Collective Bargaining and High‐Involvement Management in Comparative Perspective: Evidence from U.S. and German Call Centers

This article assesses the relationship between national and collective bargaining institutions, management practices, and employee turnover, based on case study and survey evidence from U.S. and German call center workplaces. German call centers were more likely to adopt high‐involvement management practices than those in the United States, even across workplaces with no collective bargaining institutions. Within Germany, union and works council presence was positively associated with high‐involvement practices, while works council presence alone had no effect. In contrast, union presence in U.S. call centers showed either a negative association or no association with these practices. National and collective bargaining institutions and high‐involvement management practices were associated with lower quit rates in both countries, with only partial mediation.     

What Factors Lead Management to Support or Oppose Employee Participation—With and Without Works Councils? Hypotheses and Evidence from Germany

This paper provides the first econometric analysis to distinguish between works councils in establishments where managers have a positive or negative view toward employee involvement in decision making. We similarly distinguish between establishments where no council is present in which management supports or does not support worker participation. We stress the potential role of works councils and participation in motivating employees. Our theoretical analysis and empirical results from German manufacturing establishment data show that the structure of the workforce, principal‐agent problems between owners and managers, collective bargaining, direct employee involvement, human resource management practices, and market strategy and innovativeness all play important roles. Some conflicting conclusions in the works council literature may be due to the failure to distinguish among industrial relations participation regimes characterized by cooperative or uncooperative relationships between works councils and management.     

Institutional Resilience in a Changing World Economy? The Case of the German Bankking and Chemical Industries

This paper examines whether there has been a transformation towards company-specific and unitarist industrial relations in Germany. On the basis of 25 case studies of employment practices in German and foreign-owned banks and chemical firms as well as industry data, the research found that the German system has so far remained relatively stable. Companies in the two industries studied generally still comply with the labour market institutions of multi-employer collective bargaining, workplace representation and initial vocational training. Pressures have been accommodated by changes within the system rather than by a radical change of the system.     

Productivity Coalitions and the Future of European Corporatism

This paper argues that new technology, the recession, and changing condition in the world market have transformed the ogranization of work and the system of industrial relations in many European countries. Many show a tendency toward decentralized collective bargaining at he firm level. the growing strength of workers' representative at the firm level has weakend the highly centralized bargaining systems (corporatism) which have contributed much to the stability of industrial relations. Case studies, one of west German works councils and one of Italian labormanagement committees, support the argument.     

Worker Participation and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany and Britain

The Freeman–Lazear works council/worker involvement model is assessed over two distinct industrial relations regimes. In non-union British establishments our measures of employee involvement are associated with improved economic performance, whereas for unionized plants negative results are detected. The suggestion is that local distributive bargaining can cause the wrong level of worker involvement to be chosen. Also consistent with the model is our finding that mandatory works councils do not impair, and may even improve, the performance of larger German establishments. Yet smaller plants with works councils under-perform, illustrating the problem of tailoring mandates to fit heterogeneous populations.     

The Rise of Experimentalism in German Collective Bargaining

This paper addresses the debate on union strategies by analysing industrial relations change in three of Germany's most internationalized sectors: chemicals, metalworking and construction. It characterizes two logics of change in German industrial relations: a battlefield logic and an experimentalist logic. It demonstrates historical trends towards centralization of wage bargaining in each sector before looking at recent pressures for decentralization and flexibility. In chemi‐cals, the social partners control decentralization. In metalworking increasing flexibility is characterized by a mismatch between the national‐level union and the district‐level employers. Finally, the construction union seeks to replace the centralized bargaining system with a state minimum wage.     

Collective Voice under Decentralized Bargaining: A Comparative Study of Work Reorganization in US and German Call Centres

This article compares the process of and outcomes from work reorganization in US and German call centres, based on four matched case studies in the telecommunications industry. Both German cases adopted high‐involvement employment systems with broad skills and worker discretion, while the US cases relied on a narrow division of labour, tight discipline and individual incentives. These outcomes are explained by differences in institutional supports for collective voice. Works councils in the German companies used their stronger participation rights to limit monitoring and encourage upskilling at a time when US managers were rationalizing similar jobs. Findings demonstrate that industrial relations institutions can have a substantial influence on employment systems in work settings characterized by decentralized bargaining and strong cost pressures.     

