Fiscal policy

There has been a marked improvement in the UK's public finances. Estimates of PSNBX (public sector net borrowing excluding financial interventions) for 2012–13 are now £5bn lower than the OBR's forecast at the time of the Budget. Additionally the first five months of the financial year have seen PSNBX (excluding the impacts of the transfer of the Royal Mail pension fund and the repatriation of the proceeds from the Bank of England's Asset Purchase Facility) decline by almost £4bn compared to the same period a year earlier. Therefore, even if there is no improvement in the public finances for the rest of the year, the government is well on track to undershoot the OBR's full‐year public borrowing forecast of £119.8bn for 2013–14.…     

THE UK'S PERSISTENT TRADE DEFICIT

The UK current account deficit reached a peak in excess of £20bn in 1989, equivalent to 4 per cent of GDP. In the next two years, as recession took its toll of domestic spending, it shrank quickly - on the latest data the deficit was only £4.4bn last year, 3/4 per cent of nominal GDP. Over the same period the trade gap narrowed front £25bn to £10bn, in each case taking the deficit back to the levels of 1987, before the late 1980s' boom really got under way. Since 1989, therefore, both 011 trade and the current account, there has been a significant reduction in the external deficit. Yet it remains the case that, despite the length of the recession - non-oil GDP has fallen for six successive quarters - the current account is still in deficit. Moreover, despite there being no concrete data to point to the beginnings of recovery, the shortfall is widening. The low point was the second quarter of last year, with a rare current surplus recorded in June, since when the trade deficit has steadily widened again as the consequence primarily of a 5.5per cent increase in the volume of imports over the last 12 months. Why is it that, in contrast with the experience in the 1980-81 downturn, this recession has not produced a trade or even a current account surplus? Does this mean that the recovery, when it does come, will inevitably widen the deficit with the possible consequence that ‘balance of payments problems’ will undermine the pound inside the ERM? We conclude that, while it is disappointing that UK producers have not managed to claw back more of the domestic market - in contrast with the experience of exporters in world markets - our forecast of a current account deficit of 0–2 per cent of GDP should be relatively easily financed and will riot therefore cause serious problem for economic policy. This conclusion would riot necessarily hold if the recovery occurs more rapidly than we expect arid sucks in a greater volume of imports. It may be the case that the UK will continue to run a current deficit with Japan in particular as the counterpart to ongoing Japanese direct investment in this country.     

Fiscal policy

The Chancellor recently unveiled the 2013 Spending Round, which set out the government's detailed plans for spending in 2015–16. He chose to stick to the spending totals announced in this year's Budget, which required him to find £11bn (0.7% of GDP) of real terms spending cuts in that year alone…     

Fundraising in the usa and the united kingdom: Comparing today with directions for tomorrow

In 1995, residents of the United Kingdom — a population of 58 million — contributed £9.1bn ($14.56bn) to charities. During the same time period, $143.85bn was donated by the 265 million inhabitants in the United States. Going just by the numbers, the not-for-profit world often assumes Americans are the most philanthropic people on earth. But, a careful look at some actual indicators of charitability suggest this belief may, in fact, be more wishful thinking than reality. Here are the facts.     

for whom the road tolls

How strong is the case for road pricing? Giles Keating, of Credit Suisse First Boston, argues the case for a comprehensive system of road pricing. It would reduce both congestion and the budget deficit by £16·5bn.     

the costs of privatisation

Has privatisation been too expensive? John Chown, managing director of the tax consultants J.F. Chown, examines the practice of ‘Priority Applicants’ and argues that the cost to the taxpayer has been as much as £2bn.     

