ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY IN ISRAEL, 1950–1965 1

Macroeconomic productivity in Israel is here conceived as comparison of output with factor inputs during given periods, and as creation of sustained capacity out of given resource increments. However, present social accounting practice prevents full implementation of this second approach. In contrast to nine European countries, only one third of the rapid growth rate of Israel in 1950–1965 is “explained” by the “Residual” because of relatively large infrastructural investments and of growth problems. One of these problems is inflationary pressures which caused productivity increases to restrain the rise of product prices by 30 per cent only below the rise of input prices. The real productivity gain accrued, in Israel and in the U.S.A. (1919–1957), nearly fully to labor because unit returns to capital remained constant whereas those to labor sharply rose. Some refinements of the statistical models are attempted by incorporating the utilization rates of labor and capital (for industry); and by measuring product from the uses, instead of from the income, side, adding the differences to the capital shares. This makes distributive factor shares nearly constant as postulated by Cobb-Douglas. In order to get a basis for appraising efficiency in creating long-term capacity, that part of product increments is measured which represents rises of p.c. final domestic uses and changes in the export surplus. This “net margin” formed in Israel one fifth and in the U.S.A. (1889–1913) much less of incremental product. Though in Israel one quarter, and in the U.S.A. over half (in 1919–1953) of the net margin went into sonsumption, large proportions of it presumably actually created human capacity. A comparison of product growth rates with population growth, and of the breakdown of the resulting p.c. product growth rates into full final uses, for Israel and two groups, of developed and less developed countries in the fifties shows, inter-alia, that in the L.D.C. only small proportions of their presumable capacity creation was financed by net capital inflows, thus imposing upon them domestic saving rates which presumably are too high to be sustainable.     

Downward nominal wage rigidity: Evidence from Canada 1901–1950

This paper tests for the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity in Canadian wage data for 26 occupations in 38 cities from the first half of the 20th century. The sample is of particular interest as it contains periods with average inflation rates that are close to zero as well as two sharp deflations. Results from a variety of different tests indicate that wage change distributions are consistent with the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity. However, for two subsamples containing sharp declines in output and prices, estimates of the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity are much lower. This suggests that downwards adjustments did occur during times of severe depression and deflation.     

INCOME AND CONSUMPTION DISTRIBUTION TRENDS IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1950–70*

Unlike most developing countries, the Philippines has had several (four) reasonably comparable family income and expenditure surveys, covering a reasonable period of time (15 years). This study draws on those surveys and on wage data in an attempt to judge how, if at all, the distribution of income has been changing. The household survey data shows a declining share of both income and consumption for the top income groups; for the bottom quintile the share of recorded income fell while that of recorded consumption rose. When possible biases of the data are allowed for, it is hard to argue that either a narrowing or widening of income differentials occurred over these years. Real wages of a number of important occupations appear to have fallen, however. Only a partial reconciliation of the trends indicated by these wage series and the income trends for various occupational groups implicit in the household survey data was possible, indicating either data problems or the need for more subtle interpretations of the data. Since structural change in the labour force has been rapid (an increasing share being found in the high income occupations as time passed), declining wage rates for certain lower income groups cannot be taken to imply a general worsening of distribution. Our final conclusion is that distribution has probably changed little, and is about as likely to have changed one way as the other.     

The Changing Shape of Global Inequality 1820–2000; Exploring a New Dataset

A new dataset for charting the development of global inequality between 1820 and 2000 is presented, based on a large variety of sources and methods for estimating (gross household) income inequality. On this basis we estimate the evolution of global income inequality over the past two centuries. Two sets of benchmarks about between‐country inequality (the Maddison 1990 benchmark and the recent 2005 ICP round) are taken into account. We find that between 1820 and 1950, increasing per capita income is combined with increasing global inequality. After 1950, global inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient or the Theil index remains more or less constant. It also appears that the global income distribution was uni‐modal in the nineteenth century, became increasingly bi‐modal between 1910 and 1970 with two world wars, a depression and de‐globalization, and was suddenly transformed back into a uni‐modal distribution between 1980 and 2000.     

The National Wealth–Income Ratio in Greece, 1974–2013

Can the rise of wealth–income ratios observed in rich economies be found in the case of Greece as well? This paper uses a generalization of a two‐good wealth accumulation equation to estimate the evolution of the national wealth–income ratio, and finds that, similarly to the European evidence, the ratio rises from about 280 percent in the 1970s to about 500 percent on the eve of the current financial crisis. On average, during 1974–96, the saving‐induced wealth growth cancels out the capital losses, whereas in the subsequent decade, 1997–2007, the balance changes considerably when the saving effect vanishes and the prolonged capital gains result in a rising wealth–income ratio. During the recession, income falls faster than wealth. The results remain robust to several alterations of the benchmark framework.     

The Canadian productivity stagnation, 2002–2014

Total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Canada between 2002 and 2014 has been only 0.16% per year. This figure is substantially smaller than that of the United States, or that of Canada in the past. We perform multiple counterfactual exercises to show that this small TFP growth cannot be accounted for by several compositional effects or mismeasurements of factors of production. We identify two key sectors (mostly Mining and to a lesser extent Manufacturing) that drive all of the TFP growth difference with the United States. Despite the lack of TFP growth, Canada has experienced sustained income growth due to a prolonged period of appreciation of the terms of trade (while US terms of trade have deteriorated), making real income in the two countries grow at similar rates.     

Money, prices, and causality: The Chinese hyperinflation, 1945–1949

This paper empirically examines causality between money and prices during the Chinese hyperinflation, 1945-49. The major issue concerning the interrelationship between money and prices is the endogeneity of money supply and the rate of inflation. Both the Sims test and the Granger test indicate that there was strong feedback causation between money creation and inflation during the Chinese hyperinflation. The mutual feedback between money creation and the rate of inflation is an important cause of the development of hyperinflation.     

Relative prices, income distribution and stabilization plans : The Argentine experience, 1967–1970

The objective of this paper is to analyze the anti-inflationary plan applied in Argentina in 1967, a plan which did not eliminate inflation. With respect to the failure of this plan, two different explanations have been offered: one according to which the problems were essentially political, and another, which maintained the program contained basic technical flaws. From the analysis of this paper it is clear that the truth lies much closer to the second explanation. In the last section of the paper, economic policy recommendations relevant for future anti-inflationary plans, be they implemented in Argentina or in other inflationary economies, are presented.     

The Demand for Wine in Australia, 1955–1977*

The consumption of wine in Australia has risen markedly since the mid-1960s, from an apparent consumption per capita of 5·53 litres in 1965 to 13·04 litres in 1977. A number of factors (both social and economic) have contributed to this rapid growth in consumption which, despite the increases which have occurred, is still low by European standards. This paper presents the results of a study designed to quantify these factors and to establish their relative importance in explaining the demand for wine in Australia since 1955.     

Inequality in Vietnamese Urban–Rural Living Standards, 1993–2006

We investigate urban–rural inequality in Vietnam using data from the Vietnam Living Standard Surveys between 1993 and 2006. We find that mean per capita expenditure of urban households is consistently twice as much as that of rural households and that the urban–rural gap monotonically increases from the poorer to the richer groups of the expenditure distribution. To isolate factors contributing to the urban–rural gap, we apply the Oaxaca–Blinder type decomposition to a newly developed unconditional quantile regression method. Factors contributing significantly to the high urban–rural gap include inter‐group differences in education, household age structure, labor market activity, geographic location and their related returns, with education playing the most important role. Over the period, consistent with the country's massive rural–urban migration, we find that domestic remittance plays a significant role in shortening the urban–rural expenditure gap in the later years, 2002 and 2006.