Male–female wage discrimination in Chinese industryInvestigation using firm‐level data1

We use firm‐level data to analyze male–female wage discrimination in China's industry. We find that there is a significant negative association between wages and the share of female workers in a firm's labour force. However, we also find that the marginal productivity of female workers is significantly lower than that of male workers. Comparing wage gaps and productivity gaps between men and women, we notice an intriguing contrast between state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms. The wage gap is smaller than the productivity gap in SOEs, while the converse is true for private firms. These results suggest that women in the state sector receive wage premiums, whereas women in the private sector face wage discrimination.     

Wage differentials, discrimination and efficiency

I analyze a large labor market where homogeneous firms post wages to direct the search of workers who differ in productivity. I show that the model has a unique equilibrium. The wage differential depends positively on the workers’ productivity differential only when the latter is large. When the productivity differential is small, high-productivity workers get a lower wage than low-productivity workers. This reverse wage differential remains even when the productivity differential shrinks to zero. However, the equilibrium is socially efficient. High-productivity workers always get the employment priority and higher expected wages than low-productivity workers. Although discrimination in terms of expected wages does not exist, conventional measures are likely to incorrectly find discrimination in the model.     

Sex Differentials in Earnings in the South Korean Labor Market

We examine gender differences in earnings among South Korean workers in 1988 – the year the South Korean National Assembly enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Using the "88 Occupational Wage Bargaining Survey on the Actual Condition," we calculate women's mean earnings as a percentage of men's mean earnings by major industrial category and educational attainment. We find a larger wage gap among clerical and sales workers than production workers or professionals. Generally, the more education a woman has, the smaller the gap between her earnings and those of her male counterparts. Women with a middle-school education have a mean income 53.5 percent that of comparable men, while the female-to-male wage ratio among college graduates is 76.1 percent. We analyze wage differences separately for women and men. Following Ronald Oaxaca's (1973) work, we decompose male–female wage differentials. We also calculate a discrimination coefficient. Our work shows that, all else equal, men earn from 33.6 percent to 46.9 percent more than women with comparable skills. We attribute the difference to gender discrimination.     

Gender wage differentials and discrimination in Korea: comparison by knowledge intensity of industries

This study estimates the relative size of the non-productivity-related gender wage gap across industries with differing knowledge intensities. More specifically, a gender wage premium was estimated from a modified Mincerian earnings equation, and an Oaxaca's discrimination coefficient was computed. Empirical evidence indicates that gender wage differentials tend to be less subject to potential discrimination in knowledge-based industries than in other industries with lower knowledge intensity. The estimated discrimination effect is least noticeable in top hierarchical occupations such as professionals and technicians, while it is most sizeable in production workers and sales/service workers, regardless of industrial affiliation.     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.     

Economic transition and gender differentials in wages and productivity: Evidence from Chinese manufacturing enterprises

We use firm-level data to analyze male–female wage differences in Chinese industry in the late 1990s. Our estimates indicate that employers' discrimination against women was not a significant source of the gender wage gap in Chinese state-owned enterprises. Instead, we find that the relative wage of unskilled female to male workers was higher than their relative productivity. This result indicates that unskilled female workers in the state sector had historically received wage premiums and consequently accounted for a disproportionate share of the sector's labor surplus.     

The welfare costs of union wage compression

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare costs of union wage compression. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). The labor market in this model is characterized as a right-to-manage contract, which allows unions to compress wage differentials between high- and low-skilled workers, by implementing a binding minimum wage. This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low-skilled workers. The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor, however, is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high-skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

NEW EVIDENCE ON REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY WITHIN EMPLOYER–EMPLOYEE MATCHES

In the most thorough study to date on wage cyclicality among job stayers, Devereux's (2001) analysis of men in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) produced two puzzling findings: (1) the real wages of salaried workers are noncyclical, and (2) wage cyclicality among hourly workers differs between two alternative wage measures. We examine these puzzles with additional evidence from other sources. Devereux's finding of noncyclical real wages among salaried job stayers is not replicated in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data. The NLSY data, however, do corroborate his finding of a discrepancy for hourly workers between the cyclicality of the two alternative wage measures. Evidence from the PSID Validation Study contradicts Devereux's conjecture that the discrepancy might be due to a procyclical bias from measurement error in average hourly earnings. Evidence from the Bureau of Labor Statistics establishment survey supports his hypothesis that overtime work accounts for part (but not all) of the discrepancy. We conclude that job stayers' real average hourly earnings are substantially procyclical and that an important portion of that procyclicality probably is due to compensation beyond base wages.     

