Strategic bargaining for the control of a dynamic system in state-space form

The partition of a pie model is integrated into a two-player difference game in state-space form with a finite horizon, in order to derive strategic bargaining outcomes in the framework of difference games. It is assumed that agreements are binding. In contrast to the model for the partition of a pie, the outcomes are not necessarily Pareto-efficient. For one-dimensional, linear-quadratic difference games, the subgame perfect bargaining outcome is unique, Paretoefficient, and analytically tractable. However, for higher dimensions the linear-quadratic structure breaks down and one has to resort to numerical methods.The authors thank Joseph Plasmans, Jacob Engwerda, and Herbert Hamers for valuable suggestions. A large part of this research is financed by the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research, grant 450-228-018.     

Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff. The results pose a challenge to empirical work, since equilibrium trade policy is a function not only of economic fundamentals but also of political variables at the time of congressional negotiations — some of them random realizations of mixed bargaining strategies.     

Persistence and heterogeneity in entrepreneurship: An evolutionary game theoretic analysis

Studies show that countries exhibit a relatively stable level of entrepreneurial activity. To account for this fact, we adopt an evolutionary game theoretic approach. Based upon the analysis of games that capture essential features of the entrepreneurial phenomenon, we ascertain conditions under which evolutionary stable equilibria will be played by a population consisting of agents who engage in entrepreneurship and agents who do not. We show that entrepreneurship may persist even without assuming strategic complementarities or group selection. Lastly, we explain how information about equilibrium payoffs to self- and paid employment could help address the question of whether entrepreneurs differ from other economic agents.     

Cognitive hurdles in the use of decision support systems to enhance problem understanding

Computer-assisted decision support systems have been widely promoted as a means of enhancing problem understanding in crisis and noncrisis decision making. Clinical observation of actual applications of a particular category of software for interactive decisions (CONAN, DECISIONMAKER) have identified cognitive hurdles in the use of such systems. These hurdles not only pose a challenge to the development of such normative interventions in the decision process, but also an opportunity for furthering the shift to a new psychologically informed paradigm for decision making.     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 1: Dramatic resolution vs. Rational solution

Drama theory differs from game theory in that it does not regard actors' preferences and perceived opportunities as fixed, but as capable of being changed by the actors themselves under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus characters in a drama undergo change and development. A manyperson, multiphase theory of dramatic transformation is presented, showing how thecore of a drama (in the sense of game theory) is transformed by the interaction between the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process of dramatic transformation is shown to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality; it is proved that when all these paradoxes have been overcome, a full dramatic resolution has been reached, satisfying actors' emotional and moral demands, as well as the demands of rationality.     

CALLABLE PUTS AS COMPOSITE EXOTIC OPTIONS

Introduced by Kifer (2000) , game options function in the same way as American options with the added feature that the writer may also choose to exercise, at which time they must pay out the intrinsic option value of that moment plus a penalty. In Kyprianou (2004) an explicit formula was obtained for the value function of the perpetual put option of this type. Crucial to the calculations which lead to the aforementioned formula was the perpetual nature of the option. In this paper we address how to characterize the value function of the finite expiry version of this option via mixtures of other exotic options by using mainly martingale arguments.     

集体诉讼制度与智猪博弈

结合博弈论的有关知识和股市的运行机制 ,有必要引进集体诉讼制度 ,让律师和中小投资者形成智猪博弈中的大猪和小猪 ,促使律师在中小投资者的利益受到侵害后能代表中小投资者从法律途径去制约控股股东 ,从而促使股市正常运转     

Environmental coordination in dynamic oligopolistic markets

This article deals with the design of a coordination scheme which leads a set of firms competing on an oligopolistic market to achieve a global environmental constraint, for example, a global upper bound on some pollutant emissions. The concept of normalized equilibrium is used to design a noncooperative equilibrium under the global emission constraint. This equilibrium is based on the computation of a common multiplier for the global constraint, associated with a weighting vector, which indicates the relative importance given to each firm in the achievement of the constraint. This weighted multiplier is used to design an ad nominem tax scheme which induces the oligopolists to achieve the common global constraint. Finally it is shown that this equilibrium can be designed, for the long term, by restricting the analysis to an asymptotic equilibrium steady state, called turnpike equilibrium.Research supported by FNRS-Switzerland, FCAR-Quebec, and NSERC-Canada.     

