Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects

• The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis.
• We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening.
• Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late.
• Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling.
• Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions.

     

Impact of EU exit on our UK industry forecasts

• We have lowered our forecast for UK economic growth following the vote to leave the EU on 23 June. GDP growth is now forecast at 1.1% in 2017 and 1.4% in 2018, and the medium‐term outlook has also been nudged down. We have also lowered our forecast for all of the main industrial sectors, with the biggest reductions in the long‐term forecasts for construction and manufacturing, although the weak pound could provide some short‐term boost to the latter.
• Our baseline forecast assumes that the government triggers Article 50 by the end of this year and that the UK leaves the EU by end‐2018. We assume that the government draws a red line under the freedom of movement and thus loses access to the single market. Trade relations revert to WTO rules.
• A number of factors determine the relative impact on each sector. First, in the short term, heightened uncertainty will hit business confidence, causing firms to delay capital spending. Second, less favourable trade relations with the EU could see export‐oriented sectors migrate production away from the UK. Finally, restrictions on migration will reduce the potential size of the labour force.
• Consequently, investment‐oriented sectors such as construction and machinery have seen some of the largest downgrades. Moreover, transport equipment is heavily exported to Europe, so increased trade barriers could see some production move out of the UK. Meanwhile, labour shortages could weaken growth prospects in labour‐dependent sectors. In addition, the vote has created uncertainties around the long‐term viability of London as Europe's major financial centre.
• The outlook for more consumer‐focused sectors is less downbeat, although an uptick in inflation may erode household purchasing power in the near‐term, and the multipliers from lower economic activity are likely to permanently reduce household incomes in the long term relative to our last baseline

     

Brexit and FDI

• The potential for a departure from the EU to undermine the UK's attractiveness as a location for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is often cited as one of the key risks were the UK to leave the EU. In weighing up the threat to FDI posed by ‘Brexit’ we assess the net gain from inward investment and the role played by EU membership in attracting FDI.
• In theory, FDI benefits the economy via lower interest rates, higher wages for workers and ‘spillover’ benefits boosting economy‐wide productivity. But the evidence for these benefits is ambiguous. And FDI has potential drawbacks. These include an adverse effect on the tradeable sector, reflected in a wider current account deficit, the potential to ‘crowd out’ investment by domestic firms and the fiscal cost of subsidies paid to inward investors.
• That almost half of FDI in the UK comes from other EU countries suggests that EU membership is not the only driver of foreign investment in the UK. Other factors include the UK's business friendly environment, as reflected in global competitiveness surveys, and a relatively deregulated labour market. Of perhaps most importance is the lure provided by the UK's large domestic economy. 80% of FDI in the UK is in sectors where sales to the EU account for less than 10% of total demand.
• However, FDI in manufacturing does look vulnerable to Brexit, given the importance of the EU market. Granted, manufacturing accounts for a modest share of UK FDI. But to the extent that FDI boosts productivity, a loss of inward investment in this sector is likely to come at a disproportionate cost.
• Our modelling suggests that in a worst case Brexit scenario, the stock of FDI could ultimately be 7% lower relative to the UK remaining in the EU, potentially knocking around ½% off the level of GDP.

     

Brexit deal and demographics drag on long-term outlook

• ▀ We have revised down our long-term forecast for GDP growth based largely on our expectation that the UK is headed for a much looser relationship with the EU. This will result in damage to trade and lower FDI inflows.
• ▀ We now expect potential output growth to slow to 1.4% a year from 2020–2030 down from 1.6% a year from 2010–2020. In the two decades after 2030 we expect the drag from Brexit-related effects to fade, but weaker contributions in labour supply and human capital will cut output growth to 1.2% a year.
• ▀ Demographics have been a key contributor to potential output growth over the past 30 years. But an ageing population and a more restrictive immigration regime are likely to mean the workforce grows far more slowly in the future.
• ▀ Our long-term growth forecast is weaker than the OBR's and implies that future governments will face a combination of disappointing growth in tax revenues and increasing demands for government spending from an ageing population.

     

Brexit — velvet divorce or messy breakup?

