房产税对房产市场影响的实证研究——上海模式和重庆模式的比较

文章首先运用HP滤波的方式分析了沪渝两地房产税对新房和二手房在价格和成交量上的影响,发现上海房地产市场对房产税的的征收反应更为理性,影响效果更好,但两地区新房和二手房市场的反映都存在差异;此外,利用房价对数模型,发现房产税都能有效的影响两地的房价,但由于影响两地房价的因素有很大的差异,效率并不一样,上海地区房产税每增加1%,房价将下降0.553%,重庆地区房产税每增加1%,房价将下降0.041%。因此国家需区别对待新房和二手房市场,并且因地制宜,推广不同的房产税模式。     

Transfer pricing under asymmetric information

This paper analyses optimal transfer prices in a firm organized in two divisions. The production costs of the divisions are their respective private information. The objective of headquarters is to determine the transfer pricing method that maximizes total profit less managers' compensation. Managers are interested in their current compensation and in the market evaluation of their experience. In this setting, the paper discusses why particular transfer pricing methods found in practice and literature may induce-inefficiencies, and it identifies conditions under which each method is preferable. Major results are: a market-based transfer price does not implement the first-best solution if there are benefits from internal trade; cost-based transfer,prices may achieve first-best, and they are preferable to negotiated transfer prices if communication is cost-less; dual transfer prices do not implement the first-best solution, as long as collusion cannot be discouraged.

‘There are two truisms in business. Transfer prices are wrong and charges for corporate overhead are too high.‘¹     

Anticipation,Tax Avoidance,and the Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand

Least‐squares estimates of the response of gasoline consumption to a change in the gasoline price are biased toward zero, given the endogeneity of gasoline prices. A seemingly natural solution to this problem is to instrument for gasoline prices using gasoline taxes, but this approach tends to yield implausibly large price elasticities. We demonstrate that anticipatory behavior provides an important explanation for this result. Gasoline buyers increase purchases before tax increases and delay purchases before tax decreases, rendering the tax instrument endogenous. Including suitable leads and lags in the regression restores the validity of the IV estimator, resulting in much lower elasticity estimates. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The investment decision of a Multinational Firm under uncertain quantity restrictions

In this paper we analyze the allocative investment decisions of a Multinational Firm (MNF) when it faces uncertain quantity restrictions such as a voluntary export restraint or a quota imposed by the host government. The model with uncertain quantity restrictions is analyzed further by introducing additional uncertainties such as a foreign tax rate, transfer prices, foreign exchange rates and foreign demand. The MNF invests more in the host country due to uncertain quantity restrictions. The risk averse MNF invests more in the host country despite its uncertain tax rate if the transfer price is less than the expected marginal revenue loss due to the uncertain quantity restriction. The uncertain transfer price leads the MNF to invest more in the foreign country if the tax rates are dissimilar between the two countries. Foreign demand uncertainty and foreign exchange rates uncertainty have the same effects on capital allocation between the host country and home country. In particular, we derive the condition under which the direction of investment is unambiguous.     

浅析房产税实施存在的问题及发展建议

目前我国楼市价格一路猛涨,为了有效抑制继续上升的房价,我国政府在上海、重庆率先实施房产税试点办法。本文针对2011年年初上海、重庆两地对个人住房征收房产税试点的暂行办法进行分析对比,提出我国房产税实施存在的问题,并进一步提出合理的解决办法。     

Transfer prices and incentive contracts in vertically-integrated divisionalized companies

This paper studies a divisionalized firm with sequential transfers in which central management wants to motivate two division managers who receive predecision information. Central management can only contract on the observables price, cost and quantity. Starting with the optimal compensation schemes as a benchmark, the paper considers the question whether using transfer prices to substitute for price and cost, respectively, can replicate the optimal solution or not. This is to say, whether using an aggregate measure comes at a loss. The results are dependent on the design constraints (i) single or ‘dual’ transfer prices and (ii) simultaneous design of the reward functions or exogenously given reward functions. Basically, only in the case that central management is restricted to given reward functions, and wants to use the same single transfer price for both divisions, there is a loss relative to the benchmark solution. In the other cases, generally, there is enough latitude to design the available functions to mimic the benchmark. The paper goes on to discuss special cases. First, it finds conditions when purely cost-based transfer prices are optimal, and second, it derives explicit solutions for given linear compensation schemes over divisional book profits.     

Transfer Prices: A Financial Perspective

The arguments for and against transfer pricing schemes so far have focused on profit‐seeking approaches based on tax differentials, or on evasion of government enforced goods and fund flow restrictions. This article shifts to a value‐seeking framework where transfer prices act as strategic tools that may enhance value for the multinational with a foreign affiliate by exploiting financial and/or tax arbitrage that also lead to ownership arbitrage. The results show that there is an optimal level of transfer price depending on the specific exchange rate distribution when the cost structure allows for a penalty for overcharging. Moreover, this article introduces a new form of tax arbitrage benefit of transfer prices that is based on present value of tax shields.     