Portfolio Selection and the Investment Performance of the UK Pension Funds*

Pension funds are the main institutional investors, accounting for 38 per cent of personal sector net financial wealth. As a result of their growing importance in mobilizing personal sector saving, they have emerged as the principal institutional investor, controlling over £200bn of funds at the end of 1987, their total net assets equalling 38 per cent of personal sector net financial wealth. Pension funds also dominate domestic asset markets, owning 27per cent of the stock of outstanding UK equity, 23 per cent of UK government securities and 17 per cent of total UK holdings of overseas equity. In this paper we present the conclusions from recent research, undertaken as part of an updating of the LBS Financial Model. Our results suggest that UK pension fund investment since 1980 is better than previous studies have suggested and, in particular, that funds outperformed the equity market in the 1980s, offering a higher return for any given level of risk. In addition fund behaviour is slow to change, with past behaviour exerting the strongest influence on current investment patterns. Fund managers also appear guilty of “short termism” in that they place little weight on events beyond the next three months. However, this has not made them inefficient. Finally, we find that actions to restrict the funds' surpluses should not affect their investment behaviour. Our results also suggest that the costs from exchange controls in the 1970s were substantial, amounting to some £4bn per year.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Collapsing oil prices and a falling dollar set the background to a Budget in which the Chancellor, hamstrung by lower oil revenues, was seen as having little room for manoeuvre. In fact the sharp fall in the sterling price of oil has provided him with the perfect excuse for not making significant cuts in personal income tax that were largely irrelevant to the needs of the economy. Instead of a boost to household demand we have had, thanks to OPEC, a transfer to companies in the form of a reduction in costs. This should enable them to expand output against a background of falling inflation. Our post-Budget assessment of macroeconomic prospects (Section I), made on the Treasury's assumption of a $15 oil price, shows output growing by 2 1/2 per cent this year and inflation falling below 3 per cent in 1987. We are thus less optimistic than the Treasury about output but more optimistic about inflation. How was the Chancellor able, within the confines of the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, to give anything away having lost so much oil revenue? A detailed analysis of the PSBR forecast (Section II) reveals good reasons why non-oil tax revenues should be some £3 1/2n higher than forecast this time last year. But, because we still expect public spending to be above the official figures, our PSBR forecast is £1bn higher than the Treasury's. Although the macroeconomic impact of the Budget was small (especially in relation to that of the fall in oil prices which preceded it), it continued the process of tax reform. We focus, in Section III, on the new proposals to deal with the problem of the pension fund surpluses to which we drew attention in the November issue of Financial Outlook. We conclude that the proposed measures could have a larger effect on tax revenues in the longer term than is indicated by the Treasury's Budget estimates.     

Forecast Summary

Even if output recovers in the second quarter (as we expect), it looks as if there will be no increase in GDP this year in comparison with 1991. This reflects the weak start to the year, in which non-oil output registered its seventh successive quarterly decline. Through the year (fourth quarter to fourth quarter), however, we expect GDP to rise 1.5 per cent, laying the basis for a stronger recovery in 1993. Even so, it is not until late next year that output returns to its previous peak Paradoxically, we have raised our forecast of domestic demand from February (on a milder stock rundown) but imports are taking a disproportionate amount of the extra demand, holding back domestic output and aggravating the current account deficit. From nearly £9bn this year, we see the deficit rising to over £14bn by the middle of the decade, equivalent to 1³/4 per cent of GDP. While this is disappointing, it should be relatively easily financed even with lower interest rates providing the pound is held at its present DM 2.95 parity. we assume no ERM realignment which underpins a further drop in inflation to 4 per cent later this year and to 3-3 1/2 per cent by the mid 1990s. The weakness of output means that unemployment continues to rise for another 12 months, peaking in the middle of 1993 at three million, and that public sector finances will move still further into deficit - we project a PSBR this year of £30bn and a peak of £34bn in 1993-4, equivalent to 5 1/4 per cent of GDP.     

Productivity and Growth in UK Industries: An Intangible Investment Approach*

This article calculates some facts for the ‘knowledge economy’. Using new data, first we document UK intangible investment and find that (i) this is greater than tangible investment by £37bn in 2008; (ii) R&D is 11% of total intangible investment, software 15%, and training and organizational capital 22% each; (iii) the most intangible‐intensive industries are manufacturing and financial services. Next, we measure the contribution of intangible capital to growth for 2000–08. We find that intangible capital accounts for 23% of labour productivity growth and treating intangibles as investment lowers total factor productivity growth in the 2000s by 24% (R&D lowers it by 3%).     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

