How likely is a UK recession after Brexit?

• In the wake of the UK Brexit vote, forecasters have rushed to downgrade their growth forecasts for the UK, with some now expecting a recession. Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we examine how likely a recession is by looking at the shocks the UK economy faces and the policy responses. We conclude that while a sharp slowdown is likely – in line with our own new forecasts – a recession is unlikely.
• Many UK forecasters are now predicting a recession in 2017, even though ‘stand‐alone’ recessions in industrial countries are rare. Our forecast is less downbeat. The UK faces a series of negative shocks including to consumers and business confidence, but growth will be supported by the weaker sterling and likely policy responses.
• Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we show that to shift our baseline forecast of growth of 1.1% next year to zero would require a very severe negative confidence shock. Our new baseline already assumes a shock equivalent to one‐third of that seen in the global financial crisis (GFC). All else being equal, the shock would have to be around two‐thirds of that in the GFC to cut GDP growth to zero in 2017.
• Our new baseline also does not incorporate all the possible policy levers the UK can employ. We currently assume the Bank Rate drops to zero, but if a ‘rescue package’ of £75 billion of QE and a fiscal stimulus equal to 1% of GDP was also added, then the shock to confidence needed to get zero GDP growth would have to be similar to that seen in the GFC. We do not consider this likely given the scale of financial stress and credit restriction that occurred globally at the time of the GFC.

     

Why big fiscal deficits and low inflation can coexist

• ▀ The surge in government debt caused by ballooning fiscal deficits is a necessary response to the coronavirus crisis. But we doubt this will lead to a burst of inflation in the advanced economies (AEs), let alone a debt crisis.
• ▀ Our fiscal forecasts assume AEs’ budget deficits averaged 20% of GDP or so in Q2. However, our deficit forecasts point to a sharp narrowing thereafter and for public debt as a share of GDP to peak in 2021.
• ▀ The risks around this forecast skew firmly towards deficits remaining wide, reflecting the balance of risks around our GDP forecasts and the possibility that governments allow some fiscal slippage.
• ▀ A slower narrowing of fiscal deficits than we forecast wouldn't automatically lead to a period of above-target inflation. Indeed, we wouldn't be surprised if larger-than-expected deficits were associated with weak inflation.
• ▀ High levels of corporate debt and weak labour markets raise the risk of private sector retrenchment ahead. In that case, large and sustained fiscal deficits may be needed to fill the vacuum and prevent GDP and inflation from falling. As has been the case in Japan over the past 25 years, large deficits over coming years could be associated with weak GDP growth and below-target inflation.
• ▀ If economies begin to overheat but governments keep fiscal policy loose, inflation could, of course, pick up. But central bank tightening would offset it. We believe the risk of sustained inflation overshoots is limited unless monetary policy were made subservient to governments’ own objectives. And we think the risk of central banks losing independence remains slim.

     

Summer Budget: calculated risk or reckless gamble?

• The Chancellor had created the expectation that his Summer Budget would be radical and he did not disappoint. The ‘rabbit from the hat’ was a compulsory ‘living wage’, expected to reach £9 per hour in 2020, which Mr Osborne hopes will help to compensate the lower paid for the slashing of in‐work benefits. This has effectively transferred responsibility for supporting low‐income households from the government to employers. The OBR expects this to have a relatively muted impact on employment, but this view looks pretty optimistic and the policy represents a major gamble.
• The reduction in welfare spending, plus an easing of the near‐term fiscal squeeze, has helped to smooth the public spending ‘rollercoaster’. But with a plethora of giveaways failing to disguise a net increase in the tax burden, the Budget is likely to weigh on growth prospects, even if the Chancellor's big gamble pays off.
• Alongside the Budget the Chancellor announced a new fiscal mandate, which will require governments to run a budget surplus in “normal times”. But meeting this mandate will require a fiscal stance very far from the historical norm and it will also force other sectors to move into deficit to compensate. It will also mean a looser monetary policy than would otherwise be the case. So a policy presented as creating room for fiscal policy to respond to future economic shocks could potentially narrow the scope for the more potent weapon of interest rate cuts.

     

Secular stagnation – are we stuck in Summers' long winter?

