aimed at improving resource allocation, also have important stabilization effects over the business cycle. To this end, we employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which public education expenditures, financed by distorting taxes, enhance the productivity of private education choices. We then calculate the welfare implications of competing operating targets using a state-contingent instrument rule for public education spending. Our main findings are: (i) there can be important cyclical effects of different resource allocation policies depending on the operating target used and the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty; (ii) it is important to use an operating target which is as close as possible to the heart of the market imperfection that justifies policy action; (iii) policy action should not be monotonic in the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty.     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

Fiscal crisis and fiscal reform in developing countries

In recent years, policy-makers in developing countries haveresponded to crisis of macroeconomic instability with two setsof measures: conventional stabilisation policies and policiesof economic liberalisation. The fiscal implications of thisdouble agenda are set out, following three lines of enquiry.First, how can policies be kept consistent, when some liberalisationmeasures have large adverse fiscal consequences? Second, cana fiscal deficit be reduced without damaging the provision ofpublic services vital for growth and poverty alleviation? Finally,since lack of tax revenue is usually the binding constrainton government intervention, how can this most easily be relaxed?     

The patterns and determinants of longevity in Russia's regions: Evidence from panel data

In this paper we examine whether regions of Russia have been converging or diverging in their longevity levels during the 1990s and evaluate the divergence effect of the 1998 financial crisis. We also estimate the impact of changes in poverty and public health spending on inter-temporal variations in longevity using regional-level panel data for 77 Russian regions from 1994 to 2000. Finally, we investigate the extent to which the gradual recovery in longevity observed after 1994 was derailed by the 1998 financial crisis and the public policy shifts required for regions to regain their Soviet-era levels of longevity. We find a significant negative effect of the 1998 crisis on longevity independently of the factors related directly to poverty and public health spending. In addition, a permanent negative shock to the incidence of poverty and the amount of publicly-provided health care in a region has enduring consequences on the population's health. Finally, the effect of increases in public health spending on longevity is related positively to the incidence of poverty. Journal of Comparative Economics 33 (4) (2005) 788–813.     

扶贫信贷中“寻租”行为的模型分析

本文通过建立不完全信息的动态博弈模型，对农村扶贫信贷中贷方负责人的行为进行分析，找出“寻租”行为的存在原因，从而探讨防范农村扶贫信贷中“寻租”行为的有效模式。     

The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games

We establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games. The results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities, and to apply theorems and results intended for rent-seeking games to other games, and vice versa. We conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results.     

The impact of recall periods on reported morbidity and health seeking behavior

Between 2000 and 2002, we followed 1621 individuals in Delhi, India using a combination of weekly and monthly-recall health questionnaires. In 2008, we augmented these data with another 8 weeks of surveys during which households were experimentally allocated to surveys with different recall periods in the second half of the survey. We show that the length of the recall period had a large impact on reported morbidity, doctor visits; time spent sick; whether at least one day of work/school was lost due to sickness and; the reported use of self-medication. The effects are more pronounced among the poor than the rich. In one example, differential recall effects across income groups reverse the sign of the gradient between doctor visits and per-capita expenditures such that the poor use health care providers more than the rich in the weekly recall surveys but less in monthly recall surveys. We hypothesize that illnesses – especially among the poor – are no longer perceived as “extraordinary events” but have become part of “normal” life. We discuss the implications of these results for health survey methodology, and the economic interpretation of sickness in poor populations.     

The social cost of living index

Household cost of living indexes reflect household preferences; analogous indexes for groups of households require a corresponding concept of group preferences. In this paper I investigate the ‘social cost of living index’, a group index based on the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. I first define the index and examine its properties under the assumption that the investigator constructing it expresses his distributional judgments in an explicit Bergson- Samuelson social welfare function; I then examine the ‘maximizing society’ and the ‘independent society’, two cases in which the index can be constructed from the information contained in the market demand functions. In these two cases a Laspeyres index (i.e. the fixed weight index based on the reference consumption pattern) is an upper bound on the exact social cost of living index. In general, however, the assumptions required to place bounds on the social cost of living index are much more likely to be satisfied than those required to place analogous bounds on a household's cost of living index.     

Inequality and income: The mediating effects of social spending and risk

This paper estimates models of social spending, income risk, and per capita income levels using data from a post-war panel of OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. The objective is to test two theories about the pathway from inequality to per capita income. According to one theory, inequality reduces incomes because it induces social spending, which acts as a drag on the economy. The results here suggest, however, that inequality does not seem to induce social spending, and social spending does not seem to lower per capita incomes. According to a second theory, inequality causes upheaval which adds to the volatility of per capita income, which may reduce the level of per capita income. The results suggest, however, that volatility, measured here as the standard deviation of per capita income, has little measurable impact on either per capita income or social spending. The mainsprings of per capita income are more likely to be the traditional factors: the work force, human capital, and physical capital.
JEL classification: E6.     

A reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists

Summary. One version of the Coase Theorem is, If property rights are fully allocated, competition leads to efficient allocations. This version implies that the public goods problem can be solved by allocating property rights fully. We show that this mechanism is not likely to work well in economies with global externalities because the privatized economy is highly susceptible to strategic behavior: The free-rider problem manifests itself as a complementary monopoly problem in an associated private goods economy. Thus, our work relates the validity of the Coase Theorem to the literature on the incentives for strategic behavior in economies with complementarities. Received: 12 May 1999; revised version: 9 July 1999