• We use a ‘scenario tree’ approach to look at the possible outcomes of the negotiations around the UK's exit from the EU. Given how little common ground there is between the two sides, we find that a relatively loose relationship is the most likely outcome, with the UK set to leave the EU in early‐ 2019.
• The negotiating positions of the UK and EU are diametrically opposed. The UK wants to end the free movement of labour, cease making contributions to the EU budget and regain ‘sovereignty’ from Brussels, while retaining as much access to the single market as possible. But the EU's starting position is that single market access is dependent upon agreeing to the four freedoms and that this is non‐negotiable.
• So far all signs are that the UK will prioritise the ability to control immigration over single market access. Thus remaining a member of the EEA is very unlikely to be viable over the longer‐term – our scenario tree analysis gives it a probability of just 6% – although it may be adopted as an interim step. Remaining part of the customs union is also unlikely (18%) as it will preclude the UK from making FTA with third countries.
• If the EU takes a mercantilist approach, it will have little incentive to come to an agreement with the UK over single market access for services, given the UK's large trade surplus with the EU for these activities, implying that UK firms may face growing non‐tariff barriers after the UK has left the EU. The UK's large deficit on goods trade with the EU gives a better chance of agreeing a FTA for goods, though with any FTA requiring agreement from all 27 EU members, the UK would have to be prepared for lengthy negotiations and make extensive concessions. Therefore, we think that a reversion to WTO rules (37%) is slightly more likely than agreeing a FTA (36%).

     

Brexit – Customs borders will impose costs and delays

• ? The UK's decision to leave the EU customs union is likely to see physical customs borders being introduced, including in Ireland. This will impose administrative costs and delays, with our modelling suggesting that introducing customs checks would reduce the level of UK GDP in 2030 by between 0.7–1.3%. But there are opportunities for the two sides to limit the damage through cooperation and the UK could also mitigate the costs by agreeing free‐trade agreements (FTA) with third countries.
• ? The UK can take as ‘light‐touch’ an approach to customs checks on imports from the EU as it desires. But it is likely that the EU will introduce customs checks on goods imported from the UK, even if the two sides agree an FTA, to ensure regulatory compliance and that ‘rules of origin’ have been satisfied – this will be particularly important if the UK agrees FTA with countries the EU does not have deals with.
• ? Introducing customs borders would pose some logistical problems, particularly in the Dover Strait where existing infrastructure is limited and there are space constraints. A potential fivefold increase in customs declarations will also pose challenges on the IT front. If the UK and EU are unable to agree transitional arrangements, then the additional infrastructure would need to be up and running in a very short period of time. This risks a period of substantial disruption.
• ? Traders will have to complete additional paperwork – such as export licences and import declarations – but much of this can be dealt with electronically, which should help to limit costs and delays. In addition, if the two sides were to share information then this could help to limit the extent to which risk‐based inspections caused delays.
• ? The Government is effectively calculating that the benefits from agreeing FTA with other countries will outweigh the costs of customs controls on the UK‐EU border. This judgement looks doubtful and, at best, would take many years to bear fruit.

     

Deciphering the UK's business investment performance

• ? Absent June 2016's Brexit vote, growth in business investment would have been much faster and the UK would be sharing in a global “investment boom”. Or so the Bank of England claims. But the reality is more complicated. What is striking is just how subdued investment growth has been across countries.
• ? Survey evidence presented by the Bank suggests that recent business investment growth has been less than a third of what might have been achieved absent Brexit. The UK has also been highlighted as an investment laggard among major economies.
• ? Headline investment growth has certainly been relatively weak since 2016. Uncertainty around future UK‐EU trading arrangements may have resulted in some investment being deferred or cancelled. And the Brexit‐related fall in sterling will have pushed up the cost of imported capital equipment, cutting demand.
• ? But a collapse in investment in the North Sea sector has had a significant effect on headline investment growth. On an excluding‐extraction basis, UK business investment rose at the same pace as the US (ex‐extraction) and faster than Japan in 2016 and 2017, while average annual growth rises from 1.0% to 2.4%.
• ? What is striking about the recent performance of business investment in the UK and other G7 members is how subdued growth has been across economies. Despite a favourable environment, no major advanced economy has seen investment rise at the type of rates that the Bank predicts the UK, but for Brexit, should be now enjoying.
• ? Sectoral shifts, the rise of intangible investment and the consequences of technooptimism offer some reasons as to why measured investment may have become less sensitive to economic upswings. These same factors suggest that 1990s‐style growth in private investment is unlikely in the UK (or elsewhere) even once Brexit uncertainty has cleared. Indeed, our own medium‐term forecasts see business investment growth across major economies continuing to run at a relatively subdued pace.

     

Will Brexit speed a seismic shift in UK trade patterns?

