International joint ventures: Theoretical considerations

This paper constructs models to investigate the rationale for a multinational corporation to enter into a joint venture to serve a host market. In particular, the model examines the impact of profit sharing, cost reductions, risk reductions, and competition reductions on the profits of international joint ventures. The results may explain the ‘recent’ popularity of international joint ventures. The models show that (1) a joint venture is the dominant entry strategy when there is a formidable local competitor and the risks of operation are high, (2) a wholly owned subsidiary is preferred if a multinational corporation has a significant cost advantage, (3) a joint venture is preferred to a wholly owned subsidiary if significant cost reductions can be achieved through combining the strengths of a multinational corporation and a local firm, and (4) multiple licensing is preferred if the number of local firms is large.     

Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Entrepreneurship

Milton Friedman argued that the social responsibility of firms is to maximize profits. This paper examines this argument for the economic environment envisioned by Friedman in which citizens can personally give to social causes and can invest in profit‐maximizing firms and firms that give a portion of their profits to social causes. Citizens obtain social satisfaction from corporate social giving, but corporate giving may not be a perfect substitute for personal giving. The paper presents a theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and shows that CSR is costly when it is an imperfect substitute. When investors anticipate the CSR, shareholders do not bear its cost. Instead, the entrepreneurs who form the CSR firms bear the cost. Shareholders bear the cost of CSR only when it is a surprise, and it is to such surprises that Friedman objects. A social entrepreneur is willing to form a CSR firm at a financial loss because either doing so expands the opportunity sets of citizens in consumption‐social giving space or there is an entrepreneurial warm glow from forming the firm. Firms can also undertake strategic CSR activities that increase profits, and a social entrepreneur carries strategic CSR beyond profit maximization and market value maximization. The paper also examines the implications of taxes and the effect of the market for control for the sustainability of CSR.     

Firm governance and duopoly: in weakness may lie strength

The paper proposes a model of firm governance when two firms compete in a duopoly. The paper assumes that a motivational asymmetry exists between owners and managers: owners wish to obtain maximum profits, managers wish to maximize sales. Managers perceive that salary, social status or future job prospects are more closely associated with firm size (i.e. sales) than with firm profits. The paper takes an agency view of the firm where owners only indirectly influence the behaviour of firms through the level of control they exert over managers. The paper demonstrates that a weakly governed firm, acting as a sales maximizer, can gain a competitive advantage over a strongly governed firm, acting as a profit maximizer. The paper examines the extent of this advantage under cost leadership and differentiation strategies. The paper also demonstrates that the objectives of profit maximization and maximization of competitive advantage are not necessarily congruent. The paper graphically represents the profit functions of the two firms illustrating the Nash equilibrium under Cournot and Stackelberg conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the determinants of foreign ownership shares: Evidence from US firms' joint ventures in Japan

It is often argued that firms' foreign expansion is motivated by economies of scale in information-based intangible assets. Since these assets are combined with local factors in real production, their owner often has to deal with local factor owners' opportunistic behavior such as siphoning of skills which reduces the return on intangibles to the original owner. Local factor owners' agency behavior can also reduce a subsidiary's profit. Maintaining ownership mitigates the former type of opportunistic behavior, while ceding ownership reduces the latter type. Hence there is a non-linear relationship between ownership and the cost of control. In this paper we present a model that incorporates these aspects of a joint venture ownership. In our model the share in a joint venture of a foreign parent firm with a superior technology is determined such that its marginal cost of control is set equal to the marginal benefit it derives from a joint venture. We assume that, because of the uniqueness and mobility of its intangible factor, the foreign partner has more bargaining power than its local counterpart regarding the ownership of their joint venture and that the local partner is less concerned than its foreign counterpart about the problems of agency and property rights protection because of its geographic and cultural proximity to the joint venture. As a consequence, the foreign partner is able to exert its preference for its ownership share in the joint venture. Our theoretical results allow a decomposition of ownership share into components explained by the cost of control and by the profitability of a joint venture. Our empirical results using data on technology-based US firms' subsidiaries in Japan are consistent with our model predictions. In particular, the fraction of ownership share explained by the cost of control relative to the fraction explained by intrinsic profitability is higher for industries that rely more heavily on intangible assets, as expected from the model.     

