论火力发电工程施工合同竣工结算管理

目前火力发电工程主体施工合同通常采用可调总价合同,即承包人承担合同约定范围内的风险,对于超出合同风险范围之外的由发包人承担的风险部分往往需要建设单位花费大量时间和精力来进行结算。因此,本文从建设单位管理人员的角度对施工合同竣工结算应遵循的基本原则、竣工结算原则的制定及竣工结算实务处理等方面进行了论述,以期对施工合同竣工结算管理人员提供有益的借鉴和启发。     

Equity‐based incentive contracts and behavior: Experimental evidence

Equity ‐ based incentive contracts provide managers with dual incentives, motivating both effort and fraud. We report the results from an experiment in which manager subjects make effort and fraud decisions that affect a firm's value. The main treatment variable is the incentive contract, which can be of either the simple equity or stock option type. We find that both effort and fraud are increasing in a manager's share of equity and decreasing in the strike price of an option. Interestingly, the stock option contract induces relatively more fraud than the simple equity contract, even though the two induce the same effort.     

Two-period supply chain coordination strategies with ambidextrous sustainable innovations

This study considers a manufacturer with ambidextrous sustainable innovation capability selling products in environmentally conscious market through an independent retailer in a two-period game setting. We design a two-period game theoretic and dyadic supply chain (SC) model considering exploitative and exploratory nature of environmental innovations. We study five different contract types, namely, wholesale price contract, vertical Nash game structure, cost sharing contract, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract. We demonstrate the impact of market sensitivity towards sustainable innovation and cost parameters on optimal level of decision parameters. The equilibrium results reveal that a suitably designed two-part tariff contract can be used to achieve coordination in a fragmented SC. The equilibrium results assist managers to optimise the SC based on the two-period contract model. The results obtained in this study can help the decision-makers to take decisions on investment in the ambidextrous sustainable innovation under different types of contract structures.     

期权合同在供应链采购中的应用

为分析具有期权性质的合同对于采购方降低成本的价值，文章讨论了期权合同在由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的两极供应链中的应用，并通过建立数学模型找出制造商的最优订购策略，证明了期权合同对于采购方降低采购成本、规避价格风险具有显著的作用。     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a risk‐averse monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty. The firm produces a single good at a constant marginal cost. To facilitate sales, the firm uses a two‐part pricing contract that includes a membership fee and a selling price per unit. The good is sold to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who are subject to a common demand shock. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion are to push the unit price closer to the constant marginal cost and to shrink the market coverage so as to limit the firm’s risk exposure to the demand uncertainty. The more risk‐averse firm as such charges a higher membership fee to consumers. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to lower (raise) the unit price, to raise (lower) the membership fee, and to shrink (enlarge) the market coverage under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm’s optimal two‐part pricing contract, however, is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving‐spread increase in the demand uncertainty induces the firm to lower the unit price, to raise the membership fee, and to shrink the market coverage under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The firm’s risk preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the optimal two‐part pricing under demand uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Transfer prices and incentive contracts in vertically-integrated divisionalized companies

This paper studies a divisionalized firm with sequential transfers in which central management wants to motivate two division managers who receive predecision information. Central management can only contract on the observables price, cost and quantity. Starting with the optimal compensation schemes as a benchmark, the paper considers the question whether using transfer prices to substitute for price and cost, respectively, can replicate the optimal solution or not. This is to say, whether using an aggregate measure comes at a loss. The results are dependent on the design constraints (i) single or ‘dual’ transfer prices and (ii) simultaneous design of the reward functions or exogenously given reward functions. Basically, only in the case that central management is restricted to given reward functions, and wants to use the same single transfer price for both divisions, there is a loss relative to the benchmark solution. In the other cases, generally, there is enough latitude to design the available functions to mimic the benchmark. The paper goes on to discuss special cases. First, it finds conditions when purely cost-based transfer prices are optimal, and second, it derives explicit solutions for given linear compensation schemes over divisional book profits.     

Who bribes in public contracting and why: worldwide evidence from firms

We study procurement bribery utilizing survey data from 11,000 enterprises in 125 countries. About one-third of managers report that firms like theirs bribe to secure a public contract, paying about 8 % of the contract value. Econometric estimations suggest that national governance factors, such as democratic accountability, press freedom, and rule of law, are associated with lower bribery. Larger and foreign-owned firms are less likely to bribe than smaller domestic ones. But among bribers, foreign and domestic firms pay similar amounts. Multinational firms appear sensitive to reputational risks in their home countries, but partially adapt to their host country environments.     