In October we forecast 1 per cent output growth in 1993 accompanied by little change in retail price inflation, an increase in unemployment to 3.2 million by the end of the year and a £20bn deficit on the current account of the balance of payments. Since then we have revised our view of the international outlook and the Chancellor has made his Autumn Statement. There are also some hopeful signs in the latest data on retail sales, manufactured exports and the money supply that demand may be picking up both domestically and overseas. How do these developments affect our short-term forecast? The simple answer is very little: the outlook on output and inflation in 1993 is barely changed since October (Table I). We have lowered our forecasts for world inflation and for German interest rates which means that the pound can be held steady against the DM at lower UK interest rates and that the inflationary consequences of devaluation, though significant, are slightly less over the medium term than we made out in October. There is one revision of major significance, and that relates to the PSBR, which is now likely to reach f45bn in 1993-4, more than 7per cent of nominal GDP. The change is not on the spending side - the Autumn Statement confirmed existing expenditure plans - but on revenues, notably corporate taxes and tares 011 spending, which have fallen far more quickly than we envisaged. This, in combination with a projected near-2'per cent of GDP deficit on the balance of payments, poses a difficult medium-term policy dilemma. To escape from the twin deficits requires either deflation of demand, which conflicts with the Government's new-found commitment to growth, or a more buoyant economy to boost tax revenues and a competitive pound to underpin export-led growth. Of the two the latter is self-evidently more inflationary. This highlights the policy dilemma: at some stage the Government may have to choose between reducing the deficits and its 1–4 per cent inflation target or sacrifice its commitment to growth.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year the Chancellor followed "the path of prudence and caution", cutting taxes by £4bn and budgeting for a public sector surplus of £3bn. This year - rather more compellingly - he is travelling the same route. Against the background of a record current account deficit and rising inflation, Mr. Lawson has tightened fiscal policy, cutting taxes in 1989–90 by nearly £2bn - less than is needed to offset real fiscal drag. His main priority, reaffirmed in the Budget speech, is to tackle inflation and, to this end, he chose not to revalorize excise duties. This was reinforced by a reduction in national insurance contributions, which not only benefits the low paid in relative terms, but also sharpens the incentive to supply labour at the bottom end of the wage spectrum. But this reform of national insurance is not cheap. Even though it is not practicable to implement the changes until October, the cost in 1989–90 is estimated at £1bn, rising to £2.8bn in 1990–1. This is equivalent, in PSDR terms, to a 2 per cent cut in the basic rate of income tax arid, in our post-Budget forecast, precludes further tax cuts in 1990. Unless there is an unexpectedly large rebound in personal savings, the Chancellor is likely to find himself in his present position in a year's time: presiding over a large budget surplus but unable to reduce it significantly for fear of rekindling inflation or aggravating the current account deficit. Simply writing declining numbers for the PSDR into the MTFS offers no genuine guidance on medium-term fiscal policy and may even be positively misleading to financial markets.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year saw the most coordinated cyclical upturn in the world economy since the early I970s, with OECD output rising 4per cent, industrial production and world trade even more rapidly. The boom in demand, which followed five years of continuous expansion, has outstripped supply and prices have begun to accelerate. To tackle inflation, the G7 monetary authorities have tightened policy over the last year, reversing the short-lived drop in interest rates necessitated by the stock market crash. This tightening may have to go further, especially in Germany and Japan where the effects of a rising oil price and higher indirect taxes are being exacerbated by currency depreciation. Although the rise in interest rates came too late to stop inflation rising, it has beet pursued with sufficient vigour to prevent inflation from seriously breaching the 5 per cent level. It is on these grounds that we forecast a relatively soft lending for the world economy on output, with growth continuing at 2.5–3per cent, accompanied by a limited reduction in inflation which stays in the 4–5per cent range. Progress on current account balances is also likely to be sluggish: in the absence of a serious attack on the budget deficit, the US deficit is likely to stay in the region of $140bn a year.     

Forecast Summary

Backed by the lowest interest rates in fifteen years and a competitive exchange rate, we see the economy moving off the corrugated bottom of last year and recovery gathering pace as this year progresses. We expect output to rise 1.4 per cent this year, 0.5 per cent more than we forecast in October when we were expecting a far more cautious approach on interest rates, and 3 per cent in 1994. Here we have factored in another 1 per cent cut in base rates to coincide with the Budget on 16 March but this may prove to be the floor, especially if, as is rumoured, the Prime Minister has vetoed tax increases in the Budget for fear of derailing a fragile recovery. By the end of the year, however, we expect the trend in interest rates to be upwards to halt a sliding exchange rate and to cap the devaluation-induced price increases that will be feeding into domestic prices by then. On this basis we believe that inflation can be contained at 4 per cent underlying this year, 5 per cent in 1994 - outside the Chancellor's target range. While we are more sanguine than before on the outlook for output and inflation, major problems remain on the PSBR and the balance of payments. Beginning in the December Budget, the Government will have to raise taxes to avoid a debt spiral on the budget deficit and channel resources into net exports. Even on the basis of a £4bn tax hike in the first of the unified Budgets, we expect the PSBR to run along close to £50bn and the current account deficit in the £15bn-20bn range.     

The Nominal Framework for Economic Policy

The next Budget will almost certainly be the last one before a General Election. Despite the temptations to make electorally attractive cuts in income tax or increases in public spending, we believe the opportunity should be taken to re-affirm the government's intention to move steadily towards price stability. This is particularly important at a time when our exceptionally high real interest rates may reflect fears about a future change in policy. We provide a nominal framework which extends the Medium Term Financial Strategy to 1992–3. Given the buoyancy of revenue and the likely growth of money GDP next year, we argue that the PSBR should be no higher than £6bn next year. There is a good case for keeping it at this year's expected level of £5bn.     