• We estimate that the UK has a relatively large output gap of around 2¾% of potential output. With the legacy of the financial crisis fading, the UK should see healthy growth in potential output of around 2.1% a year from 2015–24. Usually this would drive a period of strong economic growth, but we expect GDP growth to average a relatively underwhelming 2.4% a year over this period, largely due to the drag from aggressive fiscal consolidation.
• There is significant disagreement amongst economists about the size of the output gap. Estimation of the output gap has been problematic since the financial crisis because of the depth of the recession and relatively slow pace of the subsequent recovery, while sizeable revisions to the national accounts data have been an added complication. Our estimate of the output gap is towards the top of the range of independent forecasters surveyed by HM Treasury, but it is consistent with the literature on the impact of financial crises on potential output.
• We expect potential output growth of 2.1% a year from 2015–24, a faster pace than that seen since the financial crisis, but some way short of the experience of the pre‐crisis decade. The shortfall relative to the pre‐crisis period is largely due to a smaller contribution from growth in labour supply, which reflects the impact of an ageing population. However, labour is set to make a much stronger contribution to potential output growth in the UK than in most other major European countries over the next decade.
• The combination of a large output gap and healthy growth in potential output will provide the conditions for firm growth and low inflation over the medium term, with GDP growth expected to average 2.4% a year from 2015 to 2024. Growth could be stronger were it not for the sizeable drag from fiscal consolidation over the next four years and the dampening effect that this will have on activity. This will ensure that the output gap closes very slowly. The government's fiscal plans are heavily influenced by the OBR's view that there is limited scope for stronger growth to drive an improvement in the public finances. But if our view turns out to be correct, it will become apparent that the government has pursued a more austere path than is strictly necessary in order to comply with its fiscal rules.

     

General Election: How would the parties' plans impact the outlook?

• Our modelling suggests that, based upon the three main parties’ economic and fiscal plans, the outcome of the General Election would have a modest, but not immaterial, impact on the UK's economic and fiscal outlook. The Liberal Democrat plans would deliver the strongest GDP growth, followed by Labour, but both would also involve higher debt servicing costs and a higher level of government debt than the plans of the Conservatives.
• In our view these premiums on debt and borrowing costs are so small that it is very difficult to argue that the UK should pursue a more austere fiscal policy and reject the opportunity of stronger growth. But with the latest opinion polls suggesting that it is likely that the next government will be either a minority administration, or a coalition consisting of three or more parties, it is most likely that we will ultimately see some combination of the main parties' plans enacted.
• The experience of 2010 suggests that such political uncertainty could mean that we see several bouts of market nervousness between now and May 7th, particularly in equity markets. However, such turbulence is likely to be short‐lived, providing that the resulting government is perceived to be strong and durable. Even a multi‐party coalition may not be such a bad thing, particularly if it watered down the more contentious policies of the main parties. The worst‐case scenario would be a weak minority government which is both unable to pass any meaningful legislation and unable to seek a fresh mandate. Such a scenario could seriously undermine confidence amongst investors and firms.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Global growth in 2019 revised down again

• ? In response to continued weakness in global trade and signs that the softness has spread to other sectors, we have cut our 2019 world GDP growth forecast to 2.5% from 2.7% last month (after 3.0% in 2018). But we see growth accelerating in H2 due to fiscal and monetary policy changes and as some temporary negative forces unwind. While revised fractionally lower, global growth is still expected to tick up to 2.7% in 2020 – but the risks lie to the downside.
• ? The latest tranche of trade data points to another poor quarter in Q1. While the weakness in Chinese trade is partly related to the impact of US tariffs, the causes of the trade slowdown are rather broader. Reflecting this, we have again lowered our world trade growth forecast – we now see it slowing from 4.8% in 2018 to just 2.5% in 2019, only a little above the previous low of about 2% in 2016.
• ? One source of comfort is that the February global services PMI rose to its highest level since November. But retail sales in the advanced economies as a whole have been weak recently and, while consumer confidence bounced in February, it has trended lower over recent months. Reflecting this, we have cut our global consumer spending forecast for this year.
• ? We expect ongoing policy loosening in China and dovish central banks – either in the form of delays to rate hikes and liquidity tightening or via renewed easing – to boost the global economy in H2 and beyond. Some recent temporary drags on growth (such as auto sector weakness) should also wane, providing further modest support.
• ? But the modest rise seen in GDP growth in 2020 exaggerates underlying dynamics due to sharp rebounds in a few crisis‐hit economies such as Turkey, Venezuela and Argentina. And downside risks for 2020 are probably larger than in 2019; benign financial conditions and the weaker US$ assumed in our baseline may not materialise, while the build‐up of debt in EMs could act as a larger‐than‐expected drag on growth.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: entering 2018 with plenty of momentum

