Minimum wage,on-the-job search and employment: On the sectoral and aggregate equilibrium effect of the mandatory minimum wage

We study the impact of a minimum wage in a segmented labor market in which workers are at different stages of their careers. At the end of a learning-by-doing period, workers paid the minimum wage quit “bad jobs” for better-paying “good jobs”, following an on-the-job search process with endogenous search intensity. A rise in the minimum wage reduces “bad jobs” creation and prompts workers to keep their “bad jobs” by reducing on-the-job search intensity. The ambiguous impact on unqualified employment replicates and explains the findings of several empirical studies. However, a minimum wage rise reduces overall employment and output.     

Return migration, human capital accumulation and the brain drain

In this paper we present a model that explains migrations as decisions that respond to where human capital can be acquired more efficiently, and where the return to human capital is highest. The basic framework is a dynamic Roy model in which a worker possesses two distinct skills that can be augmented by learning by doing. There are different implicit prices, in different countries and different rates of skill accumulation. Our analysis contributes to the literature on the selection of immigrants and return migrants by offering a richer framework that may help to accommodate selection of emigrants and return migrants that are not immediately compatible with the one-dimensional skill model. Our analysis also has implications for the debate on brain drain and brain gain. In the two skills model presented here, return migration can lead to a mitigation of the brain drain, or even the creation of a “brain gain”, where those who return bring the home country augmented local skills.     

The brain drain, ‘educated unemployment’, human capital formation,and economic betterment1

Extending both the ‘harmful brain drain’ literature and the ‘beneficial brain gain’ literature, this paper analyzes both the negative and the positive impact of migration by skilled individuals in a unified framework. The paper extends the received literature on the ‘harmful brain drain’ by showing that in the short run, international migration can result in ‘educated unemployment’ and overeducation in developing countries, as well as a brain drain from these countries. A simulation suggests that the costs of ‘educated unemployment’ and overeducation can amount to significant losses for the individuals concerned, who may constitute a substantial proportion of the educated individuals. Adopting a dynamic framework, it is then shown that due to the positive externality effect of the prevailing, economy‐wide endowment of human capital on the formation of human capital, a relaxation in migration policy in both the current period and the preceding period can facilitate ‘take‐off’ of a developing country in the current period. Thus, it is suggested that while the migration of some educated individuals may reduce the social welfare of those who stay behind in the short run, it improves it in the long run.     

Collusion and discrimination in organizations

In a principal-multi-agent setting we investigate how optimal contracts should be modified under relative performance evaluation when agents collude. Agents may write side-contracts, which are not contingent on their effort choices but indirectly control them through side-transfers. We show that the optimal collusion-proof contract is to introduce a “discriminatory policy” in the sense that the wage schemes offered to agents depend on their identities even if they are identical with respect to productive abilities. Such discriminatory wage schemes explain the organizational strategy of “divide and conquer” as an optimal response to collusion.     

Revisions to US labor market data and the public’s perception of the economy

Using the monthly “Employment Situation” reports for 1994–2013, this paper studies the revisions to US employment data. The paper shows that the first press release underestimates net job creation in expansions and overestimates it in downturns. The “errors” in reporting the data on the labor market can distort the public’s perception about the stance of the labor market and have some political consequences. This is well reflected by the finding that the job approval rating of President Obama, the index of consumer confidence, and the economic conditions index of Gallup have all been responding to the initial news on the US labor market as they were published in the Employment Situation reports.     

Oligopsony and the distribution of wages

We propose a simple model of wage dispersion arising from oligopsonistic competition in the labor market. Our model has workers who are equally able but who have heterogeneous preferences for non-wage characteristics, while employers have heterogeneous productivity characteristics. We completely and explicitly solve for the equilibrium wage distribution and show that “inside” and “outside” forces interact in wage determination. This interaction generates spillover effects of minimum wages in a manner which is consistent with the empirical evidence.     

Specifying “regime” — A framework for defining and describing regimes in transition research

It is more and more agreed by research and policy that a long-term sustainability of industrialized societies cannot be achieved without fundamental changes at the level of different societal subsystems, such as the agricultural, transportation or water management systems. This view has lead to an increase in the amount of research carried out about the so-called “transitions”. Transitions comprise long-term, fundamental change in societal subsystems and are seen as encompassing co-evolutionary and mutually reinforcing processes in the economic, technological, institutional and socio-cultural domains. Transition research aims at understanding transitions and at finding methods that facilitate change directed towards societal goals (so-called “transition management”).This paper adds to the growing body of concepts of this young research strand. It suggests a framework for defining and describing “regimes”, the systems resulting from the broad and interdisciplinary view taken by transition research. The concept “regime” is of central importance for transition research, since it defines the level of societal systems on which transitions are mainly analysed. What actually is “the regime” to be researched and possibly managed is however usually not given through clear system boundaries but is a matter of framing and deliberation. In order to guide processes of regime identification, the paper develops five defining characteristics of regimes and gives a definition based on them. Further a method useful to structure and graphically represent knowledge about a regime is introduced. Such a structuring of knowledge is an important first step to understand how a regime “works”.     

