Mutual Fund Performance: Evidence from the UK

This paper uses a large sample containing the complete returnhistories of 2300UK openended mutual funds over a 23-year periodto measure fund performance. We find some evidence of underperformanceon a risk-adjusted basis by the average fund manager, persistenceofperformance and the existence of a substantial survivor bias.Similar findings have been reported for US equity mutual funds.New findings not previously documented for other markets includeevidence that mutual fund performance varies substantially acrossdifferent asset categories, especially foreign asset categories.We also identify some new patterns in performance related tothe funds' distance from their inception and termination dates:underperformance intensifies as the fund termination date approaches,while, in contrast, there is some evidence that funds (weakly)outperform during their first year of existence.     

Persistent performance in the mutual fund market: Tests with funds and investment advisers

Recent studies of mutual funds have concluded that there is some evidence of superior performance. We test for the existence of superior performance and its persistence with mutual funds and mutual fund investment advisers on a data set of monthly returns from 1979 to 1989 for 1,387 mutual funds grouped by 243 advisers. We find no evidence of superior performance or its persistence but we do find significant evidence of persistence of inferior performance. Consistent with previous studies our findings depend on the benchmark chosen, with multiple benchmarks producing a larger degree of inferior performance.     

Starting on the wrong foot: Seasonality in mutual fund performance

We document a systematic seasonal component in the aggregate underperformance of active mutual funds. At the aggregate level, active funds underperform the market and other passive benchmarks only in the first month of a quarter. This intra-quarter performance seasonality holds across fund sizes and investment styles. The pattern is consistent with short-term stock return reversal effects along with aggregate window-dressing and, to a lesser extent, NAV-inflation practices around quarter-ends. We find marginal or no evidence of microstructure biases, fund investor flows, or cash distributions as sources of this seasonality. Our findings highlight new features of the active management underperformance puzzle.     

Synthetic hedge funds

We provide evidence on the performance and the replication success of a broad sample of 72 synthetic hedge funds from January 2009 to December 2013. Thereby, we assign the term “synthetic hedge fund” to mutual funds and exchange-traded funds with hedge fund indices as their benchmarks. Replication success is measured through different perspectives from distributional characteristics to risk-adjusted performance. We find an overall significant underperformance of synthetic hedge funds compared to an appropriate benchmark index. Furthermore, mutual funds (associated with active portfolio management) can produce return characteristics closer to hedge fund benchmarks than exchange-traded funds (associated with passive management) can. From a single strategy perspective, we find a picture of heterogeneity. Regarding the market environment, we show larger return differences for unusual market conditions than for regular ones.     

Financial consequences of mutual fund mergers

This study examines the impact of mutual fund mergers on performance and investment flows of target and acquiring funds. Results indicate some improvements in the post-merger performance for target funds shareholders. Results also confirm prior evidence of negative net asset flows in target funds in the pre-merger period as well as negative, but not significant, net asset flows in the years following the merger. However, a more detailed analysis allows us to observe that this lack of significance in the negative reaction of investors to mutual fund mergers is explained by the compensation of abnormally high inflows and outflows in the resultant funds. These substantial flows are significantly above the average in their market segment, especially regarding money flows. This finding provides evidence that investors pay attention to mutual fund mergers, especially institutional investors who are concentrated on the market possibilities resulting from these organizational processes.     

The performance of Japanese mutual funds

We analyze the performance of Japanese open-type stock mutualfunds for the 1981-1992 period. The results show that, regardlessof the performance measures and benchmarks employed, most ofthe Japanese mutual funds underperform the benchmarks by between3.6% and 10.8% per annum. These funds tend to invest more inlarge stocks with low book-to-market ratios. But this featuredoes not explain the underperformance. A potential explanationis the dilution effect caused by inflows of funds. In Japan,a new investor of an open-type fund only pays in the after-taxvalue of the net asset value. We conduct a bootstrap experimentto assess the magnitude of this dilution effect.     

Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Decomposition into Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses

We use a new database to perform a comprehensive analysis of the mutual fund industry. We find that funds hold stocks that outperform the market by 1.3 percent per year, but their net returns underperform by one percent. Of the 2.3 percent difference between these results, 0.7 percent is due to the underperformance of nonstock holdings, whereas 1.6 percent is due to expenses and transactions costs. Thus, funds pick stocks well enough to cover their costs. Also, high-turnover funds beat the Vanguard Index 500 fund on a net return basis. Our evidence supports the value of active mutual fund management.     

