基于微观环保制度的农村内源性环境风险管理

内源性环境风险的长效管理既是村民环境诉求点又是农村环境风险管理的薄弱点.文章分析了自上而下的环境保护制度在农村环境风险管理中的局限性和微观环保制度的可行性.以S村为例,基于长期存续的公共资源治理制度的设计原则,评价了S村垃圾管理微观制度的供给与实施状况,分析了它在风险源风险性管理和受体脆弱性管理中的有效性,提出了以微观环保制度作为农村内源性环境风险管理长效机制的建议.     

Declining Industries and Persistent Tariff Protection

The paper uses a political economy framework to explain the empirical observation that trade protection is persistent. The assumptions that are shown to generate endogenous tariff persistence in the model are quite plausible: agents are uncertain about future prices, tariffs are affected by political pressure, and producers of the import–competing good own sector–specific human capital that may be lost if they exit the industry. The model also reveals that, under the conditions listed above, industries decline gradually in response to a price shock even when producers do not face increasing costs of adjustment.     

Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring

We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not conducting any inspection at all. However, with stringent upper limits on the fine, the agency mixes between observing ambient pollution and inspecting all firms. The observation of ambient pollution is always followed by sequentially rational firm inspections. Comparisons with Franckx (2002a, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43, 71–92, 2002b, Topics in Economic Analysis Policy 2(1), Article 1) show that commitment power has a very strong impact on the value of prior information.     

Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations

In a game between the governments of two countries, each chooses its own environmental policy. The Nash equilibria of the game are generally not Pareto optimal. On the one hand, each country may want to attract industry, giving it an incentive to choose low environmental taxes or standards. On the other hand, if disutility from pollution is sufficiently high, each country might prefer that a firm locates only in other countries. This effect tends to make the environmental policy under non-cooperation stricter than it would be with cooperation.     

Transport Cost and Tariff Protection of Australian Manufacturing*

This paper provides estimates of transport cost and tariff protection available to import-competing Australian manufacturing industries. It finds that transport costs provide an important component of total protection available to such industries; one which, for many, is more important than the Australian tariff. In view of the effects of protection on industrial structure and performance, it should be explicitly recognized that transport costs are an unavoidable element of the protective structure and are deserving of study in their own right.     

Revenue-Neutral Environmental Tariff Reform, Growth, and Welfare

This paper analyzes the growth and welfare effects of revenue‐neutral tariff reform in a small open endogenous growth model with environmental externalities. As is the case in countries that depend primarily on imported energy, the employment of a foreign intermediate good causes negative environmental externalities in production. This paper shows that substituting a tariff on the foreign intermediate good for a tariff on the foreign consumption good in a revenue‐neutral way raises the growth rate and the welfare, if the environmental externality is sufficiently strong and if the elasticity of substitution between inputs lies within a certain range.     

Capital Tax Competition and Cooperation with Endogenous Capital Formation

Incorporating consumption–savings choices under a general concave utility function and hence an endogenous capital supply into a model of capital tax competition, we re‐investigate Nash equilibrium and compare it with the optimum under cooperative tax policy. In contrast to the case of fixed capital supply, it is shown that if savings sufficiently increase with the interest rate, a Nash equilibrium may be more efficient than a cooperative tax policy. Therefore, the distortionary effects of capital supply are important to issues of tax policy coordination.     

Foreign Investment and Endogenous Protection with Protectionist Quid Pro Quo

The literature on quid pro quo foreign direct investment describes how unwarranted investment may be undertaken because of the endogeneity of trade policy. The quid pro quo is that foreign producers, who are exporters to the host economy, invest in return for a liberal trade policy. We describe converse circumstances. The nexus between foreign investment and endogeneity of trade policy is implicit (not explicit as in quid pro quo investment), and a government with socially correct objectives (perhaps imposed by international-agency conditionality) wishes (i) to privatize a domestic firm by sale to a foreign investor who can provide technology improvement for domestic production and (ii) to pursue a liberal trade policy. The government is electorally constrained by needs of political popularity. The outcome is that efficient private investments may not be undertaken—in contrast with the quid pro quo case where in efficient investments are undertaken. While our model is general, the conditions we describe appear to be in particular present in post-socialist economies. Our model offers a contributing explanation for the slow pace of progress in many such economies, which rely on foreign technological transfer to improve the technology and product quality of post-socialist industry, but fail to receive the requisite foreign investment despite governments' good intentions.     

Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition*

A major constraint on trade liberalization in many countries is the prospective loss of government revenue. Recent results, however, have established a simple and appealing strategy for overcoming this difficulty, whilst still realizing the efficiency gains from liberalization, in small, competitive economies: combining tariff cuts with point‐for‐point increases in destination‐based consumption taxes unambiguously increases both national welfare and total government revenue. This note explores the implications of imperfect competition for this strategy. Examples are easily found in which this strategy unambiguously reduces domestic welfare.     

