CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY AND LINKAGE BETWEEN CHINESE OFFICIAL AND SWAP MARKET EXCHANGE RATES

This article investigates the impact of currency convertibility under the current account on the informational linkage between official and swap market exchange rates for Chinese currency (renminbi). Findings indicate that currency convertibility increased the informational connection between the government's official exchange rate and the swap market exchange rate, exclusively traded by foreign investors, and thus improved the information content of renminbi exchange rates. Moreover, the results also suggest that more complete currency convertibility was needed for more informed renminbi exchange rates.     

RENMINBISING CHINA'S FOREIGN ASSETS

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China has rolled out a number of initiatives to actively promote the international role of the renminbi and to denominate more of its international claims away from the US dollar and into the renminbi. The present paper discusses the factors shaping the prospects of internationalising the renminbi from the perspective of the currency composition of China's international assets and liabilities. These factors include, among others, underlying valuation and management of the renminbi.     

后危机时期国际金融格局的变动及其对美国经济的影响

2008年金融危机给世界经济带来了重大的影响,国际金融格局也发生了显著变化。本文主要分析了国际汇率体系、国际收支和国际储备体系、国别经济政策与国际间经济政策协调的变化。在后危机时期,美国经济也受国际金融格局变化的影响,包括美元中心地位的问题、“中心一外围”模式可持续性的问题和美国的国际经济领导权问题。本文得出的主要结论是：国际几种主要货币汇率波动增大,国际汇率体系弹性增大,国际收支总体失衡程度下降,美元为主的国际储备体系呈多元化趋势,先进经济体与新兴发展经济体的经济协调在加强,美元的霸权地位面临挑战,美国在国际分工中的中心地位在下降,美国在国际经济的主导地位也在逐渐下降,新兴经济体获得更多的话语权。     

Sudden Stops and Currency Crashes

This paper investigates which factors determine whether sudden stops in international capital flows are followed by a currency crash using data for 85 economies in the period 1980–2012. An event study approach is used for an 11‐year window around the crises for nine potential explanatory variables. In addition, the paper estimates discrete‐choice panel models. The results suggest that low trade openness, shallow financial markets, and current account imbalances increase the likelihood that a sudden stop will be followed by a currency crash. Moreover, it is established that the impact of these factors differs across different exchange rate regimes.     

Bi‐currency versus Single‐currency Targeting: Lessons from the Russian Experience

This paper examines how the 2005 shift in Russian exchange rate policy from US dollar (USD) single‐currency to USD–EUR (euro) bi‐currency targeting has impacted domestic interest rates. The finding show that this policy shift has disconnected Russian interest rates from US dollar‐denominated interest rates, while instead linking them to a synthetic interest rate composed of USD and EUR rates at the same proportion as that of these two currencies in the currency basket against which the ruble's exchange rate is set. The Russian experience shows that while the adoption of bi‐currency targeting may help ensure that domestic interest rates are less dependent on the monetary cycle of a single country, these rates are instead likely to reflect financial developments in all countries whose currencies are included in the currency basket. This insight is likely to be relevant for other countries that pursue basket‐targeting policies.     

Capital Inflows,Exchange Rate Flexibility and Credit Booms

Historically, capital flow bonanzas have often fueled sharp credit expansions in advanced and emerging market economies alike. Focusing primarily on emerging markets, this paper analyzes the impact of exchange rate flexibility on credit markets during periods of large capital inflows. It is shown that bank credit is larger and its composition tilts to foreign currency in economies with less flexible exchange rate regimes, and that these results are not explained entirely by the fact that the latter attract more capital inflows than economies with more flexible regimes. The findings thus suggest countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes may stand to benefit the most from regulatory policies that reduce banks' incentives to tap external markets and to lend/borrow in foreign currency; these policies include marginal reserve requirements on foreign lending, currency‐dependent liquidity requirements and higher capital requirement and/or dynamic provisioning on foreign exchange loans.     

OPTIMAL EXPORT AND HEDGING DECISIONS WHEN FORWARD MARKETS ARE INCOMPLETE

This paper examines the behaviour of the competitive firm that exports to two foreign countries under multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. There is a forward market between the home currency and one foreign country's currency, but there are no hedging instruments directly related to the other foreign country's currency. We show that the separation theorem holds when the firm optimally exports to the foreign country with the currency forward market. The full‐hedging theorem holds either when the firm exports exclusively to the foreign country with the currency forward market or when the relevant spot exchange rates are independent. In the case that the relevant spot exchange rates are positively (negatively) correlated in the sense of regression dependence, the firm optimally opts for a short (long) forward position for cross‐hedging purposes.     

China as Number One: How about the Renminbi?

Using simulations projecting Chinese economic growth into the future, this paper first examines when China will overtake the USA to become the largest economy. Demographic changes that affect economic growth are taken into consideration in these projections. China is expected to become number one sometime in the mid-2020s, unless its growth rate of gross domestic product per worker declines dramatically, à la the lost decade of Japan. Next, the paper examines whether China becoming the number one economy will mean its currency, the renminbi (RMB), will become the international key currency. According to the basket currency regressions during the period that Chinese currency was gradually appreciating against the US dollar from July 2005 to August 2008, it is shown that the RMB has already acquired a strong influence on the Asian currencies. This shows that the RMB is fast gaining the status of a regional anchor currency for a possible regional joint float. As the Chinese government proceeds with internationalization of its currency, the RMB is expected to gain in the ranking of other aspects of international currency, such as the store of value and the medium of exchange.     

