Nominal rigidities equilibria in a non-Ricardian economy

I consider a cash-in-advance economy with nominal price rigidities. Nominal interest rates are the cost of liquidity and fiscal policy sets nominal transfers that affect the distribution of wealth. Under a fiscal policy associated with an unequal distribution of wealth and for policies of low or even zero interest rates, coordination failures exist, that is, involuntary unemployment persist even if prices are set at full employment levels. Coordination failures exist if and only if nominal rates are below a threshold. Moreover, I demonstrate the following result on welfare: full employment allocations at a nominal rate equal to the threshold (high liquidity costs) are better, in terms of welfare, from unemployment allocations at any non-negative interest rates below the threshold. On the other hand, under a sufficiently progressive fiscal system that reduces the inequality in the wealth distribution, coordination failures do not exist.     

Sudden Unintended Used‐Price Deceleration? The 2009–2010 Toyota Recalls

Using data from the vehicle resale market, I test consumer responsiveness to large‐scale product recalls that are caused by safety problems. The used‐vehicle prices of Toyotas are compared to the used‐vehicle prices of the other major domestic and foreign manufacturers. The results quantify the losses suffered by Toyota vehicle owners in secondary markets due to the 2009–2010 safety recalls of more than 9 million Toyota Motors vehicles. The treatment effect of a recall is measured using panel data with a difference‐in‐differences estimation approach that allows for time‐varying treatment effects and serial correlation. I find that this recall episode had negative effects in the resale market for automobiles that were quantitatively small (less than 2% of the vehicle’s resale value), statistically indistinguishable from zero, and short lived (did not persist beyond December 2009). A comparison with Audi’s recalls in the 1980s of vehicles with sudden unintended acceleration suggests that the extent to which a company’s reputation is established is more important than whether or not a company has a reputation for producing high‐quality products.     

Migration and gender differences in the home labour market: Evidence from Albania

This paper examines the role of migration in affecting the labour market opportunities of male and female household members left behind. We address this question by analyzing the impact of international migration flows from Albania, where migration is a massive and male-dominated phenomenon. We find that the labour supply of men and women responds differently to current and past migration. Controlling for the potential endogeneity of migration, estimates show that having a migrant abroad decreases female paid labour supply while increasing unpaid work. On the other hand, women with past family migration experience are significantly more likely to engage in self-employment and less likely to supply unpaid work. The same relationships do not hold for men. These results suggest that while left-behind women in Albania may take on the extra burden associated with the migration of male family members, they gain employment opportunities upon their return.     

Comparing the effectiveness of employment subsidies

This paper examines the implications of different types of employment subsidies for employment, welfare, and inequality. It investigates how these effects depend on what target groups the subsidies address. Our analysis focuses on policies that are “approximately welfare efficient” (AWE), i.e. policies that (a) improve employment and welfare, (b) do not raise earnings inequality and (c) are self-financing. We construct a microfounded, dynamic model of hiring and separations and calibrate it with German data. The calibration shows that hiring vouchers can be AWE, while low-wage subsidies are not AWE. Furthermore, hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed are more effective than those targeted at low-ability workers.     

Fleet management policies for humanitarian organizations: Beyond the utilization–residual value trade-off

Four-wheel drive vehicles play a pivotal role in securing the last-mile distribution of goods and services in humanitarian development programs. To optimize the use of their fleets, humanitarian organizations recommend policies aimed at enhancing the utilization of vehicles while preserving residual value. Although these decisions have a significant impact on cost, there is limited empirical evidence to show that the recommended policies are actually implemented and that they produce the expected benefits. This paper theoretically and empirically examines the complex and inter-related effects of vehicle-to-mission allocation decisions and of alternative vehicle usage patterns on vehicle utilization and residual value in humanitarian development programs. The results suggest that humanitarian organizations could break the utilization–residual value trade-off by adopting different policies than the ones currently in place. They also reveal that organizations need to realize that what seems logical from the headquarters' perspective may be illogical or inconvenient for the field, and as a result, the field may do the opposite of what is recommended or even instructed. Therefore, they either need better data and analysis combined with audits or they need to improve mechanisms that incentivize field delegations to follow standards recommended by the headquarters.     

Bankruptcy, Takeovers, and Wage Contracts

Takeovers give raiders the opportunity of breaking implicit contracts inside the firm. If implicit contracts are adopted by workers and management to reach more efficient outcomes, then the possibility of takeovers may cause a welfare loss. We show that, under some conditions, this argument can go through even if the firm and the workers can write explicit and complete contracts. The crucial assumption is that the profitability of the firm is linked to its financial situation, in the sense that a firm which has a high probability of bankruptcy will face fewer opportunities than a financially solid firm. In this framework, the possibility of takeovers imposes constraints on the set of feasible employment contracts, leading to inefficient outcomes.     