固定单价合同下的工程造价控制策略研究

本文首先对固定单价合同的特点及其优缺点进行了分析。然后,分别阐述了固定单价合同下招投标阶段、施工阶段、竣工结算阶段的工程造价控制策略。其中,招投标阶段从制作招标文件、评标、合同谈判三个方面讲述工程造价控制应该注意的问题。     

考虑商品质量评价水平的退货和价格折扣契约复合供应链协调研究

商品质量因素越来越成为影响市场需求的一个重要因素。当考虑零售商的质量评价水平时,单一的契约(如退货契约或者折扣价格契约)无法使供应链系统达到协调,此时考虑两种或者两种以上契约的复合契约不失为一种可行的协调方法。文章基于退货和折扣价格复合契约通过建立具体的数学模型分析供应链系统的协调问题,得到了预期的协调效果,进而通过一个具体的算例更为详细直观地分析了复合契约的协调问题。     

Communicating the psychological contract: an employer perspective

The concept of the psychological contract, with its focus on the exchange of perceived promises and commitments, is increasingly used as a framework to study the employment relationship. Yet research has predominantly focused on employee views and has largely neglected the organisational perspective and the management of the psychological contract. This article begins to redress the balance by reporting a study, based on a survey of 1,306 senior HR managers, that explores the management of the psychological contract and in particular the role of organisational communication. Three distinct and relevant aspects of organisational communication are identified, concerned with initial entry, day‐to‐day work and more future‐oriented, top‐down communication. Effective use of these forms of communication is associated with what managers judge to be a clearer and less frequently breached set of organisational promises and commitments, as well as with a fairer exchange and a more positive impact of policies and practices on employee attitudes and behaviour. The findings are discussed within the context of the wider literature on psychological contracts, organisational culture and HRM. The study confirms that the psychological contract offers managers a useful framework within which to consider and manage the employment relationship.     

不同质产品市场Stackelberg博弈模型

一个不同质产品市场中，两企业只能选择产量或价格中的一个为决策变量进行Stackelberg竞争，没有生产能力限制。均衡结果为产品可替代（互补）时，领头企业和尾随企业都将选择产量（价格）为决策变量，存在“先动优势”。     

Dual roles in psychological contracts: When managers take both agent and principal roles

Departing from the long-espoused assumption that managers act only as agents in employees' psychological contract with the organization, this paper asserts that in addition to the agent role, some managers, in an attempt to further their own self-interests, form and enact their own psychological contracts as principals with select employees. The combination of these dual roles often yields unacknowledged but significantly negative consequences for the employing organizations, the managers who choose a principal role, and the select employees with whom they form a psychological contract. Drawing upon agency, psychological contract, and social exchange theories, we develop the distinctive characteristics of the agent vs. principal roles, identify the antecedents that motivate managers to assume a principal role, develop four archetypes for combining the dual roles, and suggest the potentially harmful consequences for the above three parties mentioned. The paper concludes with theoretical and practical implications and suggestions for future research.     

Factors affecting institutional investors to add crypto-currency to asset portfolios

As crypto-currency has been gained great attention in financial market, it becomes more popular among institutional investment managers’ portfolios. Thus this research makes a pioneering study to investigate the role of crypto-currencies in PE company portfolios and factors affecting the institutional investors’ investment intention in order to enhance the reliability of their investment products. Data were obtained from 253 multinational PE company investment managers who have bought and used crypto-currency. The findings suggest not only important roles or drivers but also the moderating roles of innovativeness on relationships between the investment intention and its antecedents. It suggests that price volatility doesn’t lower institutional investors’ confidence as long as the market can offer timely and accurate price change information to meet investors’ price consciousness. The result also identifies that crypto-currency with high familiarity and trust can be well-suited in institutional investors’ portfolios.     

The Coordination and Preference of Supply Chain Contracts Based on Time-Sensitivity Promotional Mechanism

To encourage retailers to submit orders as soon as possible, manufacturers usually launch a time-sensitivity promotional mechanism that the earlier you order, the cheaper the wholesale price will be in advance of the selling season. This paper aims to investigate if the mechanism can improve supply chain performance. A dyadic decentralized supply chain system comprising a single manufacturer and a single retailer is viewed as a research framework. Initially, a benchmark model is proposed to provide a criterion-referenced for coordinating the supply chain in a non-standard distribution environment. Second, a time-sensitive wholesale price contract is constructed to confirm that the mechanism can coordinate the supply chain. However, the retailer accepts the entire forecast risk under the contract. An improved contract called a time-sensitive revenue-sharing contract is constructed based on the notion that the manufacturer shares partial forecast risk. The results show that participants can arbitrarily divide the optimal supply chain’s expected profit between the constructed price contracts; however, two differences exist between the contracts, that is, participants have contract preferences. Finally, a numerical analysis and a few management insights are given.     