• The UK's trade pattern has shifted significantly away from the EU since the 1990s. Our analysis suggests that this shift will continue in the decades to come, with the EU share in UK goods exports potentially slipping to around 35% by 2035. Shifts in relative prices from moves in tariff and especially non‐tariff barriers could lower the share further.
• Over 60% of UK goods exports went to the EU in the late 1990s but this has fallen to around 45%. Slow EU growth is partly to blame, with UK exports to the EU barely expanding since 2007. But our analysis also shows that a 1% rise in EU GDP leads to only around half the rise in UK exports to the EU that a 1% rise in GDP in the rest of the world induces in UK exports to non‐EU countries.
• Based on our findings and OE forecasts of long‐term growth in the EU and the world, the EU share of UK goods exports could fall to 37% by 2035 and around 30% by 2050 – back to its 1960 level. The share of services exports to the EU has held up better but is lower than for goods, at around 40%.
• Weakening growth of UK exports to the EU has taken place despite the development of the EU single market since the early 1990s. Indeed, based on our projections UK goods exports to the single market could drop below 5% of UK GDP by 2050. These projections make no allowance for Brexit effects, but the declining importance of exports to the EU single market could colour prospective Brexit negotiations.
• Simple income‐based projections of potential country shares in future UK exports suggest a further swing towards emerging countries (EM) in the decades ahead, especially China and India. Exports to EM could approach 40% of the total by 2035. A shift in the pattern of trade preferences and restrictions faced by the UK post‐Brexit could spark even larger shifts in the structure of UK exports.

     

Over the cliff edge and on to the rocks below

• ? If Brexit negotiations were to break down, the UK would face a significant increase in trade disruption from March 2019, even if it were able to put some basic trading arrangements in place. In a scenario where key sectors face extra friction, we find that the level of UK GDP would be 2.0% – or £16bn in cash terms – lower at the end of 2020 compared with our baseline. The impact on the remaining EU countries, including Ireland, would be much smaller .
• ? This article focuses on what a cliff‐edge Brexit means for trade costs and prices. This is only part of the equation – such a scenario would also influence supply chains and migration, while there is also potential for policymakers to mitigate some of the negative effects via looser policy.
• ? The notion that the UK could simply walk away from Brexit negotiations and rely on WTO rules to trade with the world is deeply flawed. The UK would need to re‐establish more than 750 very complex international arrangements just to maintain the status quo. We expect only the most critical issues – such as air travel – to be resolved by March 2019. Exporters also face a substantial increase in non‐tariff barriers.
• ? A breakdown in talks would also see both sides levying tariffs on imports from each other from March 2019, raising the cost of importing UK goods into the EU by 3.5% and by 3.1% for goods imported into the UK from the EU. For the UK, this will apply to roughly 60% of its goods exports and imports, but for all EU countries except Ireland the share would be less than 10%.
• ? The additional trade frictions would knock around 1pp a year off UK GDP growth in 2019 and 2020, resulting in a period of very weak growth. And the risks to this scenario are skewed to the downside – a slump in confidence or failure to establish the necessary customs infrastructure in time could easily generate a worse outcome

     

The economic impact of migration: productivity analysis for Spain and the UK

Over the past 20?years labour has become increasingly mobile and whilst employment and earnings effects in host countries have been extensively analysed, the implications for firm and industry performance have received far less attention. This paper explores the direct economic consequences of immigration on host nations?? productivity performance at a sectoral level in two very different European countries, Spain and the UK. Whilst the UK has traditionally seen substantial immigration, for Spain the phenomenon is much more recent. Our findings from a growth accounting analysis show that migration has made a negative contribution to labour productivity growth in Spain and a negative but negligible contribution in the UK. This difference is driven by a positive impact from migrant labour quality in the UK. This finding broadly holds across all sectors, but we note considerable variation in magnitudes. Labour productivity growth has a neutral contribution from migrant labour in construction and personal services in the UK, whilst in every case in Spain the effect is negative, most strongly in agriculture. Using an econometric approach to production function estimation we observe a positive long term effect on total factor productivity from migrant workers in the UK and a negative effect in Spain. Our findings suggest that either the UK is better at assimilating migrants or is more selective in terms of who is permitted to migrate.     