Impacts of hiring subsidies targeted at the long-term unemployed on the low-skilled labor market: The French experience

This paper proposes a theoretical matching framework to analyze firms' and workers' response to a targeted hiring subsidy program when taking into account interactions between segments of the low-skilled labor market. By developing a general equilibrium model, the paper provides a useful tool to evaluate the aggregate effects induced on the low-skilled labor market. Then, the model is computed above French data to estimate the employment and welfare effects of a measure introduced in France in 1995, the “Initiative-for-Employment Contract”. Finally, as the framework is well-suited to investigate design issues, I analyze the efficiency of the French program as well as targeting issues.     

Crime and punishment in the “American Dream”

We observe that countries where belief in the “American dream”(i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know that beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social insurance, etc). Our objective is to study the joint determination of these three features (beliefs, punitiveness and economic system) in a way that replicates the observed empirical patterns. We present a model where beliefs determine the types of contracts that firms offer and whether workers exert effort. Some workers become criminals, depending on their luck in the labor market, the expected punishment, and an individual shock that we call “meanness”. It is this meanness level that a penal system based on “retribution” tries to detect when deciding the severity of the punishment. We find that when initial beliefs differ, two equilibria can emerge out of identical fundamentals. In the “American” (as opposed to the “French”) equilibrium, belief in the “American dream” is commonplace, workers exert effort, there are high powered contracts (and income is unequally distributed) and punishments are harsh. Economists who believe that deterrence (rather than retribution) shapes punishment can interpret the meanness parameter as pessimism about future economic opportunities and verify that two similar equilibria emerge.     

Transfer fee regulations in European football

We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 (“pre-Bosman”), currently in use (“Bosman”), and recently approved (“Monti”) differ with respect to the transfer fee an initial club is entitled to depending on whether a player has a valid contract or not. We show that the different systems differ only with respect to the contract length if the contract which maximizes the expected joint surplus of the initial club and the player is feasible under each system. Otherwise, regime P is strictly dominated by regime B in terms of expected social welfare. Regime M leads to higher effort but lower incentives to invest in training compared to system B.     

Innovation management in organizations

This paper poses the question of how a firm should optimally choose both its organization and its compensation in the pursuit of innovation. One key result is that incentive pay arises as a robust instrument of innovation management both with and without delegation, although in the present model its primary purpose is not to elicit more effort for the creation of new ideas, but to ensure that new ideas are implemented if and only if this is efficient. While without delegation, the firm may “underinvest” in innovation, with delegation the opposite bias may arise as new ideas may be implemented too often (“overinvestment”). The optimal organizational choice trades off these two biases.     

The discount rate and the value of remaining years of life

We back out an estimate of a personal discount rate of between 3 and 4 percent for a person with a life expectancy of 74 years who dies at age 30 or 40 and has a value of statistical life of $6.3 million. We employ the Makeham “model” of life expectancy and Murphy-Topel “values of life years” in our calculations.     

The treatment effect, the cross difference, and the interaction term in nonlinear “difference-in-differences” models

In any nonlinear “difference-in-differences” model with strictly monotonic transformation function, the treatment effect is the cross difference of the observed outcome minus the cross difference of the potential non-treatment outcome, which equals the incremental effect of the interaction term coefficient.     

Public debt and financial development

We examine the role of public debt in financial development. The literature has highlighted its supportive role through providing collateral and benchmark. We contrast this “safe asset” view to a “lazy banks” view: developing banking sectors that lend mainly to the public sector may develop more slowly, because it could make banks profitable but inefficient. Results from country-level and bank-level regressions are more supportive of the “lazy banks” view, but the “safe asset” view seems to play a role at moderate levels of public debt held by banks. There is also evidence of a harmful interaction between public debt and financial repression.     