• ? Further evidence that the global economy ended last year on a high note is consistent with our view that world GDP growth in 2018 will be around 3.2%, a little better than the likely rise of 3% in 2017 and the best annual outturn since 2011.
• ? The global economy has entered 2018 with plenty of momentum. In December, the global composite PMI continued to trend upwards, rising to its highest level of 2017. This was primarily down to developments in the manufacturing sector, with several emerging markets recording especially strong gains.
• ? While the strength of the manufacturing PMI bodes well for global trade, other timely trade indicators, particularly from Asia, have been less positive. On balance, though, we have nudged up our forecast for world trade growth iwn 2018 to 4.8%. But this would still be a slowdown after last year's estimated rise of 6%.
• ? This partly reflects the change in the drivers of GDP growth from 2017. We still expect a modest slowdown in China, triggering a sharper drop‐off in import growth there. Eurozone GDP growth is also likely to slow slightly, to 2.2%, which is still well above our estimate of potential growth. By contrast, we have nudged up our US GDP growth forecast for this year to 2.8% – 0.5pp higher than the probable 2017 outturn – as looser fiscal policy will not be fully offset by tighter monetary policy. The recent rise in commodity prices, further dollar weakness and still‐strong global trade growth all bode well for prospects in many emerging markets.
• ? Some commentators have questioned the durability of the global economic expansion, reflecting the long period of uninterrupted GDP growth and concerns that a financial market slowdown could eventually impinge on growth. But economic expansions do not die of old age. And while equity markets look expensive on many metrics, we expect strong earnings growth to push equity prices higher over the coming months. Meanwhile, although various geopolitical risks remain, more generally economic uncertainty has diminished.

     

The global impact of a sharper US‐China slowdown

• ? We forecast a moderate global slowdown through 2020, but risks are looming of a sharper downturn in China and the US. If these were to materialise, our simulations suggest global GDP growth would hit a post‐crisis low, with the level of GDP dropping by 0.6% and growth slowing by 0.4 ppt in 2019/20.
• ? Economies with strong trade linkages to China and the US – Korea, Taiwan and Mexico – would suffer most. Conversely, a weaker dollar, lower oil prices and relatively smaller trade flows with the US and China would offset the blow in Europe and for some EMs, including Turkey, Argentina and India.
• ? Since 2010, Chinese activity has been a powerful leading indicator of every major economy's exports, proving stronger than similar indicators for US or eurozone activity. This is even the case for non‐Asian economies such as Canada, Mexico, Italy, Germany, France and the UK. This may reflect deepening trading relationships and the relatively high volatility of Chinese cyclical indicators over the period.
• ? Over the past decade, global macro stability has been supported by the US and Chinese cycles moving counter to each other. But this could reverse if the ongoing Chinese policy stimulus fails to gain traction and the weakness gains momentum.

     

