Intra‐industry Trade Liberalization: Why Skilled Workers are More Likely to Support Free Trade

This paper presents a theoretical model and empirical analysis that connects the prevalence of intra‐industry trade with increased wage inequality from trade liberalization in both skilled and unskilled labor abundant countries. The Stolper–Samuelson effect is incorporated into an intra‐industry trade liberalization (intra‐ITL) hypothesis where skilled labor opposes protectionism in all countries engaged in intra‐industry trade because skilled workers gain at the expense of unskilled workers from multilateral trade liberalization within the skill‐intensive sector. We examine empirical evidence on whether skilled individuals are more supportive of trade liberalization than unskilled individuals across 31 countries with different levels of intra‐industry trade and skill endowments. We find that the extent to which countries engage in intra‐industry trade in high‐tech commodities is strongly linked with the intensity of opposition to protection by skilled labor. Regression results strongly support our hypothesis that skilled workers, almost everywhere, are more likely to support free trade.     

Is Stolper–Samuelson dangerous and FPE a failure?

The Heckscher–Ohlin model has spawned the twin theorems of Stolper–Samuelson and factor-price equalization (FPE), both of which concern the effects of international trade on wages and income distribution. A recent literature, critical of both theorems, claims that they no longer serve as a useful guide for understanding the complex web of trade and wages. This literature also claims that the twin theorems are empirically misleading and irrelevant. The present essay argues that the critics have exaggerated the empirical failure of the twin theorems and, more importantly, they have missed the central message of the theorems; especially, that of Stolper–Samuelson on the optimality of free trade.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality,nontraded good and endogenous supply of skilled labour: A theoretical analysis

The paper develops a static four sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labour is endogenously produced by the education sector and is mobile between a traded good sector and a nontraded good sector. Capital is also perfectly mobile among the education sector, skilled labour using traded good sector and the nontraded good sector. However, land and unskilled labour are specific to another traded good sector. We analyse the effects of change in different factor endowments and reduction in tariff rate on skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that the effect of a change in different parameters on wage inequality depends on the factor intensity ranking between two skilled labour using sectors and on the relative strength of the marginal effects on demand for and supply of nontraded final good. We also analyse the effects of changes in different parameters on the supply of skilled labour.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality,product variety,public input and increasing returns: A static general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a four sector small open economy model with two traded final good sectors, a public intermediate good producing sector and a nontraded good sector producing varieties of intermediate goods. There are three primary factors: capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour. Industrial sector producing a traded good uses capital, intermediate goods and skilled labour as inputs. Intermediate goods producing sector also uses capital and skilled labour. Public input producing sector and the agricultural sector producing the other traded good use capital and unskilled labour as inputs. It is shown that, if production technologies are the same for the agricultural sector and the public input producing sector and if the scale elasticity of output is very low, then an increase in capital stock (unskilled labour endowment) raises (lowers) the skilled–unskilled wage ratio. However, an increase in skilled labour endowment does not produce any unambiguous effect. On the other hand, an increase in the tax rate on industrial output and/or an increase in the price of the agricultural product, armed with the same set of assumptions, lowers the skilled–unskilled wage ratio.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality and offshore outsourcing with asymmetric adjustment costs

We present a model that can capture the effects of offshore outsourcing on the wedge between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers when costs of adjustment are asymmetric. We identify conditions under which offshore outsourcing activities widen the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in the presence of asymmetric adjustment costs. We show how a higher cost of adjustment in the import-competing sector can magnify the offshore outsourcing induced gap between the wages of the skilled and unskilled workers. We also demonstrate the sensitivity of the effects of offshore outsourcing, on the skilled–unskilled wage gap, to asymmetries in the costs of adjustment.     

Rural–urban human capital disparity and skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China

This paper builds three‐sector general equilibrium models to investigate how a shrink of rural–urban human capital disparity generates an impact on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China. In the basic model where the urban skilled sector and the urban unskilled sector have no upstream and downstream linkage, we find that the wage inequality will be narrowed down if the urban skilled sector is more capital intensive than the urban unskilled sector. To capture the characteristic of China's state capitalism, we build an extended model where the urban skilled sector acts as an upstream industry for the urban unskilled sector, and find that the wage inequality will be reduced if the substitution elasticity of unskilled labor and intermediate product in the urban unskilled sector is large enough. When we consider the factual characteristics of the Chinese economy, our models predict that a shrink of rural–urban human capital disparity will be helpful to reduce the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China.     

Quantifying the Impact of Trade on Wages: the Role of Nontraded Goods

This paper uses an applied general‐equilbrium model to decompose the effects of changes in trade‐ and technology‐related variables between 1982 and 1996 in the United States on the wages of skilled and unskilled labor. The results indicate that trade‐related variables (tariff cuts, improvement in the terms of trade, and the increase in the trade deficit) had little impact on the widening wage gap. The major factor behind the rise in the skilled wage relative to the unskilled wage was differential rates of growth in skill‐biased technical change across sectors. The paper also highlights the role that nontraded goods play in explaining the wage gap. Finally, the paper presents estimates of how wages would change if the economy moved to autarky. The results show that expanding trade could actually reduce wage inequality, rather than increase it.     

Individual Preferences for Trade Partners in Taiwan

This article investigates economic factors and non‐economic factors of individual attitudes toward free‐trade agreements with different countries. Based on the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, highly skilled workers in Taiwan should be more supportive of free trade with China and less supportive of free trade with the United States than should unskilled workers in Taiwan. Using survey data from Taiwan, we find that highly educated people in Taiwan are more supportive of free trade with both the United States and China, and the effects of education are much stronger with respect to free trade with China. We also find that individual risk attitudes, national identity, and ethnicity play important roles in explaining trade preferences.     

Environmental control,wage inequality and national welfare in a tourism economy

This paper examines the effects of stricter environmental regulation on income distribution and welfare for an open economy with inbound tourism. The pollution input is considered as a mobile factor between sectors, and a decrease in it lowers wages of skilled labor in the traded sector but can increase the wages of unskilled labor in the non-traded sector. A stricter policy on environmental controls can narrow wage inequality and increase welfare if the tourism terms-of-trade effect dominates. These results are confirmed by simulations.     

Urban bias and wage inequality

This paper explores how urban bias affects skilled–unskilled wage inequality through building several general equilibrium models. In the basic model, we find that an increase in the degree of urban bias will widen wage inequality if the unskilled sector is more capital intensive than the skilled sector and reduce wage inequality if the skilled sector is more capital intensive than the unskilled sector. In the extended models, we find that the conclusion obtained in the basic model almost still holds under different conditions.     

Wage spillovers across sectors in Eastern Europe

This paper studies the interactions between wages in the public sector and the private traded and non-traded sector in ten transition countries which are members of the European Union, during the period 2000–2011. The theoretical literature on wage spillovers, as well as the Balassa–Samuelson hypothesis, suggests that the internationally traded sector should be the leader in wage setting, with sheltered and public sector wages adjusting. Using a cointegrated VAR approach we show that a large heterogeneity across countries is present, and non-traded and public sector wages are often leaders in wage determination or at least affect traded sector wages in the short run. This result is relevant from a policy perspective since wage spillovers, leading to costs growing faster than productivity, may affect the international cost competitiveness of the traded sector and thus the catching-up process may be accompanied by accumulation of large international imbalances.     

A Schumpeterian North–South Growth Model of Trade and Wage Inequality*

The paper presents a dynamic general‐equilibrium model of interindustry North–South trade that is used to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the Northern wage distribution. Both countries have a low‐tech sector where consumer goods of constant quality are produced by use of unskilled labor. The North also has a high‐tech sector that employs skilled labor and features a quality‐ladder model structure with endogenous growth. Both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. In a balanced trade equilibrium, it is found that Southern‐originated (Northern‐originated) trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in Northern wage inequality both between skilled and unskilled workers and within the group of skilled workers. The endogenous change in the Southern terms of trade determines the direction of change in unskilled wages in both the North and the South.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,NON‐TRADED GOODS AND REAL WAGES

Using a three‐sector general equilibrium model with non‐traded goods, we investigate the impact of foreign direct investment on the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that foreign direct investment increases the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers alike, but widens the gap between the two under plausible conditions.     

Heterogeneity of imported intermediate inputs and labour: evidence from India’s input tariff liberalization

This article explores whether the nature of imports matters when examining the effects of trade on plant-level labour outcomes. Previous literature that examines this question mainly considers imported intermediate inputs as a homogenous group and is unable to reach a consensus on the effects of input tariff liberalization on employment and wages of skilled and unskilled workers. Exploiting detailed product-level information available on intermediate inputs from plant-level data for the Indian manufacturing sector, I distinguish between plants that import mainly for quality considerations as opposed to plants that seek imports as cheaper alternatives to domestic inputs. I find that strong complementarities exist between skilled workers and imported inputs for plants importing high-quality inputs. For plants importing intermediate inputs mainly as a cost-cutting strategy, input tariff liberalization leads to an increase in employment of both skilled and unskilled workers, but a decline in skill composition. This can best be explained as a strategy that achieves economies of scale. On average, as input tariffs liberalize, importing plants employ more workers and pay higher wages than non-importing plants.     