Some Comments on Tax Competition and Its Potential Effects on Tax Rates and Revenues

Corporate taxation is seen as the price of investing in a country, that is, the price either for the right to do business within the jurisdiction or for the supply of public goods. If consumption of that right or those public goods is mobile between jurisdictions and price competition ensues which will force prices together. Also, in the case of high tax regimes, a fall in the tax burden would be anticipated. In other words, countries will spontaneously harmonize their tax systems or face the loss of intemational investment and the disadvantages they bring.     

Intermediated surge pricing

Although Uber and Lyft are known for their flexible “surge pricing,” they are surprisingly rigid in another way: each firm takes a constant percentage of passenger fare whether or not there is a surge. In this paper, I investigate the possible reasons for, and the impact of, this rigidity. I study a market in which a profit‐maximizing intermediary facilitates trade between buyers and sellers. The intermediary sets prices for buyers and sellers, and keeps the difference as her fee. Optimal prices increase when demand increases, that is, shifts right. If a demand increase is due to an increase in the number of ex ante symmetric buyers, then the intermediary's optimal percent fee decreases. If, instead, a demand increase is due to a reduction in the elasticity of demand, then the intermediary's optimal percent fee increases. In either case, if the intermediary keeps a constant percent fee regardless of shifts in demand, as is the case with Uber and Lyft, then surge pricing (i.e., the ratio of price during high demand to price during low demand) is amplified on one side of the market and diminished on the other side.     

Optimal speculative trade among large traders

A collection of large traders holds heterogeneous prior beliefs regarding market fundamentals. This gives them a motive to engage in speculative trade with respect to market prices. Rather than assuming a particular institution or market for speculative trade, we take a mechanism-design approach by attempting to characterize the mechanism that maximizes the traders’ gains from speculative trade, subject to the incentive constraints that result from the traders’ ability to manipulate market prices. Within a stylized market model, we show that this mechanism affects price volatility without destroying ex-post efficient allocations. We also characterize the implementability of optimal speculative trade when the traders’ prior beliefs are private information. Financial support from the US-Israel Binational Science Foundation, Grant No. 2002298 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Strategic Incentives for Keeping One Set of Books in International Transfer Pricing

We study the equilibrium accounting and transfer pricing policies in a multinational duopoly with price competition in the final product market. We find that the firms in a duopoly can benefit from strategically using the same transfer price for tax and managerial purposes instead of using separate transfer prices for both objectives. According to our results, the practice of one set of books should be the prevalent accounting method in markets with a small number of competitors and similar products.     

Een prijsindex van nieuwe personenauto's, 1950–1965*

Summary In constructing a price index of new motorcars the main problem is how to deal with the introduction of new models and with quality variation generally. The first difficulty is turned by compiling year-to-year indices based on models that each account for 2 per cent or more of total sales in either year. The shifting basis of these indices comprises from 7 to 15 models which together account for 45 to 70 per cent of total registrations. All models are subject to minor improvements; this quality variation is taken into account by representing increases in horse power and overall length by equivalent price reductions. The elasticity coefficients involved in this translation are derived from a cross section analysis of prices and technical characteristics of some fifty widely ranging models in 1964. A price index for the period from 1950 to 1965 is then obtained by linking successive year-to-year indices. Over the whole period list prices have risen by a third, to a large extent as the result of changes in purchase tax; this price rise is just about offset by imporvements in quality of some 2 per cent per annum.     

政府基金政策下电器电子产品再制造闭环供应链决策

为分析我国现有废弃电器电子产品回收处理相关政策对其闭环供应链决策的影响,分别构建有政府基金政策、无政府基金政策两种情况下废弃电器电子产品回收再制造闭环供应链决策模型,探讨政府基金政策设置的环境税和回收处理补贴力度对闭环供应链各成员最优决策和利润的影响。结果表明:政府征收环境税越高,新产品批发价格和零售价格越高,市场需求量越低。政府补贴力度越大,废弃电器电子产品回收价格越高,回收量越高。     

Price Dispersion and Consumer Reservation Prices

We describe firm pricing when consumers follow simple reservation price rules. In stark contrast to other models in the literature, this approach yields price dispersion in pure strategies even when firms have the same marginal costs. At the equilibrium, lower price firms earn higher profits. The range of price dispersion increases with the number of firms: the highest price is the monopoly price, while the lowest price tends to marginal cost. The average transaction price remains substantially above marginal cost even with many firms. The equilibrium pricing pattern is the same when prices are chosen sequentially.     