Investment restrictions and fund performance

We examine the effect of investment restrictions on mutual fund performance. Utilizing a unique panel of mutual fund contract changes, we explore several ways these changes affect a fund, including: performance, funding risk, and managerial contracting. We find that the general shift towards fewer restrictions over the period 1996–2011 has provided little benefit to mutual funds. Specifically, neither performance nor flow increased and we observe no changes in risk on average. We do find, however, an increased likelihood of management turnover when restrictions are removed. We conclude that contract restrictions do not explain the general underperformance of mutual funds, and that these investment restrictions are not binding.     

Performance persistence and style consistency of Indian fixed income mutual funds – A longitudinal study

In this study, we evaluate the performance of Indian fixed-income mutual funds using a comprehensive sample over a ten-year period from April 2010 to March 2020. We examine performance persistence of 190 fixed income funds across 16 fund categories and analyze investment style of the most persistent and top performing funds. We assess performance persistence using recursive portfolio formation test, and analyze investment style using Sharpe's (1992) asset class factor model supplemented with Lobosco and diBartolomeo (1997) approach for statistical robustness. We also study the correlation between performance persistence and style consistency and find persistent funds to be less consistent in style. Our findings indicate that a substantial proportion (73%) of the funds considered were under-performers. Our results pertaining to style analysis indicate substantial drift in investment style from regulator-mandated investment objectives. Further, the study nudges regulators to revisit the prevailing practice of fund classification based on Macaulay's duration. In light of the growing prominence of Indian fixed income securities, the findings of this study are all the more pertinent to investors, asset management companies and policy makers.     

Mutual fund performance when parent firms simultaneously manage hedge funds

This study examines the performance of mutual funds managed by firms that simultaneously manage hedge funds. We find that the reported returns of mutual funds in these “side-by-side” associations with hedge funds significantly underperformed those of mutual funds that shared similar fund and family characteristics but differed in that they were not affiliated with hedge funds. Digging deeper into performance, we find that the underperformance was confined to return gaps, a return measure that captures the impact of unobservable managerial actions. Interestingly, mutual funds with investment styles that were most closely aligned to affiliated hedge funds generated reported-return alphas and return gaps that underperformed by the greatest amount. Finally, we find that side-by-side mutual funds received less of a contribution to performance from IPO underpricing than similar unaffiliated mutual funds or affiliated hedge funds. Evidence does not support the hypothesis that affiliations with hedge funds allow side-by-side mutual funds to attract superior stock-picking talent. Our evidence does not allow us to rule out the possibility that management firms maximized fee income by strategically transferring performance from mutual funds to hedge funds.     

The Performance of European Index Funds and Exchange‐Traded Funds

European index funds and exchange‐traded funds underperform their benchmarks by 50 to 150 basis points per annum. The explanatory power of dividend withholding taxes as a determinant of this underperformance is at least on par with fund expenses. Dividend taxes also explain performance differences between funds that track different benchmarks and time variation in fund performance. Our results imply that not only fund expenses, but also dividend taxes can result in a substantial drag on mutual fund performance.     

Persistence in Equity Fund Performance in Brazil

We examine performance persistence in the large and growing Brazilian equity fund market from 2000 to 2012. We find a significant risk-adjusted spread between a portfolio of top- and bottom-performing funds, which supports the idea that performance persists. This spread remains after controlling for market, size, distress, and momentum risk factors and tends to be larger and more significant for a set of small and retail funds. The spread is mostly driven by the underperformance of the bottom decile of funds, which is consistent with the existence of some fund managers with insufficient skills to recover investment costs.     

The Performance,Asset Allocation,and Investment Style of International Equity Managers

This paper evaluates the performance of 114 international equity managers over the January 1988–December 1997 period. Performance tests are conducted using Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968) performance methodologies. The managers are divided into mutual fund (n=54) and separately managed fund (n=60) investment management categories. Each management category is further divided by foreign and world (global) investment objectives. Three major findings are reported. First, international equity managers, on average, were unable to outperform the MSCI World market proxy during the sample period. However, world managers did perform better than their foreign counterparts. Second, geographic asset allocation and equity style allocation decisions enhanced the performance of international managers during the sample period. Third, separately managed funds outperformed mutual funds during the period studied when mutual fund returns are measured net of management fees. The apparent managed performance advantage abates, however, when mutual fund returns are adjusted to include management fees. Thus, we find no significant difference in the performance of the management categories when returns are measured gross of fees.     