The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies

This paper studies the relationship between social conflict and skilled–unskilled wage inequality through the three-sector general equilibrium approach. In the basic model without the urban unskilled minimum wage, we find that when the government enhances the degree of controlling social conflict, the skilled–unskilled wage inequality will be narrowed down (resp. widened) if the urban skilled sector is more capital intensive (resp. labor intensive) than the urban unskilled sector. The extended models address the issue under different economic structures or different types of social conflict. In the extended model with the urban unskilled minimum wage, we find that the skilled–unskilled inequality will be widened when the degree of controlling social conflict is increased. In other extended models, we find that the above obtained results are still robust.     

Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy

We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and oligarchy. We model a two‐sector small open economy where foreign investment triggers Stolper–Samuelson effects through reducing exporting costs. The incentives to expropriate depend on the distributional effects associated to the investment. How investment affects the incomes of the different groups in society depends on the sectors where these investments are undertaken and on structural features of the economy such as factor intensity, factor substitutability, and price and output elasticities. We characterize the equilibria of the expropriation game and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively then democratic expropriations are more likely to take place. We test this prediction and provide strong evidence of its validity.     

Beyond Balassa and Samuelson: real convergence,capital flows,and competitiveness in Greece

To better understand the convergence process prior and since the European financial and debt crisis, we scrutinize the role of capital flows for competitiveness in Greece and a set of six other euro area member countries (Portugal, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic). For this purpose the paper extends the seminal Balassa–Samuelson model by international capital markets with a particular focus on their impact on national wage policies. Capital flows are assumed to be able to invert the traditional direction of transmission of real wage increases from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector and to make real wages increase beyond productivity increases. The augmented Balassa–Samuelson model is extended to trace cyclical deviations of real exchange rates from the productivity-driven equilibrium path. Panel estimations for the period from 1995 to 2013 reveal correlations in line with the Balassa–Samuelson effect, if Greece is excluded from the panel. For Greece, this in turn implies indication in favour of a credit-driven real wage increases beyond productivity increases what we call a “pseudo” Balassa–Samuelson effect.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality: A general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a static three sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labour is mobile between a traded good sector and a non-traded good sector and unskilled labour is specific to another traded good sector. The capital is perfectly mobile among all these three sectors. We examine the effects of change in different factor endowments and of globalization on skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that the effect of a change of a factor endowment on wage inequality depends on the factor intensity ranking between two skilled labours using sectors and on the relative strength of the marginal effects on demand for and supply of non-tradable good. We also find that a decrease in the price of the product produced by skilled (unskilled) labour using traded good sector lowers (raises) the skilled–unskilled wage inequality.     

Second‐Best Taxation of Incomes and Non‐Labor Inputs in a Model with Endogenous Wages

This paper considers a Mirrleesian optimal income tax model wherein labor inputs are not perfect substitutes and their wages are determined endogenously. It shows: (i) If skilled and unskilled workers are Edgeworth complements, skilled workers will necessarily face a marginal subsidy and unskilled workers a marginal tax on their incomes (these may not be the case if skilled and unskilled workers are Edgeworth substitutes); and (ii) redistributive concerns call for taxation of those inputs whose elasticity of complementarity with skilled labor is larger than with unskilled labor, and subsidization of those whose elasticity of complementarity is smaller.     

An analysis of the demand for skill in a growing economy

We construct a trade theoretic model of skill formation with skill as a produced intermediate input. Capital is required for production as well as for education which transforms unskilled labor into skilled. We use this model to reflect analytically on India's rising requirement of skilled manpower. We show that even if growth of capital and supply of skilled manpower match, relative stagnation of unskilled manufacturing sector will magnify the gap between growth in demand and supply of skill. This may happen, for example, if there is a vast pool of workforce who may not have even the basic education to qualify as “unskilled” and excessive capital flows into the skilled sector. Thus a country with lack of education at a very basic level will be forced to import skilled manpower from the rest of the world.