Upstream market structure and downstream partial ownership

Existing studies on partial ownership usually overlook the effects of vertically related markets. Our paper highlights the importance of the upstream market on downstream firms' incentives to acquire partial ownership and the consequent welfare implications. In the main model, we assume that there are three firms in the downstream market, two of which may form a partial ownership arrangement. We find several results that are in contrast to those in the literature. First, the two firms will engage in partial ownership if the upstream market is an oligopoly (triopoly or duopoly). Second, partial ownership may raise total production, consumer surplus, and social welfare. This happens when the upstream market consists of a duopoly and the two firms involved in partial ownership are supplied by different suppliers. Third, the outsider, commonly known as a free rider in the literature, may become a victim of partial ownership. Our results are robust to several extensions, including a general $n$-firm framework, product differentiation, and uniform pricing by upstream firms. We also provide the conditions under which the curvature of the demand function and the convexity of the cost function motivate firms to form partial ownership.     

Can a minimum wage increase employment and reduce prices in a neoclassical perfect information economy?

This paper investigates the possibility that the imposition of a minimum wage increases employment in the affected sector, measured in terms of hours of work, and lowers product prices. Unlike related prior theoretical research, I consider a neoclassical perfect information economy. Both labor and product markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Workers choose the number of hours of work and their effort level. Workers can potentially, but not necessarily, differ in their preferences over income, leisure, and effort. Effort is perfectly observable by the employers. The general framework that highlights the channels through which a minimum wage can increase employment and reduce prices is introduced and necessary and sufficient conditions derived. The paper also develops a number of comparative statics and some illustrative examples. The results provide a simple theoretical foundation that explains some recent findings of the empirical literature on minimum wages. Auxiliary results help explain the effects of minimum wage on the entire wage distribution in a way that is consistent with empirical findings. Finally, welfare analysis shows that worker welfare and employment tend to go in opposite directions; in particular, if employment increases after the imposition of the minimum wage, worker welfare will be reduced, though not necessarily vice versa (the opposite is true for consumer welfare). Strikingly, if a minimum wage increases worker welfare, the chief beneficiaries are not the affected workers but those with incomes that exceed the minimum wage.     

Why aren't all Truck Drivers Owner‐Operators? Asset Ownership and the Employment Relation in Interstate for‐hire Trucking

Transaction‐cost and agency theorists have frequently cited trucks as prototypical user‐owned assets, and have consequently predicted a predominance of self‐employed drivers who contract with motor carriers. In fact, owner‐operators accounted for less than one‐third of US trucking activity conducted by large interstate trucking firms in 1991, a proportion that has changed little since deregulation. Given the predictions of organizational economists, why is self‐employment in the interstate trucking industry not the dominant organization form? We propose that transaction costs and agency costs are indeed important in the trucking industry. In the absence of externalities across hauls, contracting between carriers and owner‐operators is preferred for traditional agency reasons. However, when the outcome of one haul imposes externalities on other hauls or on the carrier's reputation, an owner‐operator will not internalize all costs associated with poor outcomes. Given problems of noncontractibility of maintenance effort, carrier ownership of the vehicle is the preferred organizational form in such a case. We also propose that vehicle idiosyncrasy can create thin market conditions that encourage carrier ownership of vehicles. A study of the organization and operations of 354 trucking firms for 1991 provides evidence consistent with these predictions.     

国有企业所得税与绩效目标的福利效应

结合国有企业的相对绩效考核机制,本文建立了一个包含国有企业等多元所有制部门的开放经济模型,以考察国有企业所得税、绩效目标等外生政策调整时的福利效应。数值分析结果表明,当国企相对业绩目标低于市场水平时,适度提高国企所得税负可增进经济效率与社会福利,减轻国企所得税负将适得其反。根据这一发现,为纠正2007年企业所得税改革对国企经营的约束放松,避免经济效率与社会福利损失,政府应提高对国企的绩效考核目标。     

A novel approach to legacy donations with long-term benefits supported by numerical illustrations

Philanthropic donors face challenges in matching the causes to which they donate, the time horizon—and thus impact—of their donations, and the charitable vehicles they choose for making contributions. Wealthier donors may elect to create their own foundations and customize their charitable support. Less wealthy donors have limited choices: they may contribute to a nonprofit's current operations or to existing nonprofit endowments. We present a novel approach for making charitable donations, blending aspects of each of these strategies. Our approach has potential long-term financial benefits, allows donors to control their charitable donations in a convenient and easy-to-implement manner, can be established through an existing nonprofit organization, expands opportunities for more donors because it requires a smaller corpus contribution with lower management costs than creating a foundation, provides tax savings in the United States and other countries (e.g., the UK, Canada, and Australia) comparable to other planned giving vehicles, and may be implemented during one's lifetime using donor advised funds or as part of a legacy plan through the donor's estate documents, which is when the long-term benefits accrue.     

Seasonal Employment, Seasonal Unemployment and Unemployment Compensation: The Case of the Tourist Industry of the Greek Islands

Abstract . A theoretical and empirical investigation of the employment opportunities generated in the tourist industry of the Greek islands, this study supports the conventional thesis that unemployment is not necessarily produced by seasonal employment. Unemployment following a period of seasonal employment may be voluntary or involuntary. Some employees choose seasonal occupations because they pay more. Others do so because seasonal occupations suit their non-market activities during their off-peak season(s), or they may lack any other occupational alternatives. Any unemployment compensation policy designed to smooth out the seasonal nature of employment in industries such as tourism may accentuate the unemployment problem.     