Measuring fossil resource inequality—A case study for the UK between 1968 and 2000

This paper quantifies fossil resource inequalities amongst income quintiles in the UK between 1968 and 2000. It calculates a resource-based Gini coefficient using an input-output based resource allocation model.The results show that the Gini coefficient for total fossil resource consumption grew by 24% over the time period. By comparison the Gini coefficient for overall household expenditure rose by only 13%. The increase in resource inequality was prompted by the rising demand by high income quintiles for goods and services such as: “fuel and light” (heating and lighting the home), “car use” (private transportation), “recreation”, “travel” and “other services”. The analysis shows further that the Gini coefficient for “direct” fossil resources (“fuel and light” and “car use”) was lower and rose less steeply than the Gini coefficient for fossil resources embodied in other goods and services (indirect fossil resource requirements).Investigation into the drivers behind direct and indirect resource inequalities suggests a number of policy conclusions. Firstly, it is clear that policy initiatives to reduce fossil resource requirements (and the associated climate change impacts) must pay careful attention to distributional differences. Additionally, increased attention needs to be paid to the inequalities associated with indirect fossil resources consumption as well as the more visible direct resource inequalities.     

A sticky floors model of promotion, pay, and gender

According to raw data from the British Household Panel Survey, full-time women are more likely than men to be promoted. Controlling for observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity, we find that women are promoted at roughly the same rate as men, but may receive smaller wage increases consequent upon promotion. To help explain these phenomena, we construct a new “sticky floors” model of pay and promotion. In our model, women are just as likely as men to be promoted but find themselves stuck at the bottom of the wage scale for the new grade.     

Informal self-employment and macroeconomic fluctuations

Informal self-employment is a major source of employment in developing countries. Its cyclical behavior is important to our understanding of the functioning of LDC labor markets, but turns out to be surprisingly complex. We develop a flexible model with two sectors: a formal salaried (tradable) sector that may be affected by wage rigidities, and an informal (non tradable) self-employment sector faced with liquidity constraints to entry. This labor market is then embedded in a standard small economy macro model. We show that different types of shocks interact with different institutional contexts to produce distinct patterns of comovement between key variables of the model: relative salaried/self-employed incomes, relative salaried/self-employed sector sizes and the real exchange rate. Model predictions are then tested empirically for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. We confirm episodes where the expansion of informal self-employment is consistent with the traditional segmentation views of informality. However, we also identify episodes where informal self-employment behaves “pro-cyclically”; here, informality is driven by relative demand or productivity shocks to the non tradable sector.     

Why the marriage squeeze cannot cause dowry inflation

An influential explanation for rising dowry payments is the “marriage squeeze”. The present paper shows this explanation to be internally inconsistent. The marriage squeeze argument for inflation relies on the fact that population growth leads to an excess supply of brides in the marriage market. This excess supply is resolved by some women postponing marriage, so that the average age of brides increases. In previous studies the argument is stated informally. Here, a matching model of marriage is developed to formally analyze the link between dowry payments and population growth. It is shown that a marriage squeeze cannot yield dowry inflation. In fact, when women who do not find matches at the ‘desirable’ marrying age re-enter the marriage market as older brides, a marriage squeeze is shown to imply dowry deflation. Population change is therefore not a promising explanation for the observed increases in dowry payments.     

Superstition and “lucky” apartments: Evidence from transaction-level data

Using a sample of apartment transactions during 2004–2006 in Chengdu, China, we investigate the impact of superstitions in the Chinese real estate market. Numerology forms an important component of Chinese superstitious lore, with the numbers 8 and 6 signifying good luck, and the number 4 bad luck. We find that secondhand apartments located on floors ending with “8” fetch, on average, a 235 RMB higher price (per square meter) than on other floors. For newly constructed apartments, this price premium disappears due to uniform pricing of new housing units, but apartments on floors ending in an “8” are sold, on average, 6.9 days faster than on other floors. Buyers who have a phone number containing more “8”’s are more likely to purchase apartments in a floor ending with “8”; this suggests that at least part of the price premium for “lucky” apartments arises from the buyers’ superstitious beliefs.     

Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of “petty corruption” by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic “tracks,” and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply, in sequence, to a “track” of two or more bureaucrats in a prescribed order for approval of their projects. Our first result establishes that in a one-shot situation no project ever gets approved. This result leads us to consider a repeated interaction setting. In that context we characterize in more detail the trigger-strategy equilibria that minimize the social loss due to the system of bribes, and those that maximize the expected total bribe income of the bureaucrats. The results are used to shed some light on two much advocated anti-corruption policies: the single window policy and rotation of bureaucrats.