Training, search and wage dispersion

This paper combines on-the-job search and human capital theory to study the coexistence of firm-funded general training and frequent job turnovers. Although ex ante identical, firms differ in their training decisions. The model generates correlations between various firm characteristics that are consistent with the data. Wage dispersion exists among ex ante identical workers because workers of the same productivity are paid differently across firms, and because workers differ in their productivity ex post. Endogenous training breaks the perfect correlation between work experience and human capital, which yields new insights on wage dispersion and wage dynamics.     

North–South technology transfer in unionised multinationals

We study how incentives for North–South technology transfers in multinational enterprises are affected by labour market institutions. If workers are collectively organised, incentives for technology transfers are partly governed by firms' desire to curb trade union power. Higher union bargaining power in the North leads to more technology transfer along two different dimensions – skill upgrading of Southern workers and quality upgrading of products produced in the South – possibly to the extent that the utility of Northern workers decline. Policies to raise the wage levels of Southern workers might spur technology transfer if wages are initially very low, but have a dampening effect on North–South technology transfer once the Southern wage level has surpassed a certain threshold level. These conclusions are reached in a setting where a unionised multinational multiproduct firm produces vertically differentiated products in Northern and Southern subsidiaries.     

The heterogeneity of beauty premium in China: Evidence from CFPS

Using a nationwide representative sample of the Chinese population, we examine the effect of physical appearance on the hourly wage. Our theoretical framework that connects physical appearance and the hourly wage has two predictions. First, the beauty premium is larger for high-skilled workers than for low-skilled workers. Second, this statistical-based discrimination arises from the hiring manager’s belief that beauty contributes to productivity through non-cognitive skills. Empirical results confirm both predictions. Good-looking individuals earn roughly 5.4% more than the rest, and bad-looking individuals earn roughly 3.3% less than the rest. Moreover, quantile estimates show that the effect of physical appearance at the 0.75 quantile is more than twice as the one at the 0.25 quantile. Finally, social skills, communication skills, and self-confidence are three transmission channels through which physical appearance can positively affect one’s hourly wage in our sample. Our findings imply that the beauty premium is widespread in the labor market and relevant anti-discrimination regulations are needed.     

The diffusion of computers and the distribution of wages

When the costs are decreasing workers adopt technology at the point where the costs equal the increased productivity. Output per worker increases immediately, while productivity benefits increase only gradually if costs continue to fall. As a result, workers in computer-adopting labor market groups experience an immediate fall in wages due to increased supply. On the other hand, adopting workers experience wage increases with some delay. This model explains why increased computer use does not immediately lead to higher wage inequality. More specifically, the results of the model are shown to be consistent with the question why within-group wage inequality among skilled workers as a result of computer technology adoption in the United States increased in the 1970s, while between-group wage inequality and within-group wage inequality among the unskilled did not start to increase until the 1980s. The model also predicts that the more compressed German wage structure leads to a lagged diffusion of computer technology along with smaller changes in wage inequality. Our empirical analysis suggests that this is consistent with the actual developments in Germany since the 1980s. Finally, the theoretical predictions seem to be of the right magnitude to explain the empirical quantities observed in the data.     

Unobserved Individual and Firm Heterogeneity in Wage and Job‐Duration Functions: Evidence from German Linked Employer–Employee Data

Abstract. We analyse the correlations between individual and firm fixed effects, and wage and job‐duration functions. Our results for large firms suggest that low‐wage firms tend to be stable firms, suggesting that lower wages can buy job stability. Furthermore, high‐wage workers sort into the stable low‐wage firms. Our interpretation is that high‐wage workers have a higher wage to insure against job loss and can afford more easily to forgo wages in favour of job stability. This may provide an explanation of the puzzle identified in previous literature that high‐wage workers are matched to low‐wage firms.     

Can Minimum Wages Close the Gender Wage Gap?

