Income distribution, efficiency and rationing

This paper studies the impacts of income distribution on the efficiency of trade mechanism and rationing of agents who are priced out of trade in a dynamic search model with two-sided asymmetric information. Buyers and sellers have asymmetric information about valuations and incomes respectively. In such a frictional environment, the effects of several variants of changes in income distribution on efficiency of trading mechanism and the population of rationed buyers and sellers are elaborated.     

Non-Walrasian equilibria and the law of one price

We present a market game which features multiple posts for each commodity. We use this framework to illustrate the idea that in non-Walrasian markets, where individual activities influence market clearing prices, there are equilibria where commodities are exchanged simultaneously in two posts at different prices, thus defying the ‘law of one price’. Such equilibria are compatible with an apparent arbitrage possibility, which dissipates whenever individuals try to take advantage of it.     

Production Efficiency and the Direct-Indirect Tax Mix

In the design of the optimal direct/indirect tax mix, the canonical view was laid by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) who showed that commodity taxes are unnecessary in an economy in which there is an optimal nonlinear income tax provided that commodities are separable from labor in the utility functions of all taxpayers, that the aggregators over these commodities are ordinally equivalent and that wages are fixed. When wages are endogenous, Naito (1999) showed that this result may not hold and in addition that production efficiency may not be Pareto optimal. Given an optimal nonlinear income tax, we show that production inefficiency is Pareto optimal if the aggregate technology set is strictly concave. The Atkinson–Stiglitz condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for zero commodity taxation and commodity taxes are part of almost all Pareto optima.     

A ‘technically level playing-field’ profit efficiency analysis of enforced competition between publicly funded institutions

The study demonstrates how recent advances in the data envelopment analysis (DEA) of profit efficiency, and in combining DEA and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to measure producer performance, can be used to obtain a ‘technically level playing-field’ profit efficiency performance measure. A three-stage analysis is used to provide an empirical investigation of public-sector universities facing regulatory pressures to attain both profit efficiency and output quality. Stage one employs directional distance function analysis to decompose DEA profit efficiency measures into technical and allocative components. As these performance measures incorporate the impacts of managerial inefficiency, the operating environment and luck (statistical noise), stage two applies SFA to total (radial and non-radial) slacks to obtain a degree of disentanglement from the latter two impacts. The stage-two results are used to define a common environment and common luck scenario, thus permitting university producers’ inputs to be adjusted so as to reflect operation within this more level playing-field scenario. Stage three recomputes the first-stage DEA for this scenario, to yield an (input-focused) ‘technically level playing-field’ measure of profit efficiency that unifies the regulatory financial audit and output-quality indicators in a single, best-practice-benchmarked, performance measure.     

Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility

This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model. We assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries, and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the ‘dirty’ good that is causing damage to the environment. The purpose is to compare the (globally optimal) second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium. We show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of: (i) transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments, (ii) interaction effects between environmental and other policies, and (iii) labor mobility.     

Optimal mixed taxation,credit constraints,and the timing of income tax reporting

We study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit‐constrained low‐income households. Workers receive an even flow of income during the tax year, but report their incomes and make tax payments (receive transfers) at the end of the year. They spend their disposable income on multiple commodities over the year. We show that differentiated subsidies on commodities can be optimal even if the Atkinson–Stiglitz Theorem conditions apply. When the optimal policy leaves low‐income households with binding credit constraints, it may be optimal to subsidize differentially the good that they consume in higher proportion. Uniform subsidies would also relax the credit constraint, but would be more costly to the government since they would equally benefit unconstrained households. Numerical examples suggest that commodity tax differentiation increases with basic needs and with the interest rate at which government borrows.     

Solidarity among the poor

We conduct a field experiment with low-income subjects in Dallas, Texas. We examine voluntary, informal risk sharing using a visual representation of the solidarity game developed for low-literacy populations. We find substantially more ‘fixed gift to loser’ behavior and less ‘egotistical’ behavior than in previous studies. Individuals who display ‘egotistical’ behavior are more risk tolerant. The amount of the conditional gifts is positively related to age, income, and connection to the community. However, trust and empathy, which are commonly discussed as drivers for solidarity, are not significantly related to the amount given.     

International credit and welfare: A paradoxical theorem and its policy implications

This paper considers a developing nation that faces a foreign exchange shortage and hence its demand for foreign goods is limited both by its income and its foreign exchange balance. Availability of international credit relaxes the second constraint. We develop a simple model of strategic interaction between lending institutions and firms, and show that the availability of international credit at concessionary rates can leave the borrowing nation worse off than if it had to borrow money at higher market rates. This ‘paradox of benevolence’ is then used to motivate a discussion of policies pertaining to international lending and the Southern government's method of rationing out foreign exchange to the importers.     

Public utility pricing and capacity choice under risk: A rational expectations approach

Over the last two decades there has developed an extensive literature on the theory of public enterprise pricing and capacity choice under uncertainty. A major concern has been the analysis of the rationing of consumers in states in which demand exceeds available system capacity. An issue that has been largely ignored however is the effect that consumers' probability of being rationed (system reliability) has on their demand for the service. In this paper we develop a model that reflects the intuitive notion that a more reliable service is a higher quality service, so that an increase in system reliability shifts consumers' demand curves outward. We then incorporate this effect into our analysis of the utility's optimal pricing and investment rules. Finally, we demonstrate how the value of reliability can, in principle, be estimated from generally available demand data.     

