Why is child labor illegal?

We present a theory of the emergence of laws restricting child labor or imposing mandatory education that is consistent with the fact that poor parents tend to oppose such laws. We find that if altruistic parents are unable to commit to educating their children, child-labor laws can increase the welfare of higher-income parents in an ex ante sense. On the basis of an empirical analysis of Latin-American household surveys, we demonstrate that per capita income in the country of residence has the predicted effect on child labor supply, even after controlling for other household characteristics.     

Social security, public education and the growth-inequality relationship

We study how the relationship between economic growth and inequality depends upon the levels of funding of two of the largest government programs, public education and social security. We do this in the context of an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous agents where the government collects a tax on labor income to finance these programs. We show that in our model an increase in government spending on social security reduces income inequality and can have a non-monotonic effect on growth. When the initial level of social security funding is low, as is the case in most poor economies, then its increase will enhance growth. When its funding level is high as is typical for developed countries, we show that its further increase can slow down growth while reducing income inequality. These results obtain regardless of whether the increase in social security funding is financed by a tax increase or by cutting the public education budget. We also find that the effects of increasing the level of public education expenditures or the overall size of the government budget (holding the budget composition fixed) are characterized by similar non-monotonic growth-inequality relationships.     

The political economy of public education

I study the relationship between income inequality and public spending in education in a voting model. Voters collectively choose the uniform quality level of public education, the amount of a public good, and the tax rate on labor income. Parents can decide to opt-out of the public education system by purchasing private education at the desired quality level, and children’s expected income is assumed to be increasing in the quality of education. I show that higher income inequality is associated with higher governmental spending in education if and only if the expected marginal returns to education are larger for the children of relatively low income parents. In turn, better public education tends to reduce future inequality. These results are consistent with most findings in the empirical literature about public investment in education. Lastly, I show that for other kind of publicly provided goods, such as health care, the relationship with income inequality exhibits an ambiguous or opposite sign.     

Job search and academic achievement

The paper develops a structural model for the labor market behavior of students entering the labor market. We explicitly model the trade-off between devoting effort to studying and to job search. Furthermore, we allow for on-the-job search. The model is estimated using a unique data set of individuals who completed undergraduate education in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2001. Our estimation results show that labor market returns of high grades are low. Wage increases between jobs are explained by labor market friction rather than returns of early work experience. Our results indicate that a 1 percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate increases wage offers on average by 3 percent, but that the amount of job search effort is not very sensitive to business cycle fluctuations. Policy simulations show that study effort and hence academic achievement are much more sensitive to financial incentives than job search effort and labor market outcomes.     

Nutritional efficiency wages and child labor

This paper formally analyzes the incidence of child labor by employing an overlapping-generations general-equilibrium model of a small open economy. An individual's ability determines whether or not he/she becomes a skilled worker. The supply side of the economy is composed of two sectors: a modern sector that produces a homogeneous good using skilled labor and physical capital; and an agrarian sector that produces a traditional good using unskilled adult labor, child labor, and land. An increase in foreign direct investment and improvements in education reduce the incidence of child labor. Emigration of skilled (unskilled) workers reduces (raises) the supply of child labor, while trade sanctions reduce the demand for child labor. Child wage subsidies have an ambiguous effect on the incidence of child labor while education subsidies are effective in reducing the incidence of child labor. Simulation analysis is used to investigate the welfare effects of the aforementioned policies.     

How do epidemics induce behavioral changes?

This paper develops a theory of optimal fertility behavior under mortality shocks. In an OLG model, young adults determine their optimal fertility, labor supply and life-cycle consumption with both exogenous child and adult mortality risks. We show that a rise in adult mortality exerts an ambiguous effect on both net and total fertility in a general equilibrium framework, while child mortality shocks unambiguously lead to a rise in total fertility, leaving net fertility unchanged. We complement our theory with an empirical analysis using a sample of 39 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the 1980–2004 period, examining the overall effects of the child and adult mortality channels on both total and net fertility. We find child mortality to exert a robust, positive impact on total fertility but no impact on net fertility, whereas a rise in adult mortality is found to negatively influence both total and net fertility. Given the particular demographic profile of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (killing essentially young, active adults), we then conclude in favor of an unambiguous negative effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on net fertility in SSA.     