Optimum currency areas and the European experience

Across nations or regions, the debate on optimum exchange rate cum monetary policies is not yet resolved on three levels. First is the optimum domain of fixed exchange rates versus keeping them flexible. Second is the subordinate debate on whether one needs full monetary union (as in continental Europe) to secure an optimum currency area's internal domain; or, whether virtually fixed exchange rates — where national currencies remain in circulation — can be sufficient. Third is whether a regional grouping of economies with close trade ties (as in East Asia) gain by collectively pegging to an outside currency such as the US dollar. Using an axiomatic approach, which limits the set of cross‐country financial claims to what is feasible, I analyse how best to both share and reduce macroeconomic risks on these three levels. JEL classification: F31, F36.     

流动性过剩影响因素的实证分析

通过货币的供求对比测度出流动性过剩,采用主成分分析方法研究了流动性过剩的影响因素。实证结果表明,货币存量的持续高位、经济增长、持续低利率与人民币升值、物价指数的高涨、外汇储备和净出口增加导致流动性过剩,资产价格与流动性过剩之间存在反向关系,各因素之间存在着交互影响。实证结果与理论分析结论高度吻合。     

Exchange‐rate Effects on China's Trade*

Though China's share of world trade exceeds that of Japan, little is known about the response of China's trade to changes in exchange rates. The few estimates available have two limitations. First, the data for trade prices are based on proxies for prices from other countries. Secondly, the estimation sample includes the period of China's transformation from a centrally‐planned economy to a more market‐oriented one. We address these limitations with an empirical model explaining the shares of China's exports and imports in world trade in terms of the real effective value of the renminbi. The specifications control for foreign direct investment and for the role of imports of parts to assemble exports. Parameter estimation uses disaggregated monthly trade data and excludes China's decentralization period. We find that a 10 percent real appreciation of the renminbi lowers the share of aggregate Chinese exports by nearly one percentage point. However, the estimated response of imports is negligible and lacks precision.     

The new exchange rate policy in the Asian emerging economies – goodbye trouble,hello comfort?

In this paper, we discuss new aspects of exchange rate policy that can be observed in the Asian emerging economies. In the first place, we show the alternative regimes they may choose and their respective pros and cons. Secondly, we concentrate on the recent strategy of systematic undervaluation of one's currency – figuring prominently among ‘big’ Asian players such as China and India – and the most likely implications of such a strategy for domestic allocation, distribution and stabilization goals. With the background of Germany's experiences in 1969, almost on the eve of the Bretton Woods' system collapse, we model a speculative attack on an undervalued currency in the vein of the Flood–Garber seminal paper from 1984. Now, however, the country in concern (just like India and China) possesses strong rather than weak fundamentals. The continuous accumulation of international reserves, in addition, leads to the question of an ‘optimal management’ of foreign exchange reserves in Asian emerging economies with regard to size and composition. We finally propose a sequence of reforms/policies that should be implemented in those Asian emerging economies on their still long journey to a regime featured by autonomous monetary policy, flexible exchange rate and capital mobility. A brief summary and an outlook for future research close the paper.     

The illusive quest: Do international capital controls contribute to currency stability?

We investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in insulating economies from currency crises, focusing in particular on both direct and indirect effects of capital controls and how these relationships may have changed over time in response to global financial liberalization and the greater mobility of international capital. We predict the likelihood of currency crises using standard macroeconomic variables and a probit equation estimation methodology with random effects. We employ a comprehensive panel data set comprised of 69 emerging market and developing economies over 1975–2004. Both standard and duration-adjusted measures of capital control intensity (allowing controls to “depreciate” over time) suggest that capital controls have not effectively insulated economies from currency crises at any time during our sample period. Maintaining real GDP growth and limiting real overvaluation are critical factors preventing currency crises, not capital controls. However, the presence of capital controls greatly increases the sensitivity of currency crises to changes in real GDP growth and real exchange rate overvaluation, making countries more vulnerable to changes in fundamentals. Our model suggests that emerging markets weathered the 2007–2008 crisis relatively well because of strong output growth and exchange rate flexibility that limited overvaluation of their currencies.     

Assessing Recent Determinants of Borrowing Costs in Sub‐Saharan Africa

This study explores macroeconomic implications of the sovereign bond rush that has been taking place in sub‐Saharan Africa since 2006. The focus is on the sub‐Saharan sovereign bond yields as proxies for the region's ability to raise new funds on international markets. Despite the subcontinent's tour‐de‐force entrance to the international bond market, this paper reveals that recent (since early 2000s) borrowing in foreign currency is not without macroeconomic risk. Empirically this paper finds that sovereign bond yields are significantly influenced by global volatility, commodity prices and global liquidity—all factors that are out of the control of the sub‐Saharan economies in question. These findings suggest that portfolio repositioning by institutional investors prompted by improved growth prospects and implicit monetary policy tightening in the advanced economies or heightened risk perceptions, are likely to result in increased borrowing costs for the sub‐Saharan bond issuers and affect their ability to raise funds in international markets. Furthermore, a change in borrowing costs might lead to higher debt‐service costs and policy uncertainty, which in turn could lead to suboptimal investment levels and, ultimately, hinder economic development.     

CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION, U.S. MONEY DEMAND, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE

A number of writers have argued in recent years that massive international currency substitution has been a major cause of exchange rate volatility and monetary instability in the United States and other major countries. Such analysis is frequently coupled with recommendations for a return to pegged exchange rates. This paper critically examines the evidence presented for this currency substitution view. It argues that the weight of latest research suggests that direct international currency substitution has not been of major quantitative importance for the U.S. However, empirical evidence supports traditional views that international capital mobility can generate substantial short-run monetary interdependence even under flexible exchange rates. Thus, even though international currency substitution is of little importance to U.S. monetary conditions, a broader range of international considerations may be of considerable importance for the U.S. economy.     

CROSS‐HEDGING OF EXCHANGE RATE RISKS: A NOTE*

This note studies the optimal production and hedging decisions of a competitive international firm that exports to two foreign countries. The firm faces multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. Cross‐hedging is plausible in that one of the two foreign countries has a currency forward market. We show that the firm's optimal forward position is an over‐hedge, a full‐hedge or an under‐hedge, depending on whether the two random exchange rates are strongly positively correlated, uncorrelated or negatively correlated, respectively.     

Currency Regime and Monetary Autonomy. Empirical Evidence Using Recent and Global Data from 1990 to 2007

This paper analyzes the exchange rate regimes from the perspective of monetary independence. To be specific, using recent and global data, we examine the sensitivity of domestic interest rates to the international interest rate, by conducting co-integration tests and by estimating the adjustment speeds through error-correction model, for different de facto currency regimes and for different types of capital markets. Our estimation results basically support the traditional views of ‘impossible trinity’, as far as the cases with open capital markets are concerned. The floating regime shows the less sensitivity of domestic interest rates to the international interest rate than the fixed regime does, which implies some capacity for domestic monetary autonomy under the floating regime. The cases with closed capital markets, on the other hand, include the cases showing high sensitivity of interest rates in some emerging market economies, which might imply the ‘fear of floating’ hypothesis.     

Exchange Rate Regimes and Currency Crises: an Evaluation using Extreme Value Theory*

We test whether the exchange regime in place has an impact on the vulnerability of countries to currency crises. Our paper is distinguishable from others (i) in its use of extreme value theory to identify currency crisis periods and (ii) in using two separate designations for the exchange regime in place. The first is the self‐reported or announced exchange rate system. The second classification scheme, by Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger, is based on the relative movements of international reserves and exchange rates. The Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger procedure is intended to reveal the actual as distinct from the “legal” exchange arrangement. We find, interestingly, that the announced exchange regime has an impact on the likelihood of currency crises, while the “true” or observed regime does not. Announced pegged exchange regimes increase the risk of currency crisis even if, in reality, the exchange rate system in place is not pegged.     

The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin

Before the crisis of 1997/98, the East Asian economies—except for Japan but including China—pegged their currencies to the US dollar. To avoid further turmoil, the IMF argues that these currencies should float more freely. However, the authors’ econometric estimations show that the dollar's predominant weight in East Asian currency baskets has returned to its pre‐crisis levels. By 2002, the day‐to‐day volatility of each country's exchange rate against the dollar had again become negligible. Most governments were rapidly accumulating a “war chest” of official dollar reserves, which portends that this exchange rate stabilization will come to extend over months or quarters. From the doctrine of “original sin” applied to emerging‐market economies, the authors argue that this fear of floating is entirely rational from the perspective of each individual country. And their joint pegging to the dollar benefits the East Asian dollar bloc as a whole, although Japan remains an important outlier.     

The International Politics of Reactive Currency Statecraft: Japan’s Reaction to the Rise of the Chinese Renminbi

This study analyses how a state’s reactive currency statecraft – its strategic reaction to an international currency issued by a foreign state – is shaped, by devoting special attention to its broad foreign policy stance towards the state issuing that international currency, with a main empirical focus on the Japanese case with regard to the Chinese renminbi. This research argues that a state uses its policy related to a foreign international currency as a diplomatic means of managing its political relationship with the state issuing that currency, while also showing that in general most market actors are not greatly interested in their governments’ policies regarding foreign international currencies, especially those that are newly internationalising ones. This study finds as well that the conventional notion of ‘competition’ between international currencies does not necessarily affect a state’s reactive currency statecraft, even if its own currency is a major international one. All of this suggests that the inter-state politics between the state issuing an international currency and foreign states does have a crucial impact on the currency’s international use, especially during its early stages of internationalisation. It also implies that a state’s reactive currency statecraft can be fluid, depending upon the directions of its foreign policy.