THE CURRENT ACCOUNT

In the first half of this year the current account deficit widened sharply to £5.6bn, well above the Chancellor's full-year Budget forecast of £4bn and our own most recent forecast of £5bn. In this Forecast Release, we show that imports have continued to grow very rapidly but export growth has slowed down. This is in contrast to 1987 when exports were strong, very nearly keeping pace with imports. It can be said therefore that this year's balance of payments deterioration owes more to a failure of exports than to rising imports. As to why this has happened, we show that part of the explanation is a two-year decline in UK competitiveness but that the more important cause is the continuing strength of domestic demand which has not only sucked in imports but also diverted possible exports to the home market .     

THE 1981 BUDGET

In this Forecast Release we examine the short-term prospects for the UK economy in the light of the Budget and other developments. Compared with our February forecast the Budget has raised taxes by about £2 bn but it has also increased public expenditure by a similar amount The net effect on the PSBR, compared with our February forecast, is therefore small, especially if the Treasury's estimates for nationalised industry profits and/or public sector wages prove over-optimistic. We therefore believe that the outturn for the PSBR in 1981-82 could be close to the figure of £12 bn presented in our last forecast.
We also believe that the prospects for output and inflation are little changed The Budget by itself will have raised prices by about 1 per cent compared with our previous forecast but because we had probably over-estimated indirect tax receipts, the net effect on prices is small For output, the likely reduction in consumers' expenditure is more or less offset by higher public spending. We continue to expect a fall in output between 1980 and 1981 of 1–11/2 per cent, inflation during the year at about 10 per cent, a current account surplus of £3 bn, monetary growth of 8 to 9 per cent and a PSBR of £12 bn.     

Forecast Summary

Although hard evidence of recovery is still elusive, our forecast indicates that the trough of the recession occurred in the second quarter and that output fell 4 per cent peak-to-trough. We estimate that GDP rose 112 per cent in the third quarter - though only because of a rebound in North Sea oil production - and that for 1991 CIS a whole it will be 2 per cent down on 1990 levels. Next year GDP is forecast to rise 2 per cent but it is not until 1993 that the 1990 output peak is passed. Unemployment therefore still has a considerable way to rise - to a peak of 2.8 million in 1993. In the first year of full EMS membership, the economy has made an accelerated transition to European levels of inflation. Against a background of modest growth, it should be possible to consolidate this progress and we expect retail price inflation to average little more than 3 per cent over the next four years. Similar rapid progress has been achieved on the balance of payments where there is a trade surplus on manufactured goods for the first time since 1982. Here, however, we are less confident that the reduction in the trade gap can be sustained. In the recovery phase we expect imports to rise more rapidly than exports with the result that the current account deficit rises from £6bn this year to £8bn in 1992 and £10bn-£12bn in 1993-5.     

THE AUTUMN STATEMENT

The Treasury's forecast, published with the Autumn Statement, has been widely heralded as showing a surprisingly cheerful picture for next year as far as both output and inflation are concerned. In fact it is close to the forecast which we produced in October. Here we compare the two forecasts and then consider how our forecast is affected when we adopt the Treasury assumptions on asset sales and the exchange rate. We find that the Treasury is more optimistic than we are on investment and that holding the exchange rate - which is needed to produce the official inflation forecast - requires rather higher interest rates than we assumed in October and this widens the gap between our forecast for GDP and the Treasury's forecast.
We also consider how the government should respond to lower North Sea oil revenues. Taking a permanent income approach, we suggest that the PSBR should be allowed to rise by £2bn on this basis. The same approach, however, suggests that an extra £71/2bn of asset sales should be used to cut the PSBR not taxes. On balance therefore this analysis indicates that next year's PSBR target should be lowered by £1/2bn from the £71/2 bn contained in the 1985 MTFS.     

THE 1992 BUDGET FOUR LEGS GOOD; TWO LEGS BETTER

In framing his Budget, the Chancellor, Mr. Lamont, sought to balance two mutually exclusive goals: the political imperative of establishing the Conservatives as the party of low taxation on the one hand; the deterioration in the financial position of the public sector on the other. Inevitably the Budget fell between these two stools. The net cut in taxes, though cleverly angled towards the low paid, was a modest £2.2bn, 0.4 per cent of GDP, which is unlikely to 'buy' many votes on 9 April. This may largely free the Government of the charge of trying to bribe the electorate, yet it still leaves the PSBR at £28bn in the coming financial year, £36bn excluding privatisation receipts, which is equivalent to 6 per cent of nominal GDP. Over the medium term Mr. Lamont reaffirmed the Government's commitment to a balanced budget, though on the Treasury projections this is not achieved by 19967, despite the assumption that growth averages 3.5 per cent a year from 1993 onwards. On our calculations, a return to budget balance is unobtainable even on the Treasury's optimistic growth projections without a move to tighter fiscal policy. The Conservatives' maxim that 'budget balance is good; budget deficits are bad' may not have been formally jettisoned, but it is in the process of being re-written as 'budget balance is good; budget deficits are better, as long as they are prudent'.