CARROT AND STICK: HOW RE‐EMPLOYMENT BONUSES AND BENEFIT SANCTIONS AFFECT EXIT RATES FROM WELFARE

To increase the exit from welfare, benefit recipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a re‐employment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least 6 months. However, they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a temporary reduction of their benefits. We find that the financial sticks in the form of benefit sanctions were effective in stimulating the exit from welfare, while the financial carrots in the form of re‐employment bonuses were not. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The competitive firm under price uncertainty: the role of information and hedging

We study the impact of transparency in a commodity market on the decision problem of a competitive firm under price uncertainty and hedging opportunities. Market transparency is modeled by means of the informational content of publicly observable signals which are correlated with the random price. We find that the impact of more transparency on labor employment and production depends on the firm’s technology. In particular, more transparency may result in lower average output even though on average more labor has been used in the production process. We also analyze the link between market transparency and the welfare of the firm. We are grateful to two anonymous referees who made extremely useful comments and suggestions.     

Union wages,hours of work and the effectiveness of partial coordination agreements

Small monopoly trade unions decide upon the wage rate per hour and the hours of work subject to firm's demand for union members. Since the resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by excess unemployment, we study the employment and welfare effects when trade unions try to coordinate their policies. Firstly, we consider a joint agreement about marginal wage moderation, where trade unions remain free to choose the hours of work non-cooperatively. Secondly, we analyze in which way a joint change in the hours of work affects employment and welfare if trade unions are free to choose the wage rate.     

Flexicurity and job satisfaction in Europe: The importance of perceived and actual job stability for well-being at work

In this paper we study the effect of a micro-level measure of flexicurity on workers' job satisfaction. To this end, using micro-data from the Eurobarometer survey, we disaggregate the sample of workers into different groups according not only to their employment contract (i.e. permanent or temporary), but also to their perceived job security, and we evaluate differences in job satisfaction between these groups. After the potential endogeneity of job type has been controlled for, the results show that what matters for job satisfaction is not just the type of contract, but mainly the perceived job security, which may be independent of the type of contract.The combination “temporary but secure job” seems preferable to the combination “permanent but insecure job”, indicating that the length of the contract may be less important if the worker perceives that s/he is not at risk of becoming unemployed. Our main conclusions are robust to the use of alternative definitions of workers' types and they generally hold within different welfare regimes and also for different aspects of job satisfaction, mainly those more related to job security.     

Principles of controlling traffic noise : Solving a multi-objective decision problem

The main objectives for a government to control traffic noise are such as economic efficiency, a reasonable welfare distribution and acceptable noise standards. The instruments available for arriving at these objectives are traffic control, emission regulation and environment protection. This paper analyzes how to make trade-offs between such objectives and how to choose a combination of noise control instruments. Special attention is then made to one welfare distribution objective, namely the ‘polluters-pay-principle’. That principle demands using the vehicle tax to finance investments to protect environment. And in order to stimulate the development of less noisy vehicles such a tax has to be progressively increased for noisy cars. The analysis is demonstrated on the situation of Sweden where a differentiation of norms as well as of vehicle taxes is proposed.     

Financial participation and recruitment and retention: causes and consequences

Using a sample of over 5000 establishments in Germany, we analyze the antecedents and effects of profit sharing (PS) and employee share ownership (ESO) with respect to the ability of firms to meet their recruitment and retention objectives and to achieve employment growth. We draw on both economic and behavioral perspectives to argue that firms that adopt PS and ESO plans do so in order to attract and retain employees. Using logistic regression and a propensity score matching technique, we find that firms that face higher recruitment problems, and those that have greater employment growth objectives, are more likely to use ESO and PS. Unlike ESO, PS enhances firm-level employment growth. However, neither ESO nor PS help firms to fully resolve recruitment and retention problems.     

Cost-reduction innovation under mixed economy

This paper analyzes the innovation strategies of mixed duopoly with a (semi-) public firm and a private firm, and the welfare effects of public ownership are captured. The findings indicate that the private firm is more active in research and development activities than the (semi-) public firm. Meanwhile, the total production increases with the degree of public ownership, and both firms have to suffer losses in profits. From the viewpoint of social welfare, partial nationalization is the optimal strategy. The policy implication of the findings highlights that partial nationalization should be encouraged under mixed economy.     

Job suburbanization,zoning and the welfare of urban minority groups

This paper poses a model of the effects of job suburbanization and suburban exclusionary zoning on the welfare of blacks and other urban minority groups. It explores the circumstances under which blacks take suburban jobs and whether they are made better off if they do so. The possibilities that blacks outcommute from central area ghettos and that they relocate to suburban housing near the jobs are each considered. A hypothetical governmental project to subsidize the creation of 10,000 suburban jobs for blacks is explored in a cost-benefit framework, stressing the effects of suburban exclusionary zoning on the project's feasibility.