And a populist New Year: global hopes and fears framework

• Get ready for more populist governments. There is now sufficiently widespread backing for global populism that at least one further victory in a major economy is very likely in the next year or so, our analysis of populist policies and support in 20 large economies shows.
• While there are no populist electoral front‐runners, many large economies have elections coming up in which populists have a decent chance of capturing sizeable votes. If you roll the dice enough times, the populist number is likely to come up somewhere – there is now around a 50% chance of a populist government in one key Eurozone country; bookmakers' odds suggest an even higher probability.
• Donald Trump's victory showed how market reaction to populism is hard to predict. Our survey provides a framework for assessing the diverse and complex channels.
• We see limited possibilities of Trump‐like, populist‐propelled fiscal expansions elsewhere in the world, which are typically market positive. Even where populist‐leaning politicians have a chance of power, they have shown little appetite for fiscal expansion.
• Globally, populist policies are focussed more on immigration, trade, and governance, which are typically market negative. As such, populist electoral victories would imply modest downward revisions to baseline growth forecasts and risk greater instability.
• Populist electoral victories in Europe would result in unsettling brinksmanship and provide an existential threat to the EU, though compromise is the most likely outcome and subsequent risks are two‐sided. For example, (i) reductions in free movement in labour could make Brexit softer; (ii) populism could challenge unhelpful pro‐cyclicality in the Stability and Growth Pact.

     

Tighter labour markets to finally lift global wages

• Wage growth has been relatively slow since 2007 in advanced economies, but an upturn may be in sight. Slow productivity growth remains an issue but tighter labour markets make a positive response by wages to rising inflation more likely and there are signs that compositional and crisis‐related effects that dragged wage growth down are fading – though Japan may be an exception.
• Overall, our forecasts are for a moderate improvement in wage growth in the major economies in 2017–18, with the pace of growth rising by 0.5–1% per year relative to its 2016 level by 2018 – enough to keep consumer spending reasonably solid.
• Few countries have maintained their pre‐crisis pace of wage growth since 2007. In part this reflects a mixture of low inflation and weak productivity growth, but other factors have also been in play: in the US and Japan wage growth has run as much as 0.5–1% per year lower than conventional models would suggest.
• The link with productivity seems to have weakened since 2007 and Phillips curves – which relate wages to unemployment – have become flatter. A notable exception is Germany, where the labour market has behaved in a much more ‘normal’ fashion over recent years with wage growth responding to diminishing slack.
• ‘Compositional’ factors related to shifts in the structure of the workforce may have had an important influence in holding down wage growth, cutting it by as much as 2% per year in the US and 1% per year in the UK. There are some signs that the impact of these effects in the UK and US are fading, but not in Japan.
• The forecast rise in inflation over the next year as energy price base effects turn positive is a potential risk to real wages. But the decline in measures of labour market slack in the US, UK and Germany suggests wages are more likely to move up with inflation than was the case in 2010–11 when oil prices spiked and real wages fell.

     

Secular stagnation – are we stuck in Summers' long winter?

• We estimate that the UK has a relatively large output gap of around 2¾% of potential output. With the legacy of the financial crisis fading, the UK should see healthy growth in potential output of around 2.1% a year from 2015–24. Usually this would drive a period of strong economic growth, but we expect GDP growth to average a relatively underwhelming 2.4% a year over this period, largely due to the drag from aggressive fiscal consolidation.
• There is significant disagreement amongst economists about the size of the output gap. Estimation of the output gap has been problematic since the financial crisis because of the depth of the recession and relatively slow pace of the subsequent recovery, while sizeable revisions to the national accounts data have been an added complication. Our estimate of the output gap is towards the top of the range of independent forecasters surveyed by HM Treasury, but it is consistent with the literature on the impact of financial crises on potential output.
• We expect potential output growth of 2.1% a year from 2015–24, a faster pace than that seen since the financial crisis, but some way short of the experience of the pre‐crisis decade. The shortfall relative to the pre‐crisis period is largely due to a smaller contribution from growth in labour supply, which reflects the impact of an ageing population. However, labour is set to make a much stronger contribution to potential output growth in the UK than in most other major European countries over the next decade.
• The combination of a large output gap and healthy growth in potential output will provide the conditions for firm growth and low inflation over the medium term, with GDP growth expected to average 2.4% a year from 2015 to 2024. Growth could be stronger were it not for the sizeable drag from fiscal consolidation over the next four years and the dampening effect that this will have on activity. This will ensure that the output gap closes very slowly. The government's fiscal plans are heavily influenced by the OBR's view that there is limited scope for stronger growth to drive an improvement in the public finances. But if our view turns out to be correct, it will become apparent that the government has pursued a more austere path than is strictly necessary in order to comply with its fiscal rules.