‘Derivative’ firms,agency and economic integration

This paper proposes a ‘derivative’ firm model that emphasizes the decisions to invest in productive assets and to contract with firm managers. Contemporary examples of derivative firms include joint ventures and LBOs. The traditional joint venture is recast as a derivative firm with the model pointing out why managerial contracts and asset investment decisions should be made simultaneously for optimal shareholder wealth.     

Joint ventures for entry deterrence

The literature of joint ventures has not discussed whether joint ventures may be used to deter entry. This paper then addresses how joint ventures may be used strategically for this purpose. Under the assumptions of linear demand and linear cost, as well as Stackelberg–Cournot interactions between incumbents and their joint venture firms, it is found that the incumbents can deter entry by creating independent joint ventures. Furthermore, it is shown that the optimal number of the joint ventures for the deterrence and the optimal deterrence strategies are functions of the number of potential entrants. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spatial duopoly with discriminatory pricing

The concept and existence of an equilibrium is established for profit maximizing competitors whose decisions involve choices of both delivered price schedules and firm locations. Each firm faces a production function; each is allowed to locate in the plane and to set discriminatory prices. Any transport cost function that is continuous in the firm location variable may be used. It is shown that the locations of the two firms are in equilibrium if each firm is minimizing social cost (i.e., the total cost to the firms of supplying the market with the good it demands is minimized) with respect to the opponent's fixed location.     

The Structure and Management of Alliances: Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry*

abstract Syndicates are a form of inter‐firm alliance in which two or more venture capital firms co‐invest in an investee firm and share a joint pay‐off. Syndication is a significant part of the venture capital market yet little research has been conducted into the process of structuring syndicate deals and the management of syndicates following deal completion. This paper analyses the neglected issues concerning the structuring and management of syndicated venture capital investments from the perspectives of both lead and non‐lead syndicate members using two surveys of venture capital firms and examination of syndication documents. Lead investors typically have larger equity stakes and the syndicated investment agreement is a document that enshrines the rights of participants rather than specifying behaviour. Contractual arrangements typically serve as a back drop to relationships as non‐legal sanctions are important and decisions are typically reached following discussion and consensus, but lead venture capital investors’ residual and specific powers are important in ensuring timely decision‐making. The findings extend previous work on alliances by emphasizing the importance of non‐legal sanctions, especially reputation effects, in mitigating opportunistic behaviour by dominant equity holders. The paper also adds to the limited research on the dynamics of alliances by highlighting the role of repeat syndicates.     

Safety margins versus profit maximization

Under uncertainty, firms risk bankruptcy. We ask, in symmetric duopoly with stochastic demand, what happens when one firm minimizes the probability of negative profits while the other maximizes expected profits. When fixed costs are small, a firm can reduce the likelihood of negative profits. However, under a large fixed cost, the chance of negative profits increases upon deviation from a profit‐maximizing strategy. In any event, if one firm adopts a safety‐first strategy, the other firm has higher profits and a better survival chance by maximizing expected profit. Finally, we compare a profit maximizing to a safety‐first strategy in relation to ownership and control in firms.     

Maintenance contracts for leased goods: their role in creating brand loyalty

Using a two‐period switching cost model, this paper compares rental profit with sales profit in a framework in which duopolists produce horizontally differentiated durable goods. Rental firms use maintenance contracts that stipulate that repeat customers pay a lower fine per unit of damage than do those customers who switch to a rival firm. In the sales regime, firms give loyal customers a discount on their second period prices. If switching costs are zero, sales profit equals rental profit. For positive and identical switching costs, either regime can dominate. As the exogenous rate of depreciation falls, rental profit exceeds sales profit. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Product market objectives and the formation of research joint ventures