Do option-like incentives induce overvaluation? Evidence from experimental asset markets

One potential reason for bubbles evolving prior to the financial crisis was excessive risk taking stemming from option-like incentive schemes in financial institutions. By running laboratory asset markets, we investigate the impact of option-like incentives on price formation and trading behavior. The main results are that (i) we observe significantly higher market prices with option-like incentives than linear incentives. (ii) We further find that option-like incentives provoke subjects to behave differently and to take more risk than subjects with linear incentives. (iii) We finally show that trading at inflated prices is rational for subjects with option-like incentives since it increases their expected payout.     

House prices and consumer welfare

We develop a new approach to measuring changes in consumer welfare due to changes in the price of owner-occupied housing. In our approach, an agent's welfare adjustment is defined as the transfer required to keep expected discounted utility constant given a change in current house prices. We demonstrate that, up to a first-order approximation, there is no aggregate change in welfare due to price increases in the existing housing stock. This follows from a simple market clearing condition where capital gains experienced by sellers are exactly offset by welfare losses to buyers. We show that this result holds (approximately) even in a model that accounts for changes in consumption and investment plans prompted by current house price changes. There can, however, be changes in welfare due to additions to the stock of housing, or to changes in the price of renovating and upgrading the existing stock of housing. For the United States, we estimate the welfare cost of house price appreciation to be an average of $127 per household per year over the 1984–1998 period.     

UK INFLATION: DOWN BUT NOT OUT

The release of the December retail prices index showed a rise in both the headline and the underling rate of inflation. That was not altogether unexpected with higher fuel and tobacco duties feeding through from the Budget. But it provides a reminder that inflation can go up as well as down. Looking ahead, inflation can go up as well as down. Looking ahead, inflation will be subject to conflicting pressures over the remainder of this year. Worldwide, inflationary pressures are weak. But, on the domestic scene, a Mortgage rate cuts which have helped to bring down the headline rate of retail price inflation will be less helpful. Indirect tax increases will push up the RPI directly. And employees may look for some compensation for direct tax increases in the next pay round. This assessment looks at the likely impact of these forces on inflation and the future course of interest rates.     

Upstream conduct and price authority with competing organizations

We characterize the degree of price authority that competing upstream principals award their downstream agents in a setting where these agents own private information about demand and incur nonverifiable distribution costs. Principals cannot internalize these costs through monetary incentives and design “permission sets” from which agents choose prices. The objective is to understand the forces shaping delegation and the constraints imposed on equilibrium prices. When principals behave noncooperatively, agents are biased toward excessively high prices because they pass on distribution costs to consumers. Hence, the permission set only features a price cap that is more likely to bind as products become closer substitutes, in sectors where distribution is sufficiently costly, and when demand is not too volatile. By contrast, when principals behave cooperatively, the optimal delegation scheme is richer and more complex. Because principals want to charge the monopoly price, the optimal permission set features a price floor when the distribution cost is sufficiently low, it features instead full discretion for moderate values of this cost, and only when it is high enough, a price cap is optimal. Surprisingly, while competition (as captured by stronger product substitutability) hinders delegation in the noncooperative regime, the opposite occurs when principals maximize industry profit.     

A scenario-based integrated approach for modeling carbon price risk

Carbon prices are highly dependent on government emission policies and local industrial compositions. When historical data does not exist or limited price data can only be sourced from another country, scenario analysis becomes the only tool for the modelling of future carbon prices. However, various plausible but equally possible scenarios can produce large variations in forecast carbon prices. In a traditional approach of scenario analysis, investment decisions or risk management strategies are proposed and analysed for each given scenario, optimal solutions are determined. However, when the number of scenarios becomes large, it often becomes too complex and intractable to have a clear view on the selection of investment decisions or risk-management strategies because these decisions and strategies are closely linked with each of the many scenarios. In this paper, it is proposed to use a stochastic mean-reversion model to represent future carbon price movements, but this model is calibrated to the forecast carbon prices of all the scenarios. In this approach, a single model is used to capture the underlying uncertainty and expectation of the stochastic carbon prices as projected by all the scenarios, carbon price risk can thus be modeled and analysed without the need for direct references to any specific scenarios. The modelling and management of long-term carbon-price risk are therefore purely dependent on future carbon price levels and volatilities of these scenarios, instead of on the scenarios themselves. Through such an approach, the optimization of investment decisions and risk management solutions can be much simpler because the forecasted carbon prices are the only input data.      

利用税收政策调控房地产市场的对策思考

近年来,我国房地产业飞速发展,房价节节攀升,国家不断出台宏观政策来调控抑制房价,虽然取得一定成效,但仍然存在很多问题。加大税收杠杆的调节力度,通过税收政策的改革和创新来引导我国住房的理性消费势在必行。本文从税收角度分析了房价上涨的原因,对现行的税收政策提出了改革建议,以期稳定房价,促进房地产业的健康发展。