A Labour win would be a roll of the dice for the economy

• ? “It depends”, the classic economist's answer, is apt in assessing the economic outcome of a Labour government. Looser fiscal policy and shifting income from capital to labour could be GDP positive. But a loss of faith in Labour's commitment to Bank of England independence could offset those gains in a mix of lost confidence, spiking interest rates and currency depreciation .
• ? We attach a 20% probability to a general election being held within the next year. The Government's precarious parliamentary position leaves it vulnerable to rebellions, particularly in passing Brexit‐related legislation. But the Fixed‐term Parliaments Act makes it difficult to force a new election, even if the Government is complicit.
• ? In the event of an election in the near term, Labour would require a significant swing in support to gain a majority. Opinion polls show little evidence of this happening, so we put the chances of a majority Labour government at no more than 10%. But the odds of either a Labour‐led coalition or minority government are around 50%.
• ? The consequences of Labour's plans for sterling are ambiguous. A looser fiscal stance should prompt the MPC to tighten monetary policy more aggressively, boosting the pound. But the Party's approach to the Bank could have the opposite effect. A rise in gilt yields is a safer prediction. But with more than half of the gilt stock held by the public sector and “captive” buyers, the scope for a major sell‐off is limited.
• ? The experience of the EU referendum suggests that a Labour victory is unlikely to cause a sudden collapse in confidence. But the drag on profitability from Labour's policies and an activist approach to foreign takeovers could cut FDI inflows, which may be bad for productivity, though it would imply a more competitive pound.
• ? Our modelling suggests that a looser fiscal stance could boost the level of GDP by 2% above our baseline view after three years, if Labour sustains market confidence. But in a “bad” Labour scenario, with central bank independence compromised, the hit to confidence, market rates and sterling would offset the gains from looser fiscal policy.

     

Is the UK government pursuing the correct fiscal plan?

• The Autumn Statement saw the Chancellor reaffirm his objective of achieving a budget surplus in the next Parliament and he followed this by introducing a binding target to balance the structural current budget by 2017–18.
• But this places even more policy weight on the ‘output gap’ – a variable which cannot be measured with any certainty and which, as a concept for dictating policy, has serious flaws. If the OBR is too pessimistic on spare capacity, the outcome will be an unnecessarily tight fiscal squeeze.
• Meanwhile, a fiscal surplus requires that another sector of the economy runs a deficit. So committing to this objective implies more control over the public finances than governments actually enjoy.
• Returning the public finances to the black would be positive for fiscal sustainability. But it could have some undesirable consequences if the counterpart to a stronger fiscal position is, as expected, the household sector moving further into the red.
• Furthermore, our detailed analysis of the government's latest spending plans concludes that the scale of the planned cuts to departmental spending will be impossible to deliver, particularly given the commitments to protect spending on health, international development and parts of the education budget.
• As such, in a departure from our normal practice, our UK macroeconomic forecasts assume that the planned spending cuts will be reined back, regardless of who wins the next election.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Coronavirus variants raise near‐term concerns

• ? While vaccination roll‐outs will pick up speed in the coming months, high global Covid‐19 case numbers and the threat from the spread of more transmissible variants of the virus have prompted us to lower our 2021 world GDP growth forecast for 2021 slightly from 5.2% to 5.0% after an estimated 3.9% fall in 2020 .
• ? The start of Covid‐19 vaccination programmes has provided light at the end of the tunnel with respect to the prospect of controlling the pandemic. But hopes that the start of inoculations will lead to an imminent relaxation of restrictions has been dampened somewhat.
• ? While the slow pace of vaccinations to date has disappointed some, we do not think this is grounds for panic. Initially slow progress is to a large extent down to teething problems and near‐term constraints which should ease, particularly if other vaccines are licensed in the coming weeks and months.
• ? The bigger risk is the possibility of tighter restrictions to contain the UK and South African coronavirus variants that spread far more easily. The former mutation has now spread to around 50 economies and around a third have reported community transmission.
• ? Our global GDP growth forecast downgrade for 2021 largely reflects a more cautious assessment of the outlook for H1, particularly in Europe and other advanced economies where restrictions looks set to be extended or increased.
• ? But while the recovery path for the global economy is likely to be bumpy and risks remain elevated, we still think this year will see strong growth, by pre‐ as well as post‐ GFC standards. Some emergency fiscal support measures will end, but policy will remain supportive. Indeed, by taking control of the Senate, US President Biden may be able to pass more ambitious fiscal plans.