In this paper we extend the existing literature on research and development (R&D) investments and research joint ventures (RJVs) in two important ways. First, we analyze and compare the case where firms collude in the product market to the benchmark case of competition in the output market. Second, we allow firms to form coalitions endogenously as a separate stage in the game. We develop profit functions that depend on the partition of firms into joint ventures and the nature of product competition between venture partners. Our results illustrate the restrictive nature of some assumptions made in the literature. Typically multiple RJVs of different sizes form in equilibrium. In general, RJVs should not be promoted if they entail product market collusion. Given the information available to policy‐makers, it is unlikely that an R&D policy more refined than analyzing and allowing RJVs on a case‐by‐case basis is feasible. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competing Research Joint Ventures

Research and development (R&D) competition among firms has recently been extended to R&D competition involving research joint ventures. It was previously shown that in an industry conducting cost-reducing R&D followed by competition in the product market, if all firms both fully share R&D information and coordinate investments to maximize pint profits, final products prices are lower, and firms' profits are higher than with information shriving alone, joint profit maximization alone, or no cooperation. In this paper we question whether a single research joint venture (RJV) cartel is the best form of industry R&D coordination. We show that there are circumstances in which splitting a single RJV cartel into several competing ones yields lower product prices. Moreover, we show that in these circumstances, splitting the industry into exactly two competing RJV cartels would be best.     

Maximizing public value for subsidized non-profit firms: a mathematical economic model

In many public service industries, firms are assumed to maximize certain public goals and are not allowed to make any profits. These public service firms are financed by fixed and variable subsidies and fees-for-services paid by users. Standard economic models, such as the profit maximization and cost minimization model, are not suitable for describing the production structure and the economic behavior of these firms. Productivity and efficiency measures derived from these models therefore are not accurate. This paper derives a model that fits this type of firm and its economic context. It derives the exact mathematical relationships between public value, services delivered, (money) revenues, costs, service prices, resource prices and subsidies. In an empirical setting the model can be used as a reference to calculate productivity and efficiency scores. The usability of the model is demonstrated by an application to Social Labor Services in the Netherlands.     

Price and quality competition with quality positions

In this study, we investigate price and quality decisions in a duopoly in the presence of firms’ quality positions , which are determined by the quality levels of their existing core products. Into a standard model of vertical differentiation, we incorporate a “repositioning cost” that is proportional to the quality differences between firms’ current and new products. By varying the levels of quality positions, we analyze the impact of this cost on the equilibrium outcomes. Our results show that the presence of repositioning costs restricts firms’ abilities to improve profitability and differentiate themselves vertically. As a result, a high‐positioned firm does not necessarily have a competitive advantage over a low‐positioned firm, even if the former offers a superior new product in equilibrium. In addition, if a low‐positioned firm is significantly cost‐efficient compared with its rival with regard to repositioning, then that firm can earn higher profits than those of a high‐positioned firm by strategically offering its low‐end product. These results contrast sharply with those based on the standard vertical differentiation model.     

Career Concerns and Product Market Competition

This paper studies the effect of increased competition in the product market on managerial incentives. I propose a simple model of career concerns where firms are willing to pay for managerial talent to reduce production costs, but also to subtract talented executives from competitors. This second effect is privately valuable to firms, but is socially wasteful. As a result, equilibrium pay for talent can be inefficiently high and career concerns too strong. Explicit incentive contracts do not solve the problem, but equilibrium pay is reduced if managerial skills have firm‐specific components, or if firms are heterogeneous. In this second case, managers are efficiently assigned to firms, but equilibrium pay reflects the profitability of talent outside the efficient allocation. The effect of increased competition is ambiguous in general, and depends on the profit sensitivity to cost reductions. This ambiguity is illustrated in two examples of commonly used models of imperfect competition.     

Is the Competitor of my Competitor also my Competitor?