THE PERFORMANCE OF BANK‐MANAGED MUTUAL FUNDS

The ability of banks to offer proprietary mutual funds has expanded over recent years, and the mutual fund industry has been a significant growth area for banks. I examine the growth and performance of bank proprietary bond mutual funds. The empirical results show no evidence that bank‐managed mutual funds underperform nonbank funds. I find some evidence that bank managers are more conservative than nonbank managers in terms of investment strategy and that banks appear more likely to target individual rather than institutional investors. Also, I find that abnormal fund performance does not appear to be a significant determinant of the net asset flows into and out of bank‐managed mutual funds. Rather, the results suggest bank investors rely mainly on past marketing information and the general reputation of the bank. JEL classification: G11, G21     

Do Female Mutual Fund Managers Manage Differently?

We examine the performance and investment behavior of female fixed‐income mutual fund managers compared with male fixed‐income mutual fund managers. We find that male‐ and female‐managed funds do not differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Our results suggest that differences in investment behavior often attributed to gender may be related to investment knowledge and wealth constraints. Despite the similarities between male and female managers, we find evidence that gender influences the decision making of mutual fund investors. We find that the net asset flows into funds managed by females are lower than for males, especially for the manager's initial year managing the fund.     

INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL FUNDS

In this paper we add several new perspectives to the growing body of empirical evidence on the investment performance of international mutual funds by applying a pooled cross-sectional/time-series regression methodology to a large data base over an extended period. Risk-adjusted and unadjusted investment returns are not related to whether a fund is load or no-load, and asset size, expense ratios, and turnover rates are not related to investment performance. We find no reward for paying a load fee when investing in mutual funds. It is noteworthy that performance is not affected by fund size, given the explosive growth of international mutual funds.     

Capacity effects and winner fund performance: the relevance and interactions of fund size and family characteristics

This study analyzes the existence of capacity effects and performance persistence for US equity mutual funds for the period from 1992 to 2007. We focus on winner funds and distinguish between capacity effects from both size and inflows and explore their interactions with two measures of family size, i.e. family total net assets under management (family TNA) and the number of funds at the family level (family breadth). The differentiation of family size allows us to analyze competing effects at the family level such as economies of scale as well as organizational complexity costs and conflicts of interest. Our empirical results confirm diseconomies of scale at the winner fund level and indicate that only small winner funds with low inflows significantly outperform the four-factor benchmark on a net return basis. There are no universal benefits from economies of scale at the family level, but our findings suggest the existence of conflicts of interest in families offering a relatively large number of funds. Small winner funds in families offering a small number of funds significantly outperform while economies of scale only materialize among extremely small winner funds. We provide detailed robustness checks for our empirical results. Overall, simply conditioning on fund size is not sufficient for selecting future outperforming funds. The results indicate that fund investors may earn positive abnormal returns when combining information on fund size with information on fund flows or fund family affiliations in their asset allocation decisions.     

Asset sales in the mutual fund industry: Who gains?

We analyze gains from intercorporate sales of mutual fund subsidiaries, using mandated SEC disclosures to assess the performance of mutual funds transferred by these transactions. Sellers are financial conglomerates (banks) using equity-based deals to transfer poorly performing funds to highly focused asset management companies. The transferred funds experience significant improvements in risk-adjusted returns, efficiency, and asset growth. These improvements are closely correlated with the gains in wealth to buyers and sellers at deal announcements, indicating the market efficiently capitalizes expected performance improvements. Our results provide evidence that these transactions transfer assets to acquirers better able to manage them, generating gains for fund holders and buyer and seller shareholders.     

Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross‐Fund Subsidization

We investigate whether mutual fund families strategically transfer performance across member funds to favor those more likely to increase overall family profits. We find that “high family value” funds (i.e., high fees or high past performers) overperform at the expense of “low value” funds. Such a performance gap is above the one existing between similar funds not affiliated with the same family. Better allocations of underpriced initial public offering deals and opposite trades across member funds partly explain why high value funds overperform. Our findings highlight how the family organization prevalent in the mutual fund industry generates distortions in delegated asset management.     

Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments

This study analyzes the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds in response to their relative performance over the 1992 to 1999 period. Our results show that managers of funds whose performance is closer to that of the top performing funds have greater incentives to increase their portfolios' risk than managers at the top who exhibit a tendency to lock in their positions. The evidence suggests that termination risk imposes a constraint on the risk taking behavior of under-performing fund managers and the winner takes all phenomenon generates a strong incentive for the fund managers to be the top manager. We also analyze the difference in the risk taking behavior of funds managed by multiple managers and single managers.