Using manufacturing plant‐level census data, this paper demonstrates that minimum wage increases in Indonesia reduced gender wage gaps among production workers, with heterogeneous impacts by level of education and position of the firm in the wage distribution. Paradoxically, educated women appear to have benefitted the most, particularly in the lower half of the firm average earnings distribution. By contrast, women who did not complete primary education did not benefit on average, and even lost ground in the upper end of the earnings distribution. Minimum wage increases were thus associated with exacerbated gender pay gaps among the least educated, and reduced gender gaps among the best educated production workers. Unconditional quantile regression analysis attests to wage compression and lighthouse effects. Changes in relative employment prospects were limited.     

The Age of Hiring and Deferred Compensation: Evidence from Australia

The factors affecting age of hiring are estimated using Australian establishment data. Lower ages of new hires are associated with training and with workplaces using steeper tenure–wage profiles. Lower ages of hires are associated with steeper profiles throughout the age of hire distribution, whereas lower ages of hires are associated with the provision of training only among younger hires. Moreover, the evidence confirms that larger employers are more likely to hire younger workers but that lower ages of hire continue to be associated with steeper tenure–wage profiles even among larger employers. The robust role of the tenure–wage profile suggests that it is too early to conclude, as some have, that specific training is the paramount reason for the reduced hiring prospects of the old.     

Wage bargaining and turnover costs with heterogenous labor and perfect history screening

We study effects of mobility costs in a model of (Nash) wage bargaining between workers and firms, with instantaneous matching, heterogeneous workers, identical firms and free firm entry, and where firms can screen workers perfectly according to their previous work history but not their actual productivity. We derive the employment level and the minimum worker quality standard, in the market solution, and in the efficient solution established by a social planner. When workers have positive bargaining power, there is always some inefficient unemployment among desired workers in the market solution. The lowest hiring standard chosen by firms is higher than the planner's standard when firing costs are high relative to hiring costs, but may be lower in the opposite case. We show that any higher established hiring standard corresponds to a market equilibrium. The model explains a tendency for a high initial unemployment rate to remain high, particularly for low-skilled workers.     

Globalization,welfare, and the attitudes toward higher education

In this paper we study how the attitudes toward higher education may affect labor market outcomes in the context of globalization. In particular, we show that different educational attitudes are responsible for differences in the wage differential among countries. Using a matching model with two types of workers and firms, we find that there is a trade-off between the wage differential and the workers’ welfare, namely, that an economy that is less willing to educate itself will display a lower wage differential but will lose in terms of welfare. Moreover, from a policy perspective, we show that the negative effects on welfare due to this disinclination to study can be offset by increased labor market flexibility. All things considered, policy makers ought to keep in mind that both a positive attitude toward higher education and labor market flexibility, can lead to improved overall performance in this increasingly globalized world.     

Search efficiency,wage dynamics and welfare

Advances in information technology have improved the job-search process in the labor market. We analyze the effects of this improvement by constructing a search-and-matching model with two sectors: a risky sector with firm-specific productivity shocks and a risk-free sector. The risky sector is characterized by a low level of commitment between employers and workers – either party can end the employment relationship. We show that a better job-search process generates more job matches in the risky sector, and this benefits workers by improving their outside options. The effect on employers is subtle: while it is easier to fill vacancies, workers become more expensive. At the same time, the ease of finding new workers makes it harder for employers to keep their wage promises to workers and increases wage volatility. Our paper contributes to the literature by offering a novel explanation for the observed rise in wage volatility.     

Assessing the Possible Antipoverty Effects of Recent Rises in Age‐Specific Minimum Wages in New Zealand

Real minimum wages increased by nearly 33 percent for adults and 123 percent for teenagers in New Zealand between 1999 and 2008. Where fewer than 2 percent of workers were being paid a minimum wage at the outset of this sample period, more than 8 percent of adult workers and 60 percent of teenage workers were receiving hourly earnings close to the minimum wage by the end of this period. These policy changes provide a unique opportunity to estimate the effects of the minimum wage on poverty. Although minimum wage workers are more likely to live in the poorest households, they are relatively widely dispersed throughout the income distribution. This is particularly true of teenage minimum wage workers. Furthermore, low‐income households often do not contain any working members. We estimate that a 10 percent increase in minimum wages, even without a loss in employment or hours of work, would lower the relative poverty rate by less than one‐tenth of a percentage point.