     

Alternative policy options for combatting a downturn

• ? With limited scope for conventional monetary policy options, central banks and governments may need to turn to alternative approaches to combat slowing global growth and respond to economic shocks.
• ? Our analysis shows that not only do governments in advanced economies have limited room to cut rates but that doing so has proved less effective in boosting growth in recent years. This increases the need to look at alternatives, such as negative interest rates, renewed QE and fiscal stimulus.
• ? While negative interest rates have helped reduce borrowing costs in some economies, the impact on banks has been ambiguous. Also, lowering rates further into negative territory could be hard without incurring significant costs.
• ? QE in the form practised up to now is also likely to be less effective than in the past due to low yields, narrow risk spreads and high asset valuations. So, a deeper downturn might require more radical QE ‐ buying corporate bonds, bank loans and equities ‐ which comes with significant drawbacks.
• ? Some central bankers are starting to acknowledge the limits of monetary action, with the next step being to consider fiscal action as a more effective alternative ‐ as argued recently by the likes of Larry Summers.
• ? In our view, fiscal policy is likely to be especially effective in a climate of weak growth and low rates, with large multiplier effects. Advanced economies have more scope for fiscal stimulus than often recognised and could finance a large public investment programme by issuing ultra‐cheap long‐dated debt

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: A weaker dollar and slightly faster growth

• ? We have raised our world GDP growth forecasts this month, to 2.7% for 2017 and 3.0% in 2018 (from 2.6% and 2.9% previously). Similarly, we have lifted our inflation forecast for this year to 3.1%.
• ? Surveys continue to suggest buoyant global activity, driven by manufacturing in several countries. This, in turn, is helping pull world trade from its 2016 lows. However, this partially reflects factors such as stimulus measures in China, which is boosting construction and manufacturing and bolstering trade in the region, and also benefitting major capital goods exporters such as Germany and Japan.
• ? But there are reasons for caution given there are still underlying factors holding back demand and the likelihood that the fiscal stimulus promised by President Trump will not be as big as expected.
• ? The most important forecast change this month is that we see a weaker US dollar ahead as monetary policy tightening in the US has already been largely priced in. This means our EURUSD and GBPUSD forecasts are now $1.10 and $1.32 by year‐end, while the short‐term outlook for many EM currencies against the US$ has also firmed.
• ? We still expect the Fed to raise rates on another two occasions this year, followed by three hikes in 2018. However, we have brought forward by one quarter to Q4 2017 our forecast of when the Fed will begin to taper reinvestment of its portfolio holdings.
• ? Meanwhile, we think the ECB is still a long way from policy normalisation. We expect QE to be tapered from January until June 2018. Then, the ECB will consider lifting the deposit rate from its negative levels in the final part of 2018, and only in 2020 will it start raising the main refinancing rate.
• ? Emerging markets' prospects have improved amid a strong batch of high frequency indicators and a pick‐up in trade. Given low valuations, we see positive momentum for EM currencies and think that they may have entered a long cycle of strength.

     

Four reasons why 2018 will be the best post‐crisis year

• ? We head into 2018 in a fairly optimistic mood. The current upswing is more broadly based than any other since the global financial crisis, and – unusually by recent standards – we have entered the new year without any major crisis looming. We see world GDP growth accelerating from 3.0% last year to 3.2% in 2018, which would be the best year for the global economy since the post‐global financial crisis rebound .
• ? There are four key reasons why 2018 is going to be a good one globally: (i) strong trade growth; (ii) muted inflation keeping monetary policy accommodative; (iii) emerging markets staying robust; (iv) resilience to political uncertainty.
• ? The near‐term risk of an abrupt slowdown in China looks limited, while the Eurozone economy continues to stage robust growth which is underpinned by strong fundamentals. A potential fiscal loosening, a weaker dollar and business investment revival bode well for the US. The outlook is bright for economies that are heavily integrated into global manufacturing supply chains or reliant on commodity exports.
• ? Granted, soaring debt is a cause for concern, particularly in some emerging markets, along with high asset price valuations. They warrant close monitoring and are plausible triggers for the next global slowdown. Nonetheless, while such risks could linger or indeed escalate further before correcting, we don't see them as 2018 issues.
• ? The most obvious trigger for any such correction would be a widespread and more aggressive monetary policy normalisation. However, in our view, inflation pressures look set to build only slowly. Add the fact that high debt will make the economy more sensitive to interest rate moves, we expect central banks to normalise with caution and see policymakers doing less tightening that the consensus expectation.