人本资本形成与内生经济增长

在生产力与生产关系之间关系上分析了技术进步与制度创新的匹配关系。在知识经济时代资本泛化趋势下,以技术要素、制度要素为核心黏合其他要素形成具有多元产权主体的人力资本、治理资本在经济组织内有机整合为人本资本。以制度要素为核心的治理资本边际收益递减假设、技术要素为核心的人力资本边际收益递增假设、制度创新和技术进步匹配假设的基础上导出人本资本形成与其内生经济增长关系,并分析了我国某些国有企业存在的一些弊端。     

内生环境规制、FDI 与中国城市环境质量

关于开放条件下 FDI 环境效应的研究,关系到中国绿色发展的可持续性。文章基于 Copeland-Taylor 模型,将环境规制内生化于模型之中,分解并考察了 FDI 对本地环境质量的异质性影响。理论分析表明：(1)FDI 对本地环境质量的影响可以分解为规模效应、结构效应、技术效应和收入效应;(2)FDI 对环境质量改善的技术效应和收入效应为正,而规模效应和结构效应为负,且理论上存在 FDI 改善环境质量的门槛值。进一步地,文章选取二氧化硫浓度而非以往文献常用的污染物排放量表征城市环境质量,在地级市层面进行实证检验。实证结果表明：(1)现阶段 FDI 通过规模效应、结构效应、技术效应和收入效应总体上改善了中国的环境质量;(2)FDI 对环境的改善效果存在门槛值,即当 FDI 比重超过0.12时, FDI 的增加将导致环境质量的恶化。文章为当前我国如何有效地发挥 FDI 的改善环境作用以及制定更为灵活的引资政策和差异化的环境政策提供了启示。     

Employment and Environmental Protection

One of the most pressing problems in an economy intransition is that of unemployment. Hitherto the`costs' of this unemployment have either focused onthe value of the lost production, or on the costs tothe government of supporting the unemployed. From asocial viewpoint this is inappropriate. In this paper,we discuss the costs of unemployment in terms of theirimpacts on human welfare, particularly the healtheffects. On the positive side, as inefficient industries areshut down and as production responds to marketpressures, wasteful government subsidies are reduced,as is the level of environmental pollution. Clearly,therefore, there is a trade-off between theenvironmental and economic benefits on the one handand the welfare costs of unemployment on the other.In this paper, a simple model is developed to analyzethis trade-off. A single firm has a short-runproduction function in which output is dependent onthe level of employment. The present position ischaracterized by `inefficiency' in that the firm ismaking a loss and overproduction is taking place.Environmental damage is a function of the level ofoutput. The efficient production point is known, asare the efficiency prices.The problem to be solved is to minimize the costs ofmoving to the efficient point. The papercharacterizes the efficient dynamic path and givessome illustrations of such a path for the coal sectorin Russia, for given values of the efficiency losses,the environmental costs of using coal and the costs ofunemployment.     

Endogenous City Formation with Production Externalities: Existence of Equilibrium

I show that equilibria exist in closed city‐system models with production externalities if firms' production possibilities vary continuously with the source of the externality, are constant returns to scale in own inputs, include inaction, and satisfy free disposal; if firms have to employ their own inputs to produce output; if there is a finite number of firm types; and if some standard conditions on preferences and endowments are satisfied. This is the first model to include production externalities in the fully general equilibrium framework required for endogenous city formation. Thus, this result provides formal support for the conjecture that production externalities lead to urban agglomeration.     

On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion

In a model of strategic interaction between firms in lobbying activity, I show that capitalists might prefer tariffs (protection) to production subsidies (promotion). This is due to the congestion problem arising from the government's convex welfare costs of providing subsidies as opposed to both the free-rider problem and the congestion problem acting in opposite directions in the case of tariffs. If an industry association exists, coordination can be achieved when lobbying for tariffs, but not in the case of production subsidies.     

高速公路与环境保护

随着经济建设的发展和交通量的日益增加,我国公路建设以前所未有的速度发展。朱总理在“十五计划纲要”中明确提出交通建设要统筹规划,合理安排,扩大网络,优化结构,完善系统,推进改革,建立健全畅通、安全、便携的现代综合运输体系。加快以“五纵七横”为重点的公路过道主体网建设,全面贯通“三纵两横”。起步建设西部公路的八条新通道,完善路网结构,提高路网通达深度。2000年公路通车里程达到160万公里左右,其中高速公路2．5万公里。     

适度消费与环境保护

本文从经济活动的消费入手,揭示过度消费对环境造成的巨大危害并分析其原因,进而提出适度消费的观点和实行适度消费的两点建议。     

The Safeguard Clause, Asymmetric Information, and Endogenous Protection

When imports surge, governments often must seek simultaneously to satisfy protectionist pressures through increased tariffs, induce adjustment to foreign competition, and minimize consumer costs of protection. The WTO's safeguard clause can be viewed as an attempt to resolve these potentially conflicting goals since it allows governments to offer an implicit contract to protected industries to induce adjustment. In this paper, we show that with asymmetric information about costs, protected industries behave strategically which leads to under-adjustment. The safeguard clause therefore cannot optimally resolve the conflict among domestic political objectives.     

Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems

This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of negotiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce their emissions. We call this behaviour precautionary commitment. Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue.We also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinatedglobal co-operation can result from a strategic actionfrom the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions.