THE CORRECT SPECIFICATION OF OPPORTUNITY COST IN THE EVALUATION OF BOND ISSUE SIZE AND TIMING

The question of when and in what quantity to obtain required bond financing takes on significance due to fixed flotation coats and the opportunity to invest excess long-term debt in marketable securities. In prior research, the optimal size and timing of bond issues is most often determined as the solution to a cost minimization problem. In this paper, we first demonstrate that previous studies have incorrectly identified the opportunity cost of excess debt. We then delineate the opportunity cost in a form consistent with modern capital structure theory. Our results indicate that a firm's capital structure and marginal tax rate are important determinants of the optimal size and timing of its bond issues.     

BRITISH MANAGERS: A STUDY OF THEIR EDUCATION,TRAINING, MOBILITY AND EARNINGS

This study uses information from the National Training Survey to investigate the education, qualifications, mobility and earnings of persons with managerial responsibilities. From this analysis, we conclude that there is a need for both private and public organisations to increase the quantity and improve the quality of the training available to their managers and potential managers. More important though is the need to monitor the impact of training programmes and reward managers accordingly.     

A SURVEY OF ENGINEERING DESIGN LITERATURE: METHODOLOGY,EDUCATION, ECONOMICS,AND MANAGEMENT ASPECTS

This paper provides a comprehensive list of relevant books and articles pertaining to the subject area of “engineering design,” with specific focus on the methodology, education, economics, and management aspects of the design discipline. The purpose of this survey of engineering design literature is to provide a compendium of books and articles that may be instrumental in facilitating the process of sharing and disseminating design knowledge     

按许用压力角确定凸轮机构基本尺寸的正确方法

现有按许用压力角确定凸轮机构基本尺寸的方法欠妥.本文针对现有方法的症结,由压力角及计算式入手,提出了解决这个问题的正确方法.     

DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY,ENTRY MODE,AND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE OF CHOICE AND CONSTRAINTS

Despite theoretical arguments matching type of diversification strategy with mode of entry, the exact form of relationships between strategy, mode of entry, and performance remains enigmatic. Our analysis, based on two samples, demonstrates that matches between strategy and mode did improve performance in one time period, but not a second. In addition, the results show that exclusive reliance on a single mode (internal development or acquisition) can restrict performance. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE EFFECT OF GROUP SIZE AND ASYMMETRIES ON THE INCENTIVE TO REVEAL GROUP‐SPECIFIC INFORMATION*

In this paper, I examine how firms' incentives to differentiate their products through the revelation of truthful information about product attributes varies with the distribution of consumer preferences for those attributes. I show that information will tend to be provided for large groups, even absent scale economies in producing that information. In addition, the relative sizes of the groups whose estimates of product quality change positively vs. negatively (i.e., the degree of asymmetry) by the information is likewise an important determinant of its profitability.     

FORM OF CONTROL: A CRITICAL DETERMINANT OF ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE AND CEO REWARDS

Based on two research streams, we investigate whether acquiring firms’ form of control might be associated differently with CEO rewards or excess returns. We theoretically reason that in manager-controlled corporations acquisitions may be detrimental to the interests of shareholders and CEO rewards might be based on nonperformance criteria. In owner-manager-controlled and owner-controlled firms acquisitions may benefit the stockholders. While CEO rewards of owner-controlled firms may be based on performance criteria, however, executive rewards of owner-manager-controlled firms may be based on both performance and nonperformance factors. The findings indicate that for manager-controlled firms acquisition announcements result in negative excess returns to shareholders. For owner-controlled and owner-manager-controlled firms such announcements result in positive excess returns. The findings also suggest that increases in corporate size due to acquisitions are significantly and positively associated with CEO rewards of manager-controlled and owner-manager-controlled firms. For owner-controlled firms, excess returns are significantly and positively associated with CEO rewards. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

PERCEIVED MANAGERIAL DISCRETION: A STUDY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

The notion that managers encounter differing levels of discretion across industries and organizations is becoming central to discussions of strategy formulation and implementation. However, discretion can be exercised or created only to the extent it is perceived, and theories of cognition and decision making suggest that managers’ perceptions of discretion may vary significantly. Despite the importance of perceptions to Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) theoretical model of managerial discretion, no empirical tests examining perceived discretion have been published to date. Drawing on theories of issue interpretation and impression management, we find that managers differ systematically in the amount of discretion they perceive. Specifically, we find support for the predicted relationship between locus of control, a stable personality difference, and perceptions of managerial discretion. We also find that perceived discretion predicts managerial power, but only in situations in which the manager actually has little discretion. The dynamic model presented and tested here suggests that managers, in part through impression management activities and their ability to attend to critical contingencies, may both increase their power and enlarge their latitude for action. Implications for strategy formulation and implementation are discussed. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.