     

The short‐term impact of Brexit

• A scenario run on the Oxford Global Model suggests that Brexit would leave the level of UK GDP 1.3ppt lower by Q2 2018 compared with our baseline forecast that the UK votes to stay in the EU. A vote to leave would mainly shock business confidence but consumers would be adversely affected too. Exporters in price‐sensitive sectors would benefit from a weaker exchange rate.
• Market pricing suggests that sterling could initially fall by around 15% before recovering some of its losses, while the heightened uncertainty would also be expected to drive a sharp drop in equity prices in H2 2016.
• Brexit would present something of a dilemma for policymakers. While a weaker pound would cause inflation to initially spike upwards, we would expect the MPC to look through this and cut Bank Rate in order to support activity. And with the UK likely to retain its reputation as a safe haven, this would also see gilt yields stay lower for longer.
• Weaker growth would also put the Chancellor in breach of the fiscal mandate, though we would expect him to plead extenuating circumstances, rather than tighten policy and potentially exacerbate the slowdown.

     

Supply surprise is a ‘nice’ reprise

• ? This year advanced economies have enjoyed a rare positive supply surprise: output is higher than expected and inflation is lower. The initial China‐related boost not only proved to be a great antidote to secularly weak global demand, but it has also engendered unexpected global momentum and a benign inflation response. As a result, 2016–17 resembles a mini‐reprise of the “nice” 1990s, a non‐inflationary, consistently expansionary decade.
• ? The global momentum has been propelled by a strong international trade multiplier. This has contributed to strength in several advanced economies, particularly the Eurozone. We expect global growth in 2018 to be bolstered by US fiscal stimulus as the impulse from China fades.
• ? It will remain “nice” in 2018, albeit in the context of weak secular trend growth. We expect the benign output‐inflation trade‐off to continue. Several of the factors that are underpinning low inflation and unemployment as well as weak wage growth are likely to be present for some time.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: A world with higher inflation

• Our world GDP growth forecasts are unchanged this month, at 2.6% for 2017 and 2.9% in 2018. But we expect a sizeable increase in inflation, to 3.3% in 2017 from an estimated 2.8% in 2016, as the effect of higher oil prices feeds through.
• Global indicators continue to point to a pick‐up in activity towards the end of last year, driven by stronger manufacturing activity. The global manufacturing PMI rose to the highest level in almost three years in December, while the composite index – which includes services – was at a 13‐month high.
• World trade should be underpinned by stronger growth in the US (2.3% in 2017 and 2.5% in 2018), bolstered by the anticipated effects of President Trump's expansive fiscal policies. That said, uncertainties around our central forecast are unusually high given the high level of uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration. Encouragingly, there are increasing signs that the tighter labour market is leading to a pick‐up in wage inflation in the US, which will support consumers.
• Given these reflationary trends, we expect two increases in the Federal funds rate this year and US bond yields are likely to continue to rise. The widening of interest rate differentials between the US and the Eurozone will drive the euro down to parity with the US dollar by end‐2017 for the first time since 2002.
• We have revised our Brexit assumptions this month. We now assume that the two‐year period of exit negotiations is followed by a transitional arrangement lasting 2–3 years. This would provide breathing space to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU.
• Emerging market growth on the whole will improve in 2017 but performance will differ across countries: Russia and Brazil will exit recession, but countries with weak balance of payments positions, high dollar debt and exposure to possible US protectionist actions will be at risk. In China, policymakers are moving to greater emphasis on reducing financial risks and less focus on the 6.5% GDP growth target for 2017. Continued action is also likely to dampen further depreciation of the CNY.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: World growth still seen at just 2.5% in 2020

