To be or not to be in monetary union: A synthesis

Monetary union can benefit countries suffering from policy credibility problems if it eliminates the inflation bias and also allows for more efficient management of certain shocks. But it also carries costs as some stabilization may be feasible even in the absence of credibility, and this may be more than what an individual country can hope for in a monetary union. In this paper, we combine the stabilization and credibility branches of the currency union literature and construct a simple welfare criterion that can be used to evaluate alternative monetary arrangements. We produce examples where monetary union may be welfare improving even for low-modest levels of inflation bias (2-3%) as long as business cycles are not too a-synchronized across countries.     

Fiscal and monetary rules for a currency union

This paper addresses the optimal joint conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country model of a currency union with staggered price setting and distortionary taxes. A tractable linear-quadratic approximation permits a representation of the optimal policy plan in terms of targeting rules. In the optimal equilibrium, monetary policy should achieve aggregate price stability following a flexible inflation targeting rule. Fiscal policy should stabilize idiosyncratic shocks allowing for permanent variations of government debt but should abstain from creating inflationary expectations at the union level. Simple policy rules can approximate the optimal commitment benchmark through a mix of strict inflation targeting and flexible budget rules. Conversely, the welfare costs of balanced budget rules are at least one order of magnitude higher than conventional estimates of the costs of business cycle fluctuactions.     

Optimal monetary policy in a currency area

This paper investigates how monetary policy should be conducted in a two-region general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness. This framework delivers a simple welfare criterion based on the utility of the consumers that can be used to evaluate monetary policy in a currency area. If the two regions share the same degree of nominal rigidity, the terms of trade are completely insulated from monetary policy and the optimal outcome is obtained by targeting a weighted average of the regional inflation rates. These weights coincide with the economic sizes of the region. If the degrees of rigidity are different, the optimal plan implies a high degree of inertia in the inflation rate. But an inflation targeting policy in which higher weight is given to the inflation in the region with higher degree of nominal rigidity is nearly optimal.     

Monetary policy and welfare in a small open economy

This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a small open economy featuring monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. It shows that the utility-based loss function for this economy can be written as a quadratic expression of domestic inflation, output gap and real exchange rate. The presence of an internal monopolistic distortion and a terms of trade externality drives optimal policy away from domestic inflation targeting and affects the optimal level of exchange rate volatility. When domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes for each other, the optimal policy rule implies lower real exchange rate volatility than a domestic inflation targeting regime. The reverse is true when the elasticity of substitution between goods is low.     

货币政策的分配效应研究——基于异质性家庭视角

货币政策不仅是应对突发冲击、在短期内迅速实现经济复苏的政策工具,而且具有调节收入分配的功效。通过将异质性家庭和货币政策引入动态随机一般均衡分析框架,文章考察了扩张性货币政策的分配效应。研究发现,降息不仅能够促进李嘉图和经验规则式家庭的消费和就业,而且有助于降低消费不平等和收入不平等。与不考虑不平等因素的货币政策规则相比,考虑消费不平等和收入不平等的拓展规则引致的社会福利损失显著降低。因此,在制定和执行货币政策规则时,不仅应当考虑家庭的异质性,而且应当考虑可能的消费不平等与收入不平等。     

Openness and optimal monetary policy

We show that the composition of international trade has important implications for the optimal volatility of the exchange rate, above and beyond the size of trade flows. Using an analytically tractable small open economy model, we characterize the impact of the trade composition on the policy trade-off and on the role played by the exchange rate in correcting for price misalignments. Contrary to models where openness can be summarized by the degree of home bias, we find that openness can be a poor proxy of the welfare impact of alternative monetary policies. Using input–output data for 25 countries we document substantial differences in the import and non-tradable content of final demand components, and in the role played by imported inputs in domestic production. The estimates are used in a richer small-open-economy DSGE model to quantify the loss from an exchange rate peg relative to the Ramsey policy conditional on the composition of imports. We find that the main determinant of the losses is the share of non-traded goods in final demand.     

Fluctuations in the foreign exchange market: How important are monetary policy shocks?

We study the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks on the bilateral exchange rate between the U.S. and each of the G7 countries. We also estimate deviations from uncovered interest rate parity conditional on these shocks. The analysis is based on a structural vector autoregression in which monetary policy shocks are identified through the conditional heteroscedasticity of the structural disturbances. Unlike earlier work in this area, our empirical methodology avoids making arbitrary assumptions about the relevant policy indicator or transmission mechanism in order to achieve identification. At the same time, it allows us to assess the implications of imposing invalid identifying restrictions. Our results indicate that the nominal exchange rate exhibits delayed overshooting in response to a monetary expansion, depreciating for roughly ten months before starting to appreciate. The shock also leads to large and persistent departures from uncovered interest rate parity. Variance-decomposition results indicate that monetary policy shocks account for a non-trivial proportion of exchange rate fluctuations.     