Increasing returns and unsynchronized wage adjustment in sunspot models of the business cycle

A challenge to models of equilibrium indeterminacy based on increasing returns is that required increasing returns for generating indeterminacy can be implausibly large and rise quickly with the relative risk aversion in labor. We show that unsynchronized wage adjustment via a relative wage effect can both lower the required degree of increasing returns for indeterminacy to a plausible level and make it invariant to the relative risk aversion in labor. Consequently, indeterminacy and sunspot-driven fluctuations can emerge for plausible increasing returns regardless of the relative risk aversion in labor. Our model generates reasonable dynamics in terms of matching the business cycle, and sunspot shocks become more important with labor market friction.     

Measuring heterogeneity in the returns to education using an education reform

In this paper, we explore the impact of a mandatory education reform as well as pre-reform availability of schools above the mandatory level, on educational attainment and returns to education in Norway. We contribute to the existing literature by focusing on the heterogeneity of the impact of reforms. Our results indicate that increased compulsory education from seven to nine years increased the general level of education beyond the compulsory education. We also find that the effect of family background on educational attainment was weaker after the reform. The average treatment effect on returns to education is surprisingly high for education of intermediate duration. This means that increasing the general level of education potentially generates high returns in the form of wages. We also find that the effect of treatment on the treated on the returns to education is 1-4 percentage points higher than the average treatment effect.     

ON THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION*

This article studies the effects of child labor legislation on human capital accumulation and the distribution of wealth and welfare. We calibrate our model to U.S. data circa 1880 and find that the consequences of restricting child labor or providing tax‐financed education depend on the main source of individual household income. Households with significant financial assets unambiguously lose from government intervention, whereas high‐wage workers benefit most from a child labor ban, and low‐wage workers benefit most from free education. Introducing free education results in substantial welfare gains, whereas a child labor ban induces small welfare losses.     

Private versus social returns to human capital: Education and economic growth in India

This paper investigates whether differences between private and social returns to education of government sector employees can contribute to an explanation of the “micro–macro paradox” in the literature on education and growth. We hypothesize that in India educated people find privately rewarding jobs in a sector in which social returns are low, namely the government sector. This could help explain high returns to education at the micro level and small or negative coefficients on education growth in growth regressions at the macro level. The empirical results, which are consistent with this hypothesis, are based on an analysis of state-level data from India spanning 40 years.     

Cooperation in Stochastic OLG games

This paper builds on Cremer's (Quart. J. Econ. 101 (1986) 33) seminal analysis which shows that (almost) complete cooperation can be achieved as an equilibrium in a game played by overlapping generations of players if the institution in which players cooperate is infinitely lived.We analyze a similar model in which the costs of cooperation are subject to random shocks. Even if these random shocks are very small, the range of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained is decreased considerably in comparison to the deterministic case. Furthermore, we show how the efficient outcome can be approximated if the level of cooperation can be varied continuously and the cooperation technology has decreasing or constant returns to scale, while this is not possible in the case of increasing returns to scale.     

RELIGIONS,FERTILITY, AND GROWTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

We investigate the extent to which the pronatalism of religions impedes growth via the fertility/education channel. Using Southeast Asian censuses, we show empirically that being Catholic, Buddhist, or Muslim significantly raises fertility, especially for couples with intermediate to high education levels. With these estimates, we identify the parameters of a structural model. Catholicism is strongly pro‐child (increasing total spending on children), followed by Buddhism, whereas Islam is more pro‐birth (redirecting spending from quality to quantity). Pro‐child religions depress growth in its early stages by lowering savings and labor supply. In the later stages of growth, pro‐birth religions impede human capital accumulation.     

Reducing Start‐up Costs for New Firms: The Double Dividend on the Labor Market*

Starting a firm with expansive potential is an option for educated and high‐skilled workers. If there are labor market frictions, this additional option can be seen as reducing the chances of ending up in a low‐wage job and hence as increasing the incentives for education. In a matching model, we show that reducing the start‐up costs for new firms results in higher take‐up rates of education. It also gives rise—through a thick‐market externality—to higher rates of job creation for high‐skilled labor as well as average match productivity. We provide empirical evidence to support our argument.     

Temporary and permanent migrant selection: Theory and evidence of ability‐search cost dynamics

We integrate two workhorses of the labor literature, the Roy and search models, to illustrate the implications of migration duration—specifically, whether it is temporary or permanent—for patterns of selection. Consistent with our stylized model, we show that temporary migrants are intermediately selected on education, with weaker selection on cognitive ability. In contrast, permanent migration is associated with strong positive selection on both education and ability, as it involves finer employee–employer matching and offers greater returns to experience. Networks are also more valuable for permanent migration, where search costs are higher. Labor market frictions explain observed network–skill interactions.     