特许经营的契约性质

特许经营的契约是一组无形资产"捆绑"在一起融入某种商品交易中的复合契约;契约中交易的收入条款往往没有直接确定无形资产的独立价格,而是确定为一个基数加上某种商品交易收入的分成;契约中交易的使用条款通常包含特许人对受许人生产经营过程的"干预"、"指挥"和"协调"方面的规定。契约实质是一组无形资产的间接定价机制。     

经理人组合报酬激励契约模型研究

经理人报酬激励制度是现代企业激励机制的重要组成部分,现代经理人的报酬激励具有多种实现形式。为了激励经理人的有效行为,利用最优报酬契约经济理论构建了一个包含短期激励以及长期激励的财务性组合报酬契约模型,以及分析非财务性报酬对经理人行为选择的影响,是十分必要的,尤其是对我国国有企业经理人报酬激励制度优化问题,应该是很好的借鉴。     

Volatility of exchange rate futures and high-low price spreads

This study explores the time-series behavior and the predictability of daily percentage changes in the Japanese Yen futures contracts. The relationship between currency futures volatility and high-low price spreads in the Japanese Yen futures contracts is examined. In addition, this study explores the issue of first- and second-order dependencies in the Japanese Yen futures contract prices changes, address the issue of asymmetric volatility, and examine the extent to which the information contained in the high-low price spreads can be used to predict future Japanese Yen currency futures contract price changes. The analysis is carried out using the EGARCH model. The volatility of the Japanese Yen currency futures price changes is adequately modeled by an EGARCH process and is predictable using information contained in the high-low price spread variables constructed in this study. This study also finds a positive and significant relationship between the spread variable and the conditional mean of price changes, suggesting that current information contained in the spread variable can be used to predict future Japanese Yen currency futures contract price changes. The hypothesis that volatility is an asymmetric function of past innovations is confirmed.     

Electronic reverse auction configuration and its impact on buyer price and supplier perceptions of opportunism: A laboratory experiment

Buying organizations are increasingly using electronic reverse auctions (eRAs) to source from suppliers. However, recent quasi-experimental and field research has suggested that the use of this sourcing technique can create perceptions of opportunism among participating suppliers. Yet from the buyer's perspective, online reverse auctions can yield lower purchase prices. Given the many ways in which to configure on-line auctions, we extend existing research by using a laboratory experiment to investigate how different reverse auction configurations jointly influence bid price and suppliers’ perceptions of buyer opportunism.Our findings suggest that supplier bid prices decrease over time as they participate in more eRAs, regardless of the configuration of auction parameters. However, the combination of rank (versus price) visibility, high (versus low) supplier need to win a contract, and six (versus three) competitors was significantly more effective than other combinations of variables in immediately reducing bid prices. The data also indicated that when suppliers’ bids dropped substantially across auctions, their perceptions of opportunism increased. Notably, auction parameter combinations such as price visibility, three competitors, and low need for the contract yielded comparably low bids by the third auction, without any increases in perceived buyer opportunism.     

When do high‐level managers believe they can influence the stock price? Antecedents of stock price expectancy cognitions

Stock based rewards are often used to motivate high‐level managers to take actions to increase the stock price of the firm. However, numerous constraints may weaken the perceived link between individual effort and stock price appreciation for many recipients. This study introduces a new construct, stock price expectancy, which we define as individuals' perceptions of influence over their firm's stock price. We examined its antecedents in a sample of 349 high‐level U.S. managers and found that employment at corporate headquarters, firm size, hierarchical level, and contact with investment analysts predicted stock price expectancy perceptions. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链契约分析及优化研究

以政府、供应商和制造商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,探讨政府补贴和供应链契约对绿色供应链绩效的影响。构建了批发价格契约、收益共享契约和数量折扣契约模型,比较分析了不同契约下各主体效益及契约选择偏好,设计了收益共享且绿色投入成本共担契约来提高供应链绩效。研究发现:消费者绿色偏好越强烈,产品绿色度和供应链各主体效益越高;当产品绿色度相等时,制造商更倾向于选择批发价格契约,而供应商和政府更倾向于选择收益共享契约或数量折扣契约;相较于其他契约,设计的收益共享且绿色投入成本共担契约可以提高产品绿色度和企业效益。本文为考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链企业决策及选择合理的合作契约提供了理论支持。