Should the exchange rate be a shock absorber?

This paper examines the welfare case for the exchange rate as a “shock absorber”, cushioning an economy in face of shocks to world demand for its good. We provide an example in which, although the exchange rate acts perfectly as a shock absorber, stabilizing output around the natural rate, and eliminating the impact of nominal rigidities, it may in fact be better to prevent the exchange rate from adjusting at all. The explanation for this is that, with incomplete international financial markets, the natural rate is inefficient; it does not respond enough to demand shocks. While fixing the exchange rate increases the volatility of consumption, the pro-cyclical nature of monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate allows for a more efficient composition of consumption between home and foreign goods. Furthermore, for the shocks examined, a welfare maximizing monetary rule always dampens exchange rate volatility relative to that of a free float, and in some cases may imply a fixed exchange rate.     

Trade and Exchange Rate Policies in Formerly Centrally Planned Economies

This paper examines the international economic policies of the eastern European and Soviet Successes States in the early 1990s which provide one of those wide‐open windows of opportunity when powerful vested interests are not lobbying for retention of an existing tariff structure. Moreover, the simultaneous abandonment of central planning by over two dozen countries provided a natural experiment in which a range of differing policies might have been pursued. Policymakers in transition economies have generally ended up pursuing liberal non‐discriminatory trade and foreign exchange policies. There are exceptions and the majority may be wrong, but the presumption is that, perhaps after a learning or trial‐and‐error process, decision makers have found the rules of thumb suggested by economists to be their best guide to international economic policy. This paper notes that integration of transition economies into the global trading system has been surprisingly successful. Almost all the countries in transition from central planning have accepted the WTO rule‐based system in principle, even if there are variations in trade policies and performance, and have generally pursued multilateral non‐discriminatory trade policies. In particular, the potential danger of regionalism proving more attractive than multilateralism has not eventuated. The revealed behaviour of policymakers suggests that trade liberalisation is a good rule of thumb and regional groupings among transition economies have been insignificant. Despite a proliferation of new currencies, varying exchange rate regimes, and differing degrees of currency convertibility, the general pattern has been to accept convertibility for current account transdactions, and in many cases to extend this to a de jure commitment and to allow substantial capital account convertibility. A general policy conclusion in favour of more open and non‐discriminatory trade and exchange policies have passed the test of acceptability by policymakers in over two‐dozen countries in this category.     

关于货币政策透明度评估指标体系的研究

近年来,提高货币政策的透明度正在成为一个国际趋势。本文从如何度量货币政策透明度的角度出发,介绍了国外关于货币政策透明度评估指标体系的研究,并对其进行了简要评析。我国应借鉴发达国家的研究成果,有重点地加强我国货币政策的透明度建设,建立我国的评估指标体系,量化货币政策的透明度水平。     

不完全汇率传递下的货币政策工具规则分析

本文尝试构建一个开放条件下的总供给-总需求模型,通过名义进口价格刚性在模型中引入汇率传递因素。模型对各种货币政策工具规则下社会福利损失函数进行比较,考察在不同的汇率传递程度下的各种货币政策工具规则。研究结果显示,社会福利水平随着汇率传递程度下降而提高;货币政策工具规则对消费者物价指数(CPI)上涨作出反应一定程度上优于对国内制造商品价格上涨作出反应,制定的货币政策工具规则应该以CPI为目标,以使社会福利损失最小。     

An information-based theory of international currency

This paper develops an information-based theory of international currency based on search frictions, private trading histories, and imperfect recognizability of assets. Using an open-economy search model with multiple competing currencies, the value of each currency is determined without requiring agents to use a particular currency to purchase a country's goods. Strategic complementarities in portfolio choices and information acquisition decisions generate multiple equilibria with different types of payment arrangements. While some inflation can benefit the country issuing an international currency, the threat of losing international status puts an inflation discipline on the issuing country. When monetary authorities interact in a simple policy game, the temptation to inflate can lead optimal policy to deviate from the Friedman rule. The calibrated model can produce a welfare cost of losing international status for the issuing country larger than previous findings, though estimates depend critically on inflation rates and information costs.     

Strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs

This paper examines strategic trade and joint welfare maximizing incentives towards investment in the quality of exports by an LDC and a developed country. Firms first compete in qualities and then export to an imperfectly competitive, third country market. Under Bertrand competition, unilateral policy involves an investment subsidy by the low-quality LDC and an investment tax by the developed country, whereas jointly optimal policy calls for the reverse so as to reduce price competition by increasing product differentiation. Under Cournot competition, unilateral policy is also reversed from the Bertrand outcome, but jointly optimal policy involves a tax in both countries.     

UNIONIZATION AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY

This article examines the effect of unionization on welfare and trade policy using a model of duopolists competing in a third market. The traditional result that the presence of a union necessitates a stronger strategic trade policy to reach the optimal level of welfare hinges on the mode of competition. With Bertrand duopolists, a union can be welfare-improving; it can also lead to a weaker trade policy, or even reverse the direction of the optimal policy. Our results highlight the importance for trade policy of understanding the nature of firm behavior and the institutional features of the labor market.     

Incomplete pass-through and the welfare effects of exchange rate variability

This paper considers the implications of incomplete exchange rate pass-through for optimal monetary and exchange rate policy. A two-country model is presented, which allows an explicit derivation of welfare functions in terms of a weighted sum of the second moments of producer prices and the nominal exchange rate. From a single country perspective, the optimal exchange rate variance depends on the degree of pass-through, the size and openness of the economy, the elasticity of labour supply and the volatility of foreign producer prices. Welfare may be decreasing or increasing in the volatility of the exchange rate.     

Foreign influence and welfare

How do foreign interests influence policy? How are trade policies and the viability of trade agreements affected? What are the welfare implications of such foreign influence? In this paper we develop a model of foreign influence and apply it to the study of optimal tariffs. In a two-country voting model of electoral competition, we allow the incumbent party in each country to take costly actions that probabilistically affect the electoral outcome in the other country. We show that policies end up maximizing a weighted sum of domestic and foreign welfare. Using this formulation we show that foreign influence increases aggregate world welfare when there are no other means of alleviating the externalities that arise from cross-border effects of policies. In contrast, when countries can engage in international agreements, foreign influence can prove harmful as powerful countries may refuse to offer concessions. We also show that power imbalances are particularly detrimental to cooperation when they are positively correlated with economic size.     

A note on ‘optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information’

In [Journal of International Economics 36 (1994) 333], Larry Qiu developed a model of an optimal export promotion policy under asymmetric information. In the Bertrand competition, he shows that the expected welfare is larger under the uniform policy than under the separation-inducing policy. Actually, in this note, we show that no such separating equilibrium exists. Although his main conclusion in the Bertrand competition analysis is unaffected, his reasoning in the paper is misleading.     

Foreign entry and domestic welfare: lessons for developing countries

This paper examines the effects of foreign entry, in the form of either imports or direct foreign investment, into an oligopolistic market. Incorporating a possible divergence between private and social costs, it first derives simple conditions under which foreign entry reduces welfare relative to autarky. Then, in a multi-firm Cournot model with linear demand and international cost asymmetries, it shows that foreign entry reduces welfare unless it captures a very large share of the home market. However, it also shows that an optimal tariff can prevent this welfare decline. Some suggestive empirical evidence and extensions to differentiated products and to merger analysis are offered. The paper concludes with implications for trade and investment liberalization, as well as for domestic and international competition policy.     

R&D policies, trade and process innovation

We set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one of the firms.     

Optimal monetary policy in a currency union with interest rate spreads

We introduce “financial imperfections” – asymmetric net wealth positions, incomplete risk-sharing, and interest rate spreads across member countries – in a prototypical two-country currency union model and study implications for monetary policy transmission mechanism and optimal policy. In addition to, and independent from, the standard transmission mechanism associated with nominal rigidities, financial imperfections introduce a wealth redistribution role for monetary policy. Moreover, the two mechanisms reinforce each other and amplify the effects of monetary policy. On the normative side, financial imperfections, via interactions with nominal rigidities, generate two novel policy trade-offs. First, the central bank needs to pay attention to distributional efficiency in addition to macroeconomic (and price level) stability, which implies that a strict inflation targeting policy of setting union-wide inflation to zero is never optimal. Second, the interactions lead to a trade-off in stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price gap (the deviation of relative prices from their efficient level) across countries, which implies that the central bank allows for less flexibility in relative prices. Finally, we consider how the central bank should respond to a financial shock that causes an increase in the interest rate spread. Under optimal policy, the central bank strongly decreases the deposit rate, which reduces aggregate and distributional inefficiencies by mitigating the drop in output and inflation and the rise in relative consumption and prices. Such a policy response can be well approximated by a spread-adjusted Taylor rule as it helps the real interest rate track the efficient rate of interest.