“The people want the fall of the regime”: Schooling,political protest,and the economy

We provide evidence that economic circumstances are a key intermediating variable for understanding the relationship between schooling and political protest. Using the World Values Survey, we find that individuals with higher levels of schooling, but whose income outcomes fall short of that predicted by their biographical characteristics, in turn display a greater propensity to engage in protest activities. We discuss a number of interpretations that are consistent with this finding, including the idea that economic conditions can affect how individuals trade off the use of their human capital between production and political activities. Our results could also reflect a link between education, “grievance”, and political protest, although we argue that this is unlikely to be the sole explanation. Separately, we show that the interaction between schooling and economic conditions matters too at the country level: Rising education levels coupled with macroeconomic weakness are associated with increased incumbent turnover, as well as subsequent pressures toward democratization.     

How many educated workers for your economy? European targets,optimal public spending,and labor market impact

This paper studies optimal taxation schemes for education in a search-matching model where the labor market is divided between a high-skill and a low-skill sector. Two public policy targets - maximizing the total employment level and optimizing the social surplus - are studied according to three different public taxation strategies. We calibrate our model using evidence from thirteen European countries, and compare our results with the target from the Europe 2020 Agenda for achievement in higher education. We show that, with current labor market characteristics, the target set by governments seems compatible with the social surplus maximization objective for some countries, while being too high for other countries. For all countries, maximizing employment would imply higher educational spending than that required for the social surplus to reach its maximum.     

Filial Obligations and Child Labor

The model presented here reproduces the empirical fact that poorer countries show a higher incidence of child labor and time‐intensive care of retired parents, whereas richer countries have negligible child labor and people indulge in money‐intensive care of the old. For that purpose, the effect of social norms of filial obligations on child labor and schooling decisions is analyzed. It is shown that norms of filial obligations are sustainable as an equilibrium in the intergenerational game. Widely discussed contracting problems à la Becker, which allegedly explain underinvestment in schooling by poor households, are thus solved. However, this alone does not induce the elimination of child labor. Technological parameters and relative returns to schooling also play a fundamental role.     

Education and earnings in urban West Africa

Using a series of comparable labor force surveys in urban West Africa, we estimate the private returns to education among representative samples of workers in seven economic capitals (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lome, Niamey and Ouagadougou). The data allow us to provide a unique cross-country comparison using rigorously the same variables and methodology for each country. We tackle the issues of endogenous sector allocation (public, formal private and informal sectors) and endogeneity of the education variable in the earnings functions. We find that the returns to schooling are most often enhanced once an endogenous education variable is accounted for. This effect holds particularly true in the informal sector. In most West African cities of our sample, the public sector gives more value to education, followed by the formal private sector and then the informal sector. We also shed light on convex returns to education in all the cities and sectors, including in informal activity. More generally, a major contribution of this paper is to provide evidence of significant effects of education on individual earnings in the informal sectors of the West African cities, even at high levels of schooling.     

Risk taking with additive and multiplicative background risks

We examine the effects of background risks on optimal portfolio choice. Examples of background risks include uncertain labor income, uncertainty about the terminal value of fixed assets such as housing and uncertainty about future tax liabilities. While some of these risks are additive and have been amply studied, others are multiplicative in nature and have received far less attention. The simultaneous effect of both additive and multiplicative risks has hitherto not received attention and can explain some paradoxical choice behavior. We rationalize such behavior and show how background risks might lead to seemingly U-shaped relative risk aversion for a representative investor.     

Coordination of mobile labor

We study coordination failures in many simultaneously occurring coordination problems. Players encounter one of the problems but have the outside option of migrating to one of the remaining ones. Drawing on the global games approach, we show that such a mobile game has a unique equilibrium that allows us to examine comparative statics. The endogeneity of the outside option value and of the migration activity leads to non-monotonicity of welfare with respect to mobility friction; high mobility may hurt players. We apply these “general equilibrium’’ findings to the problem of the labor market during industrialization as described by Matsuyama [Increasing returns, industrialization and indeterminacy of equilibrium, Quart. J. Econ. 106 (1991) 617-650].