The Flip Side of Organized Decentralization: Company‐Level Bargaining in Denmark

The Danish collective bargaining system is often considered a good example of organized decentralization. It has been characterized as a centralized decentralization suggesting a reproduction of sector‐level bargaining relations at company level. A recent survey on company‐level bargaining in the Danish industrial sector confirms this hypothesis with regard to the experiences of local managers and shop stewards. However, part of the survey also questions whether the reproduction will continue in the future. Small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises and their employees tend to miss out on the mutual benefits obtained through company‐level agreements. Furthermore, shop stewards often find it difficult to gain employee support during negotiations, which jeopardizes their bargaining relations with management.     

Family-Friendly Practices and Worker Representation in Germany

The determinants of three employer-provided family-friendly work practices are estimated for German establishments. The presence of a works council stands as a positive determinant of all three practices. When works councils exist in the presence of collective bargaining, their influence tends to reflect the demographics of the workplace. The role of the works council becomes larger when the share of women increases and the share of part-timers decreases. We suggest this is consistent with the voice role of works councils.     

Industrial Relations Systems and US Foreign Direct Investment Abroad

Five readily distinguishable industrial relations systems are identified based on differences in education levels, hourly compensation costs and various government and collective bargaining constraints placed on management's freedom to set the terms and conditions of employment. A model of foreign direct investment (FDI) that incorporates these key industrial relations variables is then specified and tested against US FDI across a sample of nine industries and 33 industrialized and developing countries. The industrial relations system variables significantly influence US FDI abroad. In particular, education is negatively related to FDI across low skill–low wage countries but is positively related to FDI across high skill–high wage countries. Higher hourly compensation costs (apparently capturing higher productivity) are associated with greater FDI. Whereas government restrictions on layoffs, union penetration and centralized negotiation structures are negatively related to US FDI, the ratification of ILO standards and works council policies are positively related to US FDI. Based on these findings, the FDI attractiveness of industrial relations systems are compared and policy implications discussed.     

The Incompatibility of Decentralized Bargaining and Equal Employment Opportunity in Australia

Profound changes have occurred in the industrial relations system in Australia since the mid-1980s as the system of centralized regulation has been replaced by collective bargaining at the level of the enterprise. This has corresponded with the considerable expansion of women's employment, mainly in part-time and temporary jobs. At the same time, recognition of the disadvantaged position of women in the work-force has resulted in the enactment of laws to promote equal employment opportunity. This article examines the ability of these laws to achieve equal employment opportunity policies alongside bargaining decentralization and a growing non-standard women's work-force.     

Instability and Change in Collective Bargaining: An Analysis of the Effects of Changing Institutional Structures

Previous studies on collective bargaining structures and macroeconomic performance have largely ignored the role of stable and instable institutional structures and the effects of institutional change itself. In this article we posit that institutional stability of collective bargaining is of major importance for the moderation of unit labour costs growth. This hypothesis is tested on the basis of data which cover the period 1965–2012 and includes 28 countries. The results show that institutional change impairs the capacity to moderate unit labour cost growth significantly in the subsequent years following the change. This effect also holds for changes in both decentralization and centralization of institutions.     

The Ascendancy of Employment Arbitrators in US Employment Relations: A New Actor in the American System?

In this paper, we survey the underpinnings of the trend towards employment arbitration in the United States, and its implications for the broader industrial relations system. Specifically, we address the question of whether or not employment arbitrators have been substituted for collective bargaining by the government to an extent that warrants their inclusion as an actor in the industrial relations system. We review developments in workplace dispute resolution in the United States, the literature that attempts to explain these developments and posit an assessment of the stability of employment arbitration, and employment arbitrators, as a central feature of the US industrial relations system.     