• ▀ Although recent developments suggest that the risks of an escalation in US-China trade tensions have eased, we doubt this will deliver a significant boost to the global economy. We still expect world GDP growth of just 2.5% this year, the weakest since the global financial crisis, after an estimated 2.6% in 2019. But the risks around the forecast now seem less skewed to the downside.
• ▀ While our view remains that global GDP growth is likely to have softened further around the turn of the year, the decline remains gradual. And latest survey-based measures of activity and sentiment show tentative signs that prospects are beginning to improve, consistent with our long-standing view that the low point for global growth will be in Q1 2020.
• ▀ Just as importantly, the likelihood of the US and China formally signing off a phase one trade deal in mid-January has reduced the chances of a further flare-up in trade tensions between the two economies. However, this has to some degree been offset by the troubling events recently unfolding between the US and Iran.
• ▀ We remain sceptical that the global economy is set for a major growth boost. Any healing in US-China relations may quickly be unwound and a full reversal of the tariffs already implemented remains a distant prospect. Furthermore, some of the associated growth boost is likely to be offset by less policy support. As a result, we have raised our 2020 GDP growth by just 0.1pp in the US but by a more significant 0.3pp in China.
• ▀ Meanwhile, although the ongoing and broad-based monetary policy loosening in both AEs and EMs should start to feed through to growth this year, we doubt this will be a game-changer. Not only is policy loosening at a global level set to be fairly muted, limited spare capacity, the rising stock of global debt and elevated asset prices are likely to reduce the positive impulse from policymakers' actions.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Dollar surge brings mixed consequences

• The strengthening dollar is now becoming a significant factor for global growth and our forecasts. The tradeweighted dollar is up 2.5% over the last month and over 12% on a year ago.
• Driving the latest rise are growing expectations of US rate hikes while monetary policy in many other major economies is headed in the opposite direction.
• The beginning of ECB QE has prompted a further slide in bond yields and the euro – which at 1.06/US$ is on course to fulfill our forecast of near‐parity by year‐end. Weak data in Japan also raises the chance of a further expansion of QE there later this year.
• We remain relatively positive about the advanced economies: we forecast G7 GDP growth at 2.2% for 2015 and 2.3% next. This month we have revised up German growth for 2015 to 2.4% – a four‐year high.
• Robust US growth and a strong dollar are good news for the advanced economies. US import volume growth firmed to over 5% on the year in January, while the dollar surge potentially boosts the share of other advanced countries in this growing market.
• But for the emerging economies the picture is mixed. A stronger US may boost exports, but rising US rates are pulling capital away: there has been a slump in portfolio inflows into emergers in recent months. Emerging growth may also suffer from higher costs of dollar funding and a rising burden of dollar debt as currencies soften – the more so if US rates rise faster than markets expect.
• Moreover, emergers are also under pressure from a slowing China. Chinese import growth has been weak of late and commodity prices remain under downward pressure. A notable casualty has been Brazil, which we have downgraded again this month – GDP is expected to slump 1.1% this year.
• Emerging GDP growth overall is expected to slip to 3.7% this year, the lowest since 2009. And excluding China, emerging growth will be only 2.2% – the same as the G7 and the worst performance relative to the advanced economies since 1999.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Growth resilient to protectionist concerns

• ? Despite the mounting threat of more protectionist trade measures, we expect the impact on global growth and trade to be mild. Given this, and the still fairly solid underlying economic picture, we have left our global GDP growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 unchanged at 3.2% and 3.0% respectively.
• ? Although economic data in Q1 painted a pretty solid picture, there are signs that the global expansion may lose momentum in Q2. Most notably, the global PMI fell sharply in March, more than offsetting the gains of the previous three quarters or so. Some of the decline may reflect an over‐reaction to recent trade threats and could be reversed in April and despite the drop, the surveys still point to strong growth. But the fall highlights the risk that lingering trade tensions could damage confidence and prompt firms and consumers to delay investment and major spending plans.
• ? On a more positive note, China's economic growth picked up markedly in early 2018, which could provide a fillip to global trade growth in the near term. Given the betterthan‐expected start to the year, we have made no change to our 2018 China GDP growth forecast (of 6.4%) despite the probable negative effects of trade measures.
• ? Meanwhile, most advanced economies remain in the late expansionary stage of the cycle. And those that show signs of slowing, such as the Eurozone, are doing so from multi‐year highs. While we have nudged down our 2018 Eurozone GDP growth forecast slightly to 2.2%, the pace is expected to remain well above trend. We judge the impact of US tariffs and counter‐measures on the US economy to be subdued and have lowered our GDP growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 by just 0.1pp.
• ? For now, we see further solid growth for the world economy this year even in the environment of rising protectionism. While there is a risk that a further escalation of trade tensions could trigger a sharper slowdown in global GDP growth, we still see the risks of a full‐blown and damaging trade war as limited and the chances of protectionism leading to recessions as smaller still.