Externalities and optimal taxation

This paper reexamines the optimal tax design problem (income and commodities) in the presence of externalities. The nature of the second–best, and the choice of the tax instruments, are motivated by the informational structure in the economy. The main results are: (i) environmental levies (linear or nonlinear) differ in formula from Pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods; (ii) externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas (linear and nonlinear) for private goods; (iii) externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are linear; and (iv) a general income tax plus strictly Pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution (at any given consumption bundle).     

General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach

We analyze a class of ‘large group’ Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models by applying different concepts of functional separability to the same set of first-order conditions for utility maximization. We show that multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) functions yield ‘constant relative risk aversion’ (CRRA), and, therefore ‘constant elasticity of substitution’ (CES), functions, whereas additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions yield ‘constant absolute risk aversion’ (CARA) functions. We then show that the CARA specification sheds new light on: (i) pro-competitive effects, i.e., profit-maximizing prices are decreasing in the mass of competing firms; and (ii) a competitive limit, i.e., profit-maximizing prices converge to marginal costs when the mass of competing firms becomes arbitrarily large.     

Capital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable

This paper extends the Atkinson-Stiglitz model of direct and indirect taxation to a dynamic setting with two unobservable characteristics: productive ability and inherited wealth. Bequests are motivated by the ‘joy of giving’. A child’s inheritance is a random variable with a probability distribution that depends on his parent’s investment in a ‘bequest technology’. Public borrowing is assumed and implies the modified golden rule. We study the optimal tax policy when two instruments are available: a non-linear (wage) income tax and a proportional tax on capital income. We show that the second instrument ought, in general, to be used but that the tax rate is not necessarily positive. However, a positive tax rate is more likely when there is a positive correlation between inherited wealth and innate ability.     

Competition, human capital and income inequality with limited commitment

We develop a dynamic model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up and non-competitive covenants, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. When contracts are not enforceable, high barriers lower the outside value of ‘skilled workers’ and reduce the incentive to accumulate human capital. In contrast, low barriers can result in over-accumulation of human capital. This can be socially optimal if there are positive spillovers. A calibration exercise shows that this mechanism can account for a sizable portion of cross-country income inequality.     

The influence of black markets on a queue-rationed centrally planned economy

In centrally planned economies in which prices are fixed, and the rationing mechanism is waiting line queues, we show that an equilibrium of waiting times exists. We then introduce a “black market” in which individuals can trade commodities that they have acquired through the official economy. An equilibrium of black market prices and waiting times is shown to exist; further, the economy with a black market is “queue-efficient.”. However, the introduction of black markets is not necessarily a Pareto improvement over an economy without black markets (even when we allow winners to compensate losers).     

Over-savings and hyperbolic discounting

Hyperbolic discounting models are widely seen as implying that consumers do not save enough, in accordance with the observed low rates of savings of some households. This paper qualifies this view by showing that hyperbolic consumers may ‘oversave’ in the short run. The result extends to uncertainty on future income and does not depend on whether preferences are present-biased or future-biased. A generalized comparative statics analysis of self-control is introduced, and its relationship to the analysis of uncertainty on discount factors is emphasized.     

Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem

In this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non-trivial. It is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a ‘simple’ contract that the parties have written ex ante. This result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold-up problem to be solved, even if the parties’ valuations are private information.     

On the distributional effects of commodity taxation

A commodity tax system is inequality reducing if the after‐tax distribution of income Lorenz dominates the before‐tax distribution of income, regardless of initial conditions. This paper identifies necessary and sufficient conditions under which an ad valorem commodity tax system is inequality reducing, shedding light on the role of taxing luxury—as opposed to necessary—commodities in the equalization of after‐tax incomes.     

First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk

When bidders have different risk aversion levels, we determine in a first-price auction, the asymmetric equilibrium strategies. We analyze the impact of asymmetric risk aversion levels on bidders’ markups and on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency of the auction.     

Removed preferences

In formalizing a ‘veil of ignorance’ type procedure, this paper considers how an agent?s preferences over a set of alternatives change as he is placed at an increasing ‘distance’ from the consequences of his choices. A definition for such ‘removed preferences’ is presented and its properties studied. As an application, it is demonstrated that present biased agents are ‘essentially’ exponential when distanced from the present, and that rank-dependent expected utility agents are ‘essentially’ expected utility when distanced from risk.     

On Optimal Commodity Taxes When Consumption Is Time Consuming

This paper studies the problem of optimal taxation of commodities when consumption is a time‐consuming activity. This is done under two distinct preference separability assumptions: between goods and labor supply, and between goods and leisure. It argues that with the labor separability, the traditional uniform taxation results of optimal tax theory continue to hold. With leisure separability, on the other hand, consumption time is a major ingredient of optimal tax rates. However, the relationship between consumption time and optimal tax rates depends crucially on the representation of the economy. In representative consumer economies, time differences determine the pattern of optimal tax rates so that goods whose consumption take more time are subjected to higher tax rates. When individuals have different earning abilities, redistributive, incentive, and efficiency considerations also come into play resulting in a complex relationship. The paper derives formulas for optimal commodity taxes in this case on the basis of three different tax structures: linear commodity taxes in combination with linear and nonlinear income taxes, and nonlinear commodity taxes in combination with nonlinear income taxes.