Dominance Effects from Local Competitors: Setting Institutional Parameters for Employment Relations in Multinational Subsidiaries; a Case from the Spanish Supermarket Sector

Dominance effects are normally associated with multinational corporations (MNCs). However, we argue that a strong local competitor can create ‘dominance effects’ setting the institutional parameters for employment relations in multinational subsidiaries. Moreover such an effect can be persistent. In this case the Spanish‐owned El Corte Inglés (ECI) used its power and influence to establish an employer's federation and two ‘yellow unions’. These yellow unions infiltrated the French‐owned MNC Carrefour and most of the Spanish supermarket sector by the early 1980s and continue to dominate collective bargaining rounds and works council elections, marginalizing the main independent trade unions. This has resulted in poor pay and working conditions and a lack of effective employee representation across most of the Spanish supermarket sector. The fact that Carrefour established an international framework agreement to observe union rights in 2001 has as yet not changed this situation.     

Works Councils and Plant Closings in Germany

This paper is the first study to investigate the impact of workplace representation on plant closings in Germany, using data from a nationally representative establishment panel. Across all establishments in our sample, we find evidence of a positive association between works council presence and plant closings. There is the contrary suggestion that industry‐wide collective bargaining plays a neutral to benign role. As for the interaction between collective bargaining and workplace representation, this appears strongest for establishments with fewer than 50 employees: such plants are much more likely to close if they have a works council and are not covered by a collective agreement.     

Decentralization in the NHS: Prospects for Workplace Unionism

The substantial changes that are taking place in the organization of the UK public sector are transforming traditional patterns of industrial relations based on centralized and institutionalized collective bargaining. Whether the trade unions can successfully respond to this process will be of prime importance for the future development of industrial relations in the public sector. The paper considers recent evidence of the impact of decentralization on union organization in four hospital units. The research findings suggest that there is a growth in union activity as a result of the process of decentralization, but that the effectiveness of unions is likely to vary considerably between hospitals.     

Annual Review Article 1993: British Public Sector Industrial Relations

Abstract : Developments in public-sector industrial relations during 1993 have raised questions about unions, pay determination and conflict resolution. This review explores some of the tensions in these areas created by new restrictions on pay increases, changes in reward structures and further market-testing across services. Where the different forms of pay determination buy industrial peace, the price may be too high in terms of the productivity and efficiency requirements gains now being demanded. But co-operation is needed too, and the dilution of the Whitley system of collective bargaining may be more likely to produce the very co-operation embodied in its philosophy, but not always present in its practice. The new 'superunion' UNISON will play a role here, as single-table bargaining and even single-union deals develop. These institutional developments will also be affected by pay flexibility measures which endeavour to improve individual performance at the front line of services, while in practice increasingly giving the rewards to management.     

Co‐ordinated Bargaining: A Process for Our Times?

This article draws on past as well as present to offer a systematic overview of co-ordinated bargaining, which many commentators see as a likely vehicle for the 'Europeanization' of industrial relations. It argues that co-ordinated bargaining is indeed likely to play a major role within the EU, reflecting not only trade union pressures but also management's use of benchmarking to promote organizational change and competitiveness. The pace with which co-ordinated bargaining develops is likely to vary considerably both within and between sectors, however, leading to multi-speed 'Europeanization' and further decentralization of collective bargaining within national systems.     

Works Councils,Collective Bargaining,and Apprenticeship Training – Evidence From German Firms

In this paper, we investigate the effects of works councils on apprenticeship training in Germany. The German law attributes works councils substantial information and co‐determination rights to training‐related issues. Thus, works councils may also have an impact on the cost‐benefit relation of workplace training. Using detailed firm‐level data containing information on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training, we find that firms with works councils make a significantly higher net investment in training compared to firms without such an institution. We also find that the fraction of former trainees still employed with the same firm 5 years after training is significantly higher in the presence of works councils, thus enabling firms to recoup training investments over a longer time horizon. Furthermore, all works council effects are much more pronounced for firms covered by collective bargaining agreements.     

Macroeconomic Constraints, Social Learning and Pay Bargaining in Europe

This paper argues that European integration has constrained the discretion of industrial relations actors. The result has been not the widely predicted institutional fragmentation of collective bargaining, but a change in the functioning of these systems. At the same time, widespread 'social dumping' on the part of firms and member states has not materialized. The paper argues that the 'race to the bottom' thesis gives insufficient weight to the socialization mechanisms attached to the European integration process. Thus macroeconomic constraints and social learning processes are co-mingling with one another in European industrial relations.