This paper presents several results on multimarket competition. First, whenever a firm faces multimarket competitors that sell goods in markets to which the firm itself has no access, the firm gains a strong incentive to expand production in its own market(s). In the capacity choice model, such a firm builds larger than Cournot capacity and pushes its competitors towards other markets. Consumers always benefit from multimarket competition. In asymmetric market structures, some firms may also benefit from multimarket arrangements, but in symmetric ones, all firms are necessarily harmed by it. Second, the intensification of indirect competition is not necessarily bad for the firm. It may be the case that, the more competitors its competitors have, the higher the firm’s profit. Finally, this model also has a multiproduct interpretation which suggests that a merger of single‐product firms may be beneficial or harmful from a social welfare perspective, depending on whether the new entity will compete with several single‐product firms or another multiproduct one.     

Economics of total quality management

This paper presents two models of the economics of total quality management. In the first, the concept of quality management is viewed as a technological innovation that requires investment. To reduce cost and improve quality, firms must make investments that are largely sunk. The effect of market competition on quality related technology investments is studied. Several results follow. With new quality technologies, price falls, quality rises and average cost declines. Firms must anticipate rivals' technology choices and the market prices when justifying quality technology investments. When all firms quickly adopt quality technology, returns of such investments are normal, that is, have a zero net present value. However, firms that do not invest in quality related technology are forced from the market. A firm that is faced by competitors that are slow to adopt quality related technology, can earn positive returns by early adoption. The firm invests more in quality related technology, and produces higher quality products, charges a higher price and earns higher profits than competitors. The firm's quality, price and profit advantages persist over time. In the second model, we show that firm value increases when customer satisfaction is used as an objective by aligning incentives. This explains the common use of customer satisfaction measures in TQM programs.     

Determinants of Entry in an Emerging Economy: A Multilevel Approach

The dynamics of the world economy and global competition patterns are encouraging multinational enterprises (MNEs) to expand into emerging economies. This study validates the proposition that entry mode selection in an emerging economy is influenced by situational contingencies at four levels: nation, industry, firm, and project. Analysis of data collected from China suggests that the joint venture is preferred when perceived governmental intervention or environmental uncertainty is high or host country experience is low. The wholly-owned entry mode is preferred when intellectual property rights are not well protected, the number of firms in the industry is growing fast, the need for global integration is high, or the project is located in an open economic region. The importance of these multilevel determinants requires simultaneous and inseparable considerations of the risk, return, control, and resource effects of the entry mode decision. This necessitates a theoretical integration of multiple perspectives such as transaction cost, the eclectic paradigm, bargaining power, and organizational capability.     

Transfer pricing: Technical and productivity change within the firm

Use of transfer prices is regarded by many writers as an efficient means of management of multidivisional firms. Its use in effect creates an internal market for the firm. However, its value as a management technique isknown to be subject to a number of limitations of the type discussed in the general economic theory of market failure. Nevertheless, two important limitations of transfer pricing have been neglected in the literature: (1) imputed profit/loss based on optimal transfer prices can be a poor guide to the economic value of a division to a firm when market transaction costs are important (for instance, even if a division shows an imputed loss, it may not be optimal to dispose of it), and (2) transfer pricing can retard technical change, innovation and productivity enhancement within a division to the detriment of the firm as a whole. Both aspects are examined here.     

Real Options in an Asymmetric Duopoly: Who Benefits from Your Competitive Disadvantage?

This paper analyzes the impact of investment cost asymmetry on the optimal real option exercise strategies and the value of firms in duopoly. Both firms have an opportunity to invest in a project enhancing ( ceteris paribus ) the profit flow. We show that three types of equilibrium strategies exist. Furthermore, we express the critical levels of cost asymmetry delineating the equilibrium regions as functions of basic economic variables. The presence of strategic interactions among the firms leads to counterintuitive results. First, for a certain range of the asymmetry level, a marginal increase in the investment cost of the firm with the cost disadvantage can enhance this firm's own value. Moreover, such a cost increase can reduce the value of the competitor. Finally, we discuss the welfare implications of the optimal exercise strategies and show that the presence of identical firms can result in a socially less desirable outcome than if one of the competitors has a significant cost (dis)advantage.