基于博弈论分析合同在降低市场力方面的作用

统一的出清电价机制对发电商持留发电容量具有激励作用 ,从而增加了发电商滥用市场力的可能。市场力的存在不利于电力市场的持续健康发展 ,而博弈论的分析是一个可以有效提供策略的方法。简述了博弈论的基本概念及发展历史 ,并采用博弈理论分析了合同在有效降低市场力方面的作用     

Branding Decisions for Retailers’ Private Labels

Umbrella branding (UB) strategies for manufacturers’ products have received considerable attention in the literature. Not much is known about this strategy for private labels. Using a game-theoretic approach, we reassess the benefits of introducing a private label in a distinct category, and provide favorable conditions for the retailer to implement umbrella or individual branding for his private labels. We find that (1) UB leads to lower wholesale and retail prices for both national brands; (2) national brands’ manufacturers prefer individual branding over UB for private labels; and (3) the profitability of UB is not always guaranteed for the retailer.     

Credibility of linear equilibrium strategies in a discrete time fishery management game

In this article we consider a two-country dynamic game model of whaling in discrete time. We assume that the countries have exact information, with one-period time delay, about each other's whaling efforts as measured by the number of vessels involved in whaling. It is shown how strategies that linearly depend on the whaling effort of the other country can be used to support a given Pareto-optimal agreement so that there will not be a temptation for unilateral deviation from the agreed decision. The credibility of these cooperative equilibrum strategies is discussed.     

A multiobjective decision support system for multiresource forest management

A multiobjective and/or multiperson decision support system for analyzing multiresource forest management problems is developed in this paper. The procedure includes formulating the problem in a multiobjective and group decision making framework, and solving it using two solution techniques which consist of a distance-based compromise programming (CP) and a cooperative game theoretic approach of the Nash equilibrium type. The problem consists of five forest resources management objective functions to be maximized. Solving the problem using the two solution techniques enables determining a satisfactory compromise solution of the five forest resource management objectives. Sensitivity analysis of the two techniques shows compromise programming to be more sensitive to changes in the weight and the p-parameter of the technique while the cooperative game theoretic approach is relatively robust with respect to changes in the worst utility set.     

基于演化博弈的城市拆迁补偿机制研究

房屋动拆迁是我国城市建设与旧城改造中的重要环节,也是当前社会普遍关注的焦点。房屋动拆迁问题产生的重要原因在于补偿机制的不合理。本文引入演化博弈理论,建立城市拆迁补偿的演化博弈模型,分析不同收益值情况下的演化稳定策略,并针对当前拆迁补偿机制存在的漏洞,提出完善我国城市房屋拆迁补偿机制的政策建议。     

合作广告下制造商与零售商联合利润分配分析

从制造商和零售商合作广告这一背景出发,首先将Nash非合作与Pareto有效合作策略下供应链联合利润进行比较,得出制造商与零售商选择Pareto有效合作策略会比选择非合作策略时获得更多的联合利润;其次,在Pareto有效合作的基础上,运用讨价还价模型对供应链上的联合利润在制造商与零售商之间的分配问题进行了分析;最后,探讨了制造商和零售商各自的贴现率和破裂风险对制造商与零售商讨价还价力的影响。     

集体选择、智猪博弈与农业组织的合作机制研究——一个林业合作社的例子

从本质上来说,农业产业化经营不仅是指农业产业链条的简单延伸和发展,更是农业组织化程度不断提高和完善的一种制度变迁。没有农业合作组织的发展和壮大,就很难解决我国农业产业中的“大市场”与“小生产”的有效对接,农业产业化经营也将难以大踏步向前发展。而农业合作组织的的发展不仅取决于市场机制、环境因子等外部要素影响,更多受到合作组织内部的合作机制的制约。