     

Canada‐style trade deal most likely Brexit scenario

• ? All options for the Brexit endgame remain on the table. A free‐trade agreement (FTA) along the lines of the EU's deal with Canada looks like the most likely outcome. The two sides will also need to reach agreements on customs and regulations, with the latter involving the UK compromising on maintaining a high degree of regulatory alignment, to provide a permanent fudge on the Irish border issue. But there is still a sizeable risk of a “no deal” outcome .
• ? We expect a transitional deal to be agreed relatively quickly. The UK has suggested it would prefer a bespoke arrangement, but the EU is unlikely to offer such an option. We expect the UK to remain bound by EU rules during the transition, with the transitional period ending on 31 December 2020.
• ? If the two sides continue to pursue the preferred option of a FTA, it is unlikely to be completed by the end of the transition period. We expect the EU to reject the UK's request for a comprehensive agreement including services and insist on a Canada‐style deal. The Irish border issue means that customs and regulatory agreements would need to accompany such a deal. We place a 40% chance on this outcome.
• ? The question of regulatory alignment and the time required to negotiate a detailed FTA could spin the talks off in one of two opposing directions. If the prime minister is unable to get her party to agree to maintain a high degree of regulatory alignment, the talks could break down. If this occurs, we think it's very unlikely that the UK would honour the phase‐one agreement to maintain regulatory alignment, and we see a 30% chance that the UK walks away from the talks, resulting in a “cliff‐edge” Brexit in 2019.
• ? If the UK accepts the need to maintain regulatory alignment with the EU, it could conclude that joining the EEA and participating in the single market are better than lengthy FTA negotiations, resulting in an inferior deal. But the need to respect the four freedoms means this remains a relatively low probability outcome (20%). Wth Parliament seemingly committed to Brexit, remaining in the EU looks unlikely (10%).

     

Global wages: we don't (yet) have lift‐off

• ? Policymakers, most notably in the US, have been expecting wage growth to pick up for some time as job markets tighten. But the data over the last six months have shown few indications of wage lift‐off. Our review of the latest evidence suggests that although labour markets are, on the whole, still tightening, we see increased downside risks to our forecasts for faster global wage growth in 2018–19.
• ? Rates of “churn” in labour markets – a possible precursor to faster wage growth – have continued to rise in the US and parts of Europe.
• ? But other structural factors may still be holding wages down. A recovery in prime‐age participation in the US may be helping to cap wage rises, as may a pool of “underemployed” workers in the US and UK (though this pool is shrinking fast).
• ? Productivity growth also remains weak, running at a 0.5%–1% annual pace in Q1 2017 across the US, UK, Germany and Japan. This compares with a G7 average pace of 1.5% per year in 1985–2006.
• ? Overall, the risks to our baseline forecast of faster wage growth in the major economies in 2018 look skewed to the downside. We expect wage growth to firm in 2018 by 0.5–1 percentage points in the US, UK, Germany and Japan. We would give this modal forecast a probability of around 60%, but with a 25% chance that wage growth is somewhat slower than this and only a 15% chance that it is higher.

     

THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR IMMIGRATION1

Immigration into the UK has increased in response to high labour demand in the recent past. This additional supply of labour has helped keep interest rates lower, and growth higher, than they might have been otherwise. The longer‐term impact of higher immigration may be an increase in trend productivity growth. Although the evidence on such long‐term economic effects is incomplete, there is no reason to believe market principles ‐ or fundamental freedoms ‐ are any less relevant when it comes to flows of people rather than goods or capital.     

The short‐term impact of Brexit

• A scenario run on the Oxford Global Model suggests that Brexit would leave the level of UK GDP 1.3ppt lower by Q2 2018 compared with our baseline forecast that the UK votes to stay in the EU. A vote to leave would mainly shock business confidence but consumers would be adversely affected too. Exporters in price‐sensitive sectors would benefit from a weaker exchange rate.
• Market pricing suggests that sterling could initially fall by around 15% before recovering some of its losses, while the heightened uncertainty would also be expected to drive a sharp drop in equity prices in H2 2016.
• Brexit would present something of a dilemma for policymakers. While a weaker pound would cause inflation to initially spike upwards, we would expect the MPC to look through this and cut Bank Rate in order to support activity. And with the UK likely to retain its reputation as a safe haven, this would also see gilt yields stay lower for longer.
• Weaker growth would also put the Chancellor in breach of the fiscal mandate, though we would expect him to plead extenuating circumstances, rather than tighten policy and potentially exacerbate the slowdown.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Market falls overstate loss of momentum

• ? Financial market moves in recent months suggest that there is increasing concern about a substantial global growth slowdown or even a recession. But we continue to see this as an over‐reaction to the weakening economic data; while the downside risks to the global GDP growth outlook have clearly risen, our baseline forecast for 2019 is little changed at 2.7%, down from 3% in 2018.
• ? Recent economic news confirms that the Q3 economic soft patch appears to have spilled over into Q4, particularly in the industrial sector which has seen a broad‐based loss of momentum in many economies coinciding with a further slowdown in global trade growth. But while surveys of service sector activity have also moderated, the falls have been rather less abrupt, suggesting that overall global GDP growth is slowing albeit not alarmingly so.
• ? On balance, we think that the weaker data do not provide compelling evidence that global growth is slowing more sharply than our December forecast. Although the financial market sell‐off and associated tightening in financial conditions will impinge on growth, this may at least be partly offset by weaker inflation in response to lower oil prices, now seen at US$61pb in 2019. This, combined with the continued strength of labour markets and the likelihood of further moderate wage growth, points to a further period of solid household spending growth.
• ? Nonetheless, the risk of a sharper slowdown has risen. Cyclical risks have increased over the past couple of years as spare capacity has diminished. And uncertainty over the economic and financial market impact of the unwinding of central balance sheets have added to the risk of policy mistakes.
• ? Although our central view is that the recent financial market correction will not morph into something rather nastier, further sustained weakness (particularly if accompanied by dollar strength) would have more significant implications for activity and could see world growth falling below the 2016 post‐crisis low of 2.4%.

     

Brexit and world growth – what are the risks?

• The initial global market reaction to the UK Brexit vote was very negative and in our view overdone. Nevertheless, we expect the uncertainty to linger for a while, with the vote having refocused investors on existing vulnerabilities in the world economy. Our new forecasts see the main negative impacts on growth being in the UK, the Eurozone and Japan. Risks to our new forecasts remain skewed to the downside, with a significant danger of world growth dropping below 2% this year.
• Our new forecasts see UK growth dropping to 1.4% a year in 2017–18, down from 2.2–2.3% a year before. In the Eurozone, growth will be around 0.2% a year weaker in 2017–18 and Japan is also a loser as a result of the risk aversion‐driven stronger yen, with growth at just 0.3% in 2017 from 0.5%.
• The size of the initial global market sell‐off makes no sense in the context of the likely impact from a weaker UK. In part, it seems to have reflected the pricing in of very negative scenarios in the Eurozone. But investors may also be worrying about other global problems glossed over in recent months.
• One risk to our forecast is that confidence effects on businesses and consumers are larger than we expect – but such effects are often overstated. Another danger is that more of the recent financial market weakness will ‘stick’ than our new baseline forecasts assume.
• Our world recession indicator is already at elevated levels and suggests a significant danger of world growth slipping below 2% this year; not a recession, but it might feel like one. Global policymakers need to act quickly to head off the risks.

     

UK inflation set to tumble below target by autumn

• ? We expect CPI inflation to slow markedly this year, dropping below the 2% target by the autumn. The inflationary impulse from the 2016 depreciation is fading and should partially reverse, while global food and energy prices are expected to stabilise. Base effects will become increasingly important.
• ? CPI inflation reached a five‐and‐a‐half‐year high of 3.1% in November, up from a little over 1% a year earlier. The 2017 pick‐up in inflation was the result of a perfect storm of a weaker pound, higher oil prices and sharp rises in domestic electricity bills. But inflation has subsequently slowed, reaching 2.5% in March. And, after a brief hiatus, we expect the downward trend to continue as we move through the year.
• ? The key driver of lower inflation will be weaker core pressures. In line with the literature, there is already evidence that the impact of sterling's depreciation is fading, and we think that the pressures could partially reverse if sterling continues to strengthen. We see little prospect of an offsetting escalation in domestic cost pressures. The recent pick‐up in wage growth has been muted and a further acceleration above 3% looks unlikely while there remains slack in the labour market.
• ? The food, petrol and energy categories contributed 0.8 ppt to CPI inflation last year, compared with a drag of 0.5 ppt in 2016, as stronger global pressures combined with the weaker pound. But as global prices have been more subdued of late, by the end of 2018, we expect these categories to be contributing 0.5 ppt to CPI inflation.
• ? The final element behind the expected slowdown in inflation is base effects. The comparison with last year's strong price pressures will depress the 2018 inflation rate, and we see the base effects being at their strongest mid‐year.
• ? We think it unlikely that such a slowdown in inflation would derail the MPC from hiking interest rates twice this